Academic literature on the topic 'Argentina. President (1983-1989 : Alfonsín)'

Resumen Sostenida particularmente durante la presidencia de Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989), la “teoría de los dos demonios es considerada la memoria hegemónica-dominante referida a la última dictadura cívico-militar argentina (1976-1983). A su vez, el Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP) el “Nunca Más”, suele ser considerado una expresión de dicha memoria. Según nuestra hipótesis, el “Nunca Más” no suscribe la “teoría de los dos demonios” sino una memoria diferente aunque no antitética. El objetivo del presente trabajo consiste en caracterizar ambos conjuntos de representaciones con el fin de señalar las diferencias entre ellos. Nuestro corpus de análisis incluye como fuentes primarias los escritos y declaraciones de Alfonsín relativos al tema así como también el Prólogo del “Nunca Más” presentado en 1984. Dado que la autoría de este último es atribuida a Ernesto Sabato, presidente de la CONADEP, también se consideran algunas declaraciones del mencionado autor. Dichas fuentes primarias son históricamente contextualizadas a partir del uso de fuentes secundarias, dentro de las cuales incluimos el estado del arte relativo a la “teoría de los dos demonios”. Concluimos que si bien el planteo de Alfonsín y el Prólogo original del “Nunca Más” coinciden en el rechazo a la violencia como medio de expresión política, Alfonsín pone en un plano de igualdad a dos actores: el guerrillerismo izquierdista y el golpismo, mientras que el Prólogo critica tres modalidades de violencia: la guerrilla, el terrorismo paraestatal de derecha, actor no mencionado por Alfonsín, y el terrorismo dictatorial. Between two demons and three violences: Alfonsín’s administration and the senses of the state terrorism memory in contemporary Argentina Abstract Particularly held during Raul Alfonsín’s presidency (1983 – 1989), “the theory of the two demons” is considered the dominant-hegemonic memory referred to the last Argentine civic-military dictatorship (1976 – 1983). In turn, the report of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP)- “Nunca Más” (Never Again) is usually considered an expression of the aforesaid memory. According to our hypothesis, “Nunca Más” does not subscribe to the “theory of the two demons” but to a different memory – though not antithetical. The aim of the current paper consists of characterizing both groups of representations in order to point out the differences between them. Our corpus of analysis includes as main sources Alfonsín’s documents and statements concerned with the issue, as well as the “Nunca Más” prologue, presented in 1984. Some statements of Ernesto Sabato, CONADEP’s president, are also considered due to the fact that the authorship of the latter work mentioned has been attributed to him. Such primary sources are historically contextualized from the use of secondary sources, which within we include the state of the art relative to “the theory of the two demons”. We conclude that even though Alfonsín’s proposal and the original “Nunca Más” prologue coincide in the rejection of violence as a means of political expression, Alfonsín places in an equal position two actors – the left-wing guerrilla and the coup – while the prologue criticizes 3 violence modalities: the guerrilla, the right-wing semi-official terrorism – actor not mentioned by Alfonsín – and the dictatorial terrorism.

On May 1, 1989, María, a high school teacher from Buenos Aires, wrote a letter to President Raúl Alfonsín as he began his final months in office. The country was in the midst of a hyperinflation crisis and elections were set for just two weeks away. Earlier in the day, María had heard the president's last address to the congress, and she felt compelled to write him. “My friend,” she began, as she recounted how she and her husband, an adjunct university instructor, had worked hard over two decades of marriage, weathering continuous financial difficulties and the sensation of “always having to start over.” María emphasized that she had no political affiliations that would cloud her judgment, lest the president think she was writing to ask for political favors.

This article seeks to demonstrate the need to incorporate the international component of political strategy into analysis of the behaviour of democratising elites, a standpoint that too often has been neglected in democratisation theory. It explores a little-known aspect of Argentina's foreign policy that took place under the stewardship of the transitional democratic administration of President Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989). Specifically, it reveals that the first-freely elected administration that followed the Procesco military dictatorship articulated and implemented a strategy that aimed at defending and promoting democratic values in relation to Argentina's Southern Cone and Andean neighbours. Argentine bilateral relations with Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile are analysed through this analytical standpoint. It is argued that the Alfonsín government pursued such a policy out of a blend of fear for its own perpetuation and principled beliefs about the value of democracy as a mode of governance.

