Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Aristotle – Nicomachean ethics'

In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX provide A philosophic examination of friendship. While these Books initially appear to be non sequiturs in the inquiry, a closer examination of the questions raised by the preceding Books and consideration of the discussion of friendship's position between two accounts of pleasure in Books VII and X indicate friendship's central role in the Ethics. In friendship, Aristotle finds a uniquely human capacity that helps readers understand the good is distinct from pleasure by leading them to think seriously about what they can hold in common with their friends throughout their lives without changing who they are. What emerges from Aristotle's account of friendship is a nuanced portrait of human nature that recognizes the authoritative place of the intellect in human beings and how its ability to think about an end and hold its thinking in relation to that end depends upon whether it orders or is ordered by pleasures and pains. Aristotle lays the groundwork for this conclusion throughout the Ethics by gradually disclosing pleasures and pains are not caused solely by things we feel through the senses, but by reasoned arguments and ideas as well. Through this insight, we can begin to understand how Aristotle's Ethics is a work of political philosophy; to fully appreciate the significance of his approach, however, we must contrast his work with that of Thomas Hobbes, his harshest Modern critic. Unlike Aristotle, Hobbes is nearly silent on friendship in his political philosophy, and examining his political works especially Leviathan reveals the absence of friendship is part of his deliberate attempt to advance a politics founded on the moral teaching that pleasure is the good. Aristotle's political philosophy, by way of contrast, aims to preserve the good, and through friendship, he not only disentangles the good from pleasure, but shows a level of human community more suitable for preserving the good than political regimes because these communities have more natural bonds than any regime can hope to create between its citizens.

Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett
At the beginning of the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that, according to common opinion, justice is lawful and fair. He concludes his examination of justice with a discussion of equity, which proves to be neither strictly lawful nor strictly fair—and yet Aristotle tells us that equity is, in a certain sense, the highest form of justice. This dissertation explains how Aristotle reaches this startling conclusion. I begin with an exploration of the careful taxonomy of justice that Aristotle lays out in the first half of book five. But Aristotle abruptly abandons this taxonomy midway through the book when he turns from the simply just to the politically just. For this reason and others, I argue that the second half of the book is not, as some have asserted, the application of the universal principles of justice to a political situation, but a new beginning and a fresh attempt to articulate the virtue of justice, free from the flaws we discover through a careful study of the first half of the book. Aristotle’s political justice takes its bearings from the health of a republican government, that is, a government of free and equal citizens. And yet political justice, like political courage, remains on the level of politics. Aristotle’s discussion of equity at the end of the book presents the virtuous form of justice, which corrects the flaws of justice as lawfulness and justice as fairness and permits justice to take its place in the economy of a noble human life
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Political Science

Thesis advisor: Marina McCoy
In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the project of developing virtue and of being virtuous is always realized in one's immediate, particular circumstances. Given that perception is the faculty that gains access to the particular, Aristotle seems to afford perception a central role in ethical life. Yet Aristotle does not provide an account of ethical perception: he does not explain how the perceptual faculty is able grasp ethically relevant facts and how the perceptual capacity can do so well, nor does he explain the manner in which perception influences ethical decisions and actions. It is the project of this dissertation to provide such accounts. There are two main difficulties in the notion of ethical perception in Aristotle's thought: first, perception appears ill-suited to ethical life because the objects of perception are always perceived with respect to the individual's subjective condition--her desires, fears, etc. The information relayed by perception is always relative to the perceiver, i.e. merely the apparent good. Second, virtue is the excellence of the rational soul, while perception is a faculty shared by non-rational animals. It appears, then, that perception must be limited to playing an instrumental role in ethical reasoning and action. This dissertation addresses these difficulties by developing an account of uniquely human perception that is influenced and informed by the intellectual element of the soul. I argue that the project of ethical development, for Aristotle, is the project of integrating one's perceptual faculty with the intellectual capacity, such that one's perception transcends the natural relativity to the perceiver and gains access to the true good as it emerges in one's particular situation
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy

In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle's account of friendship is egoistic. Focusing on the Nicomachean Ethics, I begin with VIII.2. Here Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only because of the lovable (φιλητóv), which divides into the useful, pleasant, and good. I argue that "because of (διὰ)" refers to at least the final cause and that "the lovable" refers to what appears to contribute one's own happiness (εuδαιμoνία); therefore Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. This result may seem incompatible with some types of concern Aristotle principally attributes to his normative paradigm of complete friendship: wishing goods for the sake of the other and loving the other for himself. One might argue that these types of concern are altruistic, and so it cannot be the case that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. I argue that these types of concern ultimately hinge on one's own happiness. The object is the lovable (what appears to contribute to one's own happiness), specifically the good instantiated by the other's virtue; further, what a virtuous person takes as valuable about another's virtue is how it facilitates her own virtuous activity, that is, her own happiness. From here I turn to Aristotle's notion of 'another self'. One popular interpretation of other selfhood defies the altruism/egoism divide. Here the essential feature of other selfhood is virtue, which allows for no prioritization among virtuous people; there is no prioritization of the other over oneself (as in altruism) nor of oneself over the other (as in egoism), since the relevant parties are equal in moral standing (they are virtuous). Assessing the instances of 'another self' in the Nicomachean Ethics VIII.12, IX.4, and IX.9, I argue for an egoistic interpretation of other selfhood; the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one's own actualization. That is, what makes other selves valuable is how they facilitate one's own virtuous activity, one's own happiness. Finally, I address the doctrine of self-love in the Nicomachean Ethics IX.8. Again, some interpreters derive non-prioritization from the text; Aristotle claims that all virtuous people identify with the understanding (voũç), so, the non-prioritization interpretation goes, there can be no prioritization among virtuous agents, as they are identical in the relevant way. I argue for an egoistic interpretation of IX.8; Aristotle endorses praiseworthy self-love, which involves maximizing the superlatively valuable fine (καλòν) for oneself over others. Moreover, such self-prioritization occurs precisely by gratifying the understanding, that which was supposed to ground non-prioritization.

Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.

This essay is a critical interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, as it attempts to reconcile the tension between moral virtue and intellectual virtue, the two virtues which Aristotle deems characteristic of man. This paper looks to include both moral and intellectual virtue in Aristotle’s conception of the happy life, through the summarization and analyzation of David Keyt, J.L Ackrill, John Cooper and Daniel Devereux’s modern interpretations of the ethics.

In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes the assumption that there are five states of the soul through which we interact with truth. He continues Book VI with a discussion of his intended meaning of each of these states of the soul. In this study the relevant discussions on each state are extracted from the text to enable a clearer understanding of these states, as Aristotle presents them. Subsequently, the role of each state is studied in the context of the entire Nicomachean Ethics. The primary focus is directed at a clearer understanding of Aristotle’s proposed intellectual virtues, and on their respective roles in the ethical life. Simultaneously, the ethical life that Aristotle presents, and its ultimate end eudaimonia, or happiness, are approached from this perspective. Aristotle argues that reason is the distinguishing feature of humans, and that man’s excellence must include the excellent use of this capacity. This study investigates how Aristotle proposes that the rational intellect should reach its completion, and comes to the conclusion that true mastery of the intellect can only result from the cooperation of the five states of the rational soul. It becomes evident that each state of the soul has a different nature and function, and that through directed cooperation they do not compete with one another, but are mutually enhanced. However, Aristotle repeatedly emphasises the importance of extending thought into action. This makes Aristotle’s ethical theory so attractive: he manages to consolidate his theorizing with the value of experienced reality. This is his essential key to happiness, which is experienced both in perception and in action. By approaching the Nicomachean Ethics from the perspective of the five states of the rational soul, an appreciation is acquired for the fine balance by which action and reason may combine to result in man’s fulfilment of his highest potential. It is in this balance that one finds the secret to eudaimonia.
Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2011.
Ancient Languages
unrestricted

The purpose of this thesis is to deepen the understanding of our contemporary description of digital literacy using the perspective on knowledge from the Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle. I have chosen to deal with the problem using a hermeneutic approach. The method of inquiry is based on close reading of the selected literature. The selection itself has been made after a strategic selection regarding perspective on knowledge and digital literacy. It appears in the thesis that there are substantial differences but also similarities between our contemporary description of digital literacy from Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 on key competences for lifelong learning and the perspective on knowledge from the Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle.Still, the result has been possible to use for the purpose of the thesis since the problem has an answer and a deepened impression of the understandings of digital literacy.

