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Journal articles on the topic 'Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions'
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1
Bakhsh, Dr Faiz. "SCOPE OF THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (IHL) IN SITUATIONS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS: EXTENDED APPLICABILITY OF COMMON ARTICLE.3." Journal of Law & Social Studies 1, no. 2 (December 31, 2019): 99–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.52279/jlss.01.02.99105.
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The applicability of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in non-international conflicts is a complex phenomenon due to the undefined and unannounced nature of non-international armed conflicts. International Humanitarian Law extends its applicability to the armed conflicts of non-international nature between state and non-state armed groups or between non-state armed groups. Common article.3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and 1977 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, provide criteria for the applicability of IHL However, the states are often seen reluctant to accept international legal oversight into their internal matters and this phenomenon of violence often need to be identified and defined. This paper investigates the scope of the application of International Humanitarian Law in situations of non-international armed conflicts, mainly focussing on the extended applicability of common article.3 to the Geneva Conventions 1949, in situation of non-international armed conflicts. Various types and nature of armed conflicts, the applicability of International Humanitarian Law to non-international conflicts are discussed with special reference to the scope and applicability of Common Article.3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Moreover, the binding force and territorial scope of common article.3 are discussed in a broader context as to assess the applicability of International Humanitarian Law on the changing nature of the non-international armed conflicts.
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Pejic, Jelena. "The protective scope of Common Article 3: more than meets the eye." International Review of the Red Cross 93, no. 881 (March 2011): 189–225. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383111000130.
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AbstractNon-international armed conflicts are not only prevalent today, but are also evolving in terms of the types that have been observed in practice. The article sets out a possible typology and argues that Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions may be given an expanded geographical reading as a matter of treaty law. It also suggests that there is a far wider range of rules – primarily of a binding nature, but also policy-based – that apply in Common Article 3 armed conflicts with regard to the treatment of persons in enemy hands and the conduct of hostilities.
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Boelaert-Suominen, Sonja. "Commentary: The Yugoslavia Tribunal and the Common Core of Humanitarian Law Applicable to all Armed Conflicts." Leiden Journal of International Law 13, no. 3 (September 2000): 619–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156500000406.
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This article discusses the contribution made by the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal to the articulation of the body of international humanitarian law that applies to all armed conflicts, regardless of whether they are international or internal. The Tadić Jurisdiction Decision rendered by the Appeals Chamber in 1995 set the stage for a substantial “rapprochement” of the regulatory content of war crimes committed in international and internal armed conflict, using Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as the main vehicle. The first judgements have contributed greatly to the expansion of the body of “Geneva law” applicable to all armed conflicts. More recently, the Tribunal has started to examine cases of armed conflicts per se, in which perpetrators have been charged with violation of the “Hague law”, i.e., the law relating to the conduct of hostilities. The end result of this development will be elaboration of a common core of Geneva law and Hague law applicable to all armed conflicts that have reached the threshold of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
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Vázquez, Carlos Manuel. "The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide." American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (January 2007): 73–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0002930000029547.
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The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) was precipitated by several of the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. First, the administration perceived the need to respond to the Court’s invalidation of the military commissions established pursuant to the president’s Military Order of November 13,2001, as contrary to Congress’s stipulation that such tribunals conform to the laws of war. In addition, the Court’s holding that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the conflict with Al Qaeda carried important implications for other national security policies. Most important, the Court’s interpretation of the scope of common Article 3 imperiled the president’s program for the interrogation of Qaeda detainees because that article prohibits cruel and degrading treatment and violating it was a criminal offense under the War Crimes Act.
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Nejbir, Deniz Arbet. "Applying Humanitarian Law: A Review of the Legal Status of the Turkey–Kurdistan Workers’ Party (pkk) Conflict." Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 12, no. 1 (March 25, 2021): 37–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18781527-bja10026.
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Abstract This article assesses the applicability of the criteria for non-international armed conflict to the situation in South-Eastern Turkey. It demonstrates that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (also known as the pkk), as a party to the conflict, fulfils the three main criteria laid down in conventional international humanitarian law and developed by indicative factors in international jurisprudence for assessing the existence of a non-international armed conflict in the context of Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions: being an organised armed group, having the ability to engage in ‘protracted violence’, and complying with law of armed conflict. It establishes that the pkk qualifies as an organised armed group under responsible command and has the operational ability, structure and capacity to carry out ‘protracted violence’, to respect fundamental humanitarian norms of international humanitarian law and to control territory. The article also ascertains that Turkey is clearly bound by the provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, including Common Article 3, and customary international humanitarian law. Accordingly, it concludes that the conflict between the pkk and the Turkish security forces qualifies as a non-international armed conflict within the meaning of both Common Article 3 and customary international humanitarian law.
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Askin, Kelly D. "Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status." American Journal of International Law 93, no. 1 (January 1999): 97–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2997957.
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993 to prosecute war crimes committed during the Yugoslav conflict; the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in 1994 to prosecute war crimes committed during the Rwandan civil war. The Yugoslav Tribunal has the competence to try alleged offenders for crimes enumerated in Articles 2-5 of its Statute, namely, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Similarly, the Rwandan Statute accords the Tribunal authority to try defendants for crimes enunciated in Articles 2-4, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. Article 7, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the ICTY Statute and Article 6, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the ICTR Statute grant jurisdiction to these ad hoc Tribunals to try the accused for individual criminal responsibility on the bases of individual culpability and superior authority.
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Bodansky, Daniel, and Peter J. Spiro. "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld." American Journal of International Law 100, no. 4 (October 2006): 888–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0002930000031961.
