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Journal articles on the topic 'Arab nationalism or pan-arabism'
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Manduchi, Patrizia. "Arab Nationalism(s): Rise and Decline of an Ideology." Oriente Moderno 97, no. 1 (March 30, 2017): 4–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22138617-12340137.
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When speaking about Arab nationalism, at least three phenomena, only partially distinct from one another, must be identified: Arabism, Pan-Arabism and Nationalisms on a local basis.The first is Arabism (ʿurūbah, being Arab) in the sense of belonging to the same world, in a single context from Morocco to Iraq, that emerged in Egypt and Near East in the last decades of thexixcentury. From this cultural awareness of an Arab identity, the Pan-Arabism (qawmiyyah ʿarabiyyah) developed in the interwars period, but especially after the Second World War. Finally, with the acquired national Arab independences, Nationalism emerged on a local basis, and took the name ofwaṭaniyyah.The debate has never closed and all the major questions are still open: if an Arab nation (and therefore an Arab nationalism) has ever existed; if we can talk about a Pan-Arab nationalism once local based nationalisms emerged; which are the ideological principles of Arab Nationalism that are not uncritically assimilated from outside; finally, how and why the nationalistic ideologies have suffered an heavy crisis in front of the impressive rise of contemporary radical Islamism after the Seventies.Finally, if the figure of the global jihadist, not tied to this or that national cause but fighting anywhere you have to fight aǧihādin the way of God, is the antithesis of the militant of nationalistic movements, for his absolute disregard for any cause that can be defined national. The goal is the creation of an Islamic State, no matter how utopian this project is, not based on the concept of nation but on that ofummah. It’s the phase of the “après panarabisme”: the myth of cohesion from the Gulf to the Atlantic no longer enchants Arab people and Arab States, and the era of Nasser and the Ba‘athist dream has finally ended.
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Zureik, Elia, and Tewfik E. Farah. "Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate." Contemporary Sociology 17, no. 1 (January 1988): 49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2069418.
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Bashkin, Orit. "HYBRID NATIONALISMS:WAṬANĪANDQAWMĪVISIONS IN IRAQ UNDER ʿABD AL-KARIM QASIM, 1958–61." International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 2 (April 8, 2011): 293–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743811000079.
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AbstractThis paper analyzes Iraqi national narratives in the years from 1958 to 1961 to consider how innovative definitions of Arab nationalisms were affected by worldwide processes of decolonization. It demonstrates how Pan-Arabism was transformed in Qasimite Iraq because of its hybridization with Iraqi patriotism and, concurrently, how various elements of Arabist discourses were integrated into local and patriotic perceptions of Iraqi nationalism. Examining cultural idioms shared by Iraqi intellectuals belonging to different political groups, especially the communists and the Baʿthists, destabilizes a typology that assumes each ideological camp subscribed to a rigidly defined set of well-known historical narratives. The Pan-Arabists in this period often cultivated the notion that Arab nationalism did not entail an ethnic origin but rather the ability to adopt the Arabic language, as well as Arab history and culture, as a marker of one's national and cultural identity. The attempts to adapt Pan-Arab discourses to the specificities of the Iraqi milieu and to build coalitions with as many of the nation's groups as possible meant that the sectarian, anti-Shiʿi, and anti-Kurdish notions that colored Baʿthist discourses in later years were not as prominent in this period.
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Lawson, Fred H. "Pensée 4: Out with the Old, In with the New." International Journal of Middle East Studies 41, no. 1 (February 2009): 19–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743808090077.
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Historical scholarship on Arab nationalism has experienced a conceptual revolution over the last two decades. It is now widely accepted among historians that local identities and loyalties have been crucial components of nationalist thought and action from the very beginning; it is equally well established that the line between nationalism and various elements of Islam is much harder to draw than one might imagine. In addition, there is solid evidence that nationalism across the Arab world took shape, arguably as an unintended consequence, out of sustained interaction among conflicting elite and popular conceptions of political community. Moreover, it turns out to be important to differentiate Arab nationalism as a cluster of ideological principles from Pan-Arabism as a set of diplomatic practices that constituted a basic component of regional statecraft, initially at the time the Ottoman Empire found itself disintegrating and later on as the newly independent states of the Middle East and North Africa experimented with ways to get along simultaneously with one another and with outside powers.
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Zhukovskyi, I. "THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF ARAB NATIONALISM IN THE WORKS OF SATI' AL-HUSRI." Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. History, no. 143 (2019): 14–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/1728-2640.2019.143.3.
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The article is dedicated to the influence of Sati’ al-Husri philosophical, political and scientific heritage on the formation of Arab Nationalism and Pan-Arabism movements. The author analyzed main Sati’ al-Husri’s works and noted direct citations and references to his ideology. As a synonym of the European word nation Sati’ al-Husri used Arabic term al-ummah. By this concept he understood common language, culture, believes, state, history and common hopes for the future. His theory of Arab nationalism was formed under the influence of European examples, primarily German and Polish national ideas. He was especially interested in the history of nations divided between several states. Thus, Arabs could claim their national identity without united Arab state. According to Sati’ al-Husri, Arab nation was formed even before the emergence of Islam and the main features of Arab national identity are Arabic language and common history. Even more, Sati’ al-Husri argued that religious ties are weaker than cultural ones, therefore Islam should not be a core of the Arab nationalism. Such approach allowed him to include non-Muslim Arabs into the Arab nation. In accordance with the theory of Sati’ al-Husri, Arab identity should be above personal liberty. Anyone should be ready to sacrifice himself for the benefit of national idea: “Patriotism and nationalism are above all”. Rejecting personal freedom, Sati’ al-Husri proposed to impose the Arab identity by force among Arabs with another identity – Syrian or Libyan etc. There should not be any other identity except of Arabian – as states Sati’ al-Husri. During the reign of Faisal I of Iraq Sati’ al-Husri was holding high offices in the ministry of education. His main goal was to educate patriotic and nationalist feelings among students in purpose of making them faithful to the idea of Arab unity. In conclusions the author states that nationalist ideas of Sati’ al-Husri were authoritarian and manipulative. Despite the long existence of separate Arab states, the idea of Arab unity still remains relevant.
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Qutait, Tasnim. "“Qabbani versus Qur’an”: Arabism and the Umma in Robin Yassin-Kassab’s The Road from Damascus." Open Cultural Studies 2, no. 1 (May 1, 2018): 73–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/culture-2018-0008.
