Journal articles: 'ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM'

1

Gendin, Sidney. "WHY ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IS INVALID." Journal of Social Philosophy 25, no. 1 (March 1994): 144–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1994.tb00311.x.

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2

DENICOLÒ, VINCENZO. "AN ELEMENTARY PROOF OF ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM*." Japanese Economic Review 47, no. 4 (December 1996): 432–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00061.x.

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3

Pouzet, Maurice. "A projection property and Arrow's impossibility theorem." Discrete Mathematics 192, no. 1-3 (October 1998): 293–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0012-365x(98)00077-6.

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4

Hansen, Paul. "Another Graphical Proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem." Journal of Economic Education 33, no. 3 (January 2002): 217–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220480209595188.

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5

Dardanoni, Valentino. "A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem." Social Choice and Welfare 18, no. 1 (January 11, 2001): 107–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550000062.

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6

Denicolo, Vincenzo. "An Elementary Proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Correction." Japanese Economic Review 52, no. 1 (March 2001): 134–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5876.00186.

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7

Fountain, John. "A simple graphical proof of arrow's impossibility theorem." New Zealand Economic Papers 34, no. 1 (June 2000): 89–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00779950009544317.

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8

Lützen, Jesper. "How mathematical impossibility changed welfare economics: A history of Arrow's impossibility theorem." Historia Mathematica 46 (February 2019): 56–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.hm.2018.11.001.

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9

Terao, Hiroaki. "Chambers of arrangements of hyperplanes and Arrow's impossibility theorem." Advances in Mathematics 214, no. 1 (September 2007): 366–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aim.2007.02.006.

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10

Patty, John W., and Elizabeth Maggie Penn. "Measuring Fairness, Inequality, and Big Data: Social Choice Since Arrow." Annual Review of Political Science 22, no. 1 (May 11, 2019): 435–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-022018-024704.

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Kenneth J. Arrow was one of the most important intellectuals of the twentieth century, and his “impossibility theorem” is arguably the starting point of modern, axiomatic social choice theory. In this review, we begin with a brief discussion of Arrow's theorem and subsequent work that extended the result. We then discuss its implications for voting and constitutional systems, including a number of seminal results—both positive and negative—that characterize what such systems can accomplish and why. We then depart from this narrow interpretation of the result to consider more varied institutional design questions such as apportionment and geographical districting. Following this, we address the theorem's implications for measurement of concepts of fundamental interest to political science such as justice and inequality. Finally, we address current work applying social choice concepts and the axiomatic method to data analysis more generally.

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11

Morreau, Michael. "GRADING IN GROUPS." Economics and Philosophy 32, no. 2 (March 14, 2016): 323–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267115000498.

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Abstract:Juries, committees and experts panels commonly appraise things of one kind or another on the basis of grades awarded by several people. When everybody's grading thresholds are known to be the same, the results sometimes can be counted on to reflect the graders’ opinion. Otherwise, they often cannot. Under certain conditions, Arrow's ‘impossibility’ theorem entails that judgements reached by aggregating grades do not reliably track any collective sense of better and worse at all. These claims are made by adapting the Arrow–Sen framework for social choice to study grading in groups.

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Nureev, R. "Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 7. Public Choice under Representative Democracy: Government and Coalitions in Parliament." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 2 (February 20, 2003): 111–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-2-111-132.

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The specifics of pubic choice under representative democracy are considered in the seventh chapter of the textbook. The factors of forming of coalitions in parliament are analyzed. The methods of voting manipulation including the formulation of Arrow's impossibility theorem are described. The concept of logrolling is distinguished. The chapter also includes further readings, control tests and questions.

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Matsumoto, Yasumi. "How well does theory explain reality? - A case of Arrow's impossibility theorem." International Journal of Economics and Business Research 13, no. 4 (2017): 398. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijebr.2017.084382.

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Matsumoto, Yasumi. "How well does theory explain reality? - A case of Arrow's impossibility theorem." International Journal of Economics and Business Research 13, no. 4 (2017): 398. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijebr.2017.10004423.

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15

Radcliff, Benjamin. "The General Will and Social Choice Theory." Review of Politics 54, no. 1 (1992): 34–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500017174.

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The concept of the General Will has been criticized as being either tyrannical or empirically unattainable. From a social choice perspective, Riker (1982) and others have merged the substance of both perspectives. The new argument maintains that Arrow's Theorem and similar impossibility results imply that the General Will is both dangerous and “intellectually absurd.” While not denying the relevance of the collective choice literature, it is argued that such apocalyptic conclusions are premature.

