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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Aristotle – Nicomachean ethics

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Academic literature on the topic 'Aristotle – Nicomachean ethics'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Aristotle – Nicomachean ethics"

1

Hursthouse, Rosalind. "Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 35–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004008.

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Our understanding of the moral philosophy of Aristotle is hampered by a number of modern assumptions we make about the subject. For a start, we are accustomed to thinking about ethics or moral philosophy as being concerned with theoretical questions about actions—what makes an action right or wrong? Modern moral philosophy gives two different sorts of answers to this question. One is in terms of a substantial ethical theory—what makes an action right or wrong is whether it promotes the greatest happiness, or whether it is in accordance with or violates a moral rule, or whether it promotes or violates a moral right. The other sort gives a meta-ethical answer—rightness and wrongness are not really properties of actions, but in describing actions as right or wrong we commend or object to them, express our approval or disapproval or our emotions concerning them. But the ancient Greeks start with a totally different question. Ethics is supposed to answer, for each one of us, the question ‘How am I to live well?’ What this question means calls for some discussion.

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Hursthouse, Rosalind. "Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 35–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004004.

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Our understanding of the moral philosophy of Aristotle is hampered by a number of modern assumptions we make about the subject. For a start, we are accustomed to thinking about ethics or moral philosophy as being concerned with theoretical questions about actions—what makes an action right or wrong? Modern moral philosophy gives two different sorts of answers to this question. One is in terms of a substantial ethical theory—what makes an action right or wrong is whether it promotes the greatest happiness, or whether it is in accordance with or violates a moral rule, or whether it promotes or violates a moral right. The other sort gives a meta-ethical answer—rightness and wrongness are not really properties of actions, but in describing actions as right or wrong we commend or object to them, express our approval or disapproval or our emotions concerning them. But the ancient Greeks start with a totally different question. Ethics is supposed to answer, for each one of us, the question ‘How am I to live well?’ What this question means calls for some discussion.

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Owens, Joseph, Aristotle, and Terence Irwin. "Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics." Classical World 80, no. 4 (1987): 333. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4350061.

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Heinze, Eric. "The meta-ethics of law: Book One of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics." International Journal of Law in Context 6, no. 1 (February 25, 2010): 23–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744552309990280.

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Traditional scholarship has approached Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics mostly as a system of positive ethics. Less attention has been paid to the work’s meta-ethics – the claims Aristotle makes about what any system of positive ethics must say or do in order to count as an ethical theory. In this article, Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics is read not simply as an introduction to Aristotle’s system of positive ethics, but as a statement of distinct meta-ethical principles, which can be evaluated independently of any view that might be taken of his positive ethics. Insofar as Aristotle inscribes his legal theory within his ethical theory, those principles stand as a meta-ethics of law. Under Aristotle’s legal meta-ethics, law necessarily presupposes: (1) a concept of the ‘good’; (2) purpose; (3) dialectics; (4) objectivist ethics; (5) a best constitution; (6) a positive ethics; and (7) a concept of the ‘human’.

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von der Luft, Eric. "Nicomachean Ethics. By Aristotle." Modern Schoolman 66, no. 1 (1988): 79–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman19886615.

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BOŽILOVIĆ, JELENA. "ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE." Kultura polisa, no. 44 (March 8, 2021): 173–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.51738/kpolisa2021.18.1r.3.02.

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Aristotle’s understanding of political community is strongly linked with the view on political naturalism and the concept of a man as a moral being. According to Aristotle, man (by nature) achieves his human potential by living in a community, however, the political community on its own, as the largest and the most significant among all communities, enables citizens to fully develop their virtue through their participation in political life. For this reason, a man and the community are joined in a relationship resulting in mutual creation of ethics: by living in a polis, an individual develops virtue, and conversely, his virtuous actions in the community enable a polis to endure on ethical principles. This conception is found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, and is encompassed in the theory of virtue, theory of citizenship and a detailed consideration of the forms of political systems. Although elitist and exclusivist, Aristotle’s ethical and political views remain intact in terms of the value ascribed to the “the philosophy of human life”, as his legacy continues to inspire modern social thought. The aim of this paper is to show the connection Aristotle makes between a political community and ethical principles while pointing to their universal importance through the analysis of Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.

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Crisp, Roger. "Nobility in the Nicomachean Ethics." Phronesis 59, no. 3 (June 3, 2014): 231–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341267.