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Abstract In The Road from Damascus (2008), Syrian-British writer Robin Yassin-Kassab’s debut novel, the protagonist describes “the opposing camps of [his] childhood,” as narratives of “Qabbani versus Qur’an” (56). While Sami’s father idolises the pan-Arabist poet Nizar Qabbani and supports the Syrian regime despite its repressive policies, Sami’s mother, disillusioned with nationalist ideology, turns instead to faith, offering her son a “different mythology” based on “the adventures of God’s messengers” (53). Tracing Sami’s negotiations of these seemingly opposed inherited narratives, Yassin-Kassab’s novel examines the lingering impact of pan-Arabism and the alternatives offered by Islamic frameworks. While critics have previously approached this novel as part of a growing corpus of British Muslim fiction, in this essay, I focus more closely on the novel’s interrogation of Arab nationalism. As I will show, Yassin-Kassab’s novel unfolds as a series of ideological disillusionments that chart the protagonist’s confrontation with the failure of nationalist politics. Inviting the reader to follow the protagonist’s successive conversions and de-conversion from various forms of nationalism, Yassin-Kassab’s representation of the polarisation between “Qabbani versus Qur’an” poses the question of how one might find alternatives beyond such restrictive dichotomies, dramatizing the inadequacies of political vision in the Arab world today.
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Samarskaia, L. M. "Arab Nationalism in Palestine in the Beginning of the 20th Century." MGIMO Review of International Relations 12, no. 4 (September 9, 2019): 54–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2019-4-67-54-71.
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The article is dedicated to the emergence of the Arab national movement at the beginning of the 20th century. This topic is still relevant in our days since revealing the origins of political and social processes in the Middle East of the 21st century is necessary for their understanding. The main issues which are considered by the author are the following: which factors had crucial influence on the emergence of Arab nationalism (panarabism as well as regionalism), when exactly it was formed and what were the specifics of its emergence in Palestine.The author defines three main periods in the genesis and formation of the Arab national movement at the beginning of the 20th century. The first is the Nahda, the Arab cultural revival of the second half of the 19th century, which became a foundation for the later development of nationalist ideas. However, the author tries to show that the cultural revival itself was not nationalistic. The second key period is the political expression of the Arab national movement in the first decades of the 20th century, with the ottomanist and later pan-Turkist policy of the Ottoman government having the decisive influence. This policy was nationalist in essence. Zionism, as noted in the text, was not such an important issue for the nascent pan-Arab movement before the First World War, although it caused concern among the locals in Palestine. The third key stage, that was decisive in the Arab national development, is the Great Arab Revolt, which, despite the fact that it was not massive and universal, forced the pan-Arab movement enter the international arena for it attracted the attention of the great powers – mainly with the help of McMahon–Hussein correspondence. In result, during the postwar settlement, pan-Arabism became more popular and internationally recognised phenomenon, although eventually it happened to be divided into a multitude of regional movements, in particular – Palestinian nationalism fostered by the Anglo-French division of influence zones in the Middle East.In general, the formation of the Arab national movement was a multidimensional and gradual phenomenon influenced by a variety of factors. At the same time, the emergence of the regional groups had its own specifics; originally belonging to the Pan-Arab movement, although with their own features, after the First World War these groups became largely independent.
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Dawn, C. Ernest. "The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years." International Journal of Middle East Studies 20, no. 1 (February 1988): 67–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800057512.
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Arab nationalism arose as an opposition movement in Ottoman Syria, Palestine, and Iraq around the turn of the century. It remained a minority movement until the Ottoman collapse in 1918, but after the Ottoman defeat it became the overwhelmingly dominant movement in these territories where, except for some Lebanese, all successful politicians were Arab nationalists during the interwar years. Just what Arab nationalism meant to its proponents at the time, however, has been difficult to determine. The period only dimly figures in studies of Arab nationalism. Full studies have been devoted to survivors from the past, Rashid Rida⊃ and Shakib Arsian, to Sati⊂ al-Husri (al-Husari), a relative newcomer whose greatest prominence was to be in the 1940s and 1950s, and to the Muslim Brothers, who arrived on the scene even later, whose influence was to lie in the future, and who, like Rida⊃, were not considered to be primarily Arab nationalists. Otherwise, hardly a scant handful of pre-World War II Arab nationalist writers, and these from the late 1930s, receive even casual mention.
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Watanabe, Shoko. "Making an Arab-Muslim Elite in Paris: The Pan-Maghrib Student Movement of the 1930s." International Journal of Middle East Studies 53, no. 3 (August 2021): 439–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743821000337.
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AbstractThis paper aims to clarify the scope and limitations of the ideals of Pan-Maghrib nationalism as developed by the Association of North African Muslim Students in France (AEMNAF) in the 1930s. The AEMNAF members’ inclination toward sciences and technology and their emphasis on conserving their mother culture made them consider Arabism and Islam their most important identity markers. Moreover, the AEMNAF created a sense of solidarity among Maghribi students in France and extended its social influence by cooperating with French and Mashriqi opinion leaders in Europe. However, the AEMNAF's narrow definition of Muslim-ness and its elitist nature led to the exclusion of Maghribis with French citizenship from the organization. The dualistic view of technology and culture in Maghribi nationalist thought also contributed to prioritizing Francophones over Arabophones, Muslims over non-Muslims, men over women, and students in the sciences over those in humanities.
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Eppel, Michael. "The Elite, theEffendiyya, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921–1958." International Journal of Middle East Studies 30, no. 2 (May 1998): 227–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800065880.
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One of the basic characteristics of the social conditions that marked political life in the Arab states in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s was the complex relationship between the politicians from among the elites of traditional notables of the Fertile Crescent cities and theeffendiyya, or Westernized middle stratum. These elites consisted not only of traditional notable families, but also of families newly risen since the Tanzimat reforms in the 19th-century Ottoman Empire. Since the end of World War I, these elites had stood at the center of the new states established by the Western powers—Great Britain and France—and it was now the politicians from within those elites who headed the struggle of those states for independence. This relationship, as well as the character of the elite of notables and theeffendiyya, constituted an important element in the social conditions characterizing the political and ideological environment in which the Iraqi politicians from the elite of notables had operated, and in which Arab nationalism and Pan-Arab ideology became a highly influential factor.
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Ahmad, Ahmad Yousef. "Introduction to a general reading of the Arab scene." Contemporary Arab Affairs 9, no. 4 (October 1, 2016): 493–510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2016.1201932.
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This paper provides a reading of the current Arab scene with a view to understanding the reasons for its present frustrating and depressing decline. The establishment of the Arab League in 1945 embodied the birth of the modern Arab regional system. The rise of a period of pan-Arab nationalism saw numerous successes for the Arab system and possibilities for achieving Arab unity. However, this was followed by the defeat of the 1967 war, inter-Arab conflicts, the other setbacks for pan-Arabism and increasing foreign penetration, particularly by the United States, Israel, Turkey and Iran. This foreign interference, increasing terrorism and the rise of sectarian and ethnic divisions now threaten the integrity of the Arab system as well as the Arab identity. The Arab system and the Arab League are failing to tackle these threats effectively and the League has made decisions that have had serious repercussions for many critical Arab issues. The Arab Spring represented a hope for a renaissance of the Arab system, but in some cases it has worsened foreign penetration and caused further instability. This paper proposes that it is necessary to examine the features of the Arab scene in order to understand its predicament and reflect on the prospects for this decline to be exacerbated or contained. The conclusion looks at several possible future scenarios for the Arab scene.