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GÄRDENFORS, PETER. "A REPRESENTATION THEOREM FOR VOTING WITH LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES." Economics and Philosophy 22, no. 2 (July 2006): 181–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026626710600085x.

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This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set of conditions needed for the proof include a version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that also plays a central role in Arrow's impossibility theorem.

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17

NANA, GILBERT NJANPONG, and LOUIS AIME FONO. "ARROW-TYPE RESULTS UNDER INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY PREFERENCES." New Mathematics and Natural Computation 09, no. 01 (March 2013): 97–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793005713500075.

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Fono et al.11 characterized, for an intuitionistic fuzzy t-norm [Formula: see text], two properties of a given regular intuitionistic fuzzy strict component of a (T,S)-transitive intuitionistic fuzzy preference. In this paper, we examine these characterizations in the particular case where [Formula: see text]. We then use these (general and particular) results to obtain some intuitionistic fuzzy versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem. Therefore, by weakening a requirement to social preferences, we deduce a positive result, that is, we display an example of a non-dictatorial Intuitionistic Fuzzy Agregation Rule (IFAR) and, we establish an intuitionistic fuzzy version of Gibbard's oligarchy theorem.

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18

Nguyen, Hung T., Olga Kosheleva, and Vladik Kreinovich. "Decision making beyond arrow's “impossibility theorem,” with the analysis of effects of collusion and mutual attraction." International Journal of Intelligent Systems 24, no. 1 (January 2009): 27–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/int.20324.

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19

Saaty, T. L. "A ratio scale metric and the compatibility of ratio scales: The possibility of arrow's impossibility theorem." Applied Mathematics Letters 7, no. 6 (November 1994): 51–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0893-9659(94)90093-0.

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20

Brandt, Felix, and Christian Geist. "Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 55 (March 4, 2016): 565–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.4959.

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A promising direction in computational social choice is to address research problems using computer-aided proving techniques. In particular with SAT solvers, this approach has been shown to be viable not only for proving classic impossibility theorems such as Arrow's Theorem but also for finding new impossibilities in the context of preference extensions. In this paper, we demonstrate that these computer-aided techniques can also be applied to improve our understanding of strategyproof irresolute social choice functions. These functions, however, requires a more evolved encoding as otherwise the search space rapidly becomes much too large. Our contribution is two-fold: We present an efficient encoding for translating such problems to SAT and leverage this encoding to prove new results about strategyproofness with respect to Kelly's and Fishburn's preference extensions. For example, we show that no Pareto-optimal majoritarian social choice function satisfies Fishburn-strategyproofness. Furthermore, we explain how human-readable proofs of such results can be extracted from minimal unsatisfiable cores of the corresponding SAT formulas.

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21

Zwicker, William S. "Cycles and Intractability in a Large Class of Aggregation Rules." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 61 (March 10, 2018): 407–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.5657.

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We introduce the (j,k)-Kemeny rule -- a generalization of Kemeny's voting rule that aggregates j-chotomous weak orders into a k-chotomous weak order. Special cases of (j,k)-Kemeny include approval voting, the mean rule and Borda mean rule, as well as the Borda count and plurality voting. Why, then, is the winner problem computationally tractable for each of these other rules, but intractable for Kemeny? We show that intractability of winner determination for the (j,k)-Kemeny rule first appears at the j=3, k=3 level. The proof rests on a reduction of max cut to a related problem on weighted tournaments, and reveals that computational complexity arises from the cyclic part in the fundamental decomposition of a weighted tournament into cyclic and cocyclic components. Thus the existence of majority cycles -- the engine driving both Arrow's impossibility theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem -- also serves as a source of computational complexity in social choice.

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22

Maynard-Zhang, P., and D. Lehmann. "Representing and Aggregating Conflicting Beliefs." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 19 (September 1, 2003): 155–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.1206.

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We consider the two-fold problem of representing collective beliefs and aggregating these beliefs. We propose a novel representation for collective beliefs that uses modular, transitive relations over possible worlds. They allow us to represent conflicting opinions and they have a clear semantics, thus improving upon the quasi-transitive relations often used in social choice. We then describe a way to construct the belief state of an agent informed by a set of sources of varying degrees of reliability. This construction circumvents Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in a satisfactory manner by accounting for the explicitly encoded conflicts. We give a simple set-theory-based operator for combining the information of multiple agents. We show that this operator satisfies the desirable invariants of idempotence, commutativity, and associativity, and, thus, is well-behaved when iterated, and we describe a computationally effective way of computing the resulting belief state. Finally, we extend our framework to incorporate voting.