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The concept of philia occupies much of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and generates several problems with the rest of the work. This research aims to resolve the inconsistency between the concepts of friendship and self-sufficiency and to carry out this task, this research is devoted to an exposition of the concepts of friendship and self-sufficiency in the first two chapters, and finally in the third, passes to the resolution of the inconsistency. From a reading of the notion of allos autos (another self), is intended to show that not only the concept of friendship does not contradict with the concept of autarkéia (self-sufficiency), but also that the concept of philia (friendship) acts as a stabilizing agent of human happiness against contingency multiplicity
O conceito de philia ocupa boa parte da Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles e gera diversos problemas em relação ao restante da obra. A presente investigação tem como objetivo solucionar a inconsistência entre os conceitos de amizade e autossuficiência e, para levar a cabo esta tarefa, dedica-se, nos dois primeiros capítulos, a uma exposição dos conceitos de amizade e autossuficiência para finalmente no terceiro passar à resolução dessa inconsistência. A partir de uma leitura da noção de allos autos (outro eu), pretende-se mostrar que não somente o conceito de amizade não se contradiz com o de autarkéia (autossuficiência), mas que o conceito de philia (amizade) age como um agente estabilizador da felicidade humana frente à multiplicidade da contingência

This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity (an attitude which belongs to the activated state) is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity (as many interpreters assume). I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation.

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
Este trabalho visa investigar se, em Aristóteles, e, sobretudo na Ethica Nicomachea (EN), é possível encontrar elementos para a fundamentação dos conceitos atribuídos posteriormente à ética e à moral. Embora a virtude ética seja descrita de uma única forma em grego - êthikê aretê -, buscaremos trazer indicações de que já havia na EN diferentes manifestações de sua aplicação prática. Uma primeira manifestação seria a ação em consonância às leis gerais e aos costumes, que poderíamos relacionar à atual moral. Já a êthikê, em uma segunda manifestação, seria identificada a casos particulares, em que a lei não se aplica facilmente, mas o homem virtuoso é capaz de agir conforme a justa medida (mesotes). Esta idéia se apóia na cidade almejada por Aristóteles, em que caberá à Política orquestrar esta complexa êthikê.
This paper aims at investigating if it is possible to find in Aristotle s work, especially in the Ethica Nicomachea (EN), elements to substantiate the concepts that were later attributed to ethics and to moral. Although ethical virtue is uniquely described in Greek - êthikê aretê - we will seek to find evidence that different demonstrations of its practical application could already be found in the EN. The first demonstration would be acting in consonance with the general laws and customs, which could be related to today’s moral. In a second demonstration, êthikê would be found in particular cases where the law could not be easily applied, but in which the virtuous person is capable of acting accordingly to the mean state (mesotes). This idea is supported by the city envisioned by Aristotle, where Politics would be responsible for orchestrating this complex êthikê.

