Academic literature on the topic 'Arafat, Yasser'

The 2000–2005 al Aqsa Intifada spawned a horrific wave of violence in and near Jerusalem. Numerous individuals and entities were sued in U.S. courts, by both foreign and American victims, relying on a variety of liability theories and statutes. The seminal Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) case was filed in 2007 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York as Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization. It also named the Palestinian Authority (PA) and individuals including Yasser Arafat.

Two interviews by Christiane Amanpour televized September 8, 2000 on CNN, one with Ehud Barak and one with Yasser Arafat were analyzed for indicators of personal perspective. Generally, use of the same indicators as in Suleiman, O’Connell, & Kowal (2002) was confirmed: Number of syllables spoken; use of first-person singular and plural pronominals and second-person pronominals; hesitations; smooth and interruptive turn transitions; and questions posed by interviewees. The interview with Arafat was extraordinarily agonistic, as manifested in his excessive use of first-person singular and second-person pronominals, hesitations, questions, and interruptions. For her part, Amanpour incited the shift to agonism with her provocative questioning. She then moved toward a more personal perspective by speaking proportionally more and by using more first-person singular pronominals and hesitations, all the while still maintaining her professional style of smooth turn transition. The dialogical character of personal perspective is discussed.

Dos pogroms ao movimento sionista; dos kibutzim israelenses aos refugiados palestinos; das guerras às tentativas de aproximação – os acordos de Oslo, forjados no contexto do pós-Guerra Fria, representam divisores de águas. O mundo observava estático o aperto de mãos de Yitzhak Rabin e Yasser Arafat testemunhado por Bill Clinton em 1993. Oslo entrava em vigor com o caráter de acordo formal, mas representava mais do que isso. Pela primeira vez, após quarenta e cinco anos de alarmante violência e conflitos incessantes, a saudação representava a esperança do comprometimento para a consolidação da paz entre os dois povos, emergindo como um marco histórico.

This article critically analyses the contribution of foreign aid policy to the spread of political corruption in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. The argument is that the extent of the politicisation of aid and the disparagement of normative behaviour create opportunities to exploit resources and to strengthen political and personal gains of the political elite in the receiving country. Thus when examining the relationship between the extent of the politicisation of the process of assistance and the acceleration of corruption during the rule of Yasser Arafat (1994–2004) the case study shows that political considerations caused the main donors to ignore or disregard corrupt behaviour.