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 126 S.Ct. 2749.United States Supreme Court, June 29, 2006.In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the military commissions established by President George W. Bush were unauthorized by law and inconsistent with both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Rejecting jurisdictional challenges to its resolving the legality of the tribunals, the Court found the military commission proceedings against Hamdan to violate the “uniformity” requirement of the UCMJ, under which military commissions must be governed by the same standards as courtsmartial except where impracticable. The Court also found the tribunals to violate the Geneva Conventions as incorporated by Article 21 of the UCMJ, because the commissions did not qualify as “regularly constituted courts” as required under Common Article 3.
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Mantilla, Giovanni. "Forum Isolation: Social Opprobrium and the Origins of the International Law of Internal Conflict." International Organization 72, no. 2 (2018): 317–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818318000097.
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AbstractWhy have states created international laws to regulate internal armed conflicts? This article is the first to theorize the emergence and design of these international rules, focusing on Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Drawing on original multicountry archival research, I develop the mechanism offorum isolationto explain the origins of Common Article 3, demonstrating the importance of social opprobrium pressure to explain why Britain and France switched from staunch opposition to support and leadership in 1949. Specifically, forum isolation pressured these European empires to concedeandto react strategically behind the scenes, saving face and safeguarding their security interests by deliberately inserting ambiguous language in the text of Common Article 3. This move later facilitated states' avoidance of this rule in many conflict cases.
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Droege, Cordula. "“In truth the leitmotiv”: the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment in international humanitarian law." International Review of the Red Cross 89, no. 867 (September 2007): 515–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383107001245.
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AbstractThe principle of humane treatment, as Jean Pictet wrote in 1958, is in truth the leitmotiv of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Article 3 common to these Conventions and other provisions of International Humanitarian Law embody this absolute and minimum rule by prohibiting torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal dignity. These notions can be interpreted in meaningful and practical ways through the existing instruments and jurisprudence on the prohibition of ill-treatment. Their assessment must take into account the need to respect the human being in all his or her physical, mental and moral integrity, mindful of all the circumstances of the case.
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Wojcik, Mark E. "President Bush Issues an Executive Order Interpreting Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as Applied to a C.I.A. Program of Detention and Interrogation." International Legal Materials 46, no. 5 (September 2007): 978–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020782900005374.
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Meindersma, Christa. "Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as Violations of the Laws or Customs of War under Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." Netherlands International Law Review 42, no. 03 (December 1995): 375. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0165070x00005891.
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Guțan, Sabin. "Legal Aspects Regarding the Existence of the Internal Armed Conflict." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 24, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 184–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2018-0087.
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Abstract The issue of the existence of the internal armed conflict concerns both legal factors and political factors (recognition of the existence of the internal armed conflict). From a legal point of view, to declare a violent social phenomenon as internal armed conflict, we must resort to the specific rules of international humanitarian law: Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to these conventions of 1977. However, these regulations, while describing the general parameters of the existence of an internal armed conflict, do not establish clear legal criteria for delimiting the internal armed conflict of internal tensions and disturbances or other forms of non-armed conflicts. This regulatory shortcoming has led to the emergence in the jurisprudence of some states, but also in the international one, of criteria for the existence of the internal armed conflict
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Knoops, Geert-Jan Alexander. "Military Criminal Responsibilities for Targeting Suspected Terrorists within (International) Armed Conflicts: Towards a Uniform Framework." International Criminal Law Review 8, no. 1-2 (2008): 141–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156753608x265268.
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AbstractThis article examines a new form of counterterrorism measures exercised by states namely preventative targeting of alleged terrorists. The analysis conducted in this article is based on a judgment of the Israeli Supreme court of 13 December 2006 where this issue was addressed in the context of an international armed conflict. The author critically assesses the various aspects of this judgment in view of contemporary principles of contemporary international (criminal) law. In particular, it focuses on the main question whether this form of counter terrorism complies with the underlying principle of Common Article 3 of the Geneva conventions, namely the requirement of "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."
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Bello, Judith Hippler, and Theodore R. Posner. "Alien Tort Claims Act—genocide—war crimes—violations of international law by nonstate actors: Kadic v. Karadzic. 70 F.3d 232, cert, denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3832 (June 18, 1996)." American Journal of International Law 90, no. 4 (October 1996): 658–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2203994.
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In a suit brought by Bosnian nationals against Radovan Karadzic, die U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, under the Alien Tort Claims Act, a U.S. district court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonstate actor accused of committing genocide or war crimes in violation of international law. Relying on various international agreements, including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, the court found that, under modern international law, genocide and war crimes are universally condemned regardless of whether the perpetrator is die agent of a state or an independent, nonstate actor. However, the court declined to extend its holding beyond these two categories of international law violations, finding that no similar consensus exists widi respect to more commonplace violations such as torture and summary execution; the current state of international law with respect to these acts concerns state actors only, according to die court.
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Restrepo, Laura Betancur. "The Legal Status of the Colombian Peace Agreement." AJIL Unbound 110 (2016): 188–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2398772300003056.
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One of the many roles played by international law in the Colombian Peace Accord is that of guarantor—that is, creating assurances that the parties will comply with their commitments. To this end, negotiators declared that the Final Peace Accord would constitute a Special Agreement (SA) in “terms of Article 3 common to all Geneva Conventions of 1949,” which “will be introduced [in the Colombian legal system] as part of the constitutional block” and deposited “before the Swiss Federal Council.” Furthermore, they stated, “a presidential declaration will be made taking the form of a unilateral declaration of the Colombian State before the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” and its incorporation in a Resolution of the Security Council will be requested.
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Arnold, Roberta. "Sivakumaran's ‘Law of Non-International Armed Conflict’: A Criminal Lawyer's Perspective." Israel Law Review 48, no. 2 (June 11, 2015): 253–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223715000072.
