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Macagno, Fabrizio, and Douglas Walton. "Persuasive Definitions: Values, Meanings and Implicit Disagreements." Informal Logic 28, no. 3 (September 2, 2008): 203. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v28i3.594.
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The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the relationship between persuasive definition and common knowledge (propositions generally accepted and not subject to dispute in a discussion). We interpret the gap between common knowledge and persuasive definition (PD) in terms of potential disagreements: PDs are conceived as implicit arguments to win a potential conflict. Persuasive definitions are analyzed as arguments instantiating two argumentation schemes, argument from classification and argument from values, and presupposing a potential disagreement. The argumentative structure of PDs reveals different levels of disagreement, and different pos-sibilities of resolving the conflict or causing dialogical deadlock.
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Müller, Stefan. "Einschränkung oder Erweiterung?" Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik 95, no. 2 (May 14, 2019): 218–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/25890581-09501019.
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Abstract Challenges or Chances? Reflexive Perspectives on Definitions The paper neither supports nor rejects definitions as such. Rather, it combines both perspectives, stemming on two arguments. The first argument is based on Luhmann who discusses inclusion as exclusion inherent to every form of definition. The second argument is related to Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s Critical Theory. They analyze how definitions contain social relations of power and inequality. Developing these two approaches, the paper argues that definitions allow both an extension and a limitation of perspectives. Both effects of definitions are entangled and mutually constitutive. The crucial point for a reflexive discussion of definitions is the form of their relation and their weighting.
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Simard Smith, Paul L., and Andrei Moldovan. "Arguments as Abstract Objects." Informal Logic 31, no. 3 (September 13, 2011): 230. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v31i3.3401.
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In recent discussions concerning the definition of argument, it has been maintained that the word ‘argument’ exhibits the process-product ambiguity, or an act/object ambigu-ity. Drawing on literature on lexical ambiguity we argue that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous. The term ‘argu-ment’ refers to an object, not to a speech act. We also examine some of the important implications of our argument by considering the question: what sort of abstract objects are arguments?
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Hatcher, Donald. "Arguments for Another Definition of Critical Thinking." Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 20, no. 1 (2000): 3–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/inquiryctnews20002016.
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Dufner, Annette. "Potentiality Arguments and the Definition of “Human Organism”." American Journal of Bioethics 13, no. 1 (January 2013): 33–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2012.747033.
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Seidelmann, P. K. "Issues of Time for Reference Systems." Symposium - International Astronomical Union 156 (1993): 357–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0074180900173504.
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At the International Astronomical Union General Assembly in 1991 the terminologies Geocentric Coordinate Time (TCG) and Barycentric Coordinate Time (TCB) were introduced as the time coordinates of four dimensional geocentric and barycentric coordinate systems, respectively. The reasons for these time-like arguments and their applications will be discussed. The relationships between the different time-like arguments will be discussed along with their applications and relationships to the astronomical constants.Since these time-like arguments have secular differences, there are new issues to be resolved. These new issues include the definition of the epoch J2000.0, relationship between mean and apparent sidereal time, the time-like argument for specifying constants, the definition and future use of ephemeris time, delta T values and the transition to, or future use of, TCG, TCB and TDB.
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Smith, Kelly C. "Life is hard: countering definitional pessimism concerning the definition of life." International Journal of Astrobiology 15, no. 4 (September 16, 2016): 277–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1473550416000021.
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AbstractCleland and Chyba published a classic piece in 2002 that began a movement I call definitional pessimism, where it is argued that there is no point in attempting anything like a general definition of life. This paper offers a critical response to the pessimist position in general and the influential arguments offered by Cleland and her collaborators in particular. One such argument is that all definitions of life fall short of an ideal in which necessary and sufficient conditions produce unambiguous categorizations that dispose of all counterexamples. But this concept of definition is controversial within philosophy; a fact that greatly diminishes the force of the admonition that biologists should conform to such an ideal. Moreover, biology may well be fundamentally different from logic and the physical sciences from which this ideal is drawn, to the point where definitional conformity misrepresents biological reality. Another idea often pushed is that the prospects for definitional success concerning life are on a par with medieval alchemy's attempts to define matter – that is, doomed to fail for lack of a unifying scientific theory. But this comparison to alchemy is both historically inaccurate and unfair. Planetary science before the discovery of the first exoplanets offers a much better analogy, with much more optimistic conclusions. The pessimists also make much of the desirability of using microbes as models for any universal concept of life, from which they conclude that certain types of ‘Darwinian’ evolutionary definitions are inadequate. But this argument posits an unrealistic ideal, as no account of life can both be universal and do justice to the sorts of precise causal mechanisms microbes exemplify. The character of biology and the demand for universality in definitions of life thus probably accords better with functional rather than structural categories. The bottom line is that there is simply no viable alternative, either pragmatically or theoretically, to the pursuit of definitions. If nothing else, the empirical data the pessimists demand will be a very long time coming and scientists will of necessity continue to employ definitions of life in the interim. Chastising them for this will only drive their ideas underground where they can escape critical analysis, making the problems caused by problematic conceptions of life worse.
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SABRY, AMR. "What is a purely functional language?" Journal of Functional Programming 8, no. 1 (January 1998): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0956796897002943.
