Relevant bibliographies by topics / Aristotle – Views on friendship

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Academic literature on the topic 'Aristotle – Views on friendship'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 3 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Aristotle – Views on friendship"

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Millgram, Elijah. "Aristotle on Making Other Selves." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 2 (June 1987): 361–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1987.10716441.

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There is still a relative paucity of discussion of the views on friendship that Aristotle presents in the Nicomachean Ethics, although some recent work may indicate a new trend. One suspects that this paucity reflects a belief that those views are not very interesting; if true, this witnesses to an unfortunate underestimation of Aristotle's account. This account is in fact quite surprising, for – I shall argue – Aristotle believes that one makes one's friends in the most literal sense of the verb.Aristotle takes virtue-friendship, i.e., the friendship of virtuous people who are friends for virtue, as ‘friendship in the primary way.’ Other ‘friendships’ – for utility and for pleasure – are only so-called by way of similarity to friendship proper, i.e., virtue-friendship (1157a30ff). Accordingly, proper friendship must be non-instrumental, or, more carefully, not essentially instrumental, unlike the friendship-analogs that fall outside the scope of friendship proper (1157a17-20). While ‘friends of utility … were never friends of each other, but of what was expedient for them’ (1157a14ff), a true ‘friend is taken to be someone who wishes and does goods or apparent goods to his friend for the friend's own sake’ (1166a3). The theme of desiring and acting for the friend's own sake is repeated many times in the Ethics; in the Rhetoric it is explicitly taken as definitive of friendship (1361b35-40). Since the contrast between true friendship and mere friendship-analogs is that between the not essentially instrumental (for the sake of the friend) and the essentially instrumental (using the friend as a means to pleasure or utility), a successful account of Aristotle's views on friendship must preserve and explain this contrast in all its centrality.
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Terchek, Ronald J., and David K. Moore. "Recovering the Political Aristotle: A Critical Response to Smith." American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 905–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586215.

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Thomas Smith presents an Aristotelian view of the common good that resembles much contemporary political theory in that it focuses on ethics rather than politics. Smith contends that Aristotle is a potent remedy to a society in crisis due to its unconcern about the common good. Against Smith's apolitical reading of Aristotle, we examine how Aristotle's views of common advantage, the multiple needs of citizens, and political friendship support neither harmonizing conceptions of the good nor a personal “radical conversion” that makes the common good our primary political concern. In engaging the political Aristotle, we find instead that he is concerned with the necessary conflict that resists attempts to arrive at the common advantage, with the material basis of good citizenship, and with the institutions and practices that foster a good deliberative politics.
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Anderson, Austen R., and Blaine J. Fowers. "An exploratory study of friendship characteristics and their relations with hedonic and eudaimonic well-being." Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 37, no. 1 (July 10, 2019): 260–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0265407519861152.

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Friendships are an important source of happiness, well-being, physical health, and longevity. Researchers have often linked unidimensional friendship quality to life satisfaction and positive affect, which are hedonic forms of well-being. Aristotle presented an expanded view of friendship with three general characteristics: Utility, Pleasure, and Virtue. Following his theory, we expected Pleasure and Utility characteristics to be primarily related to hedonic well-being (HWB). In contrast, we expected Virtue characteristics to be more strongly related to eudaimonic well-being (EWB), which includes meaning, personal growth, and positive relationships in this study. This exploratory study assessed Aristotle’s theory about friendship and well-being with 375 participants. Two exploratory structural equation models were tested. There was an indirect relationship between Utility characteristics and HWB through Help Received. A friend’s Virtue characteristics had an indirect relationship with EWB through the reliability of the friendship. These findings indicate that friendship characteristics related to utility and virtue friendships appear to have differential implications for understanding the role of friends in happiness and flourishing.
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Mahallati, Mohammad Jafar Amir. "Aristotle and Iranian Ethicists." Comparative Islamic Studies 13, no. 1-2 (October 23, 2019): 17–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/cis.32527.

