Journal articles on the topic 'Army. Support Command, 311th. United States'

The causes and processes of the Arab Spring movements are less important for current political developments than the responses to those movements by states that were not directly involved. After discussing the Turkish, Israeli, Iranian, and American responses, the focus turns to the recently announced military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Did the Saudi government conspire with the Egyptian high command to plot the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Cairo? If so, as seems likely, was the United States aware of the conspiracy? More importantly, what does the linkage between the Egyptian army and Saudi and Gulf financial support for President al-Sisi's regime suggest for the future of stability and legitimate rule in the Arab world?

The article is devoted to the history of the planning and making of intervention of USA and South Vietnam into Laos in February-April 1971. The operation was named «Lam Son 719». The invasion group was to destroy the infrastructure of material support of People‟s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) – «Ho Chi Minh Trail». The work is built with the assistance of a memoir – translations memories combatants in Laos, soldiers and commanders of Army of United States America, South Vietnam and Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The materials housed in the monographs of American and Vietnam researchers of the Indochina conflict, 1960–1970-s.In 1971 amid the withdrawal of US troops from Indochina, American administration made a decision to invade Laos. The main target of the intervention was destroying the objects of «Ho Chi Minh Trail» in the southeastern regions of the kingdom. With a success of ARVN in Laos, the PAVNs combat effectiveness is seriously reduced. This operation was critical test of Vietnamization. «Lam Son 719» had to demonstrate high combat capability of ARVN. The victory was supposed to strengthen international credibility of USA. In 8 February 1971, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) invaded into kingdom. The command of PAVN, having guessed the enemy's plan, pulled together large forces in Lower Laos. Supported by U.S. artillery, helicopters, fightersbombers and B-52s, South Vietnamese troops advanced fought heavy battles with the enemy. The author paid attention to some military and political aspects of intervention into Laos. The article deals with the problems of South Vietnamese troops. Special attention is paid by the author to the analysis of the morale and combat effectiveness units of ARVN during invasion into Laos. The author concluded, that the intervention of ARVN and U.S. Army ended in complete failure. The main objectives of the invasion were not achieved.

Abstract Introduction U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Cadets are college students training to be Army Officers. During a month-long capstone course (Advanced Camp), Cadets are rated on their leadership ability. Little work has been done to determine predictors of leadership ability at Advanced Camp. This study examined the effect of poor sleep and mood disorders -- two prevalent factors among college students -- on leadership ability. Methods Metrics on leadership, sleep quality, anxiety, and depression, were assessed in 159 ROTC Cadets (22.06±2.49 years; 23.90%female) at Days 1 (Baseline), 14 (Mid), and 29 (Post) of Advanced Camp. Leadership ratings were determined by ROTC Instructors over the course of Advanced Camp (1–5 score; higher score indicates poorer leadership). Predictors were the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index, Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7, and Patient Health Questionnaire-9. The relationships between the predictors and leadership scores were tested using linear regression. The interaction between mood disorders and sleep quality on leadership was tested using SPSS Process (Model 1). Results Poorer sleep quality at the Post time point (reflecting the prior 2 weeks of sleep) predicted poorer leadership (B=.05,p=.03), while sleep quality from Baseline (B=.03,p=.14) and Mid (B=.01,p=.67) did not. Higher anxiety and depression scores from all time points predicted poorer leadership (p-values<.03). There was an interaction: higher anxiety and high depression predicted poorer leadership only in the context of poor sleep quality (not good or average sleep quality) [anxiety: R2=.04,F(1,159)=6.04,p=.02; interaction: R2=.03,F(1,155)=5.30,p=.02]. Conclusion The current study identified a relationship between sleep quality and leadership ratings in ROTC cadets. This relationship was moderated by anxiety and depression. ROTC instructors should encourage ROTC Cadets to take advantage of sleep opportunities at Advanced Camp in order to maximize leadership potential. Support Support for this study came from the Military Operational Medicine Research Program (MOMRP) of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC). Disclaimer: The opinions and assertions contained herein are the private views of the authors and are not to be construed as official or as reflecting the views of the US Army or of the US

Abstract Introduction Insufficient sleep is ubiquitous among active duty service members in operational settings. Although insufficient sleep has been linked to poor cognitive, psychological, and physiological outcomes in military populations, little research has investigated the impact of insufficient sleep on Soldier occupational wellbeing. This study examined the longitudinal association between sleep quality and occupational functioning in a population of active duty U.S. Army Soldiers. Methods Sixty male Soldiers (age 25.41±3.74 years) participated. Sleep quality and occupational outcomes were assessed four weeks apart (before and after an annual training mission). Sleep quality was assessed using the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI). Occupational outcome measures included the Emotional Exhaustion Scale, Walter Reed Functional Impairment Short Scale, Role Overload Scale, and Perceived Stress Scale. Linear regressions assessed the prediction of PSQI Global Score on occupational outcome scores. Student’s t-tests compared occupational outcomes between “good” and “poor” sleepers (PSQI Global Score > 5 = poor sleeper). Results Poorer sleep quality at baseline broadly predicted poor occupational outcomes post-training. Specifically, higher PSQI Global Scores predicted higher emotional exhaustion (B = 1.6, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.25), functional impairment (B = 0.29, p < 0.03, R2 = 0.14), role overload (B = 28, p < 0.008, R2 = 0.12), and perceived stress (B = 0.34, p < 0.004, R2 = 0.2). Furthermore, occupational outcome scores were significantly higher in poor sleepers than good sleepers: emotional exhaustion: (t(58) = -4.18, p < .001); functional impairment: (t(59) = -3.68, p = .001); role overload (t(58) = -3.20, p = .002); and perceived stress (t(58) = -2.43, p = .02). Conclusion This study identified a longitudinal relationship between sleep quality and occupational outcomes, suggesting that service members with poor sleep may be at risk for experiencing poor workplace wellbeing. Given the association between service member wellbeing and likelihood to re-enlist, insufficient sleep may negatively impact Soldier attrition. Future studies should aim to augment sleep quality and track occupational outcomes in this population. Support (if any) This work was funded by the Military Operational Medicine Research Program of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command.