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Functional programming languages are informally classified into pure and impure languages. The precise meaning of this distinction has been a matter of controversy. We therefore investigate a formal definition of purity. We begin by showing that some proposed definitions which rely on confluence, soundness of the beta axiom, preservation of pure observational equivalences and independence of the order of evaluation, do not withstand close scrutiny. We propose instead a definition based on parameter-passing independence. Intuitively, the definition implies that functions are pure mappings from arguments to results; the operational decision of how to pass the arguments is irrelevant. In the context of Haskell, our definition is consistent with the fact that the traditional call-by-name denotational semantics coincides with the traditional call-by-need implementation. Furthermore, our definition is compatible with the stream-based, continuation-based and monad-based integration of computational effects in Haskell. Finally, we observe that call-by-name reasoning principles are unsound in compilers for monadic Haskell.
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Zivancevic, Igor. "Evolutionary anti-realism in ethics." Theoria, Beograd 60, no. 2 (2017): 46–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1702046z.
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In this paper I discuss two forms of evolutionary debunking arguments. These arguments have precursors in Mackie?s Moral error theory and Harman?s challenge, i.e. the explanatory irrelevance of moral facts. The first argument is metaphysical, and I call it the argument of phylogenetic contingency. To put it simple, this argument claims that if our evolutionary past had been different, then our moral capacity, moral concepts and moral beliefs, would have been different as well. The other argument is epistemological. It is based on the Nozickean conceptions of sensitivity and truth tracking. This argument claims that, when it comes to moral capacity, in the evolutionary past there was no selection for tracking moral truths. As a result, moral beliefs are insensitive to truth. Finally, I show how conception of self-deception, which is by definition insensitive to truth, could augment these arguments and help their better articulation.
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Martínez Fernández, Beatriz. "Syntactic Valence in Role and Reference Grammar." Journal of English Studies 5 (May 29, 2008): 233. http://dx.doi.org/10.18172/jes.130.
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Transitivity has traditionally been equated with the number of syntactic arguments that a verb takes. However, Role and Reference Grammar (RRG) puts forward a new approach that defines transitivity in terms of macroroles, leaving the notion of syntactic valence aside. It is perhaps for this reason that the notion of syntactic valence has not received sufficient attention in this framework, and, consequently, some inconsistencies have been identified in its definition. To mention only a few, there is no proper definition of the criteria that determine the notion of syntactic valence, and many of the grammatical processes that have some impact on it – the use of the passive voice and imperatives, the presence of argument-adjuncts, or the position of the arguments in the clause – are overlooked. Hence, in this paper I carry out a critical revision of the definition of syntactic valence and aim to set out some guidelines for a more accurate treatment of this notion within the RRG framework.
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Korniłowicz, Artur. "Enhancement of properties in Mizar." PeerJ Computer Science 6 (November 30, 2020): e320. http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.320.
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A “property” in the Mizar proof-assistant is a construction that can be used to register chosen features of predicates (e.g., “reflexivity”, “symmetry”), operations (e.g., “involutiveness”, “commutativity”) and types (e.g., “sethoodness”) declared at the definition stage. The current implementation of Mizar allows using properties for notions with a specific number of visible arguments (e.g., reflexivity for a predicate with two visible arguments and involutiveness for an operation with just one visible argument). In this paper we investigate a more general approach to overcome these limitations. We propose an extension of the Mizar language and a corresponding enhancement of the Mizar proof-checker which allow declaring properties of notions of arbitrary arity with respect to explicitly indicated arguments. Moreover, we introduce a new property—the “fixedpoint-free” property of unary operations—meaning that the result of applying the operation to its argument always differs from the argument. Results of tests conducted on the Mizar Mathematical Library are presented.
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Maynard, Douglas W. "How children start arguments." Language in Society 14, no. 1 (March 1985): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0047404500010915.
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ABSTRACTPrevious research on children's arguments has neglected their initial phases, particularly how they arise out of children's ongoing practical activities. This paper examines how any utterance or activity can be opposed, the concept of opposition being at the center of any definition of argument. However, once opposition has occurred, it can be treated in a variety of ways, and a full-blown argument or dispute is only one possible and contingent outcome. Children analyze others's moves not only verbally, but nonverbally as well. Thus, bodily actions and presupposition are necessary components in the analysis of how arguments are started. Nonverbal oppositional moves may be at the base of semantically constructed disputes. When opposition occurs, it is to be taken to imply the violation of some rule or value. The meaning of that rule or value relative to children's culture is taken to have to do not with its content, but its usage in promoting a local social organization. (Conversational analysis, child language, social organization, presupposition, dispute genres, American English [middle class, Caucasian])
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Goldberg, Susan, Joan E. Grusec, and Jennifer M. Jenkins. "Confidence in protection: Arguments for a narrow definition of attachment." Journal of Family Psychology 13, no. 4 (December 1999): 475–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0893-3200.13.4.475.
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Pederson, David R., and Greg Moran. "The relationship imperative: Arguments for a broad definition of attachment." Journal of Family Psychology 13, no. 4 (December 1999): 496–500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0893-3200.13.4.496.
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Ibrahim, Mohammed. "TEACHING GRAMMAR IN SECONDARY SCHOOL: ALTERNATIVE TO DEFINITION APPROACH." Sokoto Educational Review 13, no. 2 (December 15, 2012): 43–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.35386/ser.v13i2.185.