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From Aristotle to the end of the Middle Ages, friendship was considered to be a core notion in Western political philosophy. However, as Von Heyking and Avramenko argue, friendship has lost its prominent politico-philosophical status in the modern era, particularly in the Western liberal tradition. In the Muslim tradition, and specifically in the history of Iranian thought, friendship as a moral paradigm went through a different course of development. In this article, I will present a comparative view of friendship as reflected in the works of Aristotle and three major Iranian ethicists: Ab? ?Al? A?mad Miskawayh (d. 1030), Ab??l-Q?sim ?usayn al-R?ghib al-Isfah?n? (d. ca. 1108) and Na?ir al-D?n ??s? (d. 1274). I will examine friendship-related perspectives rooted in the Irano-Islamic philosophical traditions that represent a significant but overlooked dimension of Iranian cosmopolitanism valuable for modern peacemaking approaches beyond such concepts as: “justice before peace,” “liberal peace” and “cold peace.”
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Campagnolo, Gilles, and Maurice Lagueux. "Les rapports d'échange selon Aristote. Éthique à Nicomaque V et VIII-IX." Dialogue 43, no. 3 (2004): 443–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300003048.

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AbstractThis article proposes an interpretation of the chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics concerning exchange and friendship. Rejecting approaches where Aristotle anticipates modern labour or need-based theories of value, the article claims that those notions of labour and need are required for a satisfactory interpretation of the most obscure passages of Book V. Finally, Aristotle's texts on exchange and friendship are related in such a way that the latter, since it is free from any political considerations, allows us to better understand the philosopher's view on exchange.
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Segev, Mor. "Aristotle on the Proper Attitude Toward True Divinity." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 94, no. 2 (2020): 187–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq2020942202.

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Aristotle does not explicitly state how it is that one should ideally relate to the true gods of his metaphysics, like the prime mover. He does, however, speak of an unreciprocated relationship of friendship (φιλία) between humans and such gods. I argue that Aristotle’s conception of the magnanimous person sheds light on that relationship. The magnanimous person, who is a philosopher, devalues humanity and devotes her life and efforts to the divine. Thus, contrary to some scholars, Aristotle’s conception of magnanimity resembles quite closely the ideals of humility and even “lowliness of spirit” presented by Aristotelian medieval thinkers such as Moses Maimonides. Aristotle’s endorsement of total devotion to the divine seems to go against the natural tendency of organisms to further their own lives and species. Nevertheless, I argue that this recommendation is consistent with his teleological view of nature.
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Strikwerda, Robert A., and Larry May. "Male Friendship and Intimacy." Hypatia 7, no. 3 (1992): 110–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1992.tb00907.x.

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Our primary focus is the concept of intimacy, especially in the context of adult American male relationships. We begin with an examination of comradeship, a nonintimate form of friendship, then develop an account of the nature and value of intimacy in friendship. We follow this with discussions of obstacles to intimacy and of Aristotle's views. In the final section, we discuss the process of men attaining intimacy.
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Goodrich, Peter. "Friends in high places." International Journal of Law in Context 1, no. 1 (March 2005): 41–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744552305001035.

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Aristotle, in his Ethics, argued that good legislators should pay more attention to friendship than to law. Common law, however, has trouble with friendship and has historically taken the view that agreements between friends are unenforceable for lack of intention to create legal relations. The roots of this presumption against amicable agreements lie in theology and antique ecclesiastical case law. Those sources are reviewed here and it is argued that seemingly progressive decisions that accord cohabiting friends legal recognition as spouses have the paradoxical effect of depriving them of contractual capacity. They join traditionally married couples in the ‘amity’ of the household which case law defines as an Alsatia outside of law. It is argued that such a consequence is both unintended and undesirable.
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Held, Dirk t. D. "Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship." Ancient Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2005): 193–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil200525115.

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Schoeman, Ferdinand. "Aristotle on the good of friendship." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63, no. 3 (September 1985): 269–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048408512341881.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Aristotle – Views on friendship"

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Kahane, David J. (David Joshua) 1962. "Identity and difference in Aristotle's theory of perfect friendship." Thesis, McGill University, 1990. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=60053.