Cette thèse doctorale étudie la question de la valeur morale de l'individu et de son existence relative au cadre sociétal et institutionnel, sur la base del'Expositio super libros ethicorum de Guiral Ot. Écrit pendant la première moitié des années 1320, il s’agit du premier commentaire complet écrit par un théologien franciscain sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Aristote. Le commentaire offre un point de vue sur le paysage intellectuel du XIVe siècle, sur l'état des savoirs et de l'éducation, sur la réception d'Aristote, et sur les pensées morales et politiques. Cette œuvre illustre les traditions intellectuelles des frères mineurs et des commentateurs aristotéliciens dont hérite Guiral ainsi que son originalité vis-à-vis de celles ci. Cette thèse explore les circonstances intellectuelles et politiques entourant la composition du commentaire de Guiral et elle tente d’ancrer ce commentaire philosophique dans son propre contexte historique. Cette thèse porte principalement sur les questions discutées dans les livres V et VI, relatifs aux vertus de la justice et de la prudence, ainsi que sur les questions trouvées dans le prologue concernant le sujet, la structure et la fin de la science morale. Dans le schéma médiéval de la philosophie morale, la justice et la prudence constituent les deux piliers des vertus cardinales. La justice est conçue comme une vertu de la volonté et joue un rôle central dans la tradition franciscaine du volontarisme moral; c'est aussi une vertu inexorablement liée au droit et au légalisme, et par conséquent à l'administration gouvernementale et au système judiciaire, thèmes que Guiral a particulièrement approfondis dans son oeuvre. Selon Guiral, la prudence représente bien plus qu'une simple notion propositionnelle issue d'un raisonnement syllogistique; elle est la raison et la liberté intellectuelle qui sous-tendent fondamentalement l'indépendance morale et volontaire de l'individu par rapport aux raisons institutionnelles. Guiral situe l'individu au cœur de toutes les considérations morales et politiques. Il dérive ainsi les principes et la structure de l’éthique de l'expérience de l’individu dans sa société. Dans son commentaire, Guiral démontre une compréhension profonde du volontarisme et du subjectivisme individuel: la liberté volontaire du sujet moral et l'humanité de la personne dépassent toujours la raison institutionnelle et l'être collectiviste
The present thesis aims to address the questions on the moral worth of the individual and his existence within a societal and institutional setting by examining Gerald Odonis’s Expositio super libros Ethicorum. Written in the early 1320s, it is the first full-length commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics produced by a Franciscan theologian. It provides a prism into the intellectual landscape of the fourteenth century, on the state of scholarship and education, on the reception of Aristotle, and on the currents of moral and political philosophy. Odonis’s Ethics commentary bears witness to both our author’s originality and the intellectual traditions that he has inherited from both the Minorites and the Aristotelian commentators. The present thesis explores the intellectual and political circumstances surrounding the composition of Odonis’s commentary text, and attempts to anchor the philosophical commentary to its proper historical context. The thesis focuses primarily on Odonis’s question commentary on Books V and VI on the virtues of justice and prudence, as well as questions raised in the prologue concerning the subject, structure, and purpose of moral science. In the medieval scheme of moral philosophy, justice and prudence constitute two pillars of the cardinal virtues. Justice is accepted as a virtue of the will, and plays a central part in the Franciscan tradition of moral voluntarism; it is also a virtue inexorably linked with law and legality, and hence to government administration and the judicial system. All these are reflected in Odonis's writing. For Odonis, prudence represents far more than mere propositional knowledge derived from simple syllogistic reasoning; instead, it is the reason and intellectual freedom that fundamentally underpins the moral and voluntary independence of the individual against reasons of the institution. Odonis places the individual at the core of every moral and political consideration, and understands the scheme and structure of the moral science through the perspective of an individual’s moral experience in society. In his commentary, Odonis displays a profound sense of voluntarism and individual subjectivism: the voluntary freedom of the moral subject and the humanity of the person always surpass the reason and being of the collectivised institutions

Esta dissertação tem por escopo a questão das emoções - ?à ???? - na obra de Aristóteles, principalmente nos livros I e II da Retórica e da Ética Nicomaquéia. A definição aristotélica de como ????? \'emoção\' foi compreendida de diversas formas, porém sempre a partir dos seguintes elementos: como integrante da porção não-racional da alma, habituável à tutela da razão, como manifestação psicofísica, como causada por cognições. O problema é, portanto, reencontrar e reunir todos esses elementos na obra do Estagirita.
This thesis aims at the question of emotions - ?à ???? - in the works of Aristotle, mainly in the first and second books of Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics. The Aristotelian definition of ????? as \'emotion\' was understood in different ways, but always from the following elements: as part of the nonrational portion of the soul; as something that can grow accustomed to reason; as a psychophysic manifestation; as caused by cognitions. The problem is to find and gather all these elements from the works of Aristotle.