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This paper examines the teaching of grammar in relation to Nigerian classroom. The paper examines the controversy of whether or not to teach grammar to students learning a second language pointing out the arguments advanced by those in favour and against it. Two approaches to the teaching of grammar - explicit and implicit - were equally discussed highlighting arguments for and against each. The paper finally gives support to an integrative approach to grammar teaching and recommends the same for use in teaching grammatical structures in Nigerian schools.
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Lamberov, Lev D. "Benacerraf and Set-Theoretic Reductionist Realism." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 1 (2021): 142–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158115.
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The paper is devoted to analysis of P. Benacerraf’s argument against set-theoretic reductionist realism which is a fragment of a broader argument, know as the “identification problem”. The analyzed fragment of P. Benacerraf’s argument concerns the possibility of reducing of mathematical notions to set-theoretic notions. The paper presents a reconstruction of P. Benacerraf’s original argumentation, its analysis and also several possible objections proposed by P. Benacerraf himself about 30 years later after the original publication. Namely, he claimed (1) that a set-theoretic definition of natural numbers in G. Frege’s fashion can serve as a proper and unique set-theoretic definition, (2) that his argument doesn’t undermine eliminative reductionsts’ position, (3) that even if there are no argument possible in favor of some particular set-theoretic definition of natural numbers one may take set-theoretic realism for granted. An analysis of the mentioned possible objections shows their dependence on a number of additional premises. The paper demonstrates that P. Benacerraf’s objections on his own argument against set-theoretic realism either have a pragmatic character themselves or essentially rely on additional arguments that are justified pragmatically or require additional argumentation. For example, his possible objections require that set theory is considered as the only true foundational theory in mathematics, and that it has several important pragmatic virtues, like convenience of use to formalize other mathematical theories. In some cases, P. Benacerraf’s objections on their own, or the indicated additional principles may well be called into question, which demonstrates the insufficiency of P. Benacerraf’s objections against his original argument. Without the mentioned pragmatic arguments P. Benacerraf’s objections become a kind of belief in mysticism. Accordingly, his doubts about his own argument against set-theoretical realism seem insufficient to reject the problem of identification and save the position of set-theoretical realism from collapse.
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Robinson, Howard. "Varieties of Ontological Argument." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4, no. 2 (June 21, 2012): 41–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v4i2.295.
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I consider what I hope are increasingly sophisticated versions of ontological argument, beginning from simple definitional forms, through three versions to be found in Anselm, with their recent interpretations by Malcolm, Plantinga, Klima and Lowe. I try to show why none of these work by investigating both the different senses of necessary existence and the conditions under which logically necessary existence can be brought to bear. Although none of these arguments work, I think that they lead to interesting reflections on the nature of definition, on the conditions for possessing the property of necessary existence and point towards a different, neo-Platonic ground for God’s meeting the criteria for being logically necessary.
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Merlo, Paola, and Eva Esteve Ferrer. "The Notion of Argument in Prepositional Phrase Attachment." Computational Linguistics 32, no. 3 (September 2006): 341–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/coli.2006.32.3.341.
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In this article we refine the formulation of the problem of prepositional phrase (PP) attachment as a four-way disambiguation problem. We argue that, in interpreting PPs, both knowledge about the site of the attachment (the traditional noun-verb attachment distinction) and the nature of the attachment (the distinction of arguments from adjuncts) are needed. We introduce a method to learn arguments and adjuncts based on a definition of arguments as a vector of features. In a series of supervised classification experiments, first we explore the features that enable us to learn the distinction between arguments and adjuncts. We find that both linguistic diagnostics of argumenthood and lexical semantic classes are useful. Second, we investigate the best method to reach the four-way classification of potentially ambiguous prepositional phrases. We find that whereas it is overall better to solve the problem as a single four-way classification task, verb arguments are sometimes more precisely identified if the classification is done as a two-step process, first choosing the attachment site and then labeling it as argument or adjunct.
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Samhammer, Michael. "Holm Tetens’s Rational Theology." Grazer Philosophische Studien 95, no. 2 (May 2, 2018): 287–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000041.
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Holm Tetens attempts to define ‘god’ as part of his rational theology. The term ‘god’ is supposed to be defined as ‘the infinite I-subject’. This should be achieved through the customary definition of a singular term by description. However, definitions of this kind have to meet certain formal requirements, which a Rational Theology should adhere to. This paper aims to show that Tetens’ definition faces problems with these requirements since vital arguments are either missing or incomplete in a substantial way. In the process, possible approaches to remedy the outlined problems are hinted at. Overall, this paper raises the question of an alternative interpretation of his definition of god, which is central to the author’s project.
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Baldwin, R. Scott, and Sharon Vaughn. "Why Siegel's Arguments Are Irrelevant to the Definition of Learning Disabilities." Journal of Learning Disabilities 22, no. 8 (October 1989): 513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002221948902200813.
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Henry, Stuart, and Mark M. Lanier. "The prism of crime: Arguments for an integrated definition of crime." Justice Quarterly 15, no. 4 (December 1, 1998): 609–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07418829800093921.