Argentines Fervently hoped that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy would reverse decades of economic decline and return their country to the path of modernization. Raúl Alfonsín and his Radical party assumed office in December 1983 confident of reconciling democratization with rapid development and social justice. This optimism was soon shattered, the victim of a succession of failed stabilization plans. Finally, a catastrophic economic collapse led to a convincing victory by Peronist Carlos Menem in the May 1989 presidential contest.Carlos Menem assumed the presidency on 8 July 1989 in the midst of raging hyperinflation: from August 1988 through July 1989, consumer prices had risen 3,610% and wholesale prices had skyrocketed 5,062%. Menem responded with neoliberal, “free-market” reforms designed to restructure radically the beleaguered Argentine economy along the lines of the so-called “Washington Consensus.”

The walls of downtown Buenos Aires displayed a new and haunting image in the weeks before the inauguration of President Raúl Alfonsín in December, 1983: black, outlined silhouettes of human beings, each accompanied by a name. The ghost-like figures represented those who had ‘disappeared’ in the military's proclaimed ‘war against subversion’. They testified silently but eloquently to the memory of the victims of that experience in the thoughts of many Argentines, and foreshadowed what was to become one of the most vexing political problems for the new civilian government. Among the many difficulties bequeathed to President Alfonsín by the military juntas who ruled Argentina for the eight preceding years, first among these in ethical exigency was the question of what to do concerning los desaparecidos.

In July 1989, as Carlos Menem awaited his inauguration as president, Argentina was experiencing a situation very different from that of the early days of the Alfonsín administration. Much water had passed over the dam since the transition. The crunch of economic crisis — and the failure of the Radical administration to overcome it even minimally — had brought economic questions to center stage and relegated political claims to second place. In this setting, Argentina's new foreignpolicymakers put aside the practice, set by their predecessors, of standing on principle. From the beginning, their rhetoric emphasized three keywords realism, pragmatism, and “normality,” — as the basis of a policy which focused on the economy (Argentina, 1989a: 1).According to Domingo Cavallo:The national interest, in the kind of historical circumstances now prevailing, is most dramatically manifest by economic and social demands. Thus, foreign policy will be realistic and seek to create a better political relationship with the friendly countries of the world in order to resolve Argentina's urgent economic and social problems (Argentina, 1989b: 2)

This article analyses the interplay between religious and political discourse in Argentina, departing from a case study located in the transition towards democracy in April 1987, and conveying military, political and religious discourse within the conflicts that surrounded the government of President Raúl R. Alfonsín (1983–9). It involved a well-established discourse genre, the homily, within an historical social practice, the Catholic mass; but it also included the violation of one of its main features, namely the monopoly of talk by priests. By challenging the bishop’s monologue, questioned by the homily, President Alfonsín settled a different ground, neither religious nor political, an événement that required urgent recontextualization. The mass media, as privileged agents representing contemporary social practices, recontextualized it through the multimodal attribution of genericity (Adam and Heidmann, 2004) in two main different ways, ascribing the event to either a religious or political field. In both cases, as we will see later, the actions and actors involved were consistently opposite, responding to different ideological motivations and with different strategic goals. The underlying theoretical point is that genres are not fixed in events, but rather represent ways of dealing with the exceptionality of événements that bring out ideological or political tensions.