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Amaruli, Rabith Jihan, Nazala Noor Maulany, and Singgih Tri Sulistiyono. "Sumpah Pemuda Arab, 1934: Pergulatan Identitas Orang Arab-Hadrami di Indonesia." Jurnal Sejarah Citra Lekha 3, no. 2 (September 1, 2018): 122. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/jscl.v3i2.19748.
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This article discusses the Sumpah Pemuda Arab (Arab Youth Pledge) in 1934 which became the forerunner of the formation of the first Arab-Hadrami nationalist organization, the Arab Association of Indonesia (PAI) which later became the Arab Party of Indonesia (PAI). This article conducted by using the historical method. Sumpah Pemuda Arab 1934 is the answer to the struggle of Arab-Hadrami identity and nationalism to fulfill its right as part of Indonesian citizen (WNI). This historical study is important in view of the fact that the phenomenon of the Arabism movement which is now emerging through the involvement of symbols and the identity of the oneness tends to place Arab-Hadrami as opposed to the direction and commitment of the nation.
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Wyrtzen, Jonathan. "COLONIAL STATE-BUILDING AND THE NEGOTIATION OF ARAB AND BERBER IDENTITY IN PROTECTORATE MOROCCO." International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 2 (April 8, 2011): 227–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743811000043.
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AbstractColonial state-building in Protectorate Morocco, particularly the total “pacification” of territory and infrastructural development carried out between 1907 and 1934, dramatically transformed the social and political context in which collective identity was imagined in Moroccan society. Prior scholarship has highlighted the struggle between colonial administrators and urban Arabophone nationalist elites over Arab and Berber ethnic classifications used by French officials to make Moroccan society legible in the wake of conquest. This study turns to the understudied question of how rural, tribal communities responded to state- and nation-building processes, drawing on a unique collection of Tamazight (Berber) poetry gathered in the Atlas Mountains to illuminate the multiple levels on which their sense of group identity was negotiated. While studies of identity in the interwar Arab world have concentrated on how Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabism, and local nationalisms functioned in the Arab East, this article changes the angle of analysis, beginning instead at the margins of the Arab West to explore interactions between the consolidation of nation-sized political units and multivocal efforts to reframe the religious and ethnic parameters of communal solidarity during the colonial period.
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Neveu, Norig. "Between Uniatism and Arabism." Social Sciences and Missions 32, no. 3-4 (November 12, 2019): 361–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18748945-03203016.
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Abstract In the Emirate of Transjordan, the interwar period was marked by the emergence of the Melkite Church. Following the Eastern rite and represented by Arab priests, this church appeared to be an asset from a missionary perspective as Arab nationalism was spreading in the Middle East. New parishes and schools were opened. A new Melkite archeparchy was created in the Emirate in 1932. The archbishop, Paul Salman, strengthened the foundation of the church and became a key partner of the government. This article tackles the relationship between Arabisation, nationalisation and territorialisation. It aims to highlight the way the Melkite Church embodied the adaptation strategy of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches in Transjordan. The clergy of this national church was established by mobilising regional and international networks. By considering these clerics as go-between experts, this article aims to decrypt a complex process of territorialisation and transnationalisation of the Melkite Church.
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Kuruvilla, Samuel J. "Church–State Relations in Palestine: Empires, Arab Nationalism and the Indigenous Greek Orthodox, 1880–1940." Holy Land Studies 10, no. 1 (May 2011): 55–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/hls.2011.0003.
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The need to negotiate and resolve ethno-nationalistic aspirations on the part of dependent and subject communities of faith-believers is a complex issue. The Ottoman Empire formed a classic case in this context. This article is a historical-political reflection on a small group of Christians within the broader Arab and ‘Greek’ Christian milieu that once formed the backbone of the earlier Byzantine and later Ottoman empires. The native Arab Orthodox of Palestine in the twilight years of the Ottoman Empire found themselves in a struggle between their religious affiliations with Mediterranean Greek Orthodoxy and Western Christendom as opposed to the then ascendant star of nationalist pan-Arabism in the Middle East. The supersession of the Ottoman Empire by the British colonial Mandatory system in Palestine and the loss of imperial Russian support for the Arab Orthodox in the Holy Land naturally meant that they relied more on social and political cooperation with their fellow Palestinian Muslims. This was to counter the dominance extended by the ethnic Greek ecclesiastical hierarchy in the Holy Land over the historically Arab Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem with support from elements within the Greek Republic and the British Mandatory authorities.
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Bashkin, Orit. "The Barbarism from Within—Discourses about Fascism amongst Iraqi and Iraqi-Jewish Communists, 1942-1955." DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 52, no. 3-4 (2012): 400–429. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700607-201200a7.
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This article looks at the changing significations of the word “fascist” within communist discourses in Iraq and in Israel. I do so in order to illustrate how fascism, a concept signifying a political theory conceptualized and practiced in Italy, Germany, and Spain, became a boarder frame of reference to many leftist intellectuals in the Middle East. The articles shows that communist discourses formulated in Iraq during the years 1941-1945 evoked the word “fascist” not only in order to discredit Germany and Italy but also, and more importantly, as a way of critiquing Iraq’s radical pan-Arab nationalists and Iraq’s conservative elites who proclaimed their loyalty to pan-Arabism as well. In other words, the article studies the ways in which Iraqi communist intellectuals, most notably the leader of the Iraqi Communist Party, Fahd, shifted the antifascist global battle to the Iraqi field and used the prodemocratic agenda of the Allies to criticize the absence of social justice and human rights in Iraq, and the Iraqi leadership’s submissive posture toward Britain. As it became clear to Iraqi communists that World War II was nearing its end, and that Iraq would be an important part of the American-British front, criticism of the Iraqi Premier Nūrī al-Saʿīd and his policies grew sharper, and such policies were increasingly identified as “fascist”. Within this context, Fahd equated chauvinist rightwing Iraqi nationalism in its anti-Jewish and anti- Kurdish manifestations with fascism and Nazi racism. I then look at the ways in which Iraqi Jewish communists internalized the party’s localized antifascist agenda. I argue that Iraqi Jewish communists identified rightwing Iraqi nationalism (especially the agenda espoused by a radical pan-Arab Party called al-Istiqlāl) as symptomatic of a fascist ideology. Finally, I demonstrate how Iraqi Jewish communists who migrated to Israel in the years 1950-1951 continued using the word “fascist” in their campaigns against rightwing Jewish nationalism and how this antifascist discourse influenced prominent Palestinian intellectuals
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Mabry, Tristan. "ARAB DI-NATIONALISM." Levantine Review 2, no. 1 (May 31, 2013): 27. http://dx.doi.org/10.6017/lev.v2i1.5081.
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This paper presents a new conception of "Arab nationalism", which conventionally means pan-Arab nationalism and defines an Arab as an "Arabic speaker". Yet the term "Arabic" is elusive, as is the generic "Arabic speaker"...