Abstract Introduction U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Advanced Camp (AC) is a 29-day training that assesses military skills and leadership potential in college students training to become Commissioned Officers (i.e. Cadets). Military trainings are widely known to disrupt normative sleep. Additionally, operational sleep disruption is linked to performance decrements. This study examined the ability for objective and subjective sleep during ROTC AC to predict Cadet performance. Methods One hundred and fifty-nine ROTC Cadets (age 22.06±2.49 years; 76.1% male) wore an actiwatch device continuously for 29 days during AC. Paper surveys administered at the end of AC captured subjective sleep metrics during the training. ROTC instructors evaluated Cadet performance and provided scores of overall class rank and summary performance. Multiple and ordinal linear regressions assessed the predicative utility of subjective (sleep duration [SD]; Global score [Global] from the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index) and objective (Total Sleep Time [TST]; Sleep Efficiency [SE]; Sleep Latency Onset [SOL]; Wake After Sleep Onset [WASO] from actigraphy) sleep on performance. Results The interaction of SD and Global, when controlling for age and gender, significantly predicted increased Cadet rank, F(4,153) = 3.09, p = 0.018. Models testing the prediction of SD and Global on summary performance score were non-significant. Further, regressing of both Cadet rank and summary performance individually on objective sleep metrics, when controlling for age and gender, resulted in non-significant findings. Conclusion Subjective and objective sleep showed no significant individual predictive utility on performance. However, the combined subjective model significantly predicted that Cadets who slept worse (lower SD; higher Global) during AC received a lower rank at the end of the training. These findings suggest there may be a unique combined predictive utility of subjective sleep on performance when compared to the predictive power of individual variables. Therefore, subjective sleep may be better for predicting operational performance than objective sleep. Future analyses will refine these models and examine how performance on individual AC events may be influenced by sleep. Support for this study came from the Military Operational Medicine Research Program (MOMRP) of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC). Support (if any):

Military field hospitals typically provide essential medical care in combat zones. In recent years, the United States (US) Army has deployed these facilities to assist domestic humanitarian emergency and natural disaster response efforts. As part of the nation’s whole-of-government approach to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, directed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services, during New York City’s (NYC) initial surge of COVID-19, from 26 March to 1 May 2020, the US Army erected the Javits New York Medical Station (JNYMS) field hospital to support the city’s overwhelmed healthcare system. The JNYMS tasked a nutrition operations team (NuOp) to provide patient meals and clinical nutrition evaluations to convalescent COVID-19 patients. However, few guidelines were available for conducting emergency nutrition and dietary response efforts prior to the field hospital’s opening. In this case study, we summarize the experiences of the NuOp at the JNYMS field hospital, to disseminate the best practices for future field hospital deployments. We then explain the challenges in service performance, due to information, personnel, supply, and equipment shortages. We conclude by describing the nutrition service protocols that have been implemented to overcome these challenges, including creating a standardized recordkeeping system for patient nutrition information, developing a meal tracking system to forecast meal requirements with food service contractors, and establishing a training and staffing model for military-to-civilian command transition. We highlight the need for a standardized humanitarian emergency nutrition service response framework and propose a Nutrition Response Toolkit for Humanitarian Crises, which offers low-cost, easily adaptable operational protocols for implementation in future field hospital deployments.

Abstract Introduction Sleep loss that is inherent to military operations can lead to cognitive errors and potential mission failure. Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) allele variations of several genes (COMT, ADORA2A, TNFa, CLOCK, DAT1) have been linked with inter-individual cognitive resilience to sleep loss through various mechanisms. U.S. Army Soldiers with resilience-related alleles may be better-suited to perform cognitively-arduous duties under conditions of sleep loss than those without these alleles. However, military-wide genetic screening is costly, arduous, and infeasible. This study tested whether a brief survey of subjective resilience to sleep loss (1) can demarcate soldiers with and without resilience-related alleles, and, if so, (2) can predict cognitive performance under conditions of sleep loss. Methods Six SNPs from the aforementioned genes were sequenced from 75 male U.S. Army special operations Soldiers (age 25.7±4.1). Psychomotor vigilance, response inhibition, and decision-making were tested after a night of mission-driven total sleep deprivation. The Iowa Resilience to Sleeplessness Test (iREST) Cognitive Subscale, which measures subjective cognitive resilience to sleep loss, was administered after a week of recovery sleep. A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve was used to determine whether the iREST Cognitive Subscale can discriminate between gene carriers, and a cutoff score was determined. Cognitive performance after sleep deprivation was compared between those below/above the cutoff score using t-tests or Mann-Whitney U tests. Results The iREST discriminated between allele variations for COMT (ROC=.65,SE=.07,p=.03), with an optimal cutoff score of 3.03 out of 5, with 90% sensitivity and 51.4% specificity. Soldiers below the cutoff score had significantly poorer for psychomotor vigilance reaction time (t=-2.39,p=.02), response inhibition errors of commission (U=155.00,W=246.00,p=.04), and decision-making reaction time (t=2.13,p=.04) than Soldiers above the cutoff score. Conclusion The iREST Cognitive Subscale can discriminate between those with and without specific vulnerability/resilience-related genotypes. If these findings are replicated, the iREST Cognitive Subscale could be used to help military leaders make decisions about proper personnel placement when sleep loss is unavoidable. This would likely result in increased safety and improved performance during military missions. Support (if any) Support for this study came from the Military Operational Medicine Research Program of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command.

Abstract Introduction U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Advanced Camp (AC) is a month-long capstone course that evaluates Cadet leadership. Although the relationship between sleep and objective performance is well established, less is known about how sleep may impact self-perception of performance, especially in the military context. This study examined the impact of habitual sleep on self-expected and objective AC performance. Methods 577 Cadets (age 22.22 ± 2.74; 74.36% male) completed the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) at baseline to measure subjective sleep quality (Global; higher scores indicate poorer sleep quality) and total sleep time (TST) in the month before training. Self-expected AC performance was captured by asking Cadets to estimate what their final performance score would be and objective performance was determined from summary scores from Instructors. Performance discrepancy was calculated as the difference between Cadet’s expected and objective scores. Regression models assessed the predictive utility of habitual TST and Global on performance. Results Ordinal regressions showed that as Global increased, expected AC score also decreased with an OR of .684 (95% CI, -.694 to -.064), Wald χ2(1) = 5.56, p = .018. Further, Global independently predicted performance discrepancies, where the odds of a difference existing between a Cadet’s self-expected and their objective performance was .895 less likely for those with increasing Global (p = .028). Together TST and Global predicted discrepancy magnitude between Cadet self-expected and objective performance, F(2, 349) = 2.99, p = .05, with Global as a independent predictor p < .05. Independent findings related to TST were varied and warrant further testing. Conclusion Cadets with poorer sleep quality prior to AC self-expected to perform worse and had discrepancies between their self-expected and objective performance when compared to those with higher sleep quality. TST enhanced the predictive power of Global when predicting magnitude of performance discrepancy. Therefore future research examining Global, while accounting for TST, is warranted to better understand how sleep may influence self-expectations of military performance. Support (if any) Support for this study came from the Military Operational Medicine Research Program of the United States Army Medical search and Development Command.