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One of the least clarified areas of international law is the legal regime applicable to non-international armed conflict (NIAC) – that is, where hostilities occur between state and non-state actors (NSAs) or between two or more NSAs.1 This can be explained by the reticence of states to grant legality to such movements and their preference to label them as criminal movements or terrorist groups.2 The result is that the regulation of NIAC is still limited to the application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (GCs) and their Additional Protocol II of 1977 (Additional Protocol II or AP II).3 While Common Article 3 provides only a rudimentary framework of minimum standards, Additional Protocol II, which usefully supplements it, is still less detailed than the rules governing international armed conflict (IAC). Moreover, in contrast to Common Article 3,4 it has not yet attained customary status.5 This situation is a source of concern. Faced with the horrors committed in NIACs such as those in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s, and the awareness of an inadequate legal framework, the international criminal law (ICL) community decided to resort to international human rights law (IHRL) and ICL to fill the gaps of international humanitarian law (IHL) applicable to NIAC.6
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Sosnowski, Marika. "‘Not dead but sleeping’: Expanding international law to better regulate the diverse effects of ceasefire agreements." Leiden Journal of International Law 33, no. 3 (June 11, 2020): 731–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156520000308.
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AbstractCeasefire agreements are legally governed by international humanitarian law because they have generally been considered in relation to how they affect levels of violence. However, new research in the fields of anthropology, security, and development studies suggests that ceasefires can have many more ramifications. These range from their ability to influence governance institutions, property and citizenship rights, economic networks, and security mechanisms. Consequently, this article suggests that a broader legal framework is needed through which to consider ceasefires and their consequences. While canvassing the option of ceasefires being types of contractual documents or as special agreements under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the article concludes that the best way to regulate ceasefire agreements is through an expanded version of lex pacificatoria. Rather than being governed by hard international law, such a move would allow for the implementation of more flexible programmatic standards to influence the myriad ways ceasefires are negotiated, the conduct of belligerents, and their diverse effects on the ground during wartime.
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Blanco, Ester. "Torture In Emergency Situations." Leiden Journal of International Law 2, no. 2 (November 1989): 209–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156500001278.
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As is well known, states may take measures derogating from their obligations under the human rights treaties during proclaimed states of emergency. They remain, however, bound to respect certain inalienable human rights, the ‘hard core’, at all times and in all circumstances. The right to life, the prohibition of torture, slavery and retroactive penal measures are thus considered as being a ‘minimum safeguard’ against human rights violations. They are generally accepted as being customary international law, one may even speak of jus cogens. Moreover, one may argue that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which contains a larger list of human rights than the abovementioned four, should also be respected in situations which are below the threshold of an armed conflict. In the important Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua in 1986 the International Court of Justice held that the rules in common Article 3 are fundamental principles of Humanitarian Law, which are customary law and constitute a minimum, applicable in all circumstances. Even so state practice seems to indicate the opposite; experience has shown that it is during emergency situations that flagrant abuses of human rights are most common, especially in the treatment of persons who have been detained or deprived of their liberty.
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Oxman, Bernard H., and Diane Marie Amann. "Prosecutor v. Akayesu." American Journal of International Law 93, no. 1 (January 1999): 195–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2997961.
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Case ICTR-96-4-T.International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, September 2, 1998.This pioneering opinion marks the first time an international criminal tribunal has tried and convicted an individual for genocide and international crimes of sexual violence. The case arose out of the massacres of perhaps a million Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. At least two thousand died in Taba, a rural commune where defendant Jean-Paul Akayesu was mayor. A trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda concluded that, although Akayesu may at first have tried to prevent killings, he eventually donned a military jacket and participated in or ordered atrocities. The Tribunal found him guilty of one count each of genocide and incitement to commit genocide and seven counts of crimes against humanity. It acquitted Akayesu of five counts brought under common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol Additional II to those Conventions on the ground that he was not within the class of perpetrators contemplated by them.
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Bellal, Annyssa, Gilles Giacca, and Stuart Casey-Maslen. "International law and armed non-state actors in Afghanistan." International Review of the Red Cross 93, no. 881 (March 2011): 47–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383111000051.
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AbstractAn effective legal regime governing the actions of armed non-state actors in Afghanistan should encompass not only international humanitarian law but also international human rights law. While the applicability of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to the conflict is not controversial, how and to what extent Additional Protocol II applies is more difficult to assess, in particular in relation to the various armed actors operating in the country. The applicability of international human rights law to armed non-state actors – considered by the authors as important, particularly in Afghanistan – remains highly controversial. Nevertheless, its applicability to such actors exercising control over a population is slowly becoming more accepted. In addition, violations of peremptory norms of international law can also directly engage the legal responsibility of such groups.
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Corn, Geoffrey S., and Tanweer Kaleemullah. "The Military Response to Criminal Violent Extremist Groups: Aligning Use of Force Presumptions with Threat Reality." Israel Law Review 47, no. 2 (June 6, 2014): 253–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223714000053.
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In 1949, the inclusion of Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions represented a significant advance in the regulation of armed hostilities. That article extended international humanitarian law to the realm of non-international armed conflicts. At that time, these conflicts were considered synonymous with intrastate conflicts such as civil wars. While the scope of applicability of Common Article 3 to internal threats and disturbances has witnessed what is arguably a significant evolution since that time, it is unclear whether and when this baseline humanitarian obligation – and the broader customary laws and customs of war applicable to non-international armed conflicts once this article is triggered – are applicable when a state confronts organised criminal gangs who possess a capability to engage in violence and wreak havoc that rivals, if not exceeds, that of traditional insurgent threats.Much of this uncertainty derives from the fact that the response to criminal disturbances appears to have been specifically excluded from situations triggering Common Article 3 when it was adopted in 1949. However, it is unlikely that the drafters of the Conventions at that time anticipated the nature of organised criminal gangs and the destabilising effect these groups have today in many areas of the world. The nature of this threat has resulted in the increasingly common utilisation of regular military forces to restore government control in areas in which they operate. This results in the use of force and the exercise of incapacitation powers that far exceed normal law enforcement response authority. It is therefore the thesis of this article that when the nature of these threats exceeds the normal law enforcement response authority and compels the state to resort to regular military force to restore order, international humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict, provides the only viable legal regulatory framework for such operations. However, it is also the view of the authors that the risk of excess of authority inherent in this legal framework necessitates a carefully tailored package of rules of engagement to mitigate the risk that the effort to restore order will result in the unjustified deprivation of life, liberty and property.
