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1
Wesoły, Marian. "ΑΝΑΛΥΣΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ Restoring Aristotle’s Lost Diagrams of the Syllogistic Figures." Peitho. Examina Antiqua, no. 1(3) (February 11, 2013): 83–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2012.1.4.
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The article examines the relevance of Aristotle’s analysis that concerns the syllogistic figures. On the assumption that Aristotle’s analytics was inspired by the method of geometric analysis, we show how Aristotle used the three terms (letters), when he formulated the three syllogistic figures. So far it has not been appropriately recognized that the three terms — the major, the middle and the minor one — were viewed by Aristotle syntactically and predicatively in the form of diagrams. Many scholars have misunderstood Aristotle in that in the second and third figure the middle term is outside and that in the second figure the major term is next to the middle one, whereas in the third figure it is further from it. By means of diagrams, we have elucidated how this perfectly accords with Aristotle's planar and graphic arrangement. In the light of these diagrams, one can appropriately capture the definition of syllogism as a predicative set of terms. Irrespective of the tricky question concerning the abbreviations that Aristotle himself used with reference to these types of predication, the reconstructed figures allow us better to comprehend the reductions of syllogism to the first figure. We assume that the figures of syllogism are analogous to the figures of categorical predication, i.e., they are specific syntactic and semantic models. Aristotle demanded certain logical and methodological competence within analytics, which reflects his great commitment and contribution to the field.
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Johnston, Rebekah. "Aristotle on Wittiness." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 24, no. 2 (2020): 323–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/epoche2020226157.
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Aristotle claims, in his Nicomachean Ethics, that in addition to being, for example, just and courageous, and temperate, the virtuous person will also be witty. Very little sustained attention, however, has been devoted to explicating what Aristotle means when he claims that virtuous persons are witty or to justifying the plausibility of the claim that wittiness is a virtue. It becomes especially difficult to see why Aristotle thinks that being witty is a virtue once it becomes clear that Aristotle’s witty person engages in what he calls ‘educated insolence’. Insolence, for Aristotle, is a form of slighting which, as he explains in the Rhetoric, generally causes the person slighted to experience shame and anger. In this paper, I attempt to bring some clarity to Aristotle’s claim that being witty is a virtue by examining why Aristotle thinks that the object of a witty person’s raillery will find this joking pleasant.
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Ganson, Todd Stuart. "Aristotle's Metaphysics. Aristotle, Joe Sachs." Isis 92, no. 1 (March 2001): 153–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/385074.
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Santoro, Alessio. "A City of Guardians: Refocusing the Aim and Scope of Aristotle’s Critique of Plato’s Republic." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought 36, no. 2 (June 28, 2019): 313–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340212.
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Abstract In Politics 2.2-5 Aristotle criticises the state described in Plato’s Republic. The general consensus in the secondary literature (in particular after E. Bornemann) is that Aristotle’s critique is unfair and too narrow in scope. Aristotle unjustifiably ignores significant parts of Plato’s Republic and unreasonably assumes that the community of wives, children and property extends to the whole of Kallipolis. Although R. Mayhew’s defence of Aristotle’s criticism has mitigated this negative assessment, the problem has remained unresolved. This paper questions the traditional view and suggests an explanation of Aristotle’s selective reading of Plato’s Republic. Based on what turns out to be a reasonable interpretation of Plato’s text, Aristotle does not extend Plato’s communism to the whole city, but rather reduces Plato’s city to the community of the guardians. As a result, Aristotle’s arguments in fact hit the mark and present Aristotle as a much fairer reader than is usually acknowledged.
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Wedin, Michael. "Aristotle on the Impossibility of Anaximander’s apeiron: On Generation and Corruption, 332a20-25." Phronesis 58, no. 1 (2013): 17–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341240.
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Abstract In On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle rejects the very possibility of such a thing as Anaximander’s apeiron. Characterized as a kind of intermediate stuff, the apeiron turns out to consist of contraries and as such is impossible. Commentators have rightly noted this point and some have also indicated that Aristotle offers an argument of sorts for his negative estimate. However, the argument has received scant attention, and it is fair to say that it remains unclear exactly why Aristotle rejects Anaximander’s intermediate stuff. Indeed, it is unclear how Aristotle’s argument is supposed to run in the first place. This paper offers a reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument for the impossibility of the apeiron, and on this basis offers to explain Aristotle’s grounds for rejecting Anaximander’s intermediate stuff. This is especially called for in light of the fact that Aristotle himself thinks that there can be intermediate stuffs. Finally, some attention is given to the parallel between the apeiron and Aristotle’s prime matter.
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Gregory, Andrew. "Aristotle, Dynamics and Proportionality." Early Science and Medicine 6, no. 1 (2001): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157338201x00019.
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AbstractWhat ought we to make of Aristotle's apparently disparate comments on bodies in motion? I argue that Aristotle is concerned with a higher level project than dynamics and that is the establishment of a coherent theory of change in general. This theory is designed to avoid the paradoxes and infinities that Aristotle finds in Eleatic, Heraclitean and atomist accounts, notably in relation to comparatives such as 'quicker' and 'slower'. This theory relies on a broad application of proportionality to all types of change, not merely those we would label 'dynamics'. To support this I argue that Aristotle denied the existence of the void and the possibility of instantaneous change, and that he could accommodate 'threshold' changes within his scheme. If this is so, then the aims of Aristotle's comments on motion become more comprehensible, and it will be understandable why Aristotle was more concerned with the application of proportionality in general rather with the investigation of specific cases in dynamics.
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JANSSENS, Jules. "Ibn Sīnā’s Aristotle." Mediterranea. International Journal on the Transfer of Knowledge, no. 3 (March 31, 2018): 129. http://dx.doi.org/10.21071/mijtk.v0i3.10773.