The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) has faced difficulties in achieving and sustaining at least 70% of its aircraft availability (Av) in order to support its operational requirements. The head start for this research is to discuss with a focus group (FG) which comprise of eight officers and one moderator and supported by observation on the field. The FG highlighted that the low Av was due to the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the through life cycle support (TLCS) as a result of weaknesses in the acquisition conceptual framework (ACF). Three research questions were put forward; Q1: Why has the RMAF not achieved its aircraft Av as its desired objectives? Q2: How do the RMAF’s present acquisition practices given a significant impact to Av? And Q3: What is the recommended ACF to be used to ensure higher aircraft Av? The mix mode method (quantitative and qualitative) data collection was used. The literature review focused on critical success factors (CSFs) in terms of acquisition, terms and definition, and present practices in the Royal Malaysian Army (RMA), the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), the Malaysian public sector, the Department of Defence of the United States of America (DoD USA), the Ministry of Defence of United Kingdom (MoD UK) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Based on the CSFs from the literature review, a preliminary ACF I was developed. The RMAF case study had focused on Type A, Type B, Type C and Type D aircraft. Data on aircraft status for FY 2011 to 2015 was gathered from the Air Support Command Headquarters (ASHQ). The survey was achieved through 16 self-administered structured questionnaires which are close-ended involving 120 out of 150 respondents from the Worker Group (WG). The interviewer collected qualitative data using 21 semi-structured questionnaires with open-ended answers on 20 respondents from the Management Group (MG). The survey and interview results were presented in a matrix table and categorized in accordance with themes and their relationships. Based on the results of the case study, the preliminary ACF I was modified to ACF II. Then, ACF II was validated by four experts who comprise of two senior officers and two senior managers from the aviation industry. After validation, the ACF II was modified to ACF III (final) and was proposed for implementation. Three project objectives were put forward. Objective 1: To identify the cause of low Av.

Abstract Introduction Insufficient sleep during military operations is detrimental to cognition, physical performance, and general health outcomes. However, there is evidence of inter-individual differences in resilience to sleep loss. Therefore, some Soldiers may be more resilient to the effects of sleep loss than others. This study examined the relationship between sleep duration, resilience, and Soldier well-being during a deployment-readiness training event. Methods Seventy-six male Soldiers (aged 25.7±4.0y) from the 75th Ranger Regiment participated while undergoing a two-week training exercise. Surveys were administered at the completion of training and queried subjective measures of sleep duration during training, functional impairment (Walter Reed Functional Impairment Scale), and resilience to sleep loss (Iowa Resilience to Sleepiness Test; iREST). The independent relationships between sleep duration, resilience to sleep loss, and functional impairment were assessed using linear regressions. The interaction between sleep duration and resilience to sleep loss was assessed using SPSS Process (Model 1). Results Shorter sleep duration during training predicted higher functional impairment at the end of training (B=-.71, p=.001). Less resilience to sleep loss also predicted higher functional impairment (B=.07,p=.004). An interaction between sleep duration and resilience predicted Soldier impairment (R2 change: .06; F(1,68)=.17,p=.03). Individuals with both shorter sleep duration during training and less resilience had the highest functional impairment. Those with more sleep, and those with high resilience and less sleep, both had lower functional impairment. Conclusion This study suggests the iREST can be used as a quick, subjective screening tool to indicate who may be most vulnerable to the effects of sleep loss. Identifying individual resilience to sleep loss may be useful in the military context for prescribing sleep strategies before and during missions in order to enhance Soldier readiness and performance. Support Support for this study came from the Military Operational Medicine Research Program (MOMRP) of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC).

Abstract Introduction Extended, overseas operations (deployments) increase the likelihood that military personnel will experience psychological distress. Reduced sleep during deployments is a key correlate of psychological distress. Thus, it is imperative to identify mechanisms that adaptively modulate the relationship between insufficient sleep and psychological distress. Research has recently connected basic personality traits (i.e., the Big Five: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness) to more sleep. The current project aimed to examine the relationship between basic personality traits, subjective sleep duration (SSD), and psychological distress during an operational deployment. Methods 488 soldiers took surveys both prior to and half-way through a nine-month deployment. The pre-deployment survey included the Big Five Index, and three standardized measures of psychological distress commonly used to screen military personnel for anxiety (Generalized Anxiety Disorder; GAD-7), depression (Patient Health Questionnaire; PHQ-8), and post-traumatic stress (Posttraumatic Symptom Disorder Checklist; PCL-4). The mid-deployment survey included an item from the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index measuring SSD and the same psychological distress measures from the pre-deployment survey. General linear models were used to test the interaction between SSD and each basic personality trait on each measure of psychological distress at mid-deployment while accounting for psychological distress at pre-deployment. Results Of the Big Five, conscientiousness was the only trait to significantly moderate the relationship between SSD and anxiety, t = 2.11, p = .035, where higher conscientiousness weakened the relationship. Further only agreeableness attenuated the relationship between depression and SSD, t = 2.10, p = .036. Interestingly, the only Big Five trait that moderated the relationship between SSD and PTS was openness, insomuch that openness strengthened the relationship, t = -1.92, p = .055. Conclusion The relationship between SSD and psychological distress was uniquely impacted by different personality traits. These results reinforce the age-old concept that behavior is the product of a complex, nuanced, and puzzling interaction between the individual and the environment. The current research motivates further research into personality as an adaptive mechanism for optimizing military wellbeing. Support (if any) Support for this study came from the Military Operational Medicine Research Program (MOMRP) of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC).

Abstract Introduction There is a well-established connection between sleep and the immune system, and in the midst of a global pandemic, it is vital to understand the relationship between COVID-19 symptomatology and sleep. While our communities practice safety protocols, medical personnel working on the COVID-19 response effort are at high risk for exposure and contraction. This creates an urgent need to better understand whether sleep may contribute to COVID-19 symptom onset, severity, and recovery. This study examined the relationship between subjective and objective sleep during infection. Methods Fifty volunteers (age 35.15±9.97) considered high risk for COVID-19 participated in the study. The sample consisted mostly of medical personnel (93.27%) working through the pandemic. Over six months, participants completed monthly surveys and daily logs via Qualtrics. These surveys included questions about sleep, infection symptoms, COVID-19 tests and diagnoses, and mood. Wrist-worn actigraphy was collected continuously throughout the study. Sleep duration, latency, wake after sleep onset, and efficiency were processed using Philips Actiware 6.0. Actigraphy and survey data were analyzed using SPSS v. 25. Results Sixty-two percent of participants experienced infection symptoms. Those experiencing symptoms were significantly more likely to report having poorer sleep quality t(255.59)=5.78, p=<.001, poorer mood upon waking t(258.03)=6.53, p=<.001, feeling less alert upon waking t(255.61)=4.56, p=<.001, and spending more time awake at night t(2.66.98)=-7.29, p=<.001. Results showed that compared to those asymptomatic, participants with cough t(2164)=2.07, p=.039, diarrhea t(2161)=2.51, p=.012, and headache t(106.18)=7.05, p=<.001 all had significantly less total sleep time, while those with body aches spent significantly more time awake at night t(2164)=2.10, p=.036. Conclusion This preliminary examination of the data broadly suggests that medical personnel experiencing infection symptoms may have difficulty obtaining adequate sleep. Further, specific infection symptoms may share a stronger relationship with key sleep parameters than others. These findings support further testing of the bi-direction relationship between infection symptoms and sleep. Results from this research will contribute to enhancing prevention, detection, and treatment guidance related to future domestic and globally-experienced infections. Support (if any) Support for this study comes from there Military Operational Medicine Research Program of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command.