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Bendebka, Ramzi. "Pitfalls of Nationalism in the Middle East and North Africa Region." Current Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 3, no. 1 (February 24, 2020): 71–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.12944/crjssh.3.1.07.
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Nationalism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is a fundamental issue. As long as this fundamental issue is not well discussed, any reforms in the regional system, including integration and state building, would be insufficient in alleviating the challenges faced by Arab nations as they attempt unity in the region. Any understanding of how and why MENA states make political choices towards stability and unity, necessitates the understanding of how they view themselves in terms of representing identity. The objective of this study is to investigate the transformation and the changing nationalism in the modern MENA region. For instance, Arab society has courted several ideologies from Arabism or Arab nationalism and Arab Islamic nationalism, among others. Ideologies do not exist in a vacuum. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the context in which several ideologies interact with each other and affect nationalism in the MENA region. Although Arab nationalism continues to play an ideological role, what is its relation with Islam? Why Arab Islamic nationalism in the MENA region does not unite states or non-state groups like the cases of Iran and the Kurds? It is therefore useful for this article to illustrate firstly, the relation between Arab nationalism and Arab Islamic nationalism, secondly, the case of Iran nationalism and finally, the Kurds and their strive for a separate nationalism.
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Watenpaugh, Keith D. "“Creating Phantoms”: Zaki al-Arsuzi, the Alexandretta Crisis, and the Formation of Modern Arab Nationalism in Syria." International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 3 (August 1996): 363–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800063509.
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This quotation may be nothing more than a well-turned phrase by its author, Zaki al-Arsuzi. Nonetheless, it illustrates a dilemma that young men like him faced in the troubled years preceding Syrian independence: As French-educated young men, should they take their places as minor functionaries in the colonial machine and accept the promise of a comfortable and privileged life, or should they join the growing political and ideological struggle to found an independent, national statein Syria? Al-Arsuzi, who is venerated by the current regime in Damascus as the ideological father of Baʾthism, went on to answer this question by spending the next eight years in and out ofthe former Ottoman province of Alexandretta, working in support of the Arab-nationalist cause. Both his contemporary writings and later recollections of the period reveal a growing political consciousness and the formulation of a complex Arabism that was at odds with the dominant ideology emanating from the large cities of Syria. This ideology, as embodied by the National Bloc government in Damascus, was personality-based, hamstrung by European colonial interests, and unable to arouse any sustained political sensibility in the broader population; it centered its political legitimacy and parochial brand of nationalism on opposition to the French occupation. Al-Arsuzi and others, recognizing the weakness inherent in this form of nationalism, drew away from its leadership in the course of the 1930s and moved to create other, more radical and militant Pan-Arabist groups.
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Henry, Ian P., Mahfoud Amara, and Mansour Al-Tauqi. "Sport, Arab Nationalism and the Pan-Arab Games." International Review for the Sociology of Sport 38, no. 3 (September 2003): 295–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10126902030383003.
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Ghazal, Amal N. "THE OTHER FRONTIERS OF ARAB NATIONALISM: IBADIS, BERBERS, AND THE ARABIST-SALAFI PRESS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD." International Journal of Middle East Studies 42, no. 1 (January 14, 2010): 122a. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743809990845.
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This article examines an Arabist-Salafi press network in the interwar period that operated between Algeria, Tunisia, Zanzibar, and Cairo and involved members of two sectarian communities, Sunnis and Ibadis. This Arabist-Salafi press network created a public sphere of intellectual engagement in which Salafism and nationalism were interwoven, producing a nationalist discourse transgressing post World War I borders of identity and linking the three layers of nationalism—the territorial, the Pan-Arab, and the Pan-Islamic—together. These layers not only intersected but also legitimized one another. Thus, this article not only expands the geographic horizons of Arab nationalism but also contributes to the scholarship examining the correlation between Islam and national identity in the interwar period.
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Coury, Ralph M. "The demonisation of pan-Arab nationalism." Race & Class 46, no. 4 (April 2005): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306396805052514.
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Wien, Peter. "THE LONG AND INTRICATE FUNERAL OF YASIN AL-HASHIMI: PAN-ARABISM, CIVIL RELIGION, AND POPULAR NATIONALISM IN DAMASCUS, 1937." International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 2 (April 8, 2011): 271–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743811000067.
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AbstractAfter his premature death in exile in Beirut in 1937, the body of former Iraqi prime minister Yasin al-Hashimi became a matter of contention between the Syrian and Iraqi governments, as did his legacy as an avid Pan-Arabist. When the coffin with the deceased stopped in Damascus on its promised transfer to Baghdad, the Syrian National Bloc government used the opportunity to stage a solemn republican funeral to bolster its Arab nationalist credentials. Syrian conflicts with the Iraqi government that had removed al-Hashimi in a military coup in the previous year ultimately made Yasin's return impossible, however, and he was buried in Damascus, next to Saladin's mausoleum at the Umayyad Mosque. Unfortunately for the National Bloc, the funeral coincided with the first clashes over the Alexandretta crisis. The resulting street protests destroyed all public confidence that the bloc had gained during the funeral, underlining the volatile nature of nationalist politics at the time.
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Ghazal, Amal N. "THE OTHER FRONTIERS OF ARAB NATIONALISM: IBADIS, BERBERS, AND THE ARABIST-SALAFI PRESS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD." International Journal of Middle East Studies 42, no. 1 (January 14, 2010): 105–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743809990559.
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The historiography of Arab nationalism has tended to concentrate on the secular press from the Mashriq, especially the Cairo–Beirut axis, at the expense of the religious nationalist press and the non-Mashriqi one. There is often an assumption that reliance on the secular press from the Mashriq alone can provide a clear picture of Arab intellectual life and that a proper analysis of that thought can be confined to a few intellectual centers in the eastern Arab world. Although there has never been an explicit claim that such a focus is the end of the story, there have not been enough attempts to look beyond the Cairo–Beirut axis and beyond its secular press organs in search of a broader story of the depth and breadth of Arab nationalism. This article addresses this imbalance by examining an Arabist-Salafi press network that operated between Algeria, Tunisia, Zanzibar, and Egypt and involved members of two sectarian communities, Sunnis and Ibadis. This Arabist-Salafi press network created a public sphere of intellectual engagement in which Salafism and nationalism were interwoven, producing a nationalist discourse transgressing post World War I borders of identity and linking the three layers of nationalism—the territorial, the Pan-Arab, and the Pan-Islamic—together. These layers not only intersected but also legitimized one another.
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Hamid, Shadi. "Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century." American Journal of Islam and Society 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 101–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i1.1728.