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Kretzmer, David. "Rethinking the Application of IHL in Non-International Armed Conflicts." Israel Law Review 42, no. 01 (2009): 8–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700000431.
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The first step in application by treaty of IHL norms to non-international armed conflicts, adoption of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 1949, was taken before the dramatic development of international human rights law (IHRL). The assumption was that unless international humanitarian law (IHL) norms were applied to such conflicts, the way States acted would be unrestrained by international law. With the development of IHRL this assumption is no longer valid. Application of IHL in such conflicts should therefore be re-examined. The Article argues that moving away from IHL in non-international armed conflicts should be based on the following principles: 1. In cases other than international armed conflicts, the presumption should be that the prevailing international legal regime is the human rights regime, based as it is on a law-enforcement model of law, rather than an armed conflict model. 2. The only justification for departure from that regime and for action under the armed conflict model, should be that the level and scope of organized armed violence are such that the State cannot reasonably be expected to act in accordance with the law-enforcement model. The rule of thumb in deciding whether this test has been met could be the definition of non-international armed conflicts adopted in APII. 3. There should be a return to the notion of minimum humanitarian standards or fundamental standards of humanity, which apply to all Parties in all situations, whether armed conflict, internal violence, disturbances, tensions and public emergencies. 4. A State should not be allowed to employ the armed conflict model, without at least some of the norms of protection that this model affords Parties in international armed conflicts. The ideal solution would be to demand that a State, which employs the armed conflict model has to draw the legal consequences and recognize as combatants those members of dissident forces who meet the substantive conditions of combatants under Article 4, paragraph 2 of Third Geneva Convention.
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VAN SLIEDREGT, ELIES. "International Crimes before Dutch Courts: Recent Developments." Leiden Journal of International Law 20, no. 4 (December 2007): 895–908. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156507004517.
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In the early 1990s, two former members of the Afghan secret service applied for a residence permit in the Netherlands. Their request was denied on the basis of the exclusion clause of Article 1F(a) of the Vienna Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. There were serious reasons for suspecting that the men had committed war crimes during the Afghan civil war of 1979–92. In 2000, the immigration authorities transmitted the files of the two men to the public prosecution office, which initiated prosecutions in 2003. At the trial, defence counsel raised various preliminary challenges. They argued that the case should be declared inadmissible since relying on the immigration files would violate the nemo tenetur principle and the right against self-incrimination enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, the court had no universal jurisdiction over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions since there was no international rule mandating a right to universal jurisdiction over war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. The Hague District Court dismissed the defence challenges and eventually convicted the Afghan nationals to 9 and 12 years' imprisonment. The Hague Appeal Court endorsed most of the findings of the District Court and confirmed the convictions and sentences. The reasoning underlying the decisions, both at first instance and at appeal, raise questions particularly with regard to universal jurisdiction. In this article the defence arguments are explored and the reasoning of the courts is analysed.
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Lax, Violeta Moreno. "Must EU Borders have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of Schengen Visas and Carriers' Sanctions with EU Member States' Obligations to Provide International Protection to Refugees." European Journal of Migration and Law 10, no. 3 (2008): 315–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157181608x338180.
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AbstractWhereas the EU is developing a highly protective Common European Asylum System in purported compliance with the Geneva Convention, it is also displaying growing reluctance to provide unhindered access to it to those in need. The question of physical access to protection is ambiguously dealt with within EU law. On the one hand, it appears that entry to the Schengen zone has been designed disregarding refugees' entitlement 'to special protection'. Prior to admission, refugees seem to have been assimilated to the broader class of (potentially illegal) immigrants and thus required to submit to general immigration conditions, including visa. On the other hand, some isolated EU law rules give the impression that refugees are to be exonerated from normal admittance requirements.This article intends to show how, 'in the light of present day conditions,' a contextual, dynamic and teleological interpretation of Articles 31 and 33 of the Geneva Convention as well as of Articles 3 ECHR and 2(2) of Protocol 4 ECHR require that the second set of EU rules be appropriately furthered.
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Martin, David A. "Judicial Review and the Military Commissions Act: On Striking the Right Balance." American Journal of International Law 101, no. 2 (April 2007): 344–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0002930000030116.
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld seemed a promising example of a special form of judicial role. Abstaining from deploying its ultimate power to judge the constitutionality of an action of a political branch, the United States Supreme Court used statutory construction to give a strong nudge in a direction favorable to human rights. It negated a questionable and controversial policy—President George W. Bush’s unilateral establishment of military commissions to try terrorist suspects by means of reduced procedures—and essentially remanded the matter to Congress. The initial fruits of that remand, the Military Commissions Act (MCA), came as a disappointment. The Act cuts back on judicial review of the treatment of prisoners at Guantánamo and other U.S. detention sites overseas; it limits certain key protections available to the accused in a military commission proceeding, as compared to courts-martial; and it takes a crabbed view of the requirements of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions—at least as applied to the actions of U.S. agents. Nonetheless, further judicial and congressional reconsideration is certainly possible—and highly desirable.