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Ibn Sīnā’s reading of Aristotle is that of an Arabic and Neoplatonized Aristotle, but, above all, critical, as the two commentaries of his Kitāb al-Insāf, i.e., on Lambda 6-10 and the pseudo-Theology, show. Ibn Sīnā read Aristotle’s works only in Arabic translation and was therefore influenced by their very wording. However, as his commentary on Lambda 6-10 shows, he looked at different translations, or even indirect testimonies, as e.g. Themistius’ paraphrase. Moreover, Ibn Sīnā offers a Neoplatonic inspired interpretation of Aristotle’s metaphysics, especially its theology. Such Neoplatonic reading is almost natural if one, as he does, considers the Theology, which mainly offers a paraphrase of Plotinus’ Enneads IV-VI, as a genuine Aristotelian work, even if Ibn Sīnā suspects a manipulation of the text by dishonest people, in all likelihood some Isma‘ilites. Eventually, Ibn Sīnā, despite his great reference for Aristotle, detects some flaws in the latter’s thinking, or, at least, in its very wording. All in all, Ibn Sīnā reveals to be a critical commentator, who considered Aristotle as the father, or even Godfather, of philosophy, but who nevertheless placed the search for truth above all.
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Bartlett, Robert C. "Aristotle's Science of the Best Regime." American Political Science Review 88, no. 1 (March 1994): 143–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2944887.
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Aristotle's science of the best regime brings to light an almost forgotten hut by no means settled quarrel between reason and faith concerning the best way of life and its political embodiments. Aristotle denies the claimed superiority of divine legislation, in favor of the guidance supplied by unaided reason. Aristotle knows, however, as contemporary political science may not, that only by confronting the divine law as such can science avoid collapsing into dogmatism. The present study attempts to sketch that confrontation by considering Aristotle's analysis of justice—the concern fundamental to both Aristotle and divine law—in order simply to encourage the kind of reflection necessary to reinvigorate rationalism, or that which, according to Aristotle, is closest to the divine in man.
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Sarch, Alexander. "What's Wrong With Megalopsychia?" Philosophy 83, no. 2 (April 2008): 231–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003181910800048x.
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AbstractThis paper looks at two accounts of Aristotle's views on the virtue of megalopsychia. The first, defended by Christopher Cordner, commits Aristotle to two claims about the virtuous person that might seem unpalatable to modern readers. The second account, defended by Roger Crisp, does not commit Aristotle to these claims. Some might count this as an advantage of Crisp's account. However, I argue that Cordner's account, not Crisp's, is actually the better interpretation of Aristotle. Nonetheless, this does not ultimately spell trouble for Aristotle, since, as I argue, the claims that Cordner's account commits Aristotle to are, on closer inspection, not really problematic.
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Heath, Malcolm. "Aristotle on Natural Slavery." Phronesis 53, no. 3 (2008): 243–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852808x307070.
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AbstractAristotle's claim that natural slaves do not possess autonomous rationality (Pol. 1.5, 1254b20-23) cannot plausibly be interpreted in an unrestricted sense, since this would conflict with what Aristotle knew about non-Greek societies. Aristotle's argument requires only a lack of autonomous practical rationality. An impairment of the capacity for integrated practical deliberation, resulting from an environmentally induced excess or deficiency in thumos (Pol. 7.7, 1327b18-31), would be sufficient to make natural slaves incapable of eudaimonia without being obtrusively implausible relative to what Aristotle is likely to have believed about non-Greeks. Since Aristotle seems to have believed that the existence of people who can be enslaved without injustice is a hypothetical necessity, if those capable of eudaimonia are to achieve it, the existence of natural slaves has implications for our understanding of Aristotle's natural teleology.
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Berti, Enrico. "My Walks With Aristotle." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 7, no. 1 (March 17, 2016): 55–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2016.1.3.
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In connection with the ongoing celebration of Aristotle’s Year that has been announced by UNESCO, the Poznan Archaeological Reserve – Genius Loci organized a series of lectures “Walks with Aristotle” that refer to the famous name of the Peripatos school. This invitation has been accepted by one of the greatest scholars of Aristotle, Professor Enrico Berti from the University of Padua, who has been publishing for more than 50 years various studies on the philosophy of the Stagirite as well as on the history of philosophy. Recently, his very instructive book, entitled Aristotle’s Profile, has appeared in Polish translation (Poznań 2016). Professor Berti’s presentation provides an overview of his most important achievements. Included in these are his forthcoming works: his new translation and commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics as well as his monograph Aristotelismo which reconstructs the diverse interpretations of Aristotle’s doctrines through centuries: from logic to epistemology, from physics to psychology and zoology, from metaphysics to ethics and politics and lastly from rhetoric to poetics.
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FRANK, JILL. "Citizens, Slaves, and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature." American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (February 2004): 91–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055404001029.
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To most readers, Aristotle's many references to nature throughout the first book of thePoliticsimply a foundational role for nature outside and prior to politics. Aristotle, they claim, pairs nature with necessity and, thus, sets nature as a standard that fixes the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in political life. Through readings of Aristotle on the nature of citizens, slaves, and foreigners in thePolitics, this essay argues, in contrast, that, to Aristotle, nature, especially human nature, is changeable and shaped by politics. Through an analysis of Aristotle's philosophical and scientific treatments of nature in theMetaphysicsandPhysics, this essay demonstrates that in order to preserve what he takes to be characteristic and also constitutive of a distinctively human way of living—prohaireticactivity—Aristotle is especially keen to guard against any assimilation of nature to necessity.
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Coren, Daniel. "Aristotle on Self-Change in Plants." Rhizomata 7, no. 1 (April 1, 2019): 33–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2019-0002.