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In Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, aptly subtitled From Triumphto Despair, Adeed Dawisha provides us a most compelling narrative. He tells of a time, not long ago, when Arabs still believed that a glorious futurewas ahead of them. Today, the very thought of a fiery, charismatic Arableader, adored by his people and rising to oppose the West, seems silly andunrealistic. But four decades ago, Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasserwas hailed as nothing less than a modern-day savior, and it seemed – if onlyfor an instant – that the unification of the Arab world was not just probable,but a historical inevitability. Dawisha goes beyond the successes, excesses,and outright failures that defined Arab nationalism at its height. Using awide variety of English and Arabic source material, he weaves a complicatedpicture, analyzing in detail how Arab nationalism was born and how itwould die just as quickly.Central to his argument is that, from the beginning, Arab nationalismfaced an uphill battle in its bid to win over an otherwise indifferent (and illiterate)populace. The author takes particular issue with George Antonious’thesis that leading up to World War I, the region’s elites and masses had beenstirred by “the Arab will to freedom.” It would prove terribly difficult for thenationalists to compete with entrenched pan-Islamic identities. For this reason,the most prominent early advocates of the nationalist ideal wereChristian, such as the Syrians Negib Azoury and Ibrahim al-Yajizi. TheMuslim elites were suspicious, seeing in Arab nationalism, with its secularemphasis, a perfidious plot to divide them ...
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Wien, Peter. "PREFACE: RELOCATING ARAB NATIONALISM." International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 2 (April 8, 2011): 203–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002074381100002x.
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“Relocating Arab Nationalism” locates various representations of nationalism in the Arab world in new and hitherto neglected contexts. The project was first conceived in a conversation among some of the contributing authors about the validity of nationalism as a research topic in a seemingly postnationalist period in the Middle East. This conversation turned into a panel at the 2007 MESA conference in Montreal as an attempt to contribute to a further shift of perspective in the study of Arab nationalism away from the realm of theory and politics toward that of cultural history. The articles in this volume therefore trace the contours of multiple imaginary Pan-Arab spaces between the Atlantic Ocean and the Tigris river, inquiring into the movements of people, terms, and ideas between physical locations and in time. The space is imagined but experienced; the people who moved in it were sometimes excited about its promises and sometimes disappointed about its corruption and containment. Such experiences are the focal points of the articles. They ask whether and in what ways a virtual Pan-Arab community transcending the borders of nation–states ever existed. They also present the multitude of national narratives that were at work—and more often than not in conflict—inside the boundaries of nation–states. The authors do not see Arab nationalism as first and foremost a political agenda of unification and cooperation but rather focus on the roots, establishment, and evolution of imaginative, symbolic, or “lived” ties between people(s) who claimed to belong to an Arab national community, or tried to claim space for dissident minorities through counterhegemonic narratives. Case studies from Algerian, Moroccan, Syro-Palestinian, and Iraqi contexts from the interwar to the postindependence periods investigate the ways these ties of community were established beyond the rhetoric of textbooks and political speeches.
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Rubin, Barry. "Pan-Arab Nationalism: The Ideological Dream as Compelling Force." Journal of Contemporary History 26, no. 3 (July 1991): 535–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200949102600310.
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Baumgarten, Helga. "The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948––2005." Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no. 4 (January 1, 2005): 25–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2005.34.4.25.
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This article takes a comparative look at the three main manifestations of Palestinian nationalism since 1948: the Movement of Arab Nationalists, embodying its pan-Arab phase; Fatah, its specifically Palestinian form; and Hamas, its religious (Islamic) variant. Tracing the origins of the three movements reveals that each arose as a consequence of its immediate predecessor's perceived failure to achieve Palestinian goals. The differing ideologies and strategies of each group are explored, and the points of similarity and contrast highlighted. The place of armed struggle in each is given particular emphasis. Despite the considerable differences between the three movements, arising at approximately twenty-year intervals, each has followed a similar trajectory, beginning with maximalist goals and progressively scaling them back, explicitly or implicitly, under the impact of Israel's overwhelming power.
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Khater, Akram, and Jeffrey Culang. "EDITORIAL FOREWORD." International Journal of Middle East Studies 48, no. 1 (January 14, 2016): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743815001439.
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This issue is focused on the politics of belonging/exclusion at the level of rhetoric and everyday practice. We open with two articles—Jonathan Shannon's “There and Back Again: Rhetorics of al-Andalus in Modern Syrian” and Ellen McLarney's “Freedom, Justice, and the Power of Adab”—both exploring linkages between culture and political ideas. In his article, Shannon analyzes the interweaving of a mythologized al-Andalus (the Arab-Muslim Iberian Peninsula) into Syrian popular culture, particularly music, in order to show how it was critical to the formation of Syrian memory cultures and, by extension, nation building. Yet within past- and future-oriented nationalist discourse, this rhetoric of nostalgia—whose genesis dates to the Pan-Arab halcyon days of the 1960s—posits “not only a lost paradise of past glory, but also a (utopian) vision of a future state of glory in the Arab world itself, a sort of neo-Andalusia.” Financed by petrodollars and fostered by Arab migration to and investment in Spain, literary, cinematic, and musical productions evoking al-Andalus and linking it intimately to Syria continued in the subsequent era of what one of Shannon's interlocutors describes as “political, economic, and cultural decline,” in part as a source of solace. With today's Syria tragically fractured, Shannon concludes by suggesting that “the rhetoric of al-Andalus, so closely tied not only to Arabism but also to a broad understanding of community, may yet again offer a way to reimagine the Syria of tomorrow as a ‘first rate place.’”
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Mahmudah, Sangidu, and Fadlil Munawwar Manshur. "THE RETENTION OF ARABIC LANGUAGE AS A NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TWO OF GADAH AS-SAMMAN’S NOVELS: POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE." Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 8, no. 3 (June 17, 2020): 955–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8399.
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Purpose: This article aims to analyze the retention of the Arabic language as a national identity by Lebanon nationalists who live as exiles outside European countries in two of her novels, Lailatul-Milyār and Sahrah Tanakkuriyyah Lil-Mautā. As a product of fiction from a colonized country, both stories represent postcolonial discourses, showing the effect of colonialism, while also voicing resistance to colonialism.
Methodology: The research materials or material objects in this article are two of as-Sammān’s novels. Data sources were grouped in primary data, which is the two of Sammān’s novels, and secondary data, which is various references that support analysis, including books, journals, blogs, and other relevant sources in academic studies. Deconstruction is a textual strategy, which is utilized for analyzing the data in this study. No software tool is used.
Main Findings: The Lebanese nationalists in Europe tried to maintain the use of the Arabic language as the first and foremost national identity for several reasons, including defending (1) the Arabness, (2) the membership in the national community, and (3) the nation and nationality.
Implications/ Applications: This study highlights that resistance to colonialism can be done in various ways, both through violence and non-violence. In modern times, non-violent methods are frequently used. Among the non-violent ways is to fight for the retention of the Arabic language as a national identity so that to maintain it means to maintain Arabism, the membership of the nation’s community, and defend the nation and nationality of the Arabs.