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Crawford, Emily. "Road to Nowhere? The Future for a Declaration on Fundamental Standards of Humanity." Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 3, no. 1 (2012): 43–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18781527-00301002.
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In the years following the adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, debate emerged regarding the extant lacunae in the international rules relating to armed conflict. It was argued that there were gaps in international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law with regards to so-called ‘grey-zone conflicts’ – armed conflicts that did not reach the minimum threshold of either Protocol II or Common Article 3. Therefore, it was proposed that a declaration outlining the minimum humanitarian standards applicable in all situations of violence and conflict be adopted. By 1990, this debate had crystallised around the Turku Declaration on Minimum Humanitarian Standards. However, progress on the declaration quickly stalled once discussion was moved to the United Nations. Since 1995, there have been nine reports by the Secretary-General on the question of fundamental standards of humanity to use the current terminology. Over the years, the scope and content the fundamental standards of humanity has become clearer, yet the adoption of a document on these fundamental standards is no more imminent than when the issue first moved to the United Nations. This article will therefore examine why and how this apparently vital piece of international policy has stalled.
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Pfanner, Toni. "Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action." International Review of the Red Cross 87, no. 857 (March 2005): 149–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383100181238.
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AbstractWarring parties are increasingly unequal and the principle of equality of arms does not apply to them. This asymmetry in warfare has many ramifications. The militarily weaker party is tempted to have recourse to unlawful methods of warfare in order to overcome the adversaries' strength. The expectation of reciprocity as a fundamental motivation for respecting the law is often illusory and replaced instead with perfidious behaviour; covert operations substitute for open battles, “special rules” are made for “special situations”. The fight against international terrorism seems to constitute the epitome of this kind of warfare. “Elementary considerations of humanity” as enshrined in article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions however constitute universally binding rules for all — even unequal and asymmetrical — parties to any situation of armed violence. Furthermore, attacks on humanitarian organizations have showed that humanitarian relief may be contrary to belligerents' interests, or, even worse, that attacks on humanitarian workers may be part of their agenda. Humanitarian actors must be aware of these facts and adapt their working methods so as to be able to continue to provide impartial assistance, based solely on the needs of the victims of armed violence.
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Momtaz, Djamchid. "War Crimes in Non-international Armed Conflicts under the Statute of the International Criminal Court." Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2 (December 1999): 177–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1389135900000416.
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International humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts has long been characterized by the absence of universal competence to suppress serious violations of its provisions. This failure has been due to the reluctance of states – which are naturally prone to consider any limitation of their exclusive competence in this field as a threat to their sovereignty – to criminalize such acts under international law.The first attempt at remedying such a situation was seen in the Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court (ICC), which was prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 1994, and inspired by the draft articles of the Code of Crimes against the Peace and International Security of Mankind, provisionally adopted by the ILC in 1991 at first reading. Under the Draft Statute of the ICC, serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts would be under the jurisdiction of the Court. The ILC had in mind exceptionally serious war crimes, such as those described in the pertinent article of the draft code referred to by the Commission, constituting an extremely grave violation of the principles and laws of international law applicable in armed conflicts. In the commentary on this article, the ILC took care to specify that the expression ‘armed conflict’ covered the non-international armed conflicts that are the focus of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, as well as international armed conflicts.This first step was of very limited scope. In fact, according to the ILC, in order to be criminalized, the laws and customs of war had to find their origin in general customary international law.
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S. Nurbani, Erlies. "KEWAJIBAN INDONESIA BERDASARKAN KETENTUAN YANG BERSAMAAN KONVENSI JENEWA 1949." Jurnal Jatiswara 33, no. 3 (November 28, 2018): 329. http://dx.doi.org/10.29303/jatiswara.v33i3.181.
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As a part of international community, which had ratify various of international agreements, Indonesia obliged to create national laws which compatible with international agreements. Since ratification of international agreements is not a final process which must comply by a state to abide the international agreements. The adjusment of national law whether with establish the new law or amendment the existed law, is repercussions of ratifications phase which state have to fulfill. One of Indonesia obligations, based on Geneva Conventions 1949 for the Protection of Victims of War, i.e common articles of Article 49 Geneva Convention I, Article 50 Geneva Convention II, Article 129 Geneva Convention III and Article 146 Geneva Convention IV is to establish national law on grave breaches of the convention and to prosecute the perpetrators. This article try to examine further on the Indonesia obligations based on th common articles and its implementaion in Indonesia, after 60 years of Indonesia accesion to the Geneva Conventions 1949 with the Law Number 59 Year 1958 on Indonesia Participation on all of Geneva Conventions 1949.
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Dörmann, Knut, and Jose Serralvo. "Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the obligation to prevent international humanitarian law violations." International Review of the Red Cross 96, no. 895-896 (December 2014): 707–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s181638311400037x.
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AbstractCommon Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions lays down an obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. This paper focuses on the second part of this obligation, in particular on the responsibility of third States not involved in a given armed conflict to take action in order to safeguard compliance with the Geneva Conventions by the parties to the conflict. It concludes that third States have an international legal obligation not only to avoid encouraging international humanitarian law violations committed by others, but also to take measures to put an end to on-going violations and to actively prevent their occurrence.
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Robson, Verity. "The Common Approach to Article 1: The Scope of Each State’s Obligation to Ensure Respect for the Geneva Conventions." Journal of Conflict and Security Law 25, no. 1 (2020): 101–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/kraa004.