Proponemos una aproximación crítica al primer programa económico de transición democrática de Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) en Argentina. En el contexto de una crisis económica nacional provocada por el legado de una dictadura anterior (1976-1983) combinada con la crisis latinoamericana desde 1982, el ministro de Economía, Bernardo Grinspun (1983-1985) propuso un programa económico keynesiano acorde con los aires. del primer gobierno democrático en una nueva era. En este marco, se revisaron las principales discusiones económicas de la época como algunos testimonios con el propósito de realizar una interpretación completa del plan de conductos, su desarrollo y posterior falla. Hemos descubierto que el programa Grinspun constituyó el último plan keynesiano desde la hegemonía de la posguerra,

El autor de este artículo busca mostrar el largo camino jurídico que Argentina ha debido recorrer para evitar que la impunidad por los crímenes de violación de derechos humanos y genocidio cometidos por gobiernos militares prevalezca gracias a recursos como la Ley de Autoamnistía, conocida también como de Pacificación Nacional, finalmente derogada por el presidente Raúl Alfonsín en diciembre de 1983.Palabras clave: derechos humanos, amnistía, perdón.

Este artículo analiza los usos y resignificaciones del informe <em>Nunca Más</em> desde la década del noventa hasta la actualidad. Este informe, publicado en Argentina en 1984, fue elaborado por la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP), creada en 1983 por el presidente constitucional Raúl Alfonsín para investigar las desapariciones causadas por la represión política. Desde 1995, diversos actores de la sociedad civil y una nueva conducción del Estado impulsaron varias reediciones de este informe que introdujeron a la vez una serie de cambios en la lectura del pasado de violencia política que postulaba el texto original. Dado el carácter canónico que reviste el<em> Nunca Más</em> en Argentina para narrar e interpretar estos hechos, el análisis de estas intervenciones permitirá comprender los cambios y continuidades operados en la propia interpretación de este período que atravesó el país

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This work will study the 1976-1989 period with the aim to understand why Argentina is in this chaotic path since the lost decade . We will focus on Alfonsín constitutional government and take a look at the previous military administrations, from General Videla to General Bignone that left behind a complicated future for the nation, a huge public debt and a non-productive economy
Este trabalho resenha o período compreendido entre 1976 e 1989, para possibilitar uma explicação possível da profunda crise na qual a Argentina se encontra desde o período da década perdida . Estuda a economia argentina , especificamente o governo de Raúl Alfonsin o primeiro governo constitucional após a ditadura e o período imediatamente anterior, comprendido entre 1976 e 1983, condição sine qua non dado que condicionou o governo democrático, limitando o desempenho e a evolução do país. Destaca o surgimento da pesada carga herdada como consequência da dívida externa. Esta pesada carga constituída tanto pelos empréstimos de fato contraídos (junto com os correspondentes juros contratados) quanto pela estatização de grande parte da dívida. Destaca também os motivos pelos quais o processo de consolidação democrático defrontou-se com tantas dificuldades encerrando-se emoldurado numa crise tão profunda, ainda que ocorresse a entrega de poder de um presidente constitucional para outro, escolhido num contexto de vigência plena de mecanismos de representação política e de respeito às liberdades políticas

Justice and accountability for the crimes of the military took place first during the presidency of Raúl Alfonsín (1983—89) following the fall of the dictatorship. Five major human rights trials took place in Córdoba during the Kirchner presidencies (203—15) , each with former Third Army Corps commander, General Luciano Benjamín Menéndez as a defendant. The fifth trial, the La Perla—Campo de la Ribera class action lawsuit, was the largest human rights trial to take place in Argentina. Guilty verdicts in all three trials led to lengthy prison sentences, including five life sentences for Menéndez.

This chapter examines the failure of the UCEDE in Argentina, and compares it to the success of the UDI in Chile. The first section discusses the long history of conservative party weakness in Argentina. The second section asks why no “Argentine UDI” emerged from the 1976–1983 military regime, arguing that its poor governing performance—including, notably, its defeat in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War—made the formation of such a party unviable. The third section examines the emergence of the UCEDE, emphasizing its much weaker starting position relative to the UDI. The fourth section discusses the fall of the UCEDE, which suffered a series of schisms and a sharp drop in electoral support after newly elected President Carlos Menem (1989–1999), a Peronist, began to implement much of its economic program. While the proximate cause of the UCEDE’s collapse was the Menem government, the chapter argues that the deeper cause was the party’s various built-in weaknesses.