A atividade realizada pelo filósofo configura uma das maiores incógnitas entre os estudiosos da ética de Aristóteles. Na Ética Nicomaqueia (EN), seu tratado moral de maior relevância, pouco é dito sobre tal atividade até as conclusões apresentadas no fim da obra, quando se afirma que a contemplação (theoretike energeia) é a melhor das ocupações humanas no que diz respeito à busca pela autorrealização (eudaimonia). Mas no que consiste, afinal, essa ocupação? Qual a razão de, dentre a ampla gama de atividades exequíveis pelo homem, o exercício dessa se identificar com o melhor tipo de vida? Há como compreendê-la satisfatoriamente apesar da quantidade limitada de passagens da EN que se referem ao seu exercício? Tendo em vista o caráter sistemático de Aristóteles e suas considerações acerca da exatidão necessária em cada assunto, buscar-se-á compreender a contemplação a partir daquilo que é exposto na EN. Ainda que o número de informações explícitas sobre ela seja pequeno, propor-se-á uma exegese dos trechos referentes à tal atividade e sua virtude, a sophia, bem como a análise de sua relação com outros momentos da obra. Ao esgotar as informações referentes à contemplação na EN, será possível concluir se seu conteúdo é suficientemente informativo ou não para os propósitos da obra e sua compreensão. Ademais, estabelecer no que consiste a atividade contemplativa é indispensável para entender aquilo que Aristóteles definiu como a vida própria do filósofo (bios theoretikos), da qual ele partilhou e à qual incitou outros a participar em diversos momentos do corpus. Apreender a contemplação do modo como Aristóteles a expôs revela um modo de vida teorizado e praticado por algumas das mentes mais brilhantes da história da filosofia, que não mediram esforços para tentar compreender e realizar sua humanidade da melhor maneira possível.
The philosophical activity configures one of the biggest incognitos among scholars researching Aristotle’s ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics (his most relevant ethical treatise) contains little information about such activity until the conclusions presented at the end of the work, when it is stated that contemplation (theoretike energeia) is the best of human occupations regarding the search for self-realization (eudaimonia). But, after all, how to understand such activity? What is the reason to identify it with the best way of living, given the variety of other activities able to be executed by men? Is it possible to understand it satisfactorily despite the limited number of passages referring to its exercise in the ethical treatise? In view of the systematic character of Aristotle and his considerations concerning the exactitude proper to each subject, contemplation will try to be understood only by what is exposed in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although the number of explicit informations about it is few, it will be proposed an exegesis of the excerpts referring to such activity and its virtue, sophia, as well as the analysis of its relation with other moments of the work. By exhausting information regarding contemplation in the Nicomachean Ethics, it will be possible to conclude whether its content is informative enough or not for the purposes of the work and its understanding. Moreover, establishing what contemplative activity consists in is essential to understand what Aristotle defined as the philosophical life (bios theoretikos), which he shared himself and also encouraged others to participate in several moments of the corpus. Apprehending contemplation in the way Aristotle exposed it reveals a way of life theorized and practiced by some of the most brilliant minds in the history of philosophy, who went to great lengths to try to comprehend and flourish their humanity in the best possible way.

In this paper, I examine the treatments of law contained within Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Plato’s Minos. I find that both offer powerful and complementary critiques of law, while recognizing law’s power and promise in shaping the character and opinions of each citizen. The Minos, though, goes further than the Ethics in describing and examining the possibility of divine law that transcends the limitations of merely human laws.
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An interpretation of how Aristotle explains the value of worldly goods within the terms of his ethical theory in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle claims that to live in a worthwhile and subjectively satisfying way--that is, to achieve eudaimonia--one needs such things as honor, wealth, friends, and political power. He groups these things together as the external goods, since they are all external in a spatial sense from the perspective of any given person. It is clear that people almost always attach value to such things, but it is less clear why Aristotle should. My aim is to explain why Aristotle regards these things as important, and--in a more formal sense--how far his definition of eudaimonia explains their value. On Aristotle's formal theory, the external goods ought to gain value through some relation to excellent rational activity, but fleshing out the details of this relation raises problems. Chapter 2 assesses Aristotle's formal argument for the value of such goods at NE I.1099a31-b8, chapter 1 develops an account of Aristotle's method in order to support this assessment, and chapter 3 considers the kinds of explanations for the value of the external goods available to Aristotle in terms of his account of action. Chapter 4 draws on the results of the earlier chapters to assess Aristotle's position on moral luck--that is, how Aristotle regards his various categories of value as depending upon factors outside of the agent's control. My aim throughout is to consider how successfully Aristotle draws on his formal theory in order to explain the value of the external goods as well as external things in the broadest sense.

In a famous argument at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the function and good of the human being is the "actuality of the soul in accordance with virtue". Presenting a view critical of the widespread intellectualist reading of Aristotle's Ethics, in this thesis I argue that the characteristic function of the human being is constitutive of a distinctly human life as a dynamic formal cause teleologically operative in human awareness. I argue for the validity of my own view in a preliminary way in the introduction by way of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic forms. In the second chapter, I argue that the processes of the non-rational part of the soul are acquired and actively operate once acquired independently of singular dictates of active reason within the individual. By this I mean that the virtues do not obey reason in the sense that they receive individual commands from discursive reason to desire or feel in certain ways. Rather, although the moral virtues are formed gradually by repeated acts of choice, as affective states, they are activated by being affected from without by external stimuli. These external stimuli produce impulses in the soul which are conducive to virtuous action, including a cognitive element: primarily, non-rational and non-discursive evaluative judgments of phantasia, which supply a human agent immediately with the ends of his action and the beginning-points of deliberation. These judgments are the awareness of sensible particulars as pleasant. In the third chapter, I turn to the De Anima in order to illuminate the cognitive conditions of human praxis. Following on the arguments contained in the second chapter, I argue that there are two primary cognitive moments which are necessary conditions of action. While the ends of desire are immediate objects of awareness and move humans as unmoved movers, motivational desires, which move as efficient causes, are initiated by a distinct cognitive power: proclamations to pursue or avoid.