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Abstract Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is foundational, but not exceptional: the duty to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions must be considered within the framework of public international law as a whole. The Article obliges each High Contracting Party and its organs to respect the Geneva Conventions, and to ensure respect for these Conventions by the population over which it exercises authority and any other persons or groups whose conduct is attributable to it. This scope is demonstrated by the ordinary meaning of the term, subsequent agreements, subsequent practice and other relevant rules of international law, and confirmed by reference to the travaux preparatoires. In particular, erga omnes status does not affect it. As a matter of good faith performance of the Conventions, each High Contracting Party also has a duty not to encourage violations by others. Common Article 1 does not require, as some authors have argued, the prevention or termination of breaches of the Geneva Conventions by other parties to conflict, but High Contracting Parties may choose to take steps toward doing so, as a matter of policy.
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Focarelli, C. "Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?" European Journal of International Law 21, no. 1 (February 1, 2010): 125–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chq017.
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Lanz, Matthias, Emilie Max, and Oliver Hoehne. "The Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 17 December 2014 and the duty to ensure respect for international humanitarian law." International Review of the Red Cross 96, no. 895-896 (December 2014): 1115–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383115000648.
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AbstractWhile international humanitarian law envisages the possibility of holding formal thematic discussions, only United Nations General Assembly resolutions prompted the depositary of the Geneva Conventions to consult the High Contracting Parties on the opportuneness of conflict-specific conferences. Recalling the precedents of 1999 and 2001 – convened on the basis of the support expressed by the States Parties during related consultations – this article focuses on the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 17 December 2014, which is likewise related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The result of the conference consists of a declaration reflecting the willingness of the States Parties to further implement Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions.
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Kretzmer, David, Aviad Ben-Yehuda, and Meirav Furth. "‘Thou Shall Not Kill’: The Use of Lethal Force in Non-International Armed Conflicts." Israel Law Review 47, no. 2 (June 6, 2014): 191–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223714000065.
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The assumption of this article is that when a state is involved in an international armed conflict it may employ lethal force against combatants of the enemy unless they arehors de combat. Hence, even when it would be feasible to do so, it has no duty to apprehend enemy combatants rather than use force against them. Does this same norm apply in non-international armed conflicts occurring in the territory of a single state (internal conflicts)? The writers argue that the answer is in the negative. Despite the attempt in recent years to narrow the differences between the norms that apply in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) and international armed conflicts (IACs), there are still significant differences between the two types of armed conflict, which justify the application of different norms in this context. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions refers only to humanitarian norms and does not imply that the norms relating to the conduct of hostilities in IACs apply also in NIACs. While customary international law may allow states to use lethal force in a NIAC in the actual conduct of hostilities, there is no basis for assuming that the norm that ostensibly applies in IACs relating to use of such force outside the context of hostilities applies in NIACs too. The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which is the main source for the arguments on closing the gap between IACs and NIACs, relates only to humanitarian norms and has never addressed extending the permissive IAC norms of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to NIACs. Finally, in an internal armed conflict the state has a dual capacity: it must respect and ensure the human rights of all persons subject to its jurisdiction, and it is a party in an armed conflict with some of those persons. In such a situation, the only context in which the state may deviate from regular norms of law enforcement is the actual context of hostilities, in which application of such norms is not feasible. In other contexts, its human rights obligations prevail.
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TONKIN, HANNAH. "Common Article 1: A Minimum Yardstick for Regulating Private Military and Security Companies." Leiden Journal of International Law 22, no. 4 (October 28, 2009): 779–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156509990227.
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AbstractTens of thousands of contractors work for private military and security companies (PMSCs) during armed conflict and occupation, often hired by states to perform activities that were once the exclusive domain of the armed forces. Many of the obligations and standards that guide states in regulating their armed forces are lacking in relation to PMSCs, raising concerns that states might simply outsource their military policy to PMSCs without taking adequate measures to promote compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This article argues that the universally applicable obligation ‘to ensure respect’ for IHL in Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions can provide a key mechanism for addressing these concerns.
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Sudika Mangku, Dewa Gede. "Roles and Actions That Should Be Taken by The Parties In The War In Concerning Wound and Sick Or Dead During War or After War Under The Geneva Convention 1949." Jurnal Komunikasi Hukum (JKH) 7, no. 1 (February 2, 2021): 170. http://dx.doi.org/10.23887/jkh.v7i1.31467.
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Modern international humanitarian law consists of two historical streams: The Law of The Hague which in the past was referred to as the law of war proper, and Geneva Law or Humanitarian Law. The two schools are named after the venue for the international conferences drafting treaties on war and conflict, especially the Hague Conventions 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions, which were drafted for the first time in 1863. Both Hague Law and Geneva Law are branches from jus in bello, namely international law regarding acceptable practices in the conduct of war and armed conflict). The result of the writing of this article is that basically the scope of the First Geneva Convention in the context of scale provides protection in international and non-international conflicts, but the basis for non-international protection is not specifically explained in this convention, because in this First Geneva Convention. Non-international conflicts are only included in the General Provisions Chapter, and will be further clarified in Protocol II. This non-international scope is described in accordance with the First Geneva Convention Chapter I - General Provisions Article 3 regarding armed conflicts that are not international (non-international) taking place within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties so that each Party to the conflict is obliged to implement the provisions applicable. The roles and actions that must be taken by the disputing parties during the war or not for the wounded and sick or dead cannot be separated from Human Rights, which must care for fellow human beings and please help regardless of ethnicity, religion, race, gender, age and skin. But in the Geneva convention only provides actions that should be done, there are no sanctions imposed if we ignore or do not comply with this Geneva convention. The method used in this research is normative juridical.
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Dutli, María Teresa. "Implementation of international humanitarian law - National measures: Information received by the International Committee of the Red Cross on implementation measures taken by the States at the national level." International Review of the Red Cross 34, no. 302 (October 1994): 464–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020860400078475.