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AbstractThis paper suggests that we understand Aristotle’s notion of nobility (τὸ καλόν) as what is morally praiseworthy, arguing that nobility is not to be understood impartially, that Aristotle is an egoist at the level of justification (though not at the level of motivation), and that he uses the idea of the noble as a bridge between self-interest and moral virtue. Implications for contemporary ethics are discussed.

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APOSTOLOPOULOU, Georgia. "The Initial Anthropology in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics." WISDOM 8, no. 1 (June 29, 2017): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.24234/wisdom.v8i1.175.

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In the ‘Foreword’, I address some aspects of Academician Georg Brutian’s philosophy. The Initial Anthropology paper follows. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considers the relation of ethical theory to anthropology in a specific way. He sets out an initial anthropology that describes the human through its common and non-common elements to plants as well as to ‘other animals’. The conclusion is that the human animal is the only living being that is endowed with reason and carries out ‘practical life’. We may call this difference ‘the anthropological difference’. In his ethical theory, Aristotle points to the limits of the anthropological difference. On the one hand, he holds that only practical theory can explain the ‘practical life’ as well as the ‘human Good’. On the other hand, he highlights that the human is higher than the ‘other animals’, since the human is endowed with the divine element of intellect; nevertheless, there are beings that are ‘more divine’ than the human. Thus Aristotle corroborates the human and its practical life, without abandoning the Socratic-Platonic view of the Divine. In this aspect, the alleged anthropocentrism of Aristotle’s ethics is to be reconsidered.

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Pugh, John K. "The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle." Teaching Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1989): 82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil198912120.

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Nielsen, Karen. "Dirtying Aristotle's Hands? Aristotle's Analysis of 'Mixed Acts' in the Nicomachean Ethics III, 1." Phronesis 52, no. 3 (2007): 270–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852807x208017.

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AbstractThe analysis of 'mixed acts' in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1 has led scholars to attribute a theory of 'dirty hands' and 'impossible oughts' to Aristotle. Michael Stocker argues that Aristotle recognizes particular acts that are simultaneously 'right, even obligatory', but nevertheless 'wrong, shameful and the like'. And Martha Nussbaum commends Aristotle for not sympathizing 'with those who, in politics or in private affairs, would so shrink from blame and from unacceptable action that they would be unable to take a necessary decision for the best'. In this paper I reexamine Aristotle's analysis of putatively 'mixed acts' in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1, maintaining that Aristotle denies that there are acts that are (i) voluntary under the circumstances, (ii) right, all things considered, under the circumstances, but nevertheless (iii) shameful or wrong for moral or prudential reasons under the circumstances. The paper defends this interpretation with reference to Aristotle's discussion of shame in EN IV, 9 and Rhetoric II, 6, as well as his overall meta-ethical commitment to a position I call 'mitigated circumstantial relativism'. By focusing on Aristotle's analysis of putatively 'mixed acts', we come closer to a true appreciation of Aristotle's ethical theory, even though 'mixed act' is not, I argue, a category in Aristotle's considered ontology of action.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Aristotle – Nicomachean ethics"

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Feldman, Noah Raam. "Reading the Nicomachean Ethics with Ibn Rushd." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.386422.

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Pascarella, John Antonio. "Friendship, Politics, and the Good in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2015. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc801900/.

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In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX provide A philosophic examination of friendship. While these Books initially appear to be non sequiturs in the inquiry, a closer examination of the questions raised by the preceding Books and consideration of the discussion of friendship's position between two accounts of pleasure in Books VII and X indicate friendship's central role in the Ethics. In friendship, Aristotle finds a uniquely human capacity that helps readers understand the good is distinct from pleasure by leading them to think seriously about what they can hold in common with their friends throughout their lives without changing who they are. What emerges from Aristotle's account of friendship is a nuanced portrait of human nature that recognizes the authoritative place of the intellect in human beings and how its ability to think about an end and hold its thinking in relation to that end depends upon whether it orders or is ordered by pleasures and pains. Aristotle lays the groundwork for this conclusion throughout the Ethics by gradually disclosing pleasures and pains are not caused solely by things we feel through the senses, but by reasoned arguments and ideas as well. Through this insight, we can begin to understand how Aristotle's Ethics is a work of political philosophy; to fully appreciate the significance of his approach, however, we must contrast his work with that of Thomas Hobbes, his harshest Modern critic. Unlike Aristotle, Hobbes is nearly silent on friendship in his political philosophy, and examining his political works especially Leviathan reveals the absence of friendship is part of his deliberate attempt to advance a politics founded on the moral teaching that pleasure is the good. Aristotle's political philosophy, by way of contrast, aims to preserve the good, and through friendship, he not only disentangles the good from pleasure, but shows a level of human community more suitable for preserving the good than political regimes because these communities have more natural bonds than any regime can hope to create between its citizens.