The aim of the diploma theses "Logos in Aristotle Ethics" is to interpret meaning of the term "logos" in Aristotle's work "Nicomachean Ethics". The basic methodical guideline is the structuralist assumption, that a meaning of a term is determined by its relations to other terms contained within the text, and the related assumption of unity of the meaning of the term "logos". The interpretation itself first analyzes structure of several crucial terms, most importantly the relation of a human individual to the society, the concepts of the good, the reality and the possibility, the true and the illusory, and the concept of the natural. The structure of use of the term "logos" is then analyzed in relation to these concepts. These investigations are completed by analysis of the terms of virtue and action. By the means of the structural analysis of these terms, the existence of a distinctive level of reality is established, which is captured by the term "humanity". The existence of humanity is the central point of interest in Aristotle's ethics. In the horizontal regard, there are two poles of humanity - the individual human and the society. In the vertical regard, the humanity is situated between divinity, to which it is related, and bestiality, to which it threatens to fall. Logos is then a kind of...

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’élucider l’intention, la pertinence et la cohérence de l’appropriation par Heidegger des concepts principaux de la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne dans ses premiers cours. Notre analyse portera principalement sur les notions clefs d’energeia et de phronēsis. La première section de la thèse est préparatoire : elle est consacrée à une analyse étroite des textes pertinents de l’Éthique à Nicomaque, mais aussi de la Métaphysique, en discussion avec d’autres commentateurs modernes. Cette analyse jette les fondations philologiques nécessaires en vue d’aborder les audacieuses interprétations de Heidegger sur une base plus ferme. La deuxième et principale section consiste en une discussion de l’appropriation ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque que Heidegger entreprend de 1922 à 1924, à partir des textes publiés jusqu’à ce jour et en portant une attention spéciale à Métaphysique IX. Le résultat principal de la première section est un aperçu du caractère central de l’energeia pour le projet d’Aristote dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et, plus spécifiquement, pour sa compréhension de la praxis, qui dans son sens original s’avère être un mode d’être des êtres humains. Notre analyse reconnaît trois traits essentiels de l’energeia et de la praxis, deux desquels provenant de l’élucidation aristotélicienne de l’energeia dans Métaphysique IX 6, à savoir son immédiateté et sa continuité : energeia exprime l’être comme un « accomplissement immédiat mais inachevé ». L’irréductibilité, troisième trait de l’energeia et de la praxis, résulte pour sa part de l’application de la structure de l’energeia à la caractérisation de la praxis dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque, et du contraste de la praxis avec la poiēsis et la theōria. Ces trois caractéristiques impliquent que la vérité pratique ― la vérité de la praxis, ce qui est l’ « objet » de la phronēsis ― ne peut être à proprement parler possédée et ainsi transmise : plus qu’un savoir, elle se révèle surtout comme quelque chose que nous sommes. C’est ce caractère unique de la vérité pratique qui a attiré Heidegger vers Aristote au début des années 1920. La deuxième section, consacrée aux textes de Heidegger, commence par la reconstruction de quelques-uns des pas qui l’ont conduit jusqu’à Aristote pour le développement de son propre projet philosophique, pour sa part caractérisé par une profonde, bien qu’énigmatique combinaison d’ontologie et de phénoménologie. La légitimité et la faisabilité de l’appropriation clairement ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Heidegger est aussi traitée, sur la base des résultats de la première section. L’analyse de ces textes met en lumière la pénétrante opposition établie par Heidegger entre la phronēsis et l’energeia dans son programmatique Natorp Bericht en 1922, une perspective qui diverge fortement des résultats de notre lecture philologique d’Aristote dans la première section. Cette opposition est maintenue dans nos deux sources principales ― le cours du semestre d’hiver 1924-25 Platon: Sophistes, et le cours du semestre d’été 1924 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Le commentaire que Heidegger fait du texte d’Aristote est suivi de près dans cette section: des concepts tels que energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis ou hexis ― qui trouvent leur caractérisation ontologique dans la Métaphysique ou la Physique ― doivent être examinés afin de suivre l’argument de Heidegger et d’en évaluer la solidité. L’hypothèse de Heidegger