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The importance of adopting national measures to implement international humanitarian law has been stressed on many occasions. It was repeated in the Final Declaration of the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims (Geneva, 30 August–1 September 1993), which reaffirmed the obligation laid down in Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law in order to protect the victims of war. The Declaration urged all States to make every effort to “adopt and implement, at the national level, all appropriate regulations, laws and measures to ensure respect for international humanitarian law applicable in the event of armed conflict and to punish violations thereof”. The Conference thus reasserted the need to bring about more effective compliance with that law.
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Kalshoven, Frits. "The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit." Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2 (December 1999): 3–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1389135900000362.
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The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims open with an unusual provision: it is the undertaking of the contracting states ‘to respect and to ensure respect for [the Conventions] in all circumstances’. Why reaffirm that contracting states are bound to ‘respect’ their treaty obligations? Does ‘all circumstances’ add anything special to this fundamental rule of the law of treaties? And what about ‘ensure respect’: should that not be regarded as implicit in ‘respect’, in the sense of a positive counterpart to the negative duty not to violate the terms of the Conventions?I readily admit that common Article 1 was not the first provision of the Conventions to capture my attention: there was, after all, so much to discover in these impressive structures that Article 1 could easily be passed over as an innocuous sort of opening phrase. Two things have changed this. One was the insistence of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that a State Party to the Conventions is not only itself bound to comply with its obligations under these instruments but is under a legal obligation to make sure that other States Parties do likewise. The more this thesis of the ICRC was forced upon us, the less likely it seemed to me that this could indeed be an international legal obligation upon contracting states.
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Arnaut Haseljić, Meldijana. "Joint criminal enterprise – Bosnia and Herzegovina in Croatia’s great project." Historijski pogledi 3, no. 4 (December 30, 2020): 240–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.52259/historijskipogledi.2020.3.4.240.
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY / ICTY) has indicted Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić and Berislav Pušić. Indictees are charged with individual criminal responsibility (Article 7 (1) of the Statute) and criminal responsibility of a superior (Article 7 (3) of the Statute) for crimes against humanity: persecution on political, racial and religious grounds; killing; rape; deportation; inhumane acts; inhumane acts (forcible transfer); inhumane acts (conditions of detention); imprisonment, violations of the laws or customs of war: cruel treatment; cruel treatment (conditions of detention); illegal physical labor; reckless destruction of towns, settlements or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; destruction or willful damage to institutions dedicated to religion or education; looting of public and private property; unlawful attack on civilians (Mostar); unlawful terrorism of civilians (Mostar); cruel treatment (siege of Mostar), violations of the Geneva Conventions: willful deprivation of life; inhuman treatment (sexual abuse); unlawful deportation of civilians; illegal transfer of civilians; unlawful detention of civilians; inhuman treatment; inhuman treatment (conditions of detention); destruction of large-scale property that is not justified by military necessity, and was carried out illegally and recklessly; confiscation of property that is not justified by military necessity, and was performed illegally and ruthlessly. The trial began on April 26, 2006. The Trial Chamber's judgment of 29 May 2013 concluded that the conflict between the Croatian Army / Croatian Defense Council (HV / HVO) and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) was of an international character. The factual evidence unequivocally showed that HV forces fought together with HVO members against ARBiH, and that the Republic of Croatia exercised general control over the armed forces and civilian authorities of the Croatian Community/Croatian Republic (HZ/HR) of Herceg-Bosna. The Council also found that there was a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) with the ultimate goal of establishing a Croatian entity, partly within the 1939 Croatian Banovina, to enable the unification of the Croatian people. The ultimate goal was the annexation of this area to the territory of the Republic of Croatia in case of disintegration of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which corresponded to great state claims), or alternatively to make this area an independent state within Bosnia and Herzegovina, closely connected with Croatia. As early as December 1991, members of the HZ Herceg-Bosna leadership (including Mate Boban, president of HZ/HR Herceg-Bosna) and Croatian leaders (including Franjo Tuđman, president of Croatia) assessed that in order to achieve the ultimate goal of establishing a Croatian entity it is necessary to change the national composition of the population in the areas that were calculated to be part of it. JCE participants knew that achieving this goal means removing the Bosniak population from the area of the so-called Herceg-Bosna and that it is in contradiction with the peace negotiations that were held in Geneva. Numerous crimes committed from January 1993 to April 1994 indicate an obvious pattern of behavior where the commission of a crime was the outcome of a plan prepared by JCE participants. The Trial Chamber found that all persons covered by the Indictment made a significant contribution to the implementation of the JCE and that their contribution indicated that they had the intent to pursue a common criminal purpose. Following consideration of the Appeals filed by the Prosecution and the Defense of the Convicts, the ICTY Appeals Chamber issued a final Judgment on 29 November 2017 against Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić and Berislav Pušić, declaring them liable for the joint criminal enterprise in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This appellate judgment upheld the convictions handed down by the ICTY Trial Chamber in May 2013. In addition to participating in a joint criminal enterprise, the Appeals Chamber upheld responsibility for killings, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds, deportations, unlawful detention of civilians, forced labor, inhumane acts, inhumane treatment, unlawful and wanton destruction of large-scale property not justified by military necessity, destruction or willful damage to institutions dedicated to religion or education, unlawful attacks on civilians and unlawful terrorism of civilians, and individually for rape and sexual abuse. The verdict confirmed that the participants from Croatia in the joint criminal enterprise were Franjo Tudman, Janko Bobetko and Gojko Šušak. From the presented evidence it was concluded that the leaders of HZ/RHB, including Mato Boban, and the leaders of the Republic of Croatia, including Franjo Tudjman, in December 1991 assessed that the long-term political goal was to achieve the unification of the Croatian people entities, within the borders of the Banovina of Croatia from 1939, it is necessary to carry out “ethnic cleansing” in the territories that were claimed to belong to the HZ/RHB. Evidence confirms that a joint criminal enterprise has been established to achieve the political goal. In this context, it was established that Franjo Tudjman advocated the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia by annexing part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia or, if this was not possible, by establishing an autonomous Croatian territory that would be closely connected with Croatia. Prlić, Stojić, Praljak, Petković, Ćorić, and Pušić were convicted of crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, specifically murder, willful deprivation of life, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds, deportation, unlawful detention of civilians, forced labor, inhumane acts, inhuman treatment, unlawful and wanton destruction of large-scale property not justified by military necessity, looting and confiscation of public and private property under the third category of liability for participation in JCE destruction or intentional infliction damage to institutions dedicated to religion or education, unlawful attacks on civilians and unlawful terrorism of civilians. In addition, Prlić, Stojić, Petković and Ćorić were convicted of rape and inhuman treatment (sexual abuse). Ćorić was additionally convicted for several crimes for which he is responsible as a superior.