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23

Ravindran, Renuka. "Arrow’s impossibility theorem." Resonance 10, no. 11 (November 2005): 18–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02837642.

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24

Noguchi, Mitsunori. "Generic impossibility of Arrow’s impossibility theorem." Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, no. 4-5 (August 2011): 391–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.04.003.

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25

Qudrat-I Elahi, Khandakar. "A difficulty in Arrow’s impossibility theorem." International Journal of Social Economics 44, no. 12 (December 4, 2017): 1609–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijse-02-2016-0065.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it evaluates the impossibility proposition, called the “Arrow impossibility theorem” (AIT), which is widely attributed to Arrow’s social choice theory. This theorem denies the possibility of arriving at any collective majority resolution in any group voting system if the social choice function must satisfy “certain natural conditions”. Second, it intends to show the reasons behind the proliferation of this impossibility impression. Design/methodology/approach Theoretical and philosophical. Findings Arrow’s mathematical model does not seem to suggest or support his impossibility thesis. He has considered only one voting outcome, well known by the phrase “the Condorcet paradox”. However, other voting results are equally likely from his model, which might suggest unambiguous majority choice. This logical dilemma has been created by Arrow’s excessive dependence on the language of mathematics and symbolic logic. Research limitations/implications The languages of mathematics and symbolic logic – numbers, letters and signs – have definite advantages in scientific argumentation and reasoning. These numbers and letters being invented however do not have any behavioural characteristics, which suggests that conclusions drawn from the model merely reflect the author’s opinions. The AIT is a good example of this logical dilemma. Social implications The modern social choice theory, which is founded on the AIT, seems to be an academic assault to the system of democratic governance that is dominating current global village. By highlighting weaknesses in the AIT, this paper attempts to discredit this intellectual omission. Originality/value The paper offers a counter example to show that the impossibility of social choice is not necessarily implied by the Arrow’s model. Second, it uses Locke’s theory of human understanding to explain why the concerned social scientists are missing this point. This approach is probably entirely novel in this area of research.

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26

Andrikopoulos, Athanasios. "A Generalization of Arrow’s Lemma on Extending a Binary Relation." International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences 2019 (April 1, 2019): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/5397036.

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By examining whether the individualistic assumptions used in social choice could be used in the aggregation of individual preferences, Arrow proved a key lemma that generalizes the famous Szpilrajn’s extension theorem and used it to demonstrate the impossibility theorem. In this paper, I provide a characterization of Arrow’s result for the case in which the binary relations I extend are not necessarily transitive and are defined on abelian groups. I also give a characterization of the existence of a realizer of a binary relation defined on an abelian group. These results also generalize the well-known extension theorems of Szpilrajn, Dushnik-Miller, and Fuchs.

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27

Hasibuan, Sayuti. "PARADOKS ARROW, PERTUMBUHAN EKONOMI DAN RENCANA PEMBANGUNAN JANGKA MENENGAH NASIONAL (RPJMN) TAHUN 2004-2009." Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan: Kajian Masalah Ekonomi dan Pembangunan 7, no. 2 (January 1, 2007): 202. http://dx.doi.org/10.23917/jep.v7i2.3984.

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Based on past experience as well as implementation paradigms embedded in the five-year plan 2004-2009, there is a very small likelihood that it can be successfully implemented. In the past before the crises of 1997, for a long time economic growth has been on average 6.8% per year. But that did not prevent open unemployment from rising. The plan target of reducing open unemployment to 5.1% in 2009 from about 9.7% in 2005 with 6.6% yearly average of economic growth appears very unrealistic. This unrealism is the more so because the plan as it stands embodies paradoxes in its various agendas and programs of action resulting from the operation of Arrow's impossibility theorem. While the plan aims at increasing productive employment, its assumption of human being as a resource is a passive, order receiving rather than an active, innovative and risk taking one.More fundamentally, even if the plan target of economic growth is achieved, it, being on the physical plane, will fail, as it has in the past, to translate the spiritual and corporeal values of Belief in One God and Just and Enlightened Humanity contained in the 1945 constitution. Indonesian society will move further and further away from the cherished ideals of the founding fathers of the Republic with dire implications on its future prosperity and even of its existence. It has been proposed that the operational objective of maximizing economic growth be replaced by maximizing human capability which is more suited to accommodate the multiplicity of objectives in the 1945 constitution with the different levels of physical, corporeal and spiritual dimensions.