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Berry, Matthew. "Law, Justice, and Equity in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, Boston College, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107190.

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Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett
At the beginning of the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that, according to common opinion, justice is lawful and fair. He concludes his examination of justice with a discussion of equity, which proves to be neither strictly lawful nor strictly fair—and yet Aristotle tells us that equity is, in a certain sense, the highest form of justice. This dissertation explains how Aristotle reaches this startling conclusion. I begin with an exploration of the careful taxonomy of justice that Aristotle lays out in the first half of book five. But Aristotle abruptly abandons this taxonomy midway through the book when he turns from the simply just to the politically just. For this reason and others, I argue that the second half of the book is not, as some have asserted, the application of the universal principles of justice to a political situation, but a new beginning and a fresh attempt to articulate the virtue of justice, free from the flaws we discover through a careful study of the first half of the book. Aristotle’s political justice takes its bearings from the health of a republican government, that is, a government of free and equal citizens. And yet political justice, like political courage, remains on the level of politics. Aristotle’s discussion of equity at the end of the book presents the virtuous form of justice, which corrects the flaws of justice as lawfulness and justice as fairness and permits justice to take its place in the economy of a noble human life
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Political Science

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Wong, Kin Keung. "Comparison of Nicomachean ethics and the ethics of Confucius : appropriateness of moral decisions /." View abstract or full-text, 2009. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?HUMA%202009%20WONG.

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Rabinoff, Sharon Eve. "Perception in Aristotle's Ethics." Thesis, Boston College, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3323.

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Thesis advisor: Marina McCoy
In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the project of developing virtue and of being virtuous is always realized in one's immediate, particular circumstances. Given that perception is the faculty that gains access to the particular, Aristotle seems to afford perception a central role in ethical life. Yet Aristotle does not provide an account of ethical perception: he does not explain how the perceptual faculty is able grasp ethically relevant facts and how the perceptual capacity can do so well, nor does he explain the manner in which perception influences ethical decisions and actions. It is the project of this dissertation to provide such accounts. There are two main difficulties in the notion of ethical perception in Aristotle's thought: first, perception appears ill-suited to ethical life because the objects of perception are always perceived with respect to the individual's subjective condition--her desires, fears, etc. The information relayed by perception is always relative to the perceiver, i.e. merely the apparent good. Second, virtue is the excellence of the rational soul, while perception is a faculty shared by non-rational animals. It appears, then, that perception must be limited to playing an instrumental role in ethical reasoning and action. This dissertation addresses these difficulties by developing an account of uniquely human perception that is influenced and informed by the intellectual element of the soul. I argue that the project of ethical development, for Aristotle, is the project of integrating one's perceptual faculty with the intellectual capacity, such that one's perception transcends the natural relativity to the perceiver and gains access to the true good as it emerges in one's particular situation
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy

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Rosler, Andres. "The authority of the state and the political obligation of the citizen in Aristotle." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.313581.

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Kim, Bradford Jean-Hyuk. "Aristotle on the value of friends." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2018. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7a7d2d16-2514-457c-a217-968af1111a60.

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In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle's account of friendship is egoistic. Focusing on the Nicomachean Ethics, I begin with VIII.2. Here Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only because of the lovable (φιλητóv), which divides into the useful, pleasant, and good. I argue that "because of (διὰ)" refers to at least the final cause and that "the lovable" refers to what appears to contribute one's own happiness (εuδαιμoνία); therefore Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. This result may seem incompatible with some types of concern Aristotle principally attributes to his normative paradigm of complete friendship: wishing goods for the sake of the other and loving the other for himself. One might argue that these types of concern are altruistic, and so it cannot be the case that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. I argue that these types of concern ultimately hinge on one's own happiness. The object is the lovable (what appears to contribute to one's own happiness), specifically the good instantiated by the other's virtue; further, what a virtuous person takes as valuable about another's virtue is how it facilitates her own virtuous activity, that is, her own happiness. From here I turn to Aristotle's notion of 'another self'. One popular interpretation of other selfhood defies the altruism/egoism divide. Here the essential feature of other selfhood is virtue, which allows for no prioritization among virtuous people; there is no prioritization of the other over oneself (as in altruism) nor of oneself over the other (as in egoism), since the relevant parties are equal in moral standing (they are virtuous). Assessing the instances of 'another self' in the Nicomachean Ethics VIII.12, IX.4, and IX.9, I argue for an egoistic interpretation of other selfhood; the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one's own actualization. That is, what makes other selves valuable is how they facilitate one's own virtuous activity, one's own happiness. Finally, I address the doctrine of self-love in the Nicomachean Ethics IX.8. Again, some interpreters derive non-prioritization from the text; Aristotle claims that all virtuous people identify with the understanding (voũç), so, the non-prioritization interpretation goes, there can be no prioritization among virtuous agents, as they are identical in the relevant way. I argue for an egoistic interpretation of IX.8; Aristotle endorses praiseworthy self-love, which involves maximizing the superlatively valuable fine (καλòν) for oneself over others. Moreover, such self-prioritization occurs precisely by gratifying the understanding, that which was supposed to ground non-prioritization.