Novelty/Originality of this study: These findings highlight the struggle of the Lebanese nationalists in Europe; the younger generation who are trying to inherit Arabic must also struggle to learn it, both formal and informal, even against the mainstream. The results of persistence and perseverance in learning Arabic cannot be seen immediately, but a long time after that. The ability to speak Arabic, then, can foster a spirit of nationalism in the young Arab generation.
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Akarli, Engin Deniz. "Arab Nationalism and the Ottomans: Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 . Hasan Kayali." Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 4 (July 1998): 107–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.1998.27.4.00p0010n.
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Bokhari, Kamran Asghar. "Challenges to Democracy in the Middle East." American Journal of Islam and Society 19, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 124–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v19i1.1958.
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Many scholars have attempted to tackle the question of why democracy has seemingly failed to take root in the Islamic milieu, in general, and the pre dominantlyArab Middle East, in particular, while the rest of the world has witnessed the fall of"pax-authoritaria" especially in the wake of the demercratic revolution triggered by the failure of communism. Some view this resistance to the Third Wave, as being rooted in the Islamic cultural dynamics of the region, whereas others will ascribe it to the level of political development (or the lack thereof). An anthology of essays, Challenges to Democracy in the Middle East furnishes the reader with five historical casestudies that seek to explain the arrested socio politico-economic development of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, and the resulting undemercratic political culture that domjnates the overall political landscape of the Middle East.
The first composition in this omnibus is "The Crisis of Democracy in Twentieth Century Syria and Lebanon," authored by Bill Harris, senior lecturer of political studies at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand. Haris compares and contrasts the political development of Syria and Lebanon during the French mandate period and under the various regimes since then. He examines how the two competing forms of nationalism, i.e., Lebanonism and Arabism, along with sectarianism, are the main factors that have contributed to the consolidation of one-party rule in Syria, and the I 6-year internecine conflict in Lebanon. After a brief overview of the early history of both countries, the author spends a great deal oftime discussing the relatively more recent political developments: Syria from 1970 onwards, and Lebanon from I 975 to the I 990s. Harris expresses deep pessimism regarding the future of democratic politics in both countries, which in his opinion is largely due to the deep sectarian cleavages in both states.
The next treatise is "Re-inventing Nationalism in Bthi Iraq 1968- 1994: SupraTerritorial Identities and What Lies Below," by Amatzia Baram, professor of Middle East History at the University of Haifa. Baram surveys the Ba·th's second stint in power (1968-present) in lraq. Baram's opinion is that a shift has occurred in Bthist ideology from an integrative Pan-Arab program to an Iraqi-centered Arab nationalism. She attributes this to Saddam's romance with the past, on the one hand, which is the reason for the incorporation of themes from both the ancient Mesopotamian civilization and the medieval Abbasid caliphal era, and, on the other hand, to Islam and tribalism, that inform the pragmatic concerns of the Ba'thist ideological configuration ...
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Akman, Ayhan. "Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey." Nationalities Papers 32, no. 1 (March 2004): 23–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0090599042000186214.
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A few years ago, the New York Times featured an article on the ancient city of Antioch and its modern-day inhabitants. Having lost its ancient grandeur a long time ago, Antioch (Antakya) is described as today a place that “even most Turks consider … [to be] remote and undistinguished.” The article features interviews with two members of the same family: the 110-year-old Ali Baklaci and his 20-year-old grandson Hasan Negruz. An old-timer who lived through the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, subsequent French mandate and eventual incorporation into Turkey in 1939, Ali Baklaci is unequivocal regarding his identity. In a matter-of-fact manner, he declares, “We cannot forget our origins. We are Arab people.” The grandson, Hasan Negruz, however, has a different view. While Negruz is “one of many local youths who have taken advantage of Syria's offer of free education,” the article informs us, “the experience did not turn him into a pan-Arabist.” Instead, Negruz formulates his identity in a way that is remarkably different from his grandfather's: “I am an Arab who is also a citizen of Turkey, and that's fine. I like being Turkish because this country is more modern than the Arab countries.”
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Al Sharoufi, Hussain. "Ideological manipulation in mobilising Arabic political editorials." Pragmatics and Society 2, no. 1 (May 23, 2011): 87–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ps.2.1.05als.
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This study presents the particular discursive strategies used by some Arabic newspapers to serve the Islamist fundamentalists’ goals and strengthen their hegemonic ideology in the Middle East. It also describes the move to create and sustain a new wave of Occidentalism, the doctrine of negatively representing the West, a counterpart to Edward Said’s Orientalism, the doctrine of negatively representing the East. Occidentalism is a retaliatory ideological strategy that rebuffs hegemonic Western ideas; it is used by some chauvinistic Arabs trying to create a distorted image of the West in the minds of Middle Easterners. In this paper, I will investigate the negative side of the concept of Occidentalism, as exploited by today’s fanatics in their justification for attacking the West. Some Arabic newspapers contribute to fanaticism through antagonistic rhetoric that glorifies Pan-Arab brotherhood, chauvinistic Arab nationalism, and martyrdom. By glorifying these demagogic mottoes, such newspapers create an ideological polarisation against the West, in that they try to win their readers’ sympathy, control their emotions, and deepen their nostalgic feelings for the great Arab past.
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Glassman, Jonathon. "CREOLE NATIONALISTS AND THE SEARCH FOR NATIVIST AUTHENTICITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY ZANZIBAR: THE LIMITS OF COSMOPOLITANISM." Journal of African History 55, no. 2 (May 29, 2014): 229–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021853714000024.
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AbstractThe founders of the Zanzibar National Party can be understood as creole nationalists, who imagined their political authority as stemming from membership in a transnational Arab elite. But in the mid-twentieth century, prompted by the rising hegemony of territorial nationalism and by subaltern challenges informed by pan-Africanism, they crafted a new historical narrative that depicted their movement as having originated with indigenous villagers. Party leaders then related this narrative to Western scholars, whose publications helped reproduce the myth throughout the rest of the century. This article traces the genesis of this masquerade and asks what it implies about the nature of the creole metaphor and its supposed link to discourses of cosmopolitan hybridity. The conventional contrast betweencréolitéand nativist essentialism is shown to be illusory.
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Reid, Donald. "The Making of an Egyptian Arab Nationalist." American Journal of Islam and Society 18, no. 4 (October 1, 2001): 179–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v18i4.1995.