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Zych, Tomasz. "The Scope of the Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law." Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 27, no. 2 (October 1, 2009): 251. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/wyaj.v27i2.4528.
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This article disputes what seems to have become the dominant interpretation of the obligation to respect and to ensure respect for International Humanitarian Law, as codified in common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol I. According to this dominant interpretation, States are required to take all appropriate measures to ensure that IHL is observed universally, including by other States and by non-State actors operating in other States. It is argued that the intention of the High Contracting Parties, coupled with their subsequent practice, calls for a much more narrow interpretation of that obligation.Cet article conteste ce qui semble être devenue l’interprétation dominante de l’obligation de respecter et de faire respecter le Droit International Humanitaire, tel que codifiée à l’article 1 commun aux Conventions de Genève et à l’article 1(1) du Protocole additionnel I. Selon cette interprétation dominante, les États doivent prendre toutes les mesures appropriées pour assurer que le DIH soit observé de façon universelle, y compris par d’autres États ainsi que par des acteurs non étatiques qui opèrent à l’intérieur d’autres États. On soutient que l’intention des Hautes Parties contractantes, en conjonction avec leur pratique subséquentes, laisse entendre une interprétation beaucoup plus étroite de cette obligation.
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Mosakova, E. A., and K. Kizilova. "Labor market in the UK in digital era: The gender dimension." RUDN Journal of Sociology 21, no. 3 (September 17, 2021): 512–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2272-2021-21-3-512-519.
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The article considers gender discrimination in the field of labor relations in the United Kingdom (UK) in the pre-covid period. In the past decades, the Western European countries have made the most significant progress in achieving gender equality in various fields, including labor relations, and became the world leader in this area. However, despite all the efforts of the international community, no country has achieved a full gender equality, and Great Britain is no exception. The authors argue that the British anti-discrimination legislation (before leaving the European Union) was based on international acts and conventions. For a long time, there were acts and laws prohibiting discrimination in the labor market, which seriously hindered the implementation of an effective anti-discrimination policy in the sphere of labor relations. It was not until 2010 that the law on equality was passed to replace all previous laws and regulations and to provide an exhaustive list of criteria for prohibiting discrimination. As a result, Great Britain began to develop a rather strict national anti-discrimination legislation in the field of labor relations. Thus, in the past decades, the UK has been achieving gender equality in the economic sphere at a faster pace than the average European Union country. The study shows a steady decline in the gender wage gap in the UK over the past two decades, which may be considered one of the countrys most significant achievements in fighting gender discrimination in the labor market. However, there is still a number of serious challenges: a relatively low female labor force participation and employment rate, a gender wage gap and income gap, horizontal and vertical segregation, a gender gap in postgraduate education, and a significant gender gap in time spent on family responsibilities. Age discrimination presents a special problem in the sphere of labor relations in Great Britain. In the European Union, the first laws prohibiting age discrimination were adopted only in the 2000s, and in the UK - in 2006. This problem still remains extremely acute for the labor market, since age discrimination in the UK ranks third among the most common grounds for discrimination - after gender and disability.
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Palwankar, Umesh. "Measures available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law." International Review of the Red Cross 34, no. 298 (February 1994): 9–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020860400081699.
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The present study deals with one specific aspect of the whole issue of finding ways and means of improving respect for international humanitarian law, namely, implementation of the obligation, as contained in Article 1 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to their Additional Protocol I of 1977, to ensure respect for this law. It is based upon the premise that the interpretation of common Article 1, whereby the obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law implies that every High Contracting Party ought to take action with regard to any other High Contracting Party which does not respect this law, is uncontested. The study therefore does not discuss this issue, but rather identifies and briefly comments upon the various types of measures available to States in order to fulfil their obligation to ensure respect. The examples given for the various measures are merely illustrative and ought by no means to be considered as a judgement by the author regarding their justification in the light of the circumstances under which they were adopted.
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Begoore, Yateesh. "Prisoners Dilemma: Ascertaining and Augmenting the Multinational NIAC Detention Regime." Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online 20, no. 1 (August 29, 2017): 436–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/13894633_02001014.
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While International Humanitarian Law (IHL) contains a comprehensive framework of rules and procedural protections for detainees in international armed conflicts (IACS), there is a conspicuous absence of such rules and protections for detainees in the case of non-international armed conflicts (NIACS). In fact, as the recent Serdar Mohammad v. Ministry of Defence case pointed out, the rules pertaining to NIACS make no mention of detention authority at all, leading some scholars to conclude that International Human Rights Law (IHRL), and not IHL, governs NIAC detention. Contrarily, this paper contends that not only does IHL govern (as well as grant authority for) NIAC detentions, the regime’s shortcomings regarding procedural safe-guards and treatment standards may be remedied through the application of the Copenhagen Process Principles – as evolutive interpretation or interpretation based on subsequent agreement – to Common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