depuis 1922 ― à savoir que l’ontologie aristotélicienne n’est pas à la hauteur des aperçus de ses plus pénétrantes descriptions phénoménologiques ― résulte en un conflit opposant phronēsis et sophia qui divise l’être en deux sphères irréconciliables qui auraient pour effet selon Heidegger de plonger les efforts ontologiques aristotéliciens dans une impasse. Or, cette conclusion de Heidegger est construite à partir d’une interprétation particulière de l’energeia qui laisse de côté d’une manière décisive son aspect performatif, pourtant l’un des traits essentiels de l’energeia telle qu’Aristote l’a conçue. Le fait que dans les années 1930 Heidegger ait lui-même retrouvé cet aspect de l’energeia nous fournit des raisons plus fortes de mettre en doute le supposé conflit entre ontologie et phénoménologie chez Aristote, ce qui peut aboutir à une nouvelle formulation du projet heideggérien.
The purpose of this thesis is to sort out the intent, the philosophical relevance and the consistency of Heidegger’s appropriation of the basic tenets of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in his early lecture courses. Our analysis will focus mainly on the key notions of energeia and phronēsis. The first preparatory section of the thesis is devoted to a close analysis of Aristotle’s relevant texts of the Nicomachean Ethics, but also of the Metaphysics, in discussion with other modern commentators. This lays the philological groundwork which will enable us to engage Heidegger’s challenging interpretations on a more secure footing. The second and main section discusses Heidegger’s ontological appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics from 1922 to 1924 on the basis of the texts so far published, and with a special attention to Metaphysics IX. The main result of section I is an insight into the central character of energeia for Aristotle’s project in the Nicomachean Ethics and, more specifically, for his understanding of praxis, which in its genuinely original sense turns out to be a way of being of human beings. Our analysis recognizes three essential traits to energeia and praxis, two of which stemming from the analysis of Aristotle’s own elucidation of energeia in Metaphysics IX 6, namely immediacy and continuity: energeia expresses being as an ‘immediate unfinished fulfillment’. Irreducibility, the third trait of energeia and praxis, results from applying the structure of energeia to the characterization of praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics, and from contrasting it with poiēsis and theōria. These three features entail that practical truth―the truth of praxis, the ‘object’ of phronēsis―cannot be properly possessed and thus transferred: more than something we know, it is something we are. It is this special character of practical truth that primarily attracted Heidegger to Aristotle in the early 1920s. Section II, devoted to Heidegger’s texts, starts by reconstructing some of the intellectual steps that led him to resort to Aristotle for the development of his own philosophical project, characterized by a profound, yet intriguing intermingling of ontology and phenomenology. The legitimacy and feasibility of Heidegger’s pointedly ontological appropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics is also discussed, on the basis of the results of section I. The analysis of these texts is characterized by the sharp opposition set by Heidegger between phronēsis and energeia in his 1922 programmatic Natorp Bericht, a perspective that strongly diverges from the results of our philological reading of Aristotle in section I. The assessment of this opposition is maintained throughout the discussion of the two main sources―the 1924-25 winter course Platon: Sophistes, and the 1924 summer course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Heidegger’s direct commentary of Aristotle’s text is followed closely in this section: concepts such as energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis and hexis―which find their ontological characterization in the Metaphysics or Physics―need to be scrutinized in order to follow Heidegger’s argument and to assess its soundness. Heidegger’s hypothesis from 1922―namely, that Aristotle’s ontology does not fit the insights of his more penetrating phenomenological descriptions―eventually culminates in a clash between phronēsis and sophia which divides being into two irreconcilable spheres and brings Aristotle’s ontological efforts to a dead end. Yet, this conclusion of Heidegger is built upon a specific interpretation of energeia that critically leaves in the shade its performative side, one of its essential traits as Aristotle conceived it. The fact that in the 30s Heidegger himself comes to see this side of energeia provides us with stronger grounds to question the supposed conflict between ontology and phenomenology in Aristotle, which can result in a new formulation of the Heideggerian project.