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Thirty years in the making, this ambitious book covers the first forty-threeyears of the life of Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, the political activist andwriter who became the first secretary-general of the Arab League (1945-1952). Few biographies of public figures in the Arab world have treatedtheir subjects in comparable depth and detail. The Making of an EgyptianArab Nationalist is essential reading for anyone seriously interested in thecomplexities of evolving national and religious identities in 20th-century Egypt.Coury sets out to refute interpretations elaborated by such scholars asElie Kedourie, P. J. Vatikiotis, Nadav Safran, and Richard Mitchell thirtyor forty years ago. He argues that their works, reflecting the influence ofOrientalism, perpetuated false assumptions that Islam and Arab cultureharbored essentialist and atomistic tendencies toward extremism,irrationality, and violence. He maintains that in treating 20th-centuryEgypt, they set up a false dichotomy between a rational, western-inspiredterritorial patriotism and irrational, artificial pan- Arab and Islamicmovements. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's circle before World War I and theWafd Party in the interwar period represented the first school who opposedBritish imperialism but were eager to borrow western rationalism, science,secular liberalism, and democracy. In the 1930s this moderate patriotismbegan to give way before pan-Arab and Islamic movements tainted with theextremism, terrorism, and irrationality which the West has long attributedto Islam.Coury cites hopefully revisionist works by Rashid Khalidi, PhilipKhoury, Ernest Dawn, and Hassan Kayali but is dismayed that other recentstudies have perpetuated the old, hostile stereotypes. "Martin Kramer'sArab Awakening and Islamic Revival (1996)," he says, "reveals that eventhe old-fashioned Kedourie-style hysteria, compounded, as it sometimes is,by Zionist rage (Kramer refers to Edward Said as Columbia's 'part-timeprofessor of Palestine') is still alive and well . . . "Coury insists that Azzam's "Egyptian Arab nationalism" sprang from theperspectives, needs, and interests of an upper and middle bourgeoisiefacing specific challenges. The rank and file following came from a lower ...
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Tomar, Cengiz. "Between Myth and Reality: Approaches to Ibn Khaldun in the Arab World." Asian Journal of Social Science 36, no. 3-4 (2008): 590–611. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853108x331556.
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AbstractIbn Khaldun is one of most discussed social philosophers in the modern Arab World. The most important reasons for this are that he lived in a time of crisis that resembles the one that Muslims find themselves in at the present time, that his thoughts have found approval from Western scientists, and that they possess modern characteristics. It is for these reasons that the thought of Ibn Khaldun, from the 19th century onwards, have given rise to a wide variety of interpretations, including pan-Islamism, nationalism, socialism and other ideologies that have found interest in the Arab world. In this article, after examining the heritage of thought bequeathed by Ibn Khaldun to Arab culture, starting from the time in which he lived, we will try to evaluate interpretations of the Muqaddimah in the modern Arab world.
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Matthews, Weldon C. "PAN-ISLAM OR ARAB NATIONALISM? THE MEANING OF THE 1931 JERUSALEM ISLAMIC CONGRESS RECONSIDERED." International Journal of Middle East Studies 35, no. 1 (February 2003): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743803000011.
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Gershoni, Israel, Sara Pursley, and Beth Baron. "EDITORIAL FOREWORD." International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 2 (April 8, 2011): 197–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743811000018.
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As this IJMES special issue on “Relocating Arab Nationalism” is going to press, democracy movements in the Arab world have toppled the old regimes in Tunisia and Egypt; uprisings in Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya are shaking the foundations of their respective governments; and protests in Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, Morocco, and Oman have sent rulers scrambling to respond with some combination of reform and repression that they hope will ensure their survival. The events have had reverberations in Iran, sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere; but they have clearly, at least so far, reverberated most strongly from one Arab country to another. This is reflected, among many other ways, in the protesters' self-conscious borrowing and repetition of chants and slogans, such as tūnis huwwa al-ḥall (Tunisia is the solution) and the ubiquitous al-shaʿb yurīd isqāt al-niẓām (the people want the fall of the regime). In showing how Arabist symbols, discourses, and identifications can be mobilized for purposes that are not only cultural but also deeply political, even when they do not involve any project to create a Pan-Arab nation-state, the protests sweeping the Arab world have made the recurring themes of this special issue more timely than we had imagined.
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Saber, Dima. "From pan-Arab nationalism to political Islam: A Ricoeurian reading of Al Jazeera’s coverage of the ‘6th Arab-Israeli war’ in Lebanon." Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research 9, no. 1 (April 1, 2016): 81–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/jammr.9.1.81_1.
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KATZ, KIMBERLY. "Hebron between Jordan and Egypt: an uncertain transition resulting from the 1948 Palestine War." Urban History 46, no. 1 (April 2, 2018): 132–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963926818000032.
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ABSTRACTThe story of Hebron during the 1948 Palestine War remains largely untold, obscured by the larger historical forces of the Palestinian Nakba (Catastrophe) and refugee crisis that resulted from Israel's declaration of independence. This article examines the history and historiography of Hebron from mid-May 1948 until the departure of Egyptian troops from the country on 30 April 1949, a period referred to as the ‘Dual Era’, an unusual configuration between Jordan and Egypt in which both countries temporarily ruled over the city. It analyses the Dual Era against an emerging Egyptian and Jordanian proto-pan-Arab nationalism as each country's locally based leaders vied for support for their rule from the Palestinian population in Hebron.
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Efrati, Noga. "THE EFFENDIYYA: WHERE HAVE ALL THE WOMEN GONE?" International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 2 (April 8, 2011): 375–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743811000122.
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In his “Note about the Term Effendiyya in the History of the Middle East” (International Journal of Middle East Studies 41 [2009]: 535–39), Michael Eppel clarifies his own use of effendiyya in an article he wrote for IJMES in 1998. In the 1998 article, Eppel emphasized the value of studying the effendiyya, or what he called the “Westernized middle stratum,” and its dominance in political life to better understand Hashimite Iraq (1921–58). Members of this group, he argued, benefited from modern education and donned Western dress. They were young state employees (officials, teachers, health workers, engineers, and, later, military officers) who adopted Arab nationalism and Pan-Arab ideology as a means to cope with their socioeconomic and political discontent. From the 1930s, Eppel noted, the effendiyya created the radical political atmosphere that lent backing to the “militant-authoritarian trends” that led to the pro-German Rashid ʿAli coup and the war with Britain in 1941. After World War II, they joined with other nationalist forces to lead the 1948 Wathba (uprising) against prolonging the Anglo–Iraqi treaty. In 1958, the army officers among them overthrew the monarchy. This “middle stratum” differed from the Western concept of the “new middle class,” and the indigenous Arabic term effendiyya, as employed by Eppel, endeavored to grasp the essence of this difference. It reflected a common experience that was the result of its members’ similar education, culture, and concerns rather than their economic status, social origins, and type of employment.
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Morone, Antonio M. "Idrīs’ Libya and the Role of Islam: International Confrontation and Social Transformation." Oriente Moderno 97, no. 1 (March 30, 2017): 111–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22138617-12340141.