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Vilanova Arias, Javier. "Petitio Principii, Ad Ignorantiam y fundamentación del conocimiento." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 43, no. 127 (December 14, 2011): 27–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2011.851.
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In this paper I examine the problem of circularity in the justification of knowledge from the point of view of argumentation theory. I introduce the expression founding argument for the arguments we use to try to prove that we know, and explain the classical account of the two fallacies that may be committed: ad ignorantiam and petitio principii. A new definition of both fallacies, based on recent work in the theory of argumentation, is used to show that not every founding argument is fallacious.
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Yaoukap, Patrick Tchonang, Judith Njomgang Ngansop, Daniel Tieudjo, and Bettina Pedemonte. "Relationship between drawing and figures on students’ argumentation and proof." African Journal of Educational Studies in Mathematics and Sciences 15, no. 2 (December 30, 2019): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajesms.v15i2.7.
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In this article, we wish to explore the influence of the figure and the drawing on students’ argumentation and proof during the solving problem. Our research is based on both Toulmin’s model and Vinner’s concept image and concept definition. After analysing the arguments with the Toulmin model, we analyse the personnel concept definition, concept image evoked about the figure and the effect of drawing which intervene in students’ arguments. Our data suggest that wrong student’s arguments seem to be based on their concept image evoked on the figure manipulated which is in contradiction with the formal axiomatic system. Moreover, the data of the arguments seem to come from an abusive interpretation of the drawings. Observations that emerge from students’ oral and written speeches reveal continuities and gaps between their argumentation and proof.
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Eben, Magali. "The Antitrust Market Does Not Exist: Pursuit of Objectivity in a Purposive Process." Journal of Competition Law & Economics 17, no. 3 (March 17, 2021): 586–619. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhab001.
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ABSTRACT There is no such thing as an ‘antitrust market’. Markets are merely analytical tools, which serve to structure available evidence and enable a comprehensive answer to a particular question. They do not exist as such in the real world but are figments of our intellectual imagination. In that capacity, they can be immensely useful. A pursuit of objectivity in the process of product market definition remains in vain as long as we fail to acknowledge that the utility of antitrust markets lies precisely in their reductive and purposive nature. This article makes two main arguments. The first argument is simple, yet far-reaching: antitrust market definition is useful because it is a method to enable the answer to a question. The implication is that the market is defined by reference to that particular question, rather than as an independent and neutral object. Market definition is ‘purposive’. In the context of competition investigations, this question can concern, but does not have to be limited to, determinations of market power. The second argument is that market definition, even though purposive, does not need to be subjective. Objectivity in market definition can be achieved by aspiring to process objectivity, rather than to objective outcomes. JEL codes: K21; L40; A00
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Korning Zethsen, Karen, and Aage Hill-Madsen. "Intralingual Translation and Its Place within Translation Studies – A Theoretical Discussion." Meta 61, no. 3 (March 23, 2017): 692–708. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1039225ar.
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Roman Jakobson’s tripartite typology of translation is accepted by many translation scholars as a broad definition of translation and is frequently included in the beginning of textbooks introducing Translation Studies. However, when it comes to the research carried out within Translation Studies, focus is overwhelmingly set on interlingual translation, or translation proper. A few scholars explicitly argue against the inclusion of intralingual and intersemiotic translation in a definition of translation whereas some provide arguments or discussions of concepts central to Translation Studies which explain the marginal status of intralingual and intersemiotic translation. The aim of this article is to review these arguments and to discuss the place of intralingual translation within Translation Studies. On this basis, the article suggests a criterial definition of translation to be used for scientific purposes within the field of Translation Studies, a definition which fully includes intralingual translation.
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Laas, Oliver. "Questioning the Virtual Friendship Debate: Fuzzy Analogical Arguments from Classification and Definition." Argumentation 32, no. 1 (September 4, 2017): 99–149. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10503-017-9437-7.
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Nielsen, Morten Ebbe Juul. "Multicultural Multilegalism – Definition and Challenges." Les ateliers de l'éthique 6, no. 2 (February 29, 2012): 126–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1008035ar.
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Multilegalism is a species of legal pluralism denoting the existence of quasi-autonomous “minority jurisdictions” for at least some legal matters within a “normal” state jurisdiction. Multiculturalism in the advocatory sense might provide the justification for establishing such minority jurisdictions. This paper aims to provide 1) a detailed idea about what such a multicultural multilegal arrangement would amount to and how it differs from certain related concepts and legal frameworks, 2) in what sense some standard multicultural arguments could provide a starting point for seriously considering multicultural multilegalism in practice, 3) how the idea fares against some standard liberal criticisms, and finally 4), to point out three salient problems for multilegalism, concerning a) choice of law problems, b) a dilemma facing us as to whether state supremacy should be upheld or not, and c) clashes with basic human rights.
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James Fantus, Michael. "The Religious Argument—How We Substantiate Divine Authority in Human Terms." Journal of Research in Philosophy and History 3, no. 2 (October 3, 2020): p102. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/jrph.v3n2p102.