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Abstract A lot of scholarly attention has been given to Aristotle’s account of how and why animals are capable of moving themselves. But no one has focused on the question, whether self-change is possible in plants on Aristotle’s account. I first give some context and explain why this topic is worth exploring. I then turn to Aristotle’s conditions for self-change given in Physics VIII.4, where he argues that the natural motion of the elements does not count as self-motion. I apply those conditions to natural change in plants. Then I explore the reasons for and consequences of Aristotle’s argument that plants are incapable of sensation. I argue that for Aristotle plants cannot possess the directing faculties for self-change, namely, desire and phantasia. My goal is to show why growth, metabolism, and reproduction in plants would not count as self-change for Aristotle, despite many of these natural changes appearing as autonomous as the analogous changes in animals. This sheds light on how, for Aristotle, self-change differs from natural change.
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Woleński, Jan. "Aristotle and Tarski." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 8, no. 1 (October 24, 2017): 261–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2017.1.17.
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Alfred Tarski frequently declared that his semantic definition of truth was inspired by Aristotle’s views. The present paper discusses this issue in the context of Marian Wesoły’s criticism of the thesis that there is an affinity between Tarski’s views and those of Aristotle. The article concludes with an inquiry into whether Aristotle’s definition of truthfulness can be identified with the correspondence theory of truth.
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Woleński, Jan. "Aristotle and Tarski." Peitho. Examina Antiqua, no. 1(8) (October 24, 2017): 261–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/peitho.2017.12230.
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Alfred Tarski frequently declared that his semantic definition of truth was inspired by Aristotle’s views. The present paper discusses this issue in the context of Marian Wesoły’s criticism of the thesis that there is an affinity between Tarski’s views and those of Aristotle. The article concludes with an inquiry into whether Aristotle’s definition of truthfulness can be identified with the correspondence theory of truth.
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Nielsen, Karen. "Dirtying Aristotle's Hands? Aristotle's Analysis of 'Mixed Acts' in the Nicomachean Ethics III, 1." Phronesis 52, no. 3 (2007): 270–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852807x208017.
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AbstractThe analysis of 'mixed acts' in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1 has led scholars to attribute a theory of 'dirty hands' and 'impossible oughts' to Aristotle. Michael Stocker argues that Aristotle recognizes particular acts that are simultaneously 'right, even obligatory', but nevertheless 'wrong, shameful and the like'. And Martha Nussbaum commends Aristotle for not sympathizing 'with those who, in politics or in private affairs, would so shrink from blame and from unacceptable action that they would be unable to take a necessary decision for the best'. In this paper I reexamine Aristotle's analysis of putatively 'mixed acts' in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1, maintaining that Aristotle denies that there are acts that are (i) voluntary under the circumstances, (ii) right, all things considered, under the circumstances, but nevertheless (iii) shameful or wrong for moral or prudential reasons under the circumstances. The paper defends this interpretation with reference to Aristotle's discussion of shame in EN IV, 9 and Rhetoric II, 6, as well as his overall meta-ethical commitment to a position I call 'mitigated circumstantial relativism'. By focusing on Aristotle's analysis of putatively 'mixed acts', we come closer to a true appreciation of Aristotle's ethical theory, even though 'mixed act' is not, I argue, a category in Aristotle's considered ontology of action.
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Cherry, Kevin M. "A Series of Footnotes to Plato's Philosophers." Review of Politics 80, no. 2 (2018): 257–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670517001267.
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AbstractIn her magisterial Plato's Philosophers, Catherine Zuckert presents a radically new interpretation of Plato's dialogues. In doing so, she insists we must overcome reading them through the lens of Aristotle, whose influence has obscured the true nature of Plato's philosophy. However, in her works dealing with Aristotle's political science, Zuckert indicates several advantages of his approach to understanding politics. In this article, I explore the reasons why Zuckert finds Aristotle a problematic guide to Plato's philosophy as well as what she sees as the character and benefits of Aristotle's political theory. I conclude by suggesting a possible reconciliation between Zuckert's Aristotle and her Plato, insofar as both the Socrates whom Plato made his hero and Aristotle agree that political communities will rarely direct citizens toward virtue by means of law and that we must instead look to informal means of doing so.
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Byrne, Christopher. "Aristotle and Scientific Experiments." Dialogue 59, no. 4 (December 2020): 527–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217320000244.
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ABSTRACTMany have argued that there is no room for experiments in Aristotle's natural science: experiments intervene in nature, but Aristotle holds that we must simply observe nature; if we intervened, the result would be something artificial or contrary to nature. Against this, I argue that Aristotle not only performed experiments, but also holds that there is much about nature that can be discovered experimentally.
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Shatalov, Keren Wilson. "Continuity and Mathematical Ontology in Aristotle." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 14, no. 1 (May 22, 2020): 30–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i1p30-61.
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In this paper I argue that Aristotle's understanding of mathematical continuity constrains the mathematical ontology he can consistently hold. On my reading, Aristotle can only be a mathematical abstractionist of a certain sort. To show this, I first present an analysis of Aristotle's notion of continuity by bringing together texts from his Metaphysica and Physica, to show that continuity is, for Aristotle, a certain kind of per se unity, and that upon this rests his distinction between continuity and contiguity. Next I argue briefly that Aristotle intends for his discussion of continuity to apply to pure mathematical objects such as lines and figures, as well as to extended bodies. I show that this leads him to a difficulty, for it does not at first appear that the distinction between continuity and contiguity can be preserved for abstract mathematicals. Finally, I present a solution according to which Aristotle's understanding of continuity can only be saved if he holds a certain kind of mathematical ontology.
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Nielsen, Karen. "The Private Parts of Animals: Aristotle on the Teleology of Sexual Difference." Phronesis 53, no. 4-5 (2008): 373–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852808x338337.
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AbstractIn this paper I examine Aristotle's account of sexual difference in Generation of Animals, arguing that Aristotle conceives of the production of males as the result of a successful teleological process, while he sees the production of females as due to material forces that defeat the norms of nature. My suggestion is that Aristotle endorses what I call the "degrees of perfection" model. I challenge Devin Henry's attempt to argue that Aristotle explains sex determination exclusively with reference to material necessity (in particular, levels of "vital heat" in the male semen), for Aristotle's notion of "sufficient" or "deficient" vital heat is itself teleological. If, as Aristotle is aware, male and female embryos appear with approximately equal frequency in most species, how, in light of Physics II, can he conceive of the former as in accordance with nature, and the latter as somehow contrary to nature? My proposal is that Aristotle's notion of what happens usually (ως επì τò πoλυ) is bifurcated: the usual need not be more frequent.