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Sher, Gavin. "The artistic path to virtue." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004370.

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Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.

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Elsey, Timothy Alan. "Deliberation and the Role of the Practical Syllogism." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1302455557.

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Stervinou, Louis. "A Critical Interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2027.

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This essay is a critical interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, as it attempts to reconcile the tension between moral virtue and intellectual virtue, the two virtues which Aristotle deems characteristic of man. This paper looks to include both moral and intellectual virtue in Aristotle’s conception of the happy life, through the summarization and analyzation of David Keyt, J.L Ackrill, John Cooper and Daniel Devereux’s modern interpretations of the ethics.

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Books on the topic "Aristotle – Nicomachean ethics"

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Aspasius. On Aristotle Nicomachean ethics 8. London: Duckworth, 2001.

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Aristotle and the virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

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On Aristotle's "Nicomachean ethics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.

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Joachim, Harold H. Aristotle, the Nicomachean ethics: A commentary. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1985.

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Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics: A critical guide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

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Aristóteles. Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.

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1964-, Bartlett Robert C., and Collins Susan D. 1960-, eds. Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.

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1948-, Natali Carlo, ed. Aristotle: Nicomachean ethics, Book VII: Symposium Aristotelicum. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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Emidio, Campi, and McLelland Joseph C, eds. Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics. Kirksville, Mo: Truman State University Press, 2006.

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The Routledge guide book to Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013.

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Book chapters on the topic "Aristotle – Nicomachean ethics"

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Broadie, Sarah. "Aristotle and Contemporary Ethics." In The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 342–61. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470776513.ch16.

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Meyer, Susan Sauvé. "Aristotle on the Voluntary." In The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 137–57. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470776513.ch6.

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Crisp, Roger. "Aristotle on Greatness of Soul." In The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 158–78. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470776513.ch7.

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Reeve, C. D. C. "Aristotle on the Virtues of Thought." In The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 198–217. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470776513.ch9.

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Baggini, Julian. "Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics (c.334–323 BCE)." In Philosophy: Key Texts, 11–34. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-1370-8_2.

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Lear, Gabriel Richardson. "Aristotle on Moral Virtue and the Fine." In The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 116–36. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470776513.ch5.

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Kraye, Jill. "Like Father, Like Son: Aristotle, Nicomachus and the Nicomachean Ethics." In Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia, 155–80. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1484/m.ipm-eb.4.001047.

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Pascale, Miriam. "Ira e compassione. Fonti aristotelico-tomiste di Decameron VIII 7." In Intorno a Boccaccio / Boccaccio e dintorni 2019, 115–28. Florence: Firenze University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/978-88-5518-236-2.07.

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This essay aims to examine the philosophic sources behind the representation of passions in Boccaccio’s tale of the scholar and the widow (Decameron VIII 7). If the definition of anger is attributable to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, I believe that it is possible to assume that the description of compassion, only mentioned in the moral treatise, derives instead from the Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where compassion is seen as a passion opposed to a kind of wrath, that is, indignation. The paper also investigates Boccaccio’s reception of the Latin translation of Aristotle’ Rhetoric. Did Boccaccio have direct knowledge of the Aristotelian text? Or had it been mediated to him by Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae?

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Echeñique, Javier. "Another Dissimilarity between Moral Virtue and Skills: An Interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics II 4." In Soul and Mind in Greek Thought. Psychological Issues in Plato and Aristotle, 199–215. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78547-9_10.

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Aristotle. "Nicomachean Ethics." In Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, edited by Christopher Rowe and Sarah Broadie. Oxford University Press, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oseo/instance.00262114.

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Conference papers on the topic "Aristotle – Nicomachean ethics"

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Marola, Victor. "THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS IN ARISTOTLE�S POLITICS AND THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS." In 4th International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts SGEM2017. STEF92 Technology, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2017/22/s09.084.

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