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Religious beliefs are unprovable except by empirical argument. The human race has struggled with full submission to these beliefs because beliefs, by definition intangible. The Argument, if performed well, substantiates valid religious beliefs and their utility to in human society, do not exact a price upon it or presume to self-enforce. Still, several kinds of arguments exist: Religion as an absolute, far from optional, and the other provides logic as to how we find God, the Real One, connect with Him and the beautiful universe around us without the constant redirection of religious nonsense-or its proponents in the way?This paper will examine Arguments from Islam, the Fatwa, the Greek, called a Polemic, the Apologetic, which exists in both Protestant and Catholic Christianity, the Chazakah, or presumption used in Judaism, and the Upanishad, an ancient form of spiritual inquiry and scientific method used by Vedantin Hindus. My objectives include overview of the history, structure, and forms of each type of Argument, and finally, recommendations for a standard format all religions can take advantage of.
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KAPELLER, JAKOB. "‘Model-Platonism’ in economics: on a classical epistemological critique." Journal of Institutional Economics 9, no. 2 (February 21, 2013): 199–221. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137413000052.
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AbstractRoughly 50 years ago, the eminent German philosopher and social scientist Hans Albert presented a critique of ‘Model-Platonism’ in economics to describe essential elements of the ‘neoclassical style of economic reasoning’. Specifically, Albert advanced a series of epistemological arguments to illustrate conceptual shortcomings in neoclassical theory, which may be utilized to immunize the latter against conflicting empirical evidence. This article summarizes Albert's main arguments and illustrates his most important insights by using simple propositional logic. Based on these findings, a clarification and definition of ‘Model-Platonism’ is offered and the applicability of the Model-Platonism-critique to current developments in mainstream economics is assessed. Finally, two possible extensions of Albert's argument, the concepts of oscillating informational content and axiomatic variation, are illustrated with respect to their potential for immunization against critique.
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Rein, Nathan. "When Is a Religion Like a Weed?" Bulletin for the Study of Religion 44, no. 4 (January 15, 2016): 10–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/bsor.v44i4.27760.
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Caroline Schaffalitzky de Muckadell's 2014 article, "On Essentialism and Real Definitions of Religion," offers a comprehensive rationale for the use of real, essentialist definitions of religion in the field of religious studies. In this article, I examine her arguments and the proposed definition she supplies. I argue that a close reading of Schaffalitzky's piece, concentrating especially on the way she uses examples, helps to demonstrate that she and her anti-essentialist opponents view the field of religious studies in incommensurable ways. While Schaffalitzky views definitions as serving the analytical study of religion as an object, her opponents view definitions primarily rhetorically and seek to focus attention on the process of defining.
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Šedo, Jakub. "Definice semiprezidencialismu – řešení či nové otázky?" Středoevropské politické studie Central European Political Studies Review 20, no. 1 (April 1, 2018): 69–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/cepsr.2018.1.69.
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This review essay discusses new definition of a semipresidential system, which has been introduced by Miloš Brunclík and Michal Kubát in their book Kdo vládne Česku? (Who Governs in Czechia?). Advantages and problems of their definition are discussed, with the result that the definition is interesting and generally correct. However, some modifications to the definition are proposed. Subsequently, arguments put forward against the Post-duvergerian definition of semipresidentialism are critically evaluated, including alternatives to the definition proposed by Brunclík and Kubát. The essay closes by presenting alternative ways of dealing with the dispute over the definition of semipresidentialism among Czech political scientists.
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Musvoto, Saratiel Wedzerai. "Implications Of The Homomorphism Definition Of Measurement On Accounting Measurement Theory." International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER) 10, no. 5 (April 26, 2011): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/iber.v10i5.4228.
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This study compares the principles of the representational theory of measurement with accounting practices to decipher the reasons creating a gap between accounting measurement practices and the scientific practices of measurement. Representational measurement establishes measurement in social scientific disciplines such as accounting. The discussion in this study focuses on the need for accounting to provide principled arguments to justify its status as a measurement discipline. The arguments made highlight the need for possible modifications of the accounting measurement concept to deal with issues that are at least partially philosophical in nature, such as the concept of error and the passing of value representations from finite to continuum. These problems are primarily conceptual in nature. They indicate that accounting is far from a measurement discipline. Their resolution could require major changes to the accounting concept of measurement.
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Mayhew, David A., Paul H. Muessig, and Loren D. Jensen. "Adverse Environmental Impact: 30-Year Search for a Definition." Scientific World JOURNAL 2 (2002): 21–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1100/tsw.2002.166.
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Since passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972, there has been a long, unresolved struggle to define a key phrase in Section 316(b) of the act: “adverse environmental impact” (AEI). Section 316(b) requires that the best technology available be used in cooling-water intake structures to minimize AEI due to entrainment and impingement of aquatic organisms. Various attempts were made to evaluate and define AEI, including focused national conferences on impact assessment. Unresolved arguments regarding AEI were reinvigorated following the 1995 Consent Decree requiring EPA to propose new rules to implement Section 316(b). This article reviews and compares eight proposed definitions of AEI. Six of the definitions define AEI as impact expressed at the population or higher level of biological organization. The two remaining definitions are unrelated to populations: a 1% cropping of the near-field organisms and “one fish equals AEI”. The latter definition is based on the desire of some stakeholders to define AEI as the loss of any public trust resources. Equating loss of public trust resources with AEI hampers consensus on a definition because a societal-based policy concept (public trust resources) is commingled with science-based definitions based on population effects. We recommend that a population-based definition of AEI be incorporated into Section 316(b) guidance and observe that this will not preclude a state from exercising its law and policy to protect public trust resources.