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Duncombe, Matthew. "The Scandal of Deduction and Aristotle’s Method for Discovering Syllogisms." Rhizomata 8, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 289–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2020-0013.
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Abstract (1) If a deductive argument is valid, then the conclusion is not novel. (2) If the conclusion of an argument is not novel, the argument is not useful. So, (3) if a deductive argument is valid, it is not useful. This conclusion, (3), is unacceptable. Since the argument is valid, we must reject at least one premise. So, should we reject (1) or (2)? This puzzle is usually known as the ‘scandal of deduction’. Analytic philosophers have tried to reject (1) but have assumed premise (2). I argue here that Aristotle would deny (2). Aristotle thinks that at least some deductive arguments are useful, even though they present no new conclusions. Thus, Aristotle’s view contrasts with analytic philosophers of logic, who assume that all useful deductive arguments present novel conclusions. I don’t claim that Aristotle ‘solves’ the problem: it was never posed in Aristotle’s time. Rather, I suggest that Aristotle does not face the problem because he assumes deductions can be useful, without presenting novel conclusions. Aristotle’s view of deduction tames the scandal.
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Cohoe, Caleb. "Why the Intellect Cannot Have a Bodily Organ: De Anima 3.4." Phronesis 58, no. 4 (2013): 347–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341253.
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Abstract I reconstruct Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. I present Aristotle’s account of the ‘aboutness’ or intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual. On my interpretation, Aristotle’s account is based around the notion of cognitive powers taking on forms in a special preservative way. Based on this account, Aristotle argues that no physical structure could enable a bodily part or combination of bodily parts to produce or determine the full range of forms that the human intellect can understand. For Aristotle, cognitive powers with bodily organs are always spatio-temporally limited, but the understanding is not. Aristotle claims that our understanding applies to all instances of the thing understood wherever and whenever they exist. On Aristotle’s own account the intellect in its nature is only ‘potential’, it does not actually possess any form. Thus nothing prevents it from possessing all forms.
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BOŽILOVIĆ, JELENA. "ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE." Kultura polisa, no. 44 (March 8, 2021): 173–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.51738/kpolisa2021.18.1r.3.02.
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Aristotle’s understanding of political community is strongly linked with the view on political naturalism and the concept of a man as a moral being. According to Aristotle, man (by nature) achieves his human potential by living in a community, however, the political community on its own, as the largest and the most significant among all communities, enables citizens to fully develop their virtue through their participation in political life. For this reason, a man and the community are joined in a relationship resulting in mutual creation of ethics: by living in a polis, an individual develops virtue, and conversely, his virtuous actions in the community enable a polis to endure on ethical principles. This conception is found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, and is encompassed in the theory of virtue, theory of citizenship and a detailed consideration of the forms of political systems. Although elitist and exclusivist, Aristotle’s ethical and political views remain intact in terms of the value ascribed to the “the philosophy of human life”, as his legacy continues to inspire modern social thought. The aim of this paper is to show the connection Aristotle makes between a political community and ethical principles while pointing to their universal importance through the analysis of Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.
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Gabbe, Myrna. "Aristotle on the Good of Reproduction." Apeiron 53, no. 4 (October 25, 2020): 363–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2018-0040.
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AbstractThis paper discusses Aristotle’s theory of reproduction: specifically, the good that he thinks organisms attain by reproducing. The aim of this paper is to refute the widespread theory that Aristotle believes plants and animals reproduce for the sake of attenuated immortality. This interpretive claim plays an important role in supporting one leading interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology: the theory that Aristotelian nature is teleologically oriented with a view solely to what benefits individual organisms, and what benefits the organism is its survival and well–being. This paper challenges the theories that Aristotle takes plants and animals to reproduce for the sake of attenuated immortality, and that he believes survival to be the most basic of goods. It is argued that Aristotle believes reproduction is detrimental to organisms’ health and longevity but nonetheless is central to plant and animal flourishing. It is claimed that, to explain the fundamentality of the reproductive soul function, Aristotle appeals to the eternal and divine.
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Hayes, M. G. "Aristotle’s geometrical accounting." Cambridge Journal of Economics 44, no. 6 (July 28, 2020): 1429–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/beaa025.
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Abstract This paper comments on Ambrosi’s ‘Aristotle’s geometrical accounting’ (Cambridge Journal of Economics 2018, 42, 543–576). While supporting Ambrosi’s case that Aristotle may well have used geometry to demonstrate accounting equivalence, the paper takes issue with Ambrosi’s specific approach to interpreting Aristotle’s ‘merit or worth’ in terms of income. It is entirely reasonable to understand worth in terms of income. However, Ambrosi implies that worth is determined by market prices; this is inconsistent with Aristotle’s treatment of distributive justice. Rather Aristotle states that relative worth is determined prior to market exchange. In other words, Aristotle seeks to identify the just price to which market prices may or may not correspond. Ambrosi’s own geometrical method is extended to illustrate this point, to provide a geometrical alternative to Ambrosi’s algebraic derivation of the key proposition ‘as builder to shoemaker, so shoes to houses’, and to resolve what Aristotle means by ‘one should not introduce them as terms in a figure of proportion when they are already making the exchange (since otherwise one of the two extremes will have both of the excess amounts) but when they are still in possession of their own products’. Aristotle deserves recognition as the first Western economist and as a Classical economist to boot, in the sense of holding that distribution is determined prior to exchange.
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Vogiatzi, Melpomeni. "Aristotle on the Soul as Harmony." Elenchos 41, no. 2 (December 16, 2020): 245–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2020-0014.