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28

Maniquet, François, and Philippe Mongin. "Approval voting and Arrow’s impossibility theorem." Social Choice and Welfare 44, no. 3 (September 23, 2014): 519–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0847-2.

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29

Sun, Xin, Feifei He, Mirek Sopek, and Meiyun Guo. "Schrödinger’s Ballot: Quantum Information and the Violation of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem." Entropy 23, no. 8 (August 20, 2021): 1083. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e23081083.

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We study Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem in the quantum setting. Our work is based on the work of Bao and Halpern, in which it is proved that the quantum analogue of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is not valid. However, we feel unsatisfied about the proof presented in Bao and Halpern’s work. Moreover, the definition of Quantum Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (QIIA) in Bao and Halpern’s work seems not appropriate to us. We give a better definition of QIIA, which properly captures the idea of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, and a detailed proof of the violation of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem in the quantum setting with the modified definition.

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30

Ortona, Guido. "A commonsense assessment of Arrow’s theorem." Journal of Heterodox Economics 3, no. 1 (June 1, 2016): 54–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jheec-2016-0003.

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Abstract The usual, pessimistic interpretation of Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem (often “Impossibility” in textbooks) is excessive. The impossibility defined by Arrow occurs only in presence of a tie or of a cycle. These cases are rare or very rare, and their presence may be assessed ex post. If they occur it is necessary to resort to a second-best rule, but this two-stage procedure does not induce strategic behavior, nor impeaches the use of the Condorcet rule (in observance of the axioms) in all the others. The paper conclusions sustain that implementation of modern management systems to government’s public institutions should deal with a different behavior used to know at companies. In this respect, the paper high-lights different aspects between companies and public institutions behavior admitting similarities on organizational structure and internal procedures.

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31

Polyakov, N. L., and M. V. Shamolin. "On a generalization of Arrow’s impossibility theorem." Doklady Mathematics 89, no. 3 (May 2014): 290–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s1064562414030107.

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32

Cato, Susumu. "Incomplete decision-making and Arrow’s impossibility theorem." Mathematical Social Sciences 94 (July 2018): 58–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.002.

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33

Jain, Ritesh. "A note on the Arrow’s impossibility theorem." Ekonomski anali 60, no. 207 (2015): 39–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1507039j.

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34

Ou-Yang, Kui. "Rawls’s maximin rule and Arrow’s impossibility theorem." Economics Letters 145 (August 2016): 114–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.026.

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35

Saari, Donald G. "From Arrow’s Theorem to ‘Dark Matter’." British Journal of Political Science 46, no. 1 (July 21, 2015): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000712341500023x.

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Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and Sen’s Minimal Liberalism example impose ‘impossibility’ roadblocks on progress. A reinterpretation explained in this article exposes what causes these negative conclusions, which permits the development of positive resolutions that retain the spirit of Arrow’s and Sen’s assumptions. What precipitates difficulties is surprisingly common, and it affects most disciplines. This insight identifies how to analyze other puzzles such as conflicting laws or controversies over voting rules. An unexpected bonus is that this social science issue defines a research agenda to address the ‘dark matter’ mystery confronting astronomers.

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36

Keller, Nathan. "A tight quantitative version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem." Journal of the European Mathematical Society 14, no. 5 (2012): 1331–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.4171/jems/334.

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37

Amadae, S. M. "Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the national security state." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36, no. 4 (December 2005): 734–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.08.012.

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38

Yu, Ning Neil. "A one-shot proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem." Economic Theory 50, no. 2 (February 5, 2012): 523–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0693-3.

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39

Gaertner, Wulf. "Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem stretching to other fields." Public Choice 179, no. 1-2 (January 23, 2018): 125–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0503-y.

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40

Tang, Pingzhong, and Fangzhen Lin. "Computer-aided proofs of Arrow's and other impossibility theorems." Artificial Intelligence 173, no. 11 (July 2009): 1041–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2009.02.005.

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41

Zhu, Wenhan, Guangtao Zhai, Menghan Hu, Jing Liu, and Xiaokang Yang. "Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem inspired subjective image quality assessment approach." Signal Processing 145 (April 2018): 193–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.sigpro.2017.12.001.

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42

Igersheim, Herrade. "The Death of Welfare Economics." History of Political Economy 51, no. 5 (October 1, 2019): 827–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-7803691.