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Bader, RFW. "Can there be more than a single definition of an atom in a molecule?" Canadian Journal of Chemistry 77, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 86–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1139/v98-223.
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Arguments are presented that the theoretical definition of an atom in a molecule or of a functional grouping of atoms that derive from experimental chemistry must be unique. Definitions based on the orbital model or, as recently proposed, in terms of domains defined by isovalued density envelopes fail for a number of reasons, among them being their failure to enable a quantum mechanical description of the atomic or group properties. Chemistry is concerned with the observation and measurement of properties. Definitions that do not predict the measurable, additive properties found for atoms in molecules fail to recover the essence of the atomic concept and can play no operational or predictive role in chemistry. Atoms exist in real space and their form determines their properties. There is but a single definition for an atom, free or bound, that meets this essential requirement.Key words: atoms in molecules, proper open systems.
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Pisarski, Marcin. "What is the contemporary political myth?" Review of Nationalities 10, no. 1 (December 1, 2020): 211–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pn-2020-0015.
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Abstract The article attempts to forma a definition of contemporary political myth. This definition is formulated against the background of concepts that have been presented so far in sciences close to the topic of myth, such as religious studies, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, and cultural studies. The contemporary political myth becomes an independent form which, not contradicting the definitions of myth in other scientific disciplines, is transferred, updated or created from scratch in order to liberate and direct the political energy inherent in society. The contemporary political myth becomes an unverifiable fiction which, through referring to images and symbols, often replaces a discussion or rational arguments. Despite its irrational nature, it has a distinguishable impact on the society and the political activities and behaviour undertaken within it.
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Kovacs, Gabor, and Horst Olschewski. "The definition of pulmonary hypertension: history, practical implications and current controversies." Breathe 17, no. 3 (September 2021): 210076. http://dx.doi.org/10.1183/20734735.0076-2021.
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The definition of pulmonary hypertension (PH) is based on a growing body of evidence and represents the result of ongoing discussions within the PH community over the past 50 years. In 2018, the most recent World Symposium on Pulmonary Hypertension introduced significant changes in the definition of PH by lowering the mean pulmonary arterial pressure threshold to >20 mmHg and (re)introducing the pulmonary vascular resistance ≥3 WU cut-off for all forms of pre-capillary PH. These changes and their potential clinical impact have been the subject of lively discussions in the community and some important questions and controversies have been identified.In this review we aim to present the development of the definition of PH over the past decades and discuss the main arguments that led to relevant modifications. In addition, we address the practical implications of the most recent changes and controversies that still exist.Educational aimsTo review the historical development of the definition of pulmonary hypertension.To discuss practical implications and current controversies of the currently recommended definitions of pulmonary hypertension and pulmonary arterial hypertension.
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Merkt, Helene, Sophie Haesen, Leila Meyer, Reto W. Kressig, Bernice S. Elger, and Tenzin Wangmo. "Defining an age cut-off for older offenders: a systematic review of literature." International Journal of Prisoner Health 16, no. 2 (April 9, 2020): 95–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijph-11-2019-0060.
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Purpose In the literature, 65 years is commonly used as the age to designate an older person in the community. When studying older prisoners, there is much variation. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how researchers define older offenders and for what reasons. Design/methodology/approach The authors reviewed articles on health and well-being of older offenders to assess terminology used to describe this age group, the chosen age cut-offs distinguishing younger offenders from older offenders, the arguments provided to support this choice as well as the empirical base cited in this context. Findings The findings show that the age cut-off of 50 years and the term “older” were most frequently used by researchers in the field. The authors find eight main arguments given to underscore the use of specific age cut-offs delineating older offenders. They outline the reasoning provided for each argument and evaluate it for its use to define older offenders. Originality/value With this review, it is hoped to stimulate the much-needed discussion advancing towards a uniform definition of the older offender. Such a uniform definition would make future research more comparable and ensure that there is no ambiguity when researchers state that the study population is “older offenders”.
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De Fine Licht, Karl, and Anna Folland. "Defining “Social Sustainability”: Towards a Sustainable Solution to the Conceptual Confusion." Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, no. 2 (November 18, 2019): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.5324/eip.v13i2.2913.
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The interest in "social sustainability" has recently increased in the field of urban development. We want societies, cities, and neighborhoods to be economically and environmentally sustainable, but we also want urban areas that are safe, diverse, walkable, and relaxing, just to mention a few examples. Strikingly, however, there is no consensus regarding what definition of "social sustainability" should be employed. Additionally, some people are skeptical about the prospect of finding a useful definition at all and claim it is impossible to satisfactorily define the concept for various reasons, such as its complexity. A potential first step towards navigating this conceptual maze is to provide desiderata for a definition of social sustainability. We defend a list of nine desiderata and thereby create a theoretical framework for analyzing and constructing a definition of "social sustainability". We also examine the skeptical arguments and find that it is premature to conclude that the goal of finding a useful definition is hopeless. With the criteria in place, the future debate can proceed by assessing definitions of "social sustainability" in a more structured and transparent manner. This activity is of upmost importance if we want to create just cities.