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AbstractA topic common to both Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussions of theories of the soul is the doctrine of the soul as a harmony of the parts of the body. Plato’s Phaedo as well as Aristotle’s De anima and Eudemus present this theory and argue against the identification of the soul as a harmony. This paper has two focuses, one philosophical and one historical. First, I will focus on the argumentation used by Aristotle in his dialogue Eudemus, which is often associated with Aristotle’s early attachment to Plato. On the basis of the argumentation against the harmonia theory, I will try to show that the Eudemus is not a dialogue that depicts Aristotle’s Platonic phase. Instead, by comparing the arguments of the Eudemus with both Plato and Aristotle’s mature thought, I will argue that the argumentation of the Eudemus seems to be an indirect attack on Plato’s view on the Forms and on the nature of the soul, and that it seems to be consistent with Aristotle’s mature work On the Soul. Second, given that Aristotle discusses this topic twice, I will try, also on the basis of conclusions about the Eudemus and on later reception of Aristotle’s arguments, to show why this is the case.
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Varlamova, Maria. "Philoponus on the Nature of the Heavens and the Movement of Elements in Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World." Scrinium 14, no. 1 (September 20, 2018): 446–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18177565-00141p29.
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Abstract This paper deals with the John Philoponus' arguments against the eternity of the heavens in context of the dispute against the eternity of the world. The theory of eternity of the heavens was defended by Aristotle in his Physics and in the 1st book On the Heavens. In his treatise On Eternity of the World against Aristotle Philoponus attacks the arguments of Aristotle in order to prove the essential finititude of the heavens. The Philoponus' arguments are related to the nature and motion of elements and especially to the nature of fire. In order to explore the Philoponus' arguments against Aristotle I compare his doctrine with the Aristotle's theories of elemental nature and celestial motion.
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Müller, Jörn. "Aristoteles und der naturalistische Fehlschluß." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 11 (December 31, 2006): 25–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.11.04mul.
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Is Aristotle’s ethics founded on a naturalistic fallacy? This article examines in detail the criticism which was levelled at Aristotle by George Edward Moore in his Principia Ethica in 1903. In order to check the correctness of this assumption, Aristotle’s notion of goodness is reconstructed by an analysis of his theoretical as well as his ethical writings. The picture which emerges shows that Aristotle does not understand goodness as a univocal term but as an analogical concept the focal meaning of which is closely related to the perfection of the different natural things or species. Since Moore’s criticism presupposes a univocal definition of goodness, Aristotle’s treatment of this notion does not fall prey to it. Although his understanding of goodness is connected with his teleology of nature, Aristotle is not guilty of deriving ›ought‹ from ›is‹; therefore, his ethics is also immune to the second argument against the naturalistic fallacy which is usually traced back to David Hume.
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Bartky, Elliot. "Aristotle and the Politics of Herodotus's History." Review of Politics 64, no. 3 (2002): 445–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500034975.
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In the Poetics, Aristotle criticizes Herodotus by claiming that poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history. Aristotle's remark may be understood as a defense of poetry against Herodotus's attempt to supplant the political teaching of the poets and the wise men. Aristotle aligns poetry with philosophy because the poets' political teaching serves the city at the same time that it anticipates political philosophy. In the second section of the article Herodotus's quarrel with the political teaching of the poets, especially Homer, is considered in light of Aristotle's account of the poets. Approaching Herodotus in this manner underscores the significance, for Aristotle, of the politics of Herodotus's History. The third section of the article begins with a discussion of Herodotus's indebtedness to, and difference from, the pre-Socratic philosophers, and goes on to consider Herodotus's quarrel with the wise men. Herodotus's quarrel with the poets and the wise men provides us with a better idea of why Aristotle sought to associate poetry with philosophy, and distinguish them from history.
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CRESPO, RICARDO F. "Aristotle on agency, habits and institutions." Journal of Institutional Economics 12, no. 4 (April 21, 2016): 867–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137416000059.
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AbstractThis paper introduces Aristotle's conception of agency, habits and institutions as a way of contributing to some current discussions about the definition, nature and theory of institutions. Aristotle developed a theory of human action, where we can find a place for ‘agency’. His views on habits are linked to his theory of virtue and art (skill). Concerning institutions, Aristotle provides a sound social and political philosophy that encompasses the nature and role of institutions. The paper will subsequently present Aristotle's ideas on these three notions – agency, habits and institutions – and will finally establish which of the current accounts of institutions involved in the discussion sparked by Hindriks and Guala's recent paper (2005a) he would support. Given that some realities tackled in the paper are nowadays radically different from Aristotle's times, the paper tries to keep an ‘Aristotelian-minded’ point of view – that is, analysing current topics based on Aristotelian concepts.
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Botting, David. "Without Qualification: An Inquiry Into the Secundum Quid." Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 36, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 161–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/slgr-2014-0008.
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Abstract In this paper I will consider several interpretations of the fallacy of secundum quid as it is given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations and argue that they do not work, one reason for which is that they all imply that the fallacy depends on language and thus fail to explain why Aristotle lists this fallacy among the fallacies not depending on language (extra dictione), amounting often to a claim that Aristotle miscategorises this fallacy. I will argue for a reading that preserves Aristotle’s categorization by a quite different account of how qualifications function.
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Cohoe, Caleb. "Why Continuous Motions Cannot Be Composed of Sub-motions: Aristotle on Change, Rest, and Actual and Potential Middles." Apeiron 51, no. 1 (January 26, 2018): 37–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2016-0069.