碩士
國立臺灣師範大學
教育研究所
92
The purpose of this thesis aims at exploring the relation between emotions and morality, and providing revision for the deviation of modern moral education─the lack of emotions. For this sake, the researcher chooses to make a philosophical examination on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle offered many insightful opinions. Conceptual analysis and hermeneutics are used. The procedures start from clarifying the concept of emotions, and differentiating related concepts in terms of a philosophical angle. Secondly, the researcher makes brief and concise explanations of virtue ethics and Aristotle’s ethics to understand the characteristic way of thinking of virtue ethics on moral issues. Thirdly, the researcher explores Aristotle’s perspective on emotions, and the relation between emotions and morality. Finally, according to the findings above, the research draws out some significance on modern moral education. The findings of this research are as follows: First of all, the concept of emotions is very complex, and it includes at least two important characteristics, cognition and evaluation. In other words, emotions are cognitive evaluations of the moral agent toward the external moral situations. If so, it indicates that emotions can provide for important information about the moral situations, and direct the moral agent to take care of subtle or conspicuous moral features. In sum, emotions play an important role providing moral knowledge. Secondly, in addition to moral cognitions and moral actions, the proper way of feeling and expressing emotions is also the essential segment of moral education. Accordingly, moral education should attach importance to the education of emotions. Thirdly, Aristotle thought that emotions are by themselves neither good nor bad, and the key point depends on how to feel and express emotions in a proper way, and for this, Aristotle proposed the doctrine of mean as guidance. Fourthly, shame is beneficial for the moral agent to be alert to prevention from recurrence of wrong moral actions, and proper friendship is helpful to enhancing self-understanding, and stimulating two parties to develop moral virtues altogether. Fifthly, the proceedings of moral education should be in accordance with the serial development, and Aristotle proposed habits prior to rationality. However, the first phase of habituation (acquirement of habits) is not condition, contrary to that, it is a critical practice, and it actually implies rational introspection. Finally, the natural emotional attachments in the family play a critical role in the moral development of children, so Aristotle especially emphasized the family as the starting point of moral education, and then assisted with the educational functions of schooling and the whole society.

The thesis focuses on Aristotelian-Thomist ethics system. In mainly deals with the differences in concept of beatitude, good and related issues, like the science of virtues. The emphasis is placed on understanding and covering the differences in aproach of St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotele to these ethical topics. Firs the thesis characterises the main issue in Nicomachean Ethics, then outlines the thoughts and ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas in his Commentary, with emphasis on its diference from Aristoteles teachings. First three chapters are therefore the more descriptive part of the thesis, which is based on both primary and secondary textual sources. The fourth chapter is, then, the crucial, practical part, that summarizes St. Thomas theses and ideas concerning beatitude, good and happiness, coming from his unrivaled Commentary on the Ethics.

Medieval philosophy in the Arabic world has sought to harmonize the Greek philosophic tradition with the Islamic religion. Many rulers, scholars and theologians were against this intellectual approach and defend the Islam from the philosophers. The position of philosophy and its followers in the Arabic realm was therefore uneasy. Many scholars had to hide their opinions between the lines and avoid to doing philosophy publicly. Alongside the unfriendly environment, the position of philosophy in the Arabic society was also determined by common notion of scholars, that the revealing of the philosophical thoughts can be harmful for uneducated citizen, as well as influenced by mysticism. The aim of this thesis is to summarize the main philosophical approaches responding to the problematic position of philosophy in the Arabic world. Crucial will be the philosophy of solitary by Ibn Bajja, where the author seeks to bond tight the philosopher's life with the city and thus present a new role of philosopher in the Arabic society. Keywords Ibn Bajja, Rule of the Solitary, Al-Farabi, Political Regime, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Plato, The Republic, political philosophy, mysticism, ethics, philosopher, virtue, city, weeds, knowledge, governance, happiness

This thesis is engaged in the theme of natural law, especially in sources of natural law - in theories, which are labelled as "classic". The thesis focuses on these theories (Aristotle, stoicism, Thomas Aquinas) and their common points, which are proper to these theories. That is the object of this thesis. These points present the essence of natural law. The first part explains problem of the term "natural law". The second part deals with the classic theories. The third chapter summarises findings of the second part. The fourth part is devoted to the similarity between the classic theories and the modern (enlightenment) theories. This chapter is devoted to the connection between natural law and positive law too.