Keywords: Social Sustainability, Definition, Purposes and Aims, Conditions of Adequacy
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MORELAND, J. P. "A response to a Platonistic and to a set-theoretic objection to the Kalam cosmological argument." Religious Studies 39, no. 4 (October 16, 2003): 373–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412503006565.
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The first premise of the Kalam cosmological argument has come under fire in the last few years. The premise states that the universe had a beginning, and one of two prominent arguments for it turns on the claim that an actual infinite collection of entities cannot exist. After stating the Kalam cosmological argument and the two approaches to defending its first premise, I respond to two objections against the notion that an actual infinite collection is impossible: a Platonistic objection from abstract objects and a set-theoretic objection from an ambiguity in the definition of ‘=’ and ‘<’ as applied to sets. The thought-experiment involving Hilbert's Hotel is central to the dialectic, and the discussion clarifies its use in supporting the Kalam cosmological argument.
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Ferme, Alja. "Final sonorant sequences in the Celje dialect." Linguistica 46, no. 1 (December 1, 2006): 181–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/linguistica.46.1.181-190.
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In this paper I will analyse final sonorant sequencesin the Celje variety of Slovene. In §2 various definitions of a consonant cluster will be discussed and the definition needed for further development ofthe article will be provided. In §3 I will present pretheoretical arguments against treating all final sonorant sequences as consonant clusters. In addition, a seemingly special behaviour of a small group of sequences will be pointed out. The government phonology framework will be introduced in §4. In §5 the hin the given theoretical framework.
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WELCH, PHILIP D. "SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TRUTH HIERARCHIES: A CORRECTION." Review of Symbolic Logic 13, no. 4 (May 20, 2019): 857–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020319000042.
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FLOCKE, VERA. "CARNAP’S DEFENSE OF IMPREDICATIVE DEFINITIONS." Review of Symbolic Logic 12, no. 2 (December 5, 2018): 372–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020318000370.
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AbstractA definition of a property P is impredicative if it quantifies over a domain to which P belongs. Due to influential arguments by Ramsey and Gödel, impredicative mathematics is often thought to possess special metaphysical commitments. The reason is that an impredicative definition of a property P does not have its intended meaning unless P exists, suggesting that the existence of P cannot depend on its explicit definition. Carnap (1937 [1934], p. 164) argues, however, that accepting impredicative definitions amounts to choosing a “form of language” and is free from metaphysical implications. This article explains this view in its historical context. I discuss the development of Carnap’s thought on the foundations of mathematics from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s, concluding with an account of Carnap’s (1937 [1934]) non-Platonistic defense of impredicativity. This discussion is also important for understanding Carnap’s influential views on ontology more generally, since Carnap’s (1937 [1934]) view, according to which accepting impredicative definitions amounts to choosing a “form of language”, is an early precursor of the view that Carnap presents in “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1956 [1950]), according to which referring to abstract entities amounts to accepting a “linguistic framework”.
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Nedzelsky, K. K. "Reception of the future as a kind of religious experience and a way of transforming the consciousness of believers." Ukrainian Religious Studies, no. 50 (March 10, 2009): 78–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/2009.50.2035.
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Not so long ago the definition of religion as "a reflection of reality in illusory-fantasy images, ideas, concepts" was perceived as one of the most important arguments of scientific atheism in its anti-religious struggle in the national religious studies. The closeness to the notion of "fantasy" and "fanaticism" (though completely incompatible with semantics) made this argument seem irresistible in the fight against religion, as any believer could fall under the murderous characterization of the category of "religious bigotry" it is in some way irreparably backward in comparison to a person with a developed scientific worldview.
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Gerring, John. "Culture versus Economics: An American Dilemma." Social Science History 23, no. 2 (1999): 129–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0145553200018046.
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“There are billions of potential conflicts in any modern society, but only a few become significant,” E. E. Schattschneider (1960: 66) pointed out many years ago. Accordingly, the most important political struggles are not issue conflicts butissue-cleavageconflicts, “arguments about what the argument is about” (ibid.: 70–71). The definition of alternatives, from a Schattschneiderian perspective, is the primal act of politics. If the sine qua non of a political party is the selection of leaders, then the quintessential act of a political system is the selection and framing of issues, which is to say, “the domination and subordination of conflicts” (ibid.: 66).
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Hoinărescu, Liliana. "Definition as an argumentative strategy in parliamentary discourse." Language and Dialogue 8, no. 2 (October 12, 2018): 209–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ld.00013.hoi.
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Abstract The present paper aims to investigate the main argumentative uses of definitions in various communicative contexts of the parliamentary discourse, on the basis of two sets of data, selected from the British and the Romanian Parliaments. Relevant categories of argumentative definitions are identified and described, by taking into consideration their linguistic structure and rhetorical features, as well as their current association with other types of arguments and pragmatic strategies. The cross-cultural and comparative perspective allows us to grasp to what extent the institutional forms, procedural rules and cultural models can actually influence the argumentative choices and reasoning patterns in the specific cases of the British and the Romanian Parliamentary discourse.
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Straukaitė, Ieva. "G. DICKIE’O EKSTENSIONALISTINIO-INSTITUCINIO MENO APIBRĖŽIMO NEAPIBRĖŽTUMAS." Problemos 83 (January 1, 2013): 173–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2013.0.824.