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Abstract I examine the reasons Aristotle presents in Physics VIII 8 for denying a crucial assumption of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox: that every motion is composed of sub-motions. Aristotle claims that a unified motion is divisible into motions only in potentiality (δυνάμει). If it were actually divided at some point, the mobile would need to have arrived at and then have departed from this point, and that would require some interval of rest. Commentators have generally found Aristotle’s reasoning unconvincing. Against David Bostock and Richard Sorabji, inter alia, I argue that Aristotle offers a plausible and internally consistent response to Zeno. I defend Aristotle’s reasoning by using his discussion of what to say about the mobile at boundary instants, transitions between change and rest. There Aristotle articulates what I call the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule: what is true of something at a boundary instant is what is true of it over the time of its rest. By contrast, predications true of something over its period of change are not true of the thing at either of the boundary instants of that change. I argue that this rule issues from Aristotle’s general understanding of change, as laid out in Phys. III. It also fits well with Phys. VI, where Aristotle maintains that there is a first boundary instant included in the time of rest, but not a “first in which the mobile began to change.” I then show how this rule underlies Aristotle’s argument that a continuous motion cannot be composed of actual sub-motions. Aristotle distinguishes potential middles, points passed through en route to a terminus, from actual middles. The Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule only applies to actual middles, because only they are boundaries of change that the mobile must arrive at and then depart from. On my reading, Aristotle argues that the instant of arrival, the first instant at which the mobile has come to be at the actual middle, cannot belong to the time of the subsequent motion. If it did, the mobile would already be moving towards the next terminus and thus, per Phys. VI 6, would have already left. But it cannot have moved away from the midpoint at the very same moment it has arrived there. This means that the instant of arrival must be separated from the time of departure by an interval of rest. I show how Aristotle’s reasoning applies generally to rule out any continuous reflexive motion or continuous complex rectilinear motion. On my interpretation, however, the argument does not apply to every change of direction. When, as in the case of projectile motion, multiple movers and their relative powers explain why the mobile changes directions, distinct sub-motions are not involved. Aristotle holds that such motions cannot be continuous, not because they involve intervals of rest, but because they involve multiple causes of motion. My interpretation of the Changes are Open, Rests are Closed Rule allows us to make better sense of Aristotle’s argument than any previous interpretation.
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Jones, Russell E. "Truth and Contradiction in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 6-9." Phronesis 55, no. 1 (2010): 26–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/003188610x12589452898804.
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AbstractIn De Interpretatione 6-9, Aristotle considers three logical principles: the principle of bivalence, the law of excluded middle, and the rule of contradictory pairs (according to which of any contradictory pair of statements, exactly one is true and the other false). Surprisingly, Aristotle accepts none of these without qualification. I offer a coherent interpretation of these chapters as a whole, while focusing special attention on two sorts of statements that are of particular interest to Aristotle: universal statements not made universally and future particular statements. With respect to the former, I argue that Aristotle takes them to be indeterminate and so to violate the rule of contradictory pairs. With respect to the latter, the subject of the much discussed ninth chapter, I argue that the rule of contradictory pairs, and not the principle of bivalence, is the focus of Aristotle’s refutation. Nevertheless, Aristotle rejects bivalence for future particular statements.
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Perälä, Mika. "Aristotle on Perceptual Discrimination." Phronesis 63, no. 3 (May 23, 2018): 257–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341351.
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AbstractIt is commonly assumed that Aristotle defines a sense by reference to its ability to perceive the items that are proper to that sense, and that he explains perceptions of unities of these items, and discriminations between them, by reference to what is called the ‘common sense’. This paper argues in contrast that Aristotle defines a sense by reference, not only to its ability to perceive the proper items, but also to its ability to discriminate between them, and thus aims to show that Aristotle’s theory of sense perception is basically a theory of perceptual discrimination.
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Djuric, Drago. "Aristotle: Necessity, contingency, freedom." Theoria, Beograd 51, no. 2 (2008): 99–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo0802099d.
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In this article the author attempts to present Aristotle's argumentation against the universal fatalism, which is, in the view of fatalists, a necessary consequence of the universal application of the principle of bivalence to the contradictory propositions about the future state of affairs. This problem Aristotle examines in his De Interpretatione ch. 9, wich is the main issue here. Presentation flows trough three steps: 1. Aristotle's formulation of the problem, 2. Aristotle's presentation and criticism of the logical determinism and, finally, 3. Aristotle's libertarian solution of the problem. Author points out that through the history of interpretation of the problem there are different views. These views differ not only concerning the spirit of Aristotle's text or his final solution, but concerning the way in which he refuted the universal validity of the logical determinism and fatalism.
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Tsalla, Helen. "Aristotle on Political Norms and Monarchy." Politeia 1, no. 3 (2019): 45–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/politeia20191319.
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Constitutions differ in kind, according to Aristotle (Politics, III), and the perverted ones are posterior to the nondeviant ones. This paper interprets Aristotle’s treatment of monarchy in light of his distinction in Posterior Analytics (I) between the order of being (constitutional types) and the order of experience (existing constitutions). The paper moves from an analysis of political definitions (Politics, III) and their psychological implications to Aristotle’s analysis of kingship as a species of constitutional correctness. It becomes apparent that, when discussing the relation between a political community and the rule befitting it, Aristotle is consistently using cognates of potency (dunamis) whereby a form already present in a thing becomes the principle of formal actualization of another. Such a mutual relation between rulers and ruled and between their psychological powers sheds light on Aristotle’s inclusion of kingship among proper constitutions, even in the absence of shared governance, and to his willingness to suggest policies that preserve even tyrannies.
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Dangel, Tobias. "Hegel's Reception of Aristotle's Theology." Hegel Bulletin 41, no. 1 (September 27, 2019): 102–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2019.14.