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The death of welfare economics has been declared several times. One of the reasons cited for these plural obituaries is that Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem, as set out in his pathbreaking Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951, has shown that the social welfare function—one of the main concepts of the new welfare economics as defined by Abram Bergson (Burk) in 1938 and clarified by Paul Samuelson in the Foundations of Economic Analysis—does not exist under reasonable conditions. Indeed, from the very start, Arrow kept asserting that his famous impossibility result has direct and devastating consequences for the Berg-son-Samuelson social welfare function, though he seemed to soften his position in the early eighties. On his side, especially from the seventies on, Samuelson remained active on this issue and continued to defend the concept he had devised with Bergson, tooth and nail, against Arrow’s attacks. The aim of this article is precisely to examine this rather strange controversy, which is almost unknown in the scientific community, even though it lasted more than fifty years and involved a conflict between two economic giants, Arrow and Samuelson, and, behind them, two distinct communities—welfare economics, which was on the wane, against the emerging social choice theory—representing two conflicting ways of dealing with mathematical tools in welfare economics and two different conceptions of social welfare.

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43

Moskal'onov, S. A. "Assessment criteria for aggregate social welfare." Economic Analysis: Theory and Practice 19, no. 12 (December 25, 2020): 2358–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.24891/ea.19.12.2358.

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Subject. The article addresses the history of development and provides the criticism of existing criteria for aggregate social welfare (on the simple exchange economy (the Edgeworth box) case). Objectives. The purpose is to develop a unique classification of criteria to assess the aggregate social welfare. Methods. The study draws on methods of logical and mathematical analysis. Results. The paper considers strong, strict and weak versions of the Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky, and Samuelson criteria, introduces the notion of equivalence and constructs orderings by Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky, and Samuelson. The Pareto and Samuelson's criteria are transitive, however, not complete. The Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky citeria are not transitive in the general case. Conclusions. The lack of an ideal social welfare criterion is the consequence of the Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, and of the group of impossibility theorems in economics. It is necessary to develop new approaches to the assessment of aggregate welfare.

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44

Velupillai, K. Vela. "Kenneth Joseph Arrow. 23 August 1921—21 February 2017." Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 67 (June 12, 2019): 9–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbm.2019.0002.

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Kenneth Arrow was a mathematical economist and political scientist who made many ground-breaking contributions to the theory of economics and social values. His great mathematical ability led him to introduce new approaches to theoretical economics and in particular to a series of fundamental theorems in the discipline. These included the Arrow Impossibility Theorem, the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics and the existence of a competitive equilibrium. For these and many other contributions he was awarded the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economics shared with Sir John Hicks. He took a particular interest in computation and computability in economics. He was active and very productive as a researcher for over seven decades and was renowned as a generous and inspiring teacher and colleague.

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45

Geanakoplos, John. "Three brief proofs of Arrow?s Impossibility Theorem." Economic Theory 26, no. 1 (July 2005): 211–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0556-7.

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46

Campbell, Donald E., and Jerry S. Kelly. "On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems." Social Choice and Welfare 20, no. 2 (March 1, 2003): 273–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550200181.

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47

Ubeda, Luis. "Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems." Economic Theory 23, no. 1 (December 1, 2003): 195–1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0353-0.

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48

Tanaka, Yasuhito. "Equivalence of the HEX game theorem and the Arrow impossibility theorem." Applied Mathematics and Computation 186, no. 1 (March 2007): 509–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2006.07.115.

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49

Boricic, Branislav. "Impossibility theorems in multiple von Wright’s preference logic." Ekonomski anali 59, no. 201 (2014): 69–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1401069b.

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By using the standard combining logics technique (D. M. Gabbay 1999) we define a generalization of von Wright?s preference logic (G. H. von Wright 1963) enabling to express, on an almost propositional level, the individual and the social preference relations simultaneously. In this context we present and prove the counterparts of crucial results of the Arrow-Sen social choice theory, including impossibility theorems (K. Arrow 1951 and A. K. Sen 1970b), as well as some logical interdependencies between the dictatorship condition and the Pareto rule, and thus demonstrate the power and applicability of combining logics method in mathematical economics.

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50

Savvateev, Alexey, Aleksander Filatov, and Dmitry Schwartz. "The Problem of Collective Choice, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, and it’s Short Proof." Известия Дальневосточного федерального университета. Экономика и управление, no. 4 (2018): 5–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.24866/2311-2271/2018-4/5-22.

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Journal articles on the topic 'ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM'

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