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This thesis examines how Aristotle's theory of friendship deals with differences between persons, given that his paradigm case is that of friendship between men who are excellent without qualification. I argue that because of his teleological understanding of human virtue, Aristotle believes that such men will share a comprehensive set of affective and rational apprehensions of the good; true friends will love and understand each other because of their identity in virtue.
I establish my interpretation against a rival view, which sees Aristotle as sensitive to the need for attentiveness to and valuation of differences between friends: while I show this latter view to be exegetically untenable, I suggest that it is informed by modern understandings of individual uniqueness which provide the basis for a critique of Aristotle. Finally, I explore the implications of a 'difference' critique of Aristotle for his understanding of the bonds which unite political communities.
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Ryding, Jacob. ""Perfect friendship is the friendship between men who are good and alike in virtue" : Aristotle's view on the friendship between George and Lennie in John Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Avdelningen för humaniora, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-12112.

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The main purpose of this essay is to analyze the relationship between the two main characters George and Lennie in John Steinbecks novella Of Mice and Men (1937) and determine what kind of relationship they share, how their relationship is built and whether they are genuine friends or not. The definition of friendship which will mainly be employed and used is the one defined and created by Aristotle and published in his work Nicomachean Ethics. In order for the analysis to be as precise and proper as possible, the questions of how and why will constantly be asked and answered throughout the analysis in order to operate and act as guidelines for the final conclusion. Besides Aristotle’s definition of friendship, the novella will be examined from a perspective with primary focus on the concept of friendship and it will also to some extent touch the field of interpersonal relationships. The concept will then be applied to the examination of their relationship and will only take the content of the novella itself into account. To assist the theory and provide with an extended view upon friendship, the works of Allan (Kinship and Friendship in Modern Britain: 1996), Lynch (Philosophy and Friendship: 2005), Spencer (Rethinking Friendship: Hidden solidarities today: 2006) and Pahl (On Friendship: 2000) will be applied.         The conclusion derived from the analysis shows that it is possible to interpret their relationship differently depending on which aspect of their friendship one decides to highlight, but the aspect of George and Lennie’s unequal stature due to the Lennie’s mental disability is a fact impossible to not take into account. This aspect makes it impossible for them to be genuine friends, as their relationship becomes based on one person having more responsibility than the other, making their friendship non-genuine according to Aristole.
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Gutiérrez, Ezequiel Benito. "Other selves friendship as moral perfection in Aristotle's Nichomachean ethics /." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2004. http://www.tren.com.

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Poskus, Virgilijus. "Contemporary egoistic and altruistic interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of friendship." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2004. http://www.tren.com.

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Winkowitsch, John Jay. "Friendship the source and summit of moral virtue in Aristotle's Nichomachean ethics /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online, 2006. http://www.tren.com.

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Pascarella, John Antonio. "Friendship, Politics, and the Good in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2015. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc801900/.

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In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX provide A philosophic examination of friendship. While these Books initially appear to be non sequiturs in the inquiry, a closer examination of the questions raised by the preceding Books and consideration of the discussion of friendship's position between two accounts of pleasure in Books VII and X indicate friendship's central role in the Ethics. In friendship, Aristotle finds a uniquely human capacity that helps readers understand the good is distinct from pleasure by leading them to think seriously about what they can hold in common with their friends throughout their lives without changing who they are. What emerges from Aristotle's account of friendship is a nuanced portrait of human nature that recognizes the authoritative place of the intellect in human beings and how its ability to think about an end and hold its thinking in relation to that end depends upon whether it orders or is ordered by pleasures and pains. Aristotle lays the groundwork for this conclusion throughout the Ethics by gradually disclosing pleasures and pains are not caused solely by things we feel through the senses, but by reasoned arguments and ideas as well. Through this insight, we can begin to understand how Aristotle's Ethics is a work of political philosophy; to fully appreciate the significance of his approach, however, we must contrast his work with that of Thomas Hobbes, his harshest Modern critic. Unlike Aristotle, Hobbes is nearly silent on friendship in his political philosophy, and examining his political works especially Leviathan reveals the absence of friendship is part of his deliberate attempt to advance a politics founded on the moral teaching that pleasure is the good. Aristotle's political philosophy, by way of contrast, aims to preserve the good, and through friendship, he not only disentangles the good from pleasure, but shows a level of human community more suitable for preserving the good than political regimes because these communities have more natural bonds than any regime can hope to create between its citizens.
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Oviedo, Michael Peter. "Plato's lysis and its influence on Kant and Aristotle." [College Station, Tex. : Texas A&M University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-3038.