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AbstractIn several of his writings Hegel suggests an identification of his absolute idea/spirit with Aristotle's God in the Metaphysics. This suggestion is remarkable since it indicates that Hegel regarded his philosophy in line with classical positions in ancient metaphysics. Although there is increasing discussion of the relation between Hegel and Aristotle it is still doubtful what it was that Hegel seemed to find at the highest point of Aristotle's philosophy. To clarify this relation within the realm of first philosophy I will first give a short reconstruction of Aristotle's conception of God in order, second, to confront this conception with the absolute idea/spirit in Hegel. Against Ferrarin, I will not primarily discuss the conception of actuality/activity and infinite subjectivity; rather I will focus on Aristotle's and Hegel's ontological understanding of truth. The new thesis in my paper is that Hegel can relate his theory of the absolute idea/spirit to Aristotle's God on the basis of their shared understanding of truth. This understanding allows both of them to find the highest realization and thus the fulfillment of truth in the self-thinking thinking of God (Aristotle) or the self-thinking thinking of the absolute idea/spirit (Hegel). When Hegel seems to return to Aristotle at the end of his system, this return has its systematic link in the idea of a fulfilled truth which is God or the Absolute in the sense of self-thinking thinking. Although Hegel's return to Aristotle's theology has a certain plausibility, it is also limited by the fact that for Aristotle God's self-thinking thinking is not a process of self-determination, as Hegel finds it to be and which leads him to miss a crucial feature of Aristotle's theology.
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Remer, Gary. "Rhetoric, Emotional Manipulation, and Political Morality." Rhetorica 31, no. 4 (2013): 402–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/rh.2013.31.4.402.
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Notwithstanding the widespread assumption that Aristotle forges a better relationship among rhetoric, the emotions, and political morality than Cicero, I contend that Cicero, not Aristotle, offers a more relevant account of the relationship among these terms. I argue that, by grounding his account of emotional appeals in the art of rhetoric, Aristotle does not evade the moral problems originating in emotional manipulation. Moreover, Aristotle's approach to emotional appeals in politics is, compared to Cicero's, static, unable to adapt to new political circumstances. I suggest that Cicero's approach to the rhetorical emotions is more acceptable to a modern audience than Aristotle's because it is ethically based while also responsive to political realities. Cicero accommodates emotional appeals to circumstance based on his belief in decorum as a moral principle. Further, I show that emotional manipulation in Cicero is not as problematical as it initially appears.
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Quarantotto, Diana. "Aristotle’s Way away from Parmenides’ Way. A Case of Scientific Controversy and Ancient Humour." Elenchos 37, no. 1-2 (December 1, 2016): 209–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2016-371-209.
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Abstract In Physics Α, Aristotle introduces his science of nature and devotes a substantial part of the investigation to refuting the Eleatics’ theses, and to resolving their arguments, against plurality and change. In so doing, Aristotle also dusts off Parmenides’ metaphor of the routes of inquiry and uses it as one of the main schemes of his book. Aristotle’s goal, I argue, is to present his own physical investigation as the only correct route, and to show that Parmenides’ “way of truth” is instead both wrong and a sidetrack. By revisiting Parmenides’ metaphor of the route, Aristotle twists it against him, distorts it and uses this distortion as a source of fun and of some mockery of Parmenides himself. Thereby, Physics Α gives us a taste of Aristotle’s biting humour and of his practice of the “virtue” of wit (eutrapelia).
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Gomilko, Olga. "The Return of Aristotle: The World Congress “Philosophy of Aristotle”(Athens, July 9 -15, 2016)." Filosofiya osvity. Philosophy of Education 19, no. 2 (December 23, 2016): 245–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.31874/2309-1606-2016-19-2-245-256.
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The process of consolidation of post-material values requires strengthening of the position of human mind. Aristotle’s return is meant to teach humankind how to use the mind effectively in order to act properly for achieving a dignified life. The revival of interest in Aristotle’s philosophy restores his status as a teacher and renounces the perception of Aristotle as an opponent. The World Congress “Philosophy of Aristotle”, which took place on July 9—15, 2016 in Greece, marks an important step in this process. The coverage of the congress in this article is based on personal impressions, and it does not mean to present the overall content of the congress work. The purpose of the article is to provoke philosophical discussion about institutional issues of the Ukrainian philosophical life.
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Malink, Marko. "Aristotle on Circular Proof." Phronesis 58, no. 3 (2013): 215–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341249.
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Abstract In Posterior Analytics 1.3, Aristotle advances three arguments against circular proof. The third argument relies on his discussion of circular proof in Prior Analytics 2.5. This is problematic because the two chapters seem to deal with two rather disparate conceptions of circular proof. In Posterior Analytics 1.3, Aristotle gives a purely propositional account of circular proof, whereas in Prior Analytics 2.5 he gives a more complex, syllogistic account. My aim is to show that these problems can be solved, and that Aristotle’s third argument in 1.3 is successful. I argue that both chapters are concerned with the same conception of circular proof, namely the propositional one. Contrary to what is often thought, the syllogistic conception provides an adequate analysis of the internal deductive structure of the propositional one. Aristotle achieves this by employing a kind of multiple-conclusion logic.
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Hamlyn, D. W. "Aristotle on Dialectic." Philosophy 65, no. 254 (October 1990): 465–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003181910006469x.
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There have in recent years been at least two important attempts to get to grips with Aristotle's conception of dialectic. I have in mind those by Martha C. Nussbaum in ‘Saving Aristotle's appearances’, which is chapter 8 of her The Fragility of Goodness, and by Terence H. Irwin in his important, though in my opinion somewhat misguided, book Aristotle's First Principles. There is a sense in which both of these writers are reacting to the work of G. E. L. Owen on cognate matters, particularly his well-known paper ‘Tithenai ta phainomena’. Owen himself was in part reacting to what I suppose is the traditional view of how Aristotle regarded dialectic, as revealed in Topics I. 1. On that view dialectic is for Aristotle a lesser way of proceeding than is demonstration, the method of science. For demonstration proceeds from premises which are accepted as true in themselves (that is to say that they are essentially and thus in some sense necessarily true) and moves from them to conclusions which follow necessarily from those premises; and the middle term of such a demonstrative syllogism then provides the ‘reason why’ for the truth of the conclusion. Dialectic proceeds from premises which are accepted on a lesser basis ‘by everyone or by the majority or by the wise, i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them’ (Topics I.1, 100b21–3), and proceeds deductively from them to further conclusions.
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Giardina, Giovanna R. "Empedocles and the Other Physiologists in Aristotle’s Physics II 8." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 7, no. 1 (December 1, 2016): 13–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2016.1.1.