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Šiuolaikinėje analitinėje meno filosofijoje viena pagrindinių problemų – ar įmanoma ir kaip įmanoma apibrėžti meną? Straipsnyje analizuojamas George’o Dickie’o institucinis meno apibrėžimas. Parodoma, kaip jis atsako į antiesencialistų argumentus, neigiančius meno apibrėžimo galimybę. Teigiama, kad meno apibrėžimą Dickie’s įrodinėja pasitelkdamas ekstensionalistinę metodologiją, kuria remdamasis meno ir ne-meno atskyrimo kriterijus aiškina kaip semantinius eksternalistinius, episteminius eksternalistiniusir normatyviai neutralius. Tvirtinama, kad Dickie’o suformuluotas institucinis meno apibrėžimas negali būti laikomas meno apibrėžimu, nes jis remiasi ydingo loginio rato principu. Iš to daroma išvada, kad Dickie’s nepagrindžia meno apibrėžimo galimybės, bet pasiūlo ekstensionalistinę institucinę meno sampratą.Indefiniteness of George Dickie’s Extensional-Institutional Definition of ArtIeva Straukaitė SummaryA major problem in contemporary analytic philosophy of art is whether and how it is possible to define art. The paper analyzes George Dickie’s institutional definition of art. His response to anti-essentialists’ arguments which deny the possibility to define art is presented. It is argued that Dickie attempts to substantiate his definition of art by invoking extensional methodology on the basis of which he construes the criteria for distinguishing between art and non-art as externalistic semantic, externalistic epistemic, and value-neutral. It is asserted that the institutional definition of art formulated by Dickie cannot be considered a definition of art as it is sustained by a logically vicious circle. Hence the conclusion that Dickie does not substantiate the possibility of a definition of art but introduces an extensional-institutional conception of art.
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Laurent, Nathan, and Lee Duffield. "Queensland's broad-scale land-clearing policy debate, 1998–2006: An analysis of evidence-based arguments in news media content." Queensland Review 25, no. 1 (June 2018): 70–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/qre.2018.8.
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AbstractThis article outlines the methodology and key findings of a media content analysis of news reporting in the Courier-Mail and Queensland Country Life on the issue of broad-scale land-clearing (BSLC) in Queensland during the period 1998–2006. The case study identifies and examines evidence-based arguments made by stakeholders in the public policy debate surrounding BSLC, including elected officials and judges, interest groups, government agencies, scientists, business owners and individuals, such as academics. In both newspapers, it was noted that throughout the period under review, arguments made on environmental grounds in favour of the policy goal of maximum immediate conservation tended to be concerned with establishing an accurate definition of the BSLC problem. However, reporting of arguments made on political and economic grounds reflected stark differences between the two newspapers. The findings of this study support observations that some participants in a contest over new policy may dispute (persistently, and regardless of previous developments) the validity of: (1) definitions of a problem; (2) proposed policy solutions; (3) matters of detail or technical application; and (4) the enactment and implementation of legislation.
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Aliyeva, E. A. "Innovation Essence: Analyzing Theoretical Approaches." Vestnik of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, no. 6 (December 12, 2019): 21–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.21686/2413-2829-2019-6-21-31.
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At the age of fast development of science and progress the topic of innovation arising and being introduced in science and practical life is extremely acute in society. In spite of the fact that the term ‘innovation’ has been used for a long time already showing the novelty of the phenomenon (for instance, discovery, invention), today, according to the author, a lot of experts and scientists have no common opinion about the essence of the innovation notion. By analyzing the existing definitions of the term ‘innovation’ the author shows that even today’s academics studying the same quotations, views, definitions and arguments in the field of innovation essence and importance, finding positive and negative characteristics of each approach to the innovation definition usually come to different assessments. The author proposes to introduce the unique definition of this notion, as it could make the idea of innovation more concrete and at the same time specify their goals and classification, improve their assessment and importance in today’s progressive, competitive social and economic development of society and country as a whole.
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Wu, Megan. "In Defense of Platonic Essentialism About Numbers." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 14, no. 1 (April 6, 2021): 103–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.14.1.103-113.
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In defense of anti-essentialism, pragmatist Richard Rorty holds that we may think of all objects as if they were numbers. I find that Rorty’s metaphysics hinges on two rather weak arguments against the essences of numbers. In contrast, Plato’s metaphysics offers a plausible definition of essentiality by which numbers do have essential properties. Further, I argue that Rorty’s argumentative mistake is mischaracterizing Plato’s definition. I conclude that Plato’s definition of “essential” is a robust one which implies that many properties, beyond those we might intuitively think of, can count as essential properties of objects.
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Wu, Megan. "In Defense of Platonic Essentialism about Numbers." Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal 14 (2021): 102–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/stance2021148.
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In defense of anti-essentialism, pragmatist Richard Rorty holds that we may think of all objects as if they were numbers. I find that Rorty’s metaphysics hinges on two rather weak arguments against the essences of numbers. In contrast, Plato’s metaphysics offers a plausible definition of essentiality by which numbers do have essential properties. Further, I argue that Rorty’s argumentative mistake is mischaracterizing Plato’s definition. I conclude that Plato’s definition of “essential” is a robust one which implies that many properties, beyond those we might intuitively think of, can count as essential properties of objects.