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Kim, Bradford Jean-Hyuk. "Aristotle on the value of friends." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2018. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7a7d2d16-2514-457c-a217-968af1111a60.

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In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle's account of friendship is egoistic. Focusing on the Nicomachean Ethics, I begin with VIII.2. Here Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only because of the lovable (φιλητóv), which divides into the useful, pleasant, and good. I argue that "because of (διὰ)" refers to at least the final cause and that "the lovable" refers to what appears to contribute one's own happiness (εuδαιμoνία); therefore Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. This result may seem incompatible with some types of concern Aristotle principally attributes to his normative paradigm of complete friendship: wishing goods for the sake of the other and loving the other for himself. One might argue that these types of concern are altruistic, and so it cannot be the case that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. I argue that these types of concern ultimately hinge on one's own happiness. The object is the lovable (what appears to contribute to one's own happiness), specifically the good instantiated by the other's virtue; further, what a virtuous person takes as valuable about another's virtue is how it facilitates her own virtuous activity, that is, her own happiness. From here I turn to Aristotle's notion of 'another self'. One popular interpretation of other selfhood defies the altruism/egoism divide. Here the essential feature of other selfhood is virtue, which allows for no prioritization among virtuous people; there is no prioritization of the other over oneself (as in altruism) nor of oneself over the other (as in egoism), since the relevant parties are equal in moral standing (they are virtuous). Assessing the instances of 'another self' in the Nicomachean Ethics VIII.12, IX.4, and IX.9, I argue for an egoistic interpretation of other selfhood; the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one's own actualization. That is, what makes other selves valuable is how they facilitate one's own virtuous activity, one's own happiness. Finally, I address the doctrine of self-love in the Nicomachean Ethics IX.8. Again, some interpreters derive non-prioritization from the text; Aristotle claims that all virtuous people identify with the understanding (voũç), so, the non-prioritization interpretation goes, there can be no prioritization among virtuous agents, as they are identical in the relevant way. I argue for an egoistic interpretation of IX.8; Aristotle endorses praiseworthy self-love, which involves maximizing the superlatively valuable fine (καλòν) for oneself over others. Moreover, such self-prioritization occurs precisely by gratifying the understanding, that which was supposed to ground non-prioritization.
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Vakirtzis, Andreas. "Character friendship and moral development in Aristotle's Ethics." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/16464.