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In this paper I propose to show: 1) that in Phys. II 8 Aristotle takes Empedocles as a paradigm for a theoretical position common to all philosophers who preceded him: the view that materialism implies a mechanistic explanation of natural becoming; and 2) that, since Empedocles is regarded as a philosopher who clearly expresses the position of all mechanistic materialists, Aristotle builds his teleological arguments precisely to refute him. Indeed, Aristotle believes that refuting the arguments of Empedocles – the champion of mechanism – means refuting the mechanistic theory itself. In order to illustrate this point, I will discuss some passages from Phys. II 8, while also turning to consider the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle’s Physics. I will then endeavour to explain why in 198b19 ff. Aristotle formulates the argument of rain, which has attracted so much attention from scholars of the Physics: I will consider whether Aristotle believes that rain serves a purpose, contrary to what he claims with regard to meteorological phenomena in Meteorologica.
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TIPTON, JASON A. "Aristotle's observations of the foraging interactions of the red mullet (Mullidae: Mullus spp) and sea bream (Sparidae: Diplodus spp)." Archives of Natural History 35, no. 1 (April 2008): 164–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e0260954108000156.
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A brief but detailed observation which Aristotle made regarding the foraging behavior of the red mullet (Mullus surmuletus) is examined closely in order to better understand the substance of the discussion. Aristotle's description of the heterospecific red mullet/sea bream foraging behavior is evaluated in light of contemporary observations and life history characteristics. Possible methods, including underwater observations with the use of diving equipment and observations in fish ponds, employed by Aristotle in making these observations are discussed. I also speculate on the ways in which the red mullet/sea bream interaction might be thought of as gregarious behavior according to Aristotle.
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Clayton, Edward W. "The Audience for Aristotle's Rhetoric." Rhetorica 22, no. 2 (2004): 183–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/rh.2004.22.2.183.
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Abstract Although there is general consensus that knowledge of Aristotle's intended audience is important for understanding the Rhetoric, there is no consensus about who that audience is. In this essay, four of the most widely accepted theories are investigated: that Aristotle is writing for the legislator of an ideal city; that Aristotle is writing for the Athenian public or an elite subset of that public; that Aristotle is writing for his students; and that the Rhetoric was written for multiple audiences over an extended period of time. Ultimately, the most plausible of these explanations is that he is writing for his students.
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Distelzweig, Peter M. "The Intersection of the Mathematical and Natural Sciences: The Subordinate Sciences in Aristotle." Apeiron 46, no. 2 (April 2013): 85–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2011-0008.
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Abstract Aristotle is aware of the mathematical treatment of natural phenomena constitutive of Greek astronomy, optics, harmonics, and mechanics. Here I provide an account of Aristotle’s understanding of these ‘subordinate sciences’, drawing on both his methodological discussions and his optical treatment of the rainbow in Meteorology III 5. This account sheds light on the de Caelo, in which Aristotle undertakes a natural investigation of the heavens distinct from, but closely related to, astronomical (thus mathematical) investigations. Although Aristotle insists that such subordinate sciences belong to mathematical and not natural science, he sees them as essential to complete scientific knowledge of the sensible world.
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Duncombe, Matthew. "Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7." Phronesis 60, no. 4 (September 11, 2015): 436–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341292.
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AtCategories7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives (R1), but at 8a13-28 worries that the definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives (R2, at 8a31-2) to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot explain Aristotle’s attitude to relatives, since he immediately returns to using R1. I propose a non-extensional reading. R1 and R2 do not specify different sets of relatives, but rather different ways to understand each relative.
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Johnstone, Mark A. "Aristotle and Alexander on Perceptual Error." Phronesis 60, no. 3 (May 20, 2015): 310–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341287.
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Aristotle sometimes claims that (i) the perception of special perceptibles by their proper sense is unerring. This claim is striking, since it might seem that we quite often misperceive things like colours, sounds and smells. Aristotle also claims that (ii) the perception of common perceptibles (e.g. shape, number, movement) is more prone to error than the perception of special perceptibles. This is puzzling in its own right, and also places constraints on the interpretation of (i). I argue that reading Alexander of Aphrodisias on perceptual error offers an understanding of Aristotle that can help us to make good sense of both of Aristotle’s claims.
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Pettigrew, Richard. "Aristotle on the Subject Matter of Geometry." Phronesis 54, no. 3 (2009): 239–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852809x441340.
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AbstractI offer a new interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of geometry, which he presents in greatest detail in Metaphysics M 3. On my interpretation, Aristotle holds that the points, lines, planes, and solids of geometry belong to the sensible realm, but not in a straightforward way. Rather, by considering Aristotle's second attempt to solve Zeno's Runner Paradox in Book VIII of the Physics, I explain how such objects exist in the sensibles in a special way. I conclude by considering the passages that lead Jonathan Lear to his fictionalist reading of Met. M3,1 and I argue that Aristotle is here describing useful heuristics for the teaching of geometry; he is not pronouncing on the meaning of mathematical talk.
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Wians, William. "Commentary on Kirkland." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 29, no. 1 (May 19, 2014): 214–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134417-00291p18.
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In his fine paper on the aims of Aristotle’s methods, Sean Kirkland suggests that Aristotle practiced a proto-phenomenological approach to truth. In doing so, Kirkland reminds us of the lived dimension of Aristotle’s philosophizing, an active and ongoing response to the world that begins long before the emergence of philosophical concepts and systems. I am in sympathy with much of what Kirkland argues. However, I think more needs to be said about the relationship between dialectic and demonstration, and about the precise nature of dialectic itself, which Aristotle characterizes as a form of deductive argument, rather than the loose collection of inductive techniques implied by Kirkland. Aristotle shows a remarkable sensitivity to the complexity of searching for principles, and the variety of means by which the search is conducted, implying a need for a discourse on methods, though he himself supplies it only unsystematically.