Introduction. In the context of growing anti-Russian information wars, intensive and sharp ideological confrontation active information support of Russia’s foreign policy becomes more and more crucial. Methods. Authors use mainly the methods of expert evaluation and trends, opinion polls to prove that the US has long been waging information wars against Russia first using the term (“information war”) back in 1992. Moreover, with time the United States makes the methods of struggle more and more sophisticated and has already attracted the EU and NATO as associates. In addition, the methods of comparative analysis of research results of leading domestic and foreign experts in the field of information and ideological component of modern international relations and issues of information support of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, as well as general scientific and special methods of knowledge of legal phenomena and processes made as the object of the research: the method of systematic and structural analysis, comparative legal and formal-logical methods have been used. Analysis. Along with the tools of public diplomacy our state takes all the needed measures to defend its information sovereignty at all levels. Despite the fact that the Russian state strategy has consistently created a system of detecting, preventing and eliminating threats to its information security, still it is necessary to deal with ever growing amount of antiRussian false information in the global media space. Results. Being one of the instruments of public diplomacy and foreign policy of any sovereign state, soft power takes into account the objective conditions of international relations and world politics and proceeds from the requirements of the national interests of the state as the main actor of the entire system of modern international relations. In the world practice of implementing the policy of soft power, starting with the creation of the Westphalian system of international relations, there was no precedent, when the state regardless of the socio-political nature of building a political system or the purposes of the foreign activity would be guided by different objectives and methods of analysis of world politics, the entire system of international relations and other goal-setting action in the international arena, including defined in the last decade by the concept of soft power. In the history of international relations, there has not been any world policy free from its ideological component. The thesis of de-ideologization of international relations, which received its definite distribution in the period immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the practice of foreign policy actions of all the main actors of modern world politics has clearly proved its complete failure. Today, in the context of “hybrid wars” within the entire system of international relations, the world politics is no less ideologized than during the “cold war”. The political leadership of Russia allows the hypothetical possibility of cyberwarfare, provoked by the actions of the Republican administration of the United States. In December 2019, the White House authorized the preparation of a plan for conducting an information war with the Russian Federation by special forces of the U.S. Army, assigning the solution of this task to the above-mentioned cyber command. The policy of soft power of Russia, as well as its public diplomacy, as the whole complex of foreign policy activities of the Russian Federation in the international arena, is derived from the fundamental function of defending the national interests of Russia in the new political reality. The Russian Federation has consistently opposed the transformation of international relations into an arena of ideological confrontation with the use of tools of the so-called “information wars”. State sovereignty is unified. Information security, as a factor of ensuring information sovereignty, is a basic component of the unified state sovereignty. This is an accepted truth underlying the understanding of the nature of modern international relations, the principle underlying the foreign policy activity of any modern sovereign state, due to the objective regularity of the growth of the ideological factor of modern international relations. Moreover, in the face of targeted misinformation Russia needs to ensure its information security at both levels: political (ideological) and technical (technological) ones combining cyber as well as soft power tools. Only such a combination of these two crucial elements and continuous improvement can lead to victory in hybrid wars.

FOREWORD This special issue of the Industrial and Systems Engineering Review highlights top papers from the 2020 annual General Donald R. Keith memorial capstone conference held at the United States Military Academy in West Point, NY. The conference was certainly a first of its kind virtual conference including asynchronous delivery of paper presentations followed by synchronous question and answer sessions with evaluation panels. Following a careful review of 63 total submissions, eleven were selected for publication in this journal. Unique to this year’s special edition is the mixed selection of seven project team capstone papers, and four honors research papers. Each paper incorporated features of systems or industrial engineering and presented detailed and reflective analysis on the topic. Although there are many elements which cut across the works, three general bodies of knowledge emerged in the papers including: systems engineering and decision analysis, systems design, modeling and simulation, and system dynamics. Systems Engineering and Decision Analysis topics included three unique contributions. Recognized as ‘best paper’ at the 2020 virtual conference, the work of Robinson et al. designed a multi-year predictive cost engineering model enabled through an MS O365 Power BI decision support interface to support U.S. Army Corps of Engineer (USACE) inland waterway national investment strategies. Schloo and Mittal’s work presents research in testing and evaluation of the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) 2000 towards improving real-world soldier performance. Gerlica et al. employs a robust and scalable K-means clustering methodology to improve decision making in defensive shift schemes for Air Force Baseball outfield personnel. Systems Design works included three unique contributions. Binney et al. worked to design evaluation criteria for military occupational specialties associated with open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts for the Army’s OSINT Office. Hales et al. interdisciplinary work aided in the design of search and identification systems to be incorporated on autonomous robotics to enable survivability improvements for the Army’s chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) units. Burke and Connell evaluated and designed a performance measurement-based assessment methodology for U.S. Pacific Command’s Key Leader Engagement process. System modeling and simulation included three unique contributions: Arderi et al. simulated and assessed how the Hyper-Enabled Operator (HEO) project improves situational awareness for U.S. Special Forces using the Infantry Warrior Simulation (IWARS). Blanks et al. employed a VBA module and Xpress software for a scheduling optimization model for enhancement of final exam scheduling at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Kelley and Mittal utilized a Batch Run Analysis and Simulation Studio (BRASS) program to batch multiple iterations of IWARS scenarios to study the integration of autonomous systems alongside military units. Finally, two unique contributions utilizing system dynamics (SD) modeling is presented: Dixon and Krueger developed a Vensim SD model to examine how policy recommendations across Central America could restrict gang activities while positively promoting women’s involvement in society. Cromer et al. utilized systems design approaches and a K-means clustering machine learning techniques to develop SD models in support of the U.S. Africa Command and Defense Threat Reduction Agency to examine the interdependence of threats across the Horn of Africa. Thank you and congratulations to the 2020 undergraduate scholars and all authors who provided meaningful contributions through steadfast intellectual efforts in their fields of study! Well done! LTC James H. Schreiner, PhD, PMP, CPEM Program Director, Systems and Decision Sciences (SDS) Department of Systems Engineering United States Military Academy Mahan Hall, Bldg 752, Room 423 West Point, NY 10996, USA james.schreiner@westpoint.edu