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In my thesis, I examine the role of character friendship for the agent’s moral development in Aristotle’s ethics. I contend that we should divide character friendship in two categories: a) character friendship between completely virtuous agents, and, b) character friendship between unequally developed, or, equally developed, yet not completely virtuous agents. Regarding the first category, I argue that this highest form of friendship provides the opportunity for the agent to advance his understanding of certain virtues through the help of his virtuous friend. This process can be expressed in two ways. In the first way, I take character friendship in (a) as a relationship that is based on mutual relinquishing of opportunities for action or giving up external goods based on each agent’s needs. This process helps the agents develop their character in certain virtues which have remained slightly underdeveloped than others due to nature (NE 1144b4-7), or development (Politics 1329a9ff). This means, for instance, that if agent A is wealthy and his friend B is a middle class worker and they win the lottery together, A will relinquish his share of money to his friend so that he will be able to practice the virtue of magnificence; a virtue that his previous financial condition prevented him from developing appropriately. The second process is rather different and new in scholarly debate concerning Aristotle’s theory of moral development. I suggest that the completely virtuous agent is able to further develop his character through a process I will describe as interpretative mimesis. In this process, the agent receives the form of his friend’s action and is able to apply this pattern of behaviour in a situation that he thinks is appropriate. I have to highlight though the fact the fact that he does not just ape his friend’s action. Instead, he interprets the action based on his skills and abilities and the demands of the situations he faces. Thus, this pattern works as an extra epistemological tool in the agent’s hand in new and challenging moral situations. Now, case (b) comes on the opposite side of the majority of scholars’ view on character friendship. They think that Aristotle reserves character friendship only for completely virtuous agents. I argue that this is not the correct approach, and that less than completely virtuous agents can take part in character friendships as well. This view has the advantage of making character friendship in (b) a tool in Aristotle’s hands for his agents of lower moral level to develop their understanding of virtue and its applications. I propose that the route of moral development in case (b) resembles the one in the second process of case (a). Namely, the agent receives the form of his friend’s action and uses it as a pattern in some new situation he has to face. I will not name the process though as “interpretative” or any kind of mimesis. The reason for this is that Aristotle gives us textual evidence (NE 1172a9-14) for an imitative method of moral development only for the second process of case (a). I will take case (b) then as a pattern guide application of my friend’s action which we could call pre-interpretative mimesis period of the agent’s moral development. If my arguments are correct then character friendship is much more valuable than scholars thought. Our friends turn out to be examples of good action who guide us through the sweaty and painful path that is called virtue. And this path never stops; even if we have become “moral heroes”; or, put it differently, “masters” of practical wisdom.
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Swaffield, Susan Elizabeth. "Headteachers' views of external support, challenge and critical friendship in England." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.609819.

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Books on the topic "Aristotle – Views on friendship"

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Aristóteles. Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.

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1964-, Bartlett Robert C., and Collins Susan D. 1960-, eds. Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.

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Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

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Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

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V, Maltese Enrico, ed. Georgii Gemisti Plethonis Contra scholarii pro Aristotele obiectiones. Leipzig: Teubner, 1988.

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Aristotle and the rediscovery of citizenship. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

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O'Connor, David Kevin. Virtue and community: Aristotle on justice and friendship. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1986.

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Other selves: Aristotle on personal and political friendship. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

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Aspasius. On Aristotle Nicomachean ethics 8. London: Duckworth, 2001.

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Aquinas, Aristotle, and the power of the common good. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

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Book chapters on the topic "Aristotle – Views on friendship"

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Sherman, Nancy. "5. Aristotle on the Shared Life." In Friendship, edited by Neera Kapur Badhwar, 91–107. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/9781501741104-007.

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Andrew, Hung Tsz Wan. "Aristotle and Confucians on Friendship." In Love and Friendship Across Cultures, 3–19. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_1.

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Taylor, Kevin. "Friendship in Aristotle and Buddhism: Confluences and Divergences." In Love and Friendship Across Cultures, 37–53. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_3.

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Williams, Robert R. "Aristotle and Hegel on Recognition and Friendship." In The Plural States of Recognition, 20–36. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230285569_2.

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Jang, Misung. "Aristotle’s Political Friendship (politike philia) as Solidarity." In Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics, 417–33. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_20.

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Klausa, Ekkehard. "Berlin, A Center of German-American Relations—A Solid Friendship Despite Ups and Downs." In Views of Berlin, 3–12. Boston, MA: Birkhäuser Boston, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6715-2_1.

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Hong, Ki-Won. "The Best Form of Government and Civic Friendship in Aristotle’s Political Thought: A Discussion Note." In Aristotle and The Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice, 77–86. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6031-8_4.

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van Domselaar, Iris. "A Neo-Aristotelian Notion of Reciprocity: About Civic Friendship and (the Troublesome Character of) Right Judicial Decisions." In Aristotle and The Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice, 223–47. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6031-8_13.

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"Magna Moralia." In Aristotle's Ethics, edited by Jonathan Barnes and Anthony Kenny. Princeton University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691158464.003.0004.