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The formation of the Libyan state had an atypical chronology and history. It was not until the 1940s that the construction of the state and the formation of the Libyan nation took place, during the death throes of Italian colonial rule. The arrival of Idrīs on the throne was a compromise: although on the one hand it was the return to a pre-colonial and pre-modern political leadership, on the other this leadership lay within a modern institutional framework, derived from European constitutionalism. In the process of renewal of the tradition linked to the figure of Idrīs, the leader of the al-Sanūsiyyah, the Islam has been inestimably important. At the point of independence, the task was to transform Libya from an artifice of colonialism into a shared political and cultural reality; it was Islam, much more than Arabism, that was identified as the lowest common denominator. The twenty years of rule by Idrīs, from his appointment as Amīr of an autonomous Cyrenaica on 1 July 1949 to the revolution of 1 September 1969, can be summarized as a continual attempt at the opening-up and controlled reform of a strongly conservative political system, which, in view of a rapidly changing society, sought to move from a fragmented political perspective to a truly national one, without any conclusive success. Internal instability became increasingly related to external interference, not just by former colonial countries or the superpowers but also by other Arab countries such as Egypt, who were the purveyors of a project of militant nationalism: Libya became a zone of political and ideological conflict between the West and the Third World.
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Al-Haq, Fawwaz Al-Abed, and Sarah A. Al-Essa. "Arabicization of Business Terms from Terminology Planning Perspective." International Journal of English Linguistics 6, no. 1 (January 31, 2016): 150. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijel.v6n1p150.
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<p>The main purpose of this study was to measure the extent of acceptability of Arabicized business terms. The present study investigated the attitudes of business students toward the Arabicization of business terms. Besides, it drew attention to the criteria of acceptability to be taken into consideration in the Arabicization process to produce acceptable business terms. Finally, it brought into focus the role of gender, university affiliation, and specialization in the Arabicization process of business terms. A total of two hundred questionnaires were distributed to business students at the University of Jordan and Yarmouk University. It has been found that Arabicized business terms were moderately accepted by the users. Overall, users’ attitude toward Arabicized business terms was somewhat positive. Gender and university affiliation variables had influence on these criteria. Like the specialization variable, they caused different attitudes toward these terms. Enthusiasm toward the idea of Arabicization because of pan-Arab identity was strong. This study could be useful for Arabicization decision makers to get acceptable Arabicized business terms. It is the first step towards enhancing understanding of gender role in the Arabicization process. This study also has implications for further research into the importance of Arab nationalism in promoting Arabicized terms.<strong> </strong><strong></strong></p>
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Saad, Radwa. "Reconciling Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism: The North African Leadership Dilemma." Leadership and Developing Societies 3, no. 1 (December 9, 2019): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.47697/lds.3436100.
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The purpose of this research to examine the challenges Arab leaders face in simultaneously adhering to Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism and extract conditions in which the two ideologies can be reconciled to produce mutual benefits. This study poses the question: what strategies do North-African leaders deploy to balance their Pan-Arab and Pan-African commitments and what repercussions do these strategies have on the state of Arab-African relations? By drawing on two scenarios where Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism conflicted, namely the 1967-1979 Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 2011 Libyan civil war, it will highlight the role leadership can play in mediating such tensions. The study finds that it is only through the decrease of hegemonic pursuits and the increase in effective leadership processes both domestically and regionally that the two ideologies can coexist.
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Sawani, Youssef Mohamed. "The ‘end of pan-Arabism’ revisited: reflections on the Arab Spring." Contemporary Arab Affairs 5, no. 3 (July 1, 2012): 382–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2012.696785.
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This article draws on implications of the Arab Spring so as to elucidate the dynamics that characterize its revolutions. The analysis builds upon the results of major public opinion surveys conducted in the Arab world, both immediately before and after the Arab Spring, in order to facilitate the identification of developments that shape the relationship between Arabism and Islamism in the context of mass media, the demographic ‘youth bulge’ and Arab ongoing intellectual debates. The argument advanced here is that the Arab Spring consolidates the view that Arabism and Islamism have maintained their position and hold on public opinion and prevailing attitudes as the primary and inseparable trends of Arab thought. The interaction and shifting relative weights of both trends provide the context for the identity, conceptual outlook and reciprocal framework of contemporary Arabs; and the Arab Spring seems only to confirm the two trends as constituting the essential point of reference and departure for Arabs. Within this context and scope of analysis this article traces the emergence of a ‘historical mass’ for change that, coupled with an indelibly engrained link between the two trends is opening up a new conceptual sphere and public space for the emergence of a new Arabism. Such development is also supported by the role of mass media and the thoughtful intellectual contributions that have been advancing a new Arab paradigm which further refutes the ‘End of Arabism’ thesis.
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Mellon, James G. "Pan‐Arabism, pan‐Islamism and inter‐state relations in the Arab World." Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 8, no. 4 (December 2002): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537110208428675.
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Abdullah, Nafilah. "A.R BASWEDAN DAN PAI: POTRET NASIONALISME WARGA KETURUNAN PERSPEKTIF SOSIOPOLITIK HISTORIS." Jurnal Sosiologi Agama 11, no. 1 (January 21, 2018): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/jsa.2017.1101-08.
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In this article, the authors review about A.R. Baswedan and his movement through the Arab Party of Indonesia (PAI). A.R Baswedan is an Arab descendant known as the pioneer of independence of the Republic of Indonesia. The author through historical socio-political studies found that A.R Baswedan is an example of Arabic descent who counter Arabism and views between the Arab descendants and the descendants of indigenous Indonesians are the same or equal and the same fate. They both have one nationality, Indonesia. This fusion attitude in the Indonesian citizenship and nationality equation is evident in its movement within the PAI.Keywords: A.R. Baswedan, Biography, and Thought (PAI)
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Abdullah, Nafilah. "A.R BASWEDAN DAN PAI: POTRET NASIONALISME WARGA KETURUNAN PERSPEKTIF SOSIOPOLITIK HISTORIS." Jurnal Sosiologi Agama 11, no. 1 (January 21, 2018): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/jsa.2017.111-08.
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In this article, the authors review about A.R. Baswedan and his movement through the Arab Party of Indonesia (PAI). A.R Baswedan is an Arab descendant known as the pioneer of independence of the Republic of Indonesia. The author through historical socio-political studies found that A.R Baswedan is an example of Arabic descent who counter Arabism and views between the Arab descendants and the descendants of indigenous Indonesians are the same or equal and the same fate. They both have one nationality, Indonesia. This fusion attitude in the Indonesian citizenship and nationality equation is evident in its movement within the PAI.Keywords: A.R. Baswedan, Biography, and Thought (PAI)
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Green, Jerrold D. "Are Arab Politics Still Arab?" World Politics 38, no. 4 (July 1986): 611–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010169.
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For many scholars and observers of the Middle East, the uniqueness of the Arabs has proved to be far more interesting than those areas of Arab political life that exhibit similarities with politics elsewhere. Some of the studies reviewed here provide a partial corrective to this gap. They suggest that Arab politics, much like politics in other settings, is concerned with issues of socioeconomic change and conflict, problems of legitimacy, the role of competing ideologies, and elite factionalism. Those of the studies that highlight the weaknesses of pan-Arabism are more persuasive than those that emphasize its vitality. What is needed now is the ability to determine where we can usefully generalize about Arab politics and where politics in the Arab world are in fact unique. The social-scientific approach is deemed more likely to accomplish this analytical goal than the traditional area-studies and policy approaches.