This thesis aims to analyze Islamic rhetoric of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its underlying objectives and reasons by examining policies, speeches and declarations of the PLO, Fateh and Yasser Arafat. It is widely accepted that the PLO functiones according to secular rules
perceives Israel, Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian question on Palestinian nationalist and Third worldist grounds. However in spite of its secular functioning and goals, the PLO since its inception has referred to Islamic rhetoric on natinal struggle of Palestine&rsquo
s liberation. Henceforth it is argued that the PLO has chosen a pragmatist and instrumentalist language in referring to Islamic symbols and discourses. Islamic rhetoric of the PLO has aimed primarily to mobilize the Palestinians for national goals and to legitimize the PLO against rising power of political Islam headed by Hamas. Furthermore the thesis also demonstrates that the PLO&rsquo
s Islamic rhetoric was affected by Palestinian society&rsquo
s shift along Islamic lines and Islamic component of Palestinian nationalism and culture. The PLO seemed to intensify its resort to Islamic rhetoric with every crisis that decreased the PLO&rsquo
s authority and power. It is concluded that content of the PLO&rsquo
s pragmatic Islamic rhetoric was never related with making Islam as normative and legal basis of Palestinian society, rather it was related with mobilization and legitimating.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
Este trabalho retoma a assinatura dos Acordos de Oslo entre israelenses e palestinos em setembro de 1993 a partir do entendimento de que os termos necessários para a resolução do conflito histórico não são discutidos no processo de paz. No decorrer da análise do texto do primeiro documento a ser assinado, a Declaração de Princípios (DOP), percebe-se que o conteúdo da proposta de paz e a fórmula de negociações bilaterais adotada não propõem uma alteração da assimetria de poder existente entre palestinos da OLP e o Estado de Israel, o que torna o processo desigual e extremamente favorável à continuação da ocupação militar israelense sobre os territórios da Faixa de Gaza e da Cisjordânia. O trabalho, portanto, foca sua análise no processo de negociação anterior à assinatura da DOP e no contexto político e econômico dos responsáveis por Oslo para estabelecer quais foram os interesses envolvidos em fechar um acordo e de que maneira eles influenciaram a redação dos termos da declaração. Durante a pesquisa, notamos que os Acordos de Oslo beneficiaram exclusivamente os atores envolvidos nas negociações secretas na Noruega, a OLP e israelenses do partido trabalhista, o que nos permite afirmar que o processo de paz não foi representativo dos diversos setores políticos palestinos e israelenses. O estudo também revela que a proposta de paz oferecida aos palestinos em Oslo é uma formulação israelense que remete ao início do processo de paz no Oriente Médio no ano de 1978, cujo principal objetivo foi a normalização das relações diplomáticas entre israelenses e os Estados árabes vizinhos. Assim, as condições negociadas na ocasião de Oslo partiram de um antigo pressuposto de que a paz regional não pressupõe a criação do Estado palestino, mas apenas o direito de autorrepresentação dos residentes dos territórios ocupados. Essas condições foram aceitas pela liderança de Yasser Arafat como estratégia para obter prestígio político e retornar ao território da Palestina. Concluímos, portanto, que o processo de paz de Oslo não se tratou de uma legítima iniciativa para estabelecer a paz de maneira justa e igualitária na região, conforme divulgado por Israel e pelos Estados Unidos, mas de um acordo entre o partido trabalhista e os palestinos da OLP, elaborado de uma maneira que possibilitou a expansão territorial israelense sobre Gaza e Cisjordânia, desconsiderou a questão dos refugiados e não reconheceu o direito à autodeterminação nacional palestina.
This paper refers to the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians in September 1993 from the understanding that the necessary terms in order to solve the historical conflict are not discussed in the peace process. The reading of the first document to be signed, the Declaration of Principles (DOP), reveals that the contents of the peace proposal and the bilateral negotiations formula do not alter the existing asymmetry of power between Palestinians from the PLO and the State of Israel, which makes the uneven process extremely favorable to the continuation of the Israeli military occupation over the territories of Gaza and the West Bank. The paper therefore focuses its analysis on the negotiation process previous to the signing of the DOP and the political and economic context of those responsible for Oslo, in order to establish what were the interests involved and how they influenced the drafting of the terms of the Declaration. During the research, it becomes clear that the Oslo agreements only benefited the actors involved in secret negotiations in Norway, namely the PLO and Israeli Labor Party, which allows us to state that the peace process was not representative of the various Palestinian and Israeli political sectors. The study also reveals that the peace proposal made to the Palestinians in Oslo is an Israeli formulation, that refers back to the beginning of the peace process in the Middle East in 1978, whose main goal was the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab neighboring states . Thus, the conditions discussed in Oslo were based on an old assumption that regional peace does not imply in the creation of a Palestinian state, but only the right to self-representation of the Palestinian residents in the occupied territories. These conditions were accepted by Yasser Arafat as a strategy to gain political prestige and return to the territory of Palestine. We conclude therefore that the Oslo peace process was not a legitimate initiative to establish a fair and equal peace in the region, as claimed by Israel and the United States, but an agreement made between the Israeli Labour Party and the PLO, drafted to enabled the Israeli territorial expansion over the West Bank and Gaza, to dismiss the question of refugees and not recognize the Palestinian’s right to national self-determination.

In Chapter 4, Palestinians discuss negotiations of property rights with Fatah, a revolutionary Palestinian political organization founded by Yasser Arafat and other key Palestinian leaders, in camps across Lebanon.

This chapter discusses different aspects of the Arab–Israeli conflict over time — military, political, and economic. The first two decades of the Arab–Israeli conflict, often marked by armed hostilities, were notable for Arab refusal to recognize Israel's existence. Since the 1967 war, Arab states, specifically Syria and Saudi Arabia, have displayed willingness to recognize Israel, and two, Egypt and Jordan, have signed peace treaties; Yasser Arafat recognized Israel's right to exist in the 1993 Oslo agreement. In this regard, most Arab states have adopted a realist approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict, seeking coexistence based in part on acceptance of Israel's military supremacy. In contrast, Israel appears to insist on security through regional domination, coupled with retention of the West Bank as Greater Israel.

In September 1993, United States President Bill Clinton presided over a handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat on the White House lawn—capping off a “day of awe,” as the press described it with reverence. The occasion was the announcement of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) for political settlement of the Israel–Palestine conflict, which resulted from secret meetings in Oslo sponsored by the Norwegian government. This chapter examines the nature and significance of the Oslo Accords, and the consequences that flowed from them. It begins by reviewing highlights of the immediate background that set the context for the negotiations. It then turns to the DOP and the consequences of the Oslo process, which extends to the present, adding a few words on lessons that should be learned.

This chapter deals with the beginning of the decline of Peace Now. The leaders of the movement locate the turning point in 2000, with two significant events: the collapse in the summer of the Camp David negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat, and the outbreak of the second Intifada in September, which led to the deaths of over a thousand Israelis. This interpretation, interesting as it may be, is not entirely faithful to the historical facts. Although 2000 was undoubtedly a significant year in the life of the peace movement, analysis of Peace Now's trajectory shows that its decline actually began in 1983, with the ending of the Lebanon War and Menachem Begin's withdrawal from political life. 1983 was the pivotal year, the date during which the movement appears to have reached its peak, and the moment at which its slow but steady decline began. The number and size of its demonstrations began to decrease.