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In this English translation of Magna Moralia, the discussion focuses on the themes of good, happiness, virtue, action, justice, continence and incontinence, pleasure, good fortune, friendship, and gentlemanliness. According to the author, the study of moral character is part of the craft of politics. The text also considers the views of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato and argues that happiness consists in living well, that is, virtuously: it is not virtue itself but the exercise of virtue. Other insights offered by the text include those relating to moral virtues such as courage, temperance, liberality, pride, and magnificence, friendliness, and good temper; intellectual virtues such as knowledge, wisdom, intelligence, and understanding; the problems that arise from incontinence; and the connection between happiness and pleasure.
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Gundogdu, Hakan. "Some Philosophical Reflections on Foundations of Sustainable Social Development." In Advances in Electronic Government, Digital Divide, and Regional Development, 8–24. IGI Global, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-61520-709-1.ch002.

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Sustainable social development cannot be fully understood apart from its cultural, moral, political, and educational foundations; and philosophy helps us to see it as a whole and to clearly comprehend its foundations. The main assumption behind that claim is that we can know what to do for realizing sustainable development if we actually know about specific or internal reasons for the fall of the societies and civilizations. This chapter begins with such an assumption and asserts that there must be four integrated foundations for any sustainable social development by benefiting from the views of Max Weber, Ibn Khaldun, Aristotle, John Dewey and some Ottoman Turkish philosophers: among those foundations are (1) effective working mentality grounded on culture, (2) strong ethical perspective including the virtues of moderation, friendship and sympathy, (3) flexible but stable social stratification which is based on middle class and positive competition, (4) effective state composed of solidarity, democracy and education of critical thinking. All those can, the author thinks, can be seen as parts of a sort of social liberalism rather than classical or neo-liberalism.
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Conference papers on the topic "Aristotle – Views on friendship"

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Li, Guode. "A Comparative Study of the Epic Views of Aristotle and Hegel." In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Contemporary Education, Social Sciences and Humanities (ICCESSH 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/iccessh-19.2019.231.

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Sun, Yiwei, Suhang Wang, Tsung-Yu Hsieh, Xianfeng Tang, and Vasant Honavar. "MEGAN: A Generative Adversarial Network for Multi-View Network Embedding." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/489.

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Data from many real-world applications can be naturally represented by multi-view networks where the different views encode different types of relationships (e.g., friendship, shared interests in music, etc.) between real-world individuals or entities. There is an urgent need for methods to obtain low-dimensional, information preserving and typically nonlinear embeddings of such multi-view networks. However, most of the work on multi-view learning focuses on data that lack a network structure, and most of the work on network embeddings has focused primarily on single-view networks. Against this background, we consider the multi-view network representation learning problem, i.e., the problem of constructing low-dimensional information preserving embeddings of multi-view networks. Specifically, we investigate a novel Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) framework for Multi-View Network Embedding, namely MEGAN, aimed at preserving the information from the individual network views, while accounting for connectivity across (and hence complementarity of and correlations between) different views. The results of our experiments on two real-world multi-view data sets show that the embeddings obtained using MEGAN outperform the state-of-the-art methods on node classification, link prediction and visualization tasks.
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Fadaie, Gholamreza. "The Influence of Classification on World View and Epistemology." In InSITE 2008: Informing Science + IT Education Conference. Informing Science Institute, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.28945/3279.

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Worldview as a kind of man's look towards the world of reality has a severe influence on his classification of knowledge. In other words one may see in classification of knowledge the unity as well as plurality. This article deals with the fact that how classification takes place in man's epistemological process. Perception and epistemology are mentioned as the key points here. Philosophers are usually classifiers and their point of views forms the way they classify things and concepts. Relationship and how one looks at it in shaping the classification scheme is critical. The classifications which have been introduced up to now have had several models. They represent the kind of looking at, or point of view of their founders to the world. Aristotle, as a philosopher as well as an encyclopedist, is one of the great founders of knowledge classification. Afterwards the Islamic scholars followed him while some few rejected his model and made some new ones. If we divide all classifications according to their roots we may define them as human based classification, theology based classification, knowledge based classification, materialistic based classification such as Britannica's classification, and fact based classification. Tow broad approaches have been defined in this article: static and dynamic. The static approach refers to the traditional approaches and the dynamic one refers to the eight way of looking toward objects in order to realize them. The structure of classification has had its influence on epistemology, too. If the first cut on knowledge tree is fully defined, the branches would usually be consistent with it.
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