Constant demand for new naval and commercial vessels has created special conditions for the Government-owned Soviet shipbuilding industry, which practically has not been affected by the world shipbuilding crisis. On the other hand, such chronic diseases of the centralized economy as lack of incentive, material shortage and poor workmanship cause specific problems for ship construction. Being technically and financially unable to rapidly improve the overall technology level and performance of the entire industry, the Soviets concentrate their efforts on certain important areas and have achieved significant results, especially in welding and cutting titanium and aluminum alloys, modular production methods, standardization, etc. All productivity improvement efforts are supported by an army of highly educated engineers and scientists at shipyards, in multiple scientific, research and design institutions. Discussion Edwin J. Petersen, Todd Pacific Shipyards Three years ago I addressed the Ship Production Symposium as chairman of the Ship Production Committee and outlined some major factors which had contributed to the U.S. shipbuilding industry's remarkable achievements in building and maintaining the world's largest naval and merchant fleets during the five-year period starting just before World War II. The factors were as follows:There was a national commitment to get the job done. The shipbuilding industry was recognized as a needed national resource. There was a dependable workload. Standardization was extensively and effectively utilized. Shipbuilding work was effectively organized. Although these lessons appear to have been lost by our Government since World War II, the paper indicates that the Soviet Union has picked up these principles and has applied them very well to its current shipbuilding program. The paper also gives testimony to the observation that the Soviet Government recognizes the strategic and economic importance of a strong merchant fleet as well as a powerful naval fleet. In reviewing the paper, I found great similarity between the Soviet shipbuilding productivity improvement efforts and our own efforts or goals under the National Shipbuilding Research Program in the following areas:welding technology, flexible automation (robotics), application of group technology, standardization, facilities development, and education and training. In some areas, the Soviet Union appears to be well ahead of the United States in improving the shipbuilding process. Most noteworthy among these is the stable long-and medium-range planning that is possible by virtue of the use and adherence to the "Table of Vessel Classes." It will be obvious to most who hear and read these comments what a vast and significant improvement in shipbuilding costs and schedules could be achieved with a relatively dependable 15year master ship procurement plan for the U.S. naval and merchant fleets. Another area where the Soviet Union appears to lead the United States is in the integration of ship component suppliers into the shipbuilding process. This has been recognized as a vital step by the National Shipbuilding Research Program, but so far we have not made significant progress. A necessary prerequisite for this "supplier integration" is extensive standardization of ship components, yet another area in which the Soviets have achieved significantly greater progress than we have. Additional areas of Soviet advantage are the presence of a multilevel research and development infrastructure well supported by highly educated scientists, engineering and technical personnel; and better integration of formally educated engineering and technical personnel into the ship production process. In his conclusion, the author lists a number of problems facing the Soviet economy that adversely affect shipbuilding productivity. Perhaps behind this listing we can delve out some potential U.S. shipbuilding advantages. First, production systems in U.S. shipyards (with the possible exception of naval shipyards) are probably more flexible and adjustable to meet new circumstances as a consequence of not being constrained by a burdensome centralized bureaucracy, as is the case with Soviet shipyards. Next, such initiatives as the Ship Production Committee's "Human Resources Innovation" projects stand a better chance of achieving product-oriented "production team" relationship among labor, management, and technical personnel than the more rigid Soviet system, especially in view of the ability of U.S. shipyard management to offer meaningful financial incentives without the kind of bureaucratic constraints imposed in the Soviet system. Finally, the current U.S. Navy/shipbuilding industry cooperative effort to develop a common engineering database should lead to a highly integrated and disciplined ship design, construction, operation, and maintenance system for naval ships (and subsequently for commercial ships) that will ultimately restore the U.S. shipbuilding process to a leadership position in the world marketplace (additional references [16] and [17]).On that tentatively positive note, it seems fitting to close this discussion with a question: Is the author aware of any similar Soviet effort to develop an integrated computer-aided design, production and logistics support system? The author is to be congratulated on an excellent, comprehensive insight into the Soviet shipbuilding process and productivity improvement efforts that should give us all adequate cause not to be complacent in our own efforts. Peter M. Palermo, Naval Sea Systems Command The author presents an interesting paper that unfortunately leaves this reader with a number of unanswered questions. The paper is a paradox. It depicts a system consisting of a highly educated work force, advanced fabrication processes including the use of standardized hull modules, sophisticated materials and welding processes, and yet in the author's words they suffer from "low productivity, poor product quality, . . . and the rigid production systems which resists the introduction of new ideas." Is it possible that incentive, motivation, and morale play an equally significant role in achieving quality and producibility advances? Can the author discuss underlying reasons for quality problems in particular—or can we assume that the learning curves of Figs. 5 and Fig. 6 are representative of quality improvement curves? It has been my general impression that quality will improve with application of high-tech fabrication procedures, enclosed fabrication ways, availability of highly educated welding engineers on the building ways, and that productivity would improve with the implementation of modular or zone outfitting techniques coupled with the quality improvements. Can the author give his impressions of the impact of these innovations in the U.S. shipbuilding industry vis-a-vis the Soviet industry? Many of the welding processes cited in the paper are also familiar to the free world, with certain notable exceptions concerning application in Navy shipbuilding. For example, (1) electroslag welding is generally confined to single-pass welding of heavy plates; application to thinner plates—l1/4 in. and less when certified—would permit its use in more applications than heretofore. (2) Electron beam welding is generally restricted to high-technology machinery parts; vacuum chamber size restricts its use for larger components (thus it must be assumed that the Soviets have solved the vacuum chamber problem or have much larger chambers). (3) Likewise, laser welding has had limited use in U.S. shipbuilding. An interesting theme that runs throughout the paper, but is not explicitly addressed, is the quality of Soviet ship fitting. The use of high-tech welding processes and the mention of "remote controlled tooling for welding and X-ray testing the butt, and for following painting" imply significant ship fitting capabilities for fitting and positioning. This is particularly true if modules are built in one facility, outfitted and assembled elsewhere depending on the type of ship required. Any comments concerning Soviet ship fitting capabilities would be appreciated. The discussion on modular construction seems to indicate that the Soviets have a "standard hull module" that is used for different types of vessels, and if the use of these hull modules permit increasing hull length without changes to the fore and aft ends, it can be assumed that they are based on a standard structural design. That being the case, the midship structure will be overdesigned for many applications and optimally designed for very few. Recognizing that the initial additional cost for such a piece of hull structure is relatively minimal, it cannot be forgotten that the lifecycle costs for transporting unnecessary hull weight around can have significant fuel cost impacts. If I perceived the modular construction approach correctly, then I am truly intrigued concerning the methods for handling the distributive systems. In particular, during conversion when the ship is lengthened, how are the electrical, fluid, communications, and other distributive systems broken down, reassembled and tested? "Quick connect couplings" for these type systems at the module breaks is one particular area where economies can be achieved when zone construction methods become the order of the day in U.S. Navy ships. The author's comments in this regard would be most welcome. The design process as presented is somewhat different than U.S. Navy practice. In U.S. practice, Preliminary and Contract design are developed by the Navy. Detail design, the development of the working drawings, is conducted by the lead shipbuilder. While the detail design drawings can be used by follow shipbuilders, flexibility is permitted to facilitate unique shipbuilding or outfitting procedures. Even the contract drawings supplied by the Navy can be modified— upon Navy approval—to permit application of unique shipbuilder capabilities. The large number of college-trained personnel entering the Soviet shipbuilding and allied fields annually is mind-boggling. According to the author's estimation, a minimum of about 6500 college graduates—5000 of which have M.S. degrees—enter these fields each year. It would be most interesting to see a breakdown of these figures—in particular, how many naval architects and welding engineers are included in these figures? These are disciplines with relatively few personnel entering the Navy design and shipbuilding field today. For example, in 1985 in all U.S. colleges and universities, there were only 928 graduates (B.S., M.S. and Ph.D.) in marine, naval architecture and ocean engineering and only 1872 graduates in materials and metallurgy. The number of these graduates that entered the U.S. shipbuilding field is unknown. Again, the author is to be congratulated for providing a very thought-provoking paper. Frank J. Long, Win/Win Strategies This paper serves not only as a chronicle of some of the productivity improvement efforts in Soviet shipbuilding but also as an important reminder of the fruits of those efforts. While most Americans have an appreciation of the strengths of the Russian Navy, this paper serves to bring into clearer focus the Russians' entire maritime might in its naval, commercial, and fishing fleets. Indeed, no other nation on earth has a greater maritime capability. It is generally acknowledged that the Soviet Navy is the largest in the world. When considering the fact that the commercial and fishing fleets are, in many military respects, arms of the naval fleet, we can more fully appreciate how awesome Soviet maritime power truly is. The expansion of its maritime capabilities is simply another but highly significant aspect of Soviet worldwide ambitions. The development and updating of "Setka Typov Su dov" (Table of Vessel Classes), which the author describes is a classic example of the Soviet planning process. As the author states, "A mighty fishing and commercial fleet was built in accordance with a 'Setka' which was originally developed in the 1960's. And an even more impressive example is the rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy." In my opinion it is not mere coincidence that the Russians embarked on this course in the 1960's. That was the beginning of the coldest of cold war periods—Francis Gary Power's U-2 plane was downed by the Russians on May 1, 1960; the mid-May 1960 Four Power Geneva Summit was a bust; the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961 and, in 1962, we had the Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States maritime embargo capability in that crisis undoubtedly influenced the Soviet's planning process. It is a natural and normal function of a state-controlled economy with its state-controlled industries to act to bring about the controlled productivity improvement developments in exactly the key areas discussed in the author's paper. As the author states, "All innovations at Soviet shipyards have originated at two main sources:domestic development andadaptation of new ideas introduced by leading foreign yards, or most likely a combination of both. Soviet shipbuilders are very fast learners; moreover, their own experience is quite substantial." The Ship Production Committee of SNAME has organized its panels to conduct research in many of these same areas for productivity improvement purposes. For example, addressing the areas of technology and equipment are Panels SP-1 and 3, Shipbuilding Facilities and Environmental Effects, and Panel SP-7, Shipbuilding Welding. Shipbuilding methods are the province of SP-2; outfitting and production aids and engineering and scientific support are the province of SP-4, Design Production Integration. As I read through the descriptions of the processes that led to the productivity improvements, I was hoping to learn more about the organizational structure of Soviet shipyards, the managerial hierarchy and how work is organized by function or by craft in the shipyard. (I would assume that for all intents and purposes, all Russian yards are organized in the same way.) American shipyard management is wedded to the notion that American shipbuilding suffers immeasurably from a productivity standpoint because of limitations on management's ability to assign workers across craft lines. It is unlikely that this limitation exists in Soviet shipyards. If it does not, how is the unfettered right of assignment optimized? What are the tangible, measurable results? I believe it would have been helpful, also, for the author to have dedicated some of the paper to one of the most important factors in improvement in the labor-intensive shipbuilding industry—the shipyard worker. There are several references to worker problems—absenteeism, labor shortage, poor workmanship, and labor discipline. The reader is left with the impression that the Russians believe that either those are unsolvable problems or have a priority ranking significantly inferior to the organizational, technical, and design efforts discussed. As a case in point, the author devotes a complete section to engineering education and professional training but makes no mention of education or training programs for blue-collar workers. It would seem that a paper on productivity improvement efforts in Soviet shipbuilding would address this most important element. My guess is that the Russians have considerable such efforts underway and it would be beneficial for us to learn of them.

ABSTRACT Introduction Obstetric fistulae are a leading scourge for women in developing countries resulting, in severe individual suffering and devastating socio-economic repercussions for her family and community. The underlying causes of obstetric fistula stem from multiple factors to include poor nutrition, early marriage, insufficient education and inferior social status of women as well as substandard medical care. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has invested more than $100 million globally since 2004 to address these factors as well as support women suffering with fistulae. The ultimate goal is to eradicate obstetric fistula in Bangladesh in the next 20 years. Despite these efforts, nearly 20,000 women in Bangladesh, still suffer with this malady. Methods To close this gap, USAID and the Department of Defense (DOD) developed a novel Interagency Agreement (IAA) leveraging the surgical skills of military health professionals to scale-up the ongoing fistula care program. The agreement outlined three lines of effort: (1) treat existing fistulae by bolstering surgical capacity of the existing USAID fistula care program; (2) promote fistula mitigation with lectures and hands-on teaching of obstetric care as well as safe gynecologic surgery; and (3) assist with advocacy at higher levels of the Bangladesh government. A Bangladesh Fistula Mission Partnership working group was formed to design and implement this IAA. Critical partners from the US Embassy in Dhaka included USAID (Health, Legal, Contracting), the DOD (Office of Defense Cooperation), and Department of State (Regional Security Officer). Partners from the US Army included United States Army-Pacific Command (Surgeon, Legal, Finance, Security Cooperation, Contracting), Regional Health Command-Pacific (Operations, Legal, Public Affairs), and Tripler Army Medical Center (Department of OBGYN, Operations, Public Affairs). Institutional Review Board approval was not required as the treatments offered were standard of care. Results The Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) health professionals executed the IAA with one pre-deployment site survey and two surgical missions in 2016–2017. The military team supported the surgical repair of 40 pelvic fistulae and perineal tears and provided operative management for an additional 25 patients with pelvic organ prolapse. Furthermore, the team conducted 19 professional lectures and multiple educational forums at hospitals in Kumudini, Khulna and the premier medical university in Dhaka for over 800 attendees including physicians, nurses and students to help prevent obstetric and surgical fistulae. Importantly, the team assisted USAID as subject matter experts in its advocacy to the Bangladesh Ministry of Health for improved maternity care and regulatory oversight. During the missions, the team enhanced their readiness by exercising individual and collective tasks while exposing personnel to the cultural context of the region. Conclusion This IAA was the first USAID funded and DoD-executed health mission in the US Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility. Direct participation in the IAA enabled TAMC to support the US Indo-Pacific Command Theater Campaign Plan, the Department of Defense Instruction 2000.30 on Global Health Engagements, the USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy, and the US Ambassadors Integrated Country Strategy Objectives in Bangladesh. This effort can serve as a model for future cooperation between USAID and the DoD.

Breast cancer is the most common malignancy and a major cause of cancer-related deaths among women in the United States and Western Europe (American Cancer Society 1998, Wingo et al. 1998). Most women succumb to breast cancer if their tumors metastasize but cures are more likely if the cancers remain localized (Harris et al. 1992a,b,c, Walker et al. 1997). Thus, a greater understanding of the metastatic process in human breast cancer should translate into substantial improvements in therapeutic outcome for breast cancer patients. Towards that end, we will review and summarize the literature about, and begin to develop a working model for, the genetics of human breast cancer metastasis. There have been great strides in recent years with regard to our overall understanding of metastasis. Yet our apparently straightforward objective - to define cause-effect relationships for genes in breast cancer - was difficult because of four issues. First, many reports fail to distinguish between oncogenesis and progression or invasion and metastasis when reporting data. Secondly, there is a failure, by some, to recognize that breast cancer is not a single disease, but a collection of diseases. This is particularly apparent in the genetics literature. Thirdly, it is difficult to evaluate the relative importance of correlative data, particularly as it relates to mechanistic control of steps in the metastatic cascade. Fourthly, there is a tremendous noise-to-signal ratio for genetics of late-stage, metastatic breast cancers resulting from genotypic instability, phenotypic drift and tumor heterogeneity. Acknowledgements We are particularly indebted to Dr Bernard E Weissman from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Much of the published work described here was done in conjunction with his laboratory. We also appreciate the efforts of Andrea Manni, P G Satyaswaroop, Michael Verderame, and Steven Goldberg for critical reading and helpful comments and suggestions. We also appreciate the support of grants from the US Army Medical Research and Material Command (DAMD17-96-6152 to D R W); the National Foundation for Cancer Research (to D R W and L L W); PHS grant CA62168 (to D R W), the Latham Fund (L L W) and the Jake Gittlen Memorial Golf Tournament (D R W).

Introduction In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it. These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals. The trajectory of his persona begins in the early days of his coming to power as a charismatic leader during a “time of distress” (Weber) and culminates in his bloody end next to a roadside drainage culvert. In between these points Qaddafi’s persona underwent refinement and reinvention. Coupled with the legacy he left on the Libyan political system, the journey of Muammar Qaddafi’s personas demonstrate how political personality can be the salvation or damnation of an entire state.Qaddafi: The Brotherly RevolutionaryCaptain Muammar Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969 at the age of just 27. He was the leader of a group of military officers who overthrew King Idris in a popular and relatively bloodless coup founded on an ideology of post-colonial Arab nationalism and a doing away with the endemic corruption and nepotism that were the hallmarks of the monarchy. With this revolutionary cause in mind and in an early indication that he recognised the power of political image, Qaddafi showed restraint in adopting the trappings of office. His modest promotion to the rank of Colonel was an obvious example of this, and despite the fact that in practical terms he was the supreme commander of Libya’s armed forces, he resisted the temptation to formally aggrandize himself with military titles for the ensuing 42 years of his rule.High military rank was in a way irrelevant to a man moving to change his persona from army officer to messianic national leader. Switching away from a reliance on military hierarchy as a basis for his authority allowed Qaddafi to re-cast himself as a leader with a broader mission. He began to utilise titles such as “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) and “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution.” The persona on display here was one of detached impartiality and almost reluctant leadership. There was the suggestion that Qaddafi was not really acting as a head of state, but merely an ordinary Libyan who, through popular acclaim, was being begged to lead his people. The attraction of this persona remained until the bitter end for Qaddafi, with his professed inability to step aside from a leadership role he insisted he did not formally occupy. This accords with the contention of Weber, who describes how an individual favoured with charisma can step forward at a time of crisis to complete a “mission.” Once in a position of authority, perpetuating that role of leadership and acclamation can become the mission itself:The holder, of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master—so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ himself. But he does not derive his ‘right’ from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader. (Weber 266-7)As his rule extended across the decades, Qaddafi fostered his revolutionary credentials via a typical cult of personality approach. His image appeared on everything from postage stamps to watches, bags, posters and billboards. Quotations from the Brother Leader were set to music and broadcast as pop songs. “Spontaneous” rallies of support would occur when crowds of loyalists would congregate to hear the Brotherly Leader speak. Although Qaddafi publicly claimed he did not like this level of public adoration he accepted it because the people wanted to adore him. It was widely known however that many of these crowds were paid to attend these rallies (Blundy and Lycett 16).Qaddafi: The Philosopher In developing his persona as a guide and a man who was sharing his natural gifts with the people, Qaddafi developed a post-colonial philosophy he called “Third Universal Theory.” This was published in volumes collectively known as The Green Book. This was mandatory reading for every Libyan and contained a distillation of Qaddafi’s thoughts and opinions on everything from sports to politics to religion to the differences between men and women. Whilst it may be tempting for outsiders to dismiss these writings as the scribbling of a dictator, the legacy of Qaddafi’s persona as political philosopher is worthy of some examination. For in offering his revelations to the Libyan people, Qaddafi extended his mandate beyond leader of a revolution and into the territory of “messianic reformer of a nation.”The Green Book was a three-part series. The first instalment was written in 1975 and focuses on the “problem of democracy” where Qaddafi proposes direct democracy as the best option for a progressive nation. The second instalment, published in 1977, focuses on economics and expounds socialism as the solution to all fiscal woes. (Direct popular action here was evidenced in the RCC making rental of real estate illegal, meaning that all tenants in the country suddenly found themselves granted ownership of the property they were occupying!) The final chapter, published in 1981, proposes the Third Universal Theory where Qaddafi outlines his unique solution for implementing direct democracy and socialism. Qaddafi coined a new term for his Islamically-inspired socialist utopia: Jamahiriya. This was defined as being a “state of the masses” and formed the blueprint for Libyan society which Qaddafi subsequently imposed.This model of direct democracy was part of the charismatic conceit Qaddafi cultivated: that the Libyan people were their own leaders and his role was merely as a benevolent agent acceding to their wishes. However the implementation of the Jamahiriya was anything but benevolent and its legacy has crippled post-Qaddafi Libya. Under this system, Libyans did have some control over their affairs at a very local level. Beyond this, an increasingly complex series of committees and regional groupings, over which the RCC had the right of veto, diluted the participation of ordinary citizens and their ability to coalesce around any individual leader. The banning of standard avenues of political organisation, such as parties and unions, coupled with a ruthless police state that detained and executed anyone offering even a hint of political dissent served to snuff out any opposition before it had a chance to gather pace. The result was that there were no Libyans with enough leadership experience or public profile to take over when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011.Qaddafi: The Liberator In a further plank of his revolutionary persona Qaddafi turned to the world beyond Libya to offer his brotherly guidance. This saw him champion any cause that claimed to be a liberation or resistance movement struggling against the shackles of colonialism. He tended to favour groups that had ideologies aligned with his own, namely Arab unity and the elimination of Israel, but ultimately was not consistent in this regard. Aside from Palestinian nationalists, financial support was offered to groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines), Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), ETA (Spain), the Polisario Front (Western Sahara), and even separatist indigenous Australians. This policy of backing revolutionary groups was certainly a projection of his persona as a charismatic enabler of the revolutionary mission. However, the reception of this mission in the wider world formed the basis for the image that Qaddafi most commonly occupied in Western eyes.In 1979 the ongoing Libyan support for groups pursuing violent action against Israel and the West saw the country designated a State-Sponsor of Terror by the US Department of State. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were severed and did not resume until 2004. At this point Qaddafi seemed to adopt a persona of “opponent of the West,” ostensibly on behalf of the world’s downtrodden colonial peoples. The support for revolutionary groups was changing to a more active use of them to strike at Western interests. At the same time Qaddafi stepped up his rhetoric against America and Britain, positioning himself as a champion of the Arab world, as the one leader who had the courage of his convictions and the only one who was squarely on the side of the ordinary citizenry (in contrast to other, more compliant Arab rulers). Here again there is evidence of the charismatic revolutionary persona, reluctantly taking up the burden of leadership on behalf of his brothers.Whatever his ideals, the result was that Qaddafi and his state became the focus of increasing Western ire. A series of incidents between the US and Libya in international waters added to the friction, as did Libyan orchestrated terror attacks in Berlin, Rome and Vienna. At the height of this tension in 1986, American aircraft bombed targets in Libya, narrowly missing Qaddafi himself. This role as public enemy of America led to Qaddafi being characterised by President Ronald Reagan (no stranger to the use of persona himself) as the “mad dog of the Middle East” and a “squalid criminal.” The enmity of the West made life difficult for ordinary Libyans dealing with crippling sanctions, but for Qaddafi, it helped bolster his persona as a committed revolutionary.Qaddafi: Leader of the Arab and African Worlds Related to his early revolutionary ideologies were Qaddafi’s aspirations as a pan-national leader. Inspired by Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser from a young age, the ideals of pan-Arab unity were always a cornerstone of Qaddafi’s beliefs. It is not therefore surprising that he developed ambitions of being the person to bring about and “guide” that unity. Once again the Weberian description of the charismatic leader is relevant, particularly the notion that such leadership does not respect conventional boundaries of functional jurisdictions or local bailiwicks; in this case, state boundaries.During the 1970s Qaddafi was involved in numerous attempts to broker Arab unions between Libya and states such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. All of these failed to materialise once the exact details of the mergers began to be discussed, in particular who would assume the mantle of leadership in these super-states. In line with his persona as the rightly-guided revolutionary, Qaddafi consistently blamed the failure of these unions on the other parties, souring his relationship with his fellow Arab leaders. His hardline stance on Israel also put him at odds with those peers more determined to find a compromise. Following the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981 Qaddafi praised the act as justified because of Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.Having given up on the hope of achieving pan-Arab Unity, Qaddafi sought to position himself as a leader of the African bloc. In 2009 he became Chairperson of the African Union and took to having himself introduced as “The King of Kings of Africa.” The level of dysfunction of the African Union was no less than that of the Arab League and Qaddafi’s grandiose plans for becoming the President of the United States of Africa failed to materialise.In both his pan-Arab and pan-Africa ambitions, we see a persona of Qaddafi that aims at leadership beyond his own state. Whilst there may be delusions of grandeur apparent in the practicalities of these goals, this image was nevertheless something that Qaddafi used to leverage the next phase of his political transformation.Qaddafi: The Post-9/11 Statesman However much he might be seen as erratic, Qaddafi’s innate intelligence could result in a political astuteness lacking in many of his Arab peers. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Qaddafi was the first international leader to condemn the attacks on America and pledge support in the War on Terror and the extermination of al-Qaeda. Despite his history as a supporter of terrorism overseas, Qaddafi had a long history of repressing it at home, just as with any other form of political opposition. The pan-Islamism of al-Qaeda was anathema to his key ideologies of direct democracy (guided by himself). This meant the United States and Libya were now finally on the same team. As part of this post-9/11 sniffing of the wind, Qaddafi abandoned his fledgling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and finally agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the Pan Am 107 flight downed over Lockerbie in 1987.This shift in Qaddafi’s policy did not altogether dispel his persona of brotherly leadership amongst African nations. As a bloc leader and an example of the possibility of ‘coming in from the cold’, Qaddafi and Libya were reintegrated into the world community. This included giving a speech at the United Nations in 2009. This event did little to add to his reputation as a statesman in the West. Given a 15-minute slot, the Libyan leader delivered a rambling address over 90 minutes long, which included him tearing up a copy of the UN Charter and turning his back to the audience whilst continuing to speak.Qaddafi: The Clown From the Western point of view, performances like this painted Qaddafi’s behaviour as increasingly bizarre. Particularly after Libya’s rapprochement with the West, the label of threatening terrorist supporter faded and was replaced with something along the lines of a harmless clown prince. Tales of the Libyan leader’s coterie of virgin female bodyguards were the subject of ridicule, as was his ardour for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Perhaps this behaviour was indicative of a leader increasingly divorced from reality. Surrounded by sycophants dependent on his regard for their tenure or physical survival, as well as Western leaders eager to contrast his amiability with that of Saddam Hussein, nobody was prepared to draw attention to the emperor’s new clothes.Indeed, elaborate and outlandish clothing played an increasing role in Qaddafi’s persona as the decades went on. His simple revolutionary fatigues of the early years were superseded by a vast array of military uniforms heavily decorated with medals and emblems; traditional African, Arab or Bedouin robes depending on the occasion; and in later years a penchant for outfits that included images of the African continent or pictures of dead martyrs. (In 2009 Vanity Fair did a tongue-in-cheek article on the fashion of Colonel Qaddafi entitled Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion. This spawned a number of similar features including one in TIME Magazine entitled Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.)The Bedouin theme was an aspect of persona that Qaddafi cultivated as an ascetic “man of the people” throughout his leadership. Despite having many palaces available he habitually slept in an elaborate tent, according once again with Weber’s description of the charismatic leader as one who eschews methodical material gain. This predisposition served him well in the 1986 United States bombing, when his residence in a military barracks was demolished, but Qaddafi escaped unscathed as he was in his tent at the time. He regularly entertained foreign dignitaries in tents when they visited Libya and he took one when travelling abroad, including pitching it in the gardens of a Parisian hotel during a state visit in 2007. (A request to camp in New York’s Central Park for his UN visit in 2009 was denied; “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi”).The role of such a clown was unlikely to have been an aim for Qaddafi, but was instead the product of his own increasing isolation. It will likely be his most enduring character in the Western memory of his rule. It should be noted though that clowns and fools do not maintain an iron grip on power for over 40 years.The Legacy of Qaddafi’s Many Personas Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was a clever and complex leader who exhibited many variations of persona during his four decades of rule. These personas were generally facets of the same core self-belief of a charismatic leader, but could be conflicting, and often confusing, to observers. His eccentricities often hid a layer of deeper cunning and ambition, but ultimately led to his marginalisation and an impression by world leaders that he was untrustworthy.His erratic performance at the UN in 2009 perhaps typifies the end stages of Qaddafi’s leadership: a man increasingly disconnected from his people and the realities of what was going on around him. His insistence that the 2011 Libyan revolution was variously a colonial or terrorist inspired piece of theatre belied the deep resentment of his rule. His role as opponent of the Western and Arab worlds alike meant that he was unsupported in his attempts to deal with the uprising. Indeed, the West’s rapid willingness to use their airpower was instrumental in speeding on the rebel forces.What cannot be disputed is the chaotic legacy this charismatic figure left for his country. Since the uprising climaxed in his on-camera lynching in October 2011, Libya has been plunged in to turmoil and shows no signs of this abating. One of the central reasons for this chaos is that Qaddafi’s supremacy, his political philosophies, and his use of messianic persona left Libya completely unprepared for rule by any other party.This ensuing chaos has been a cruel, if ironic, proof of Qaddafi’s own conceit: Libya could not survive without him.References Al-Gathafi, Muammar. The Green Book: The Solution to the Problem of Democracy; The Solution to the Economic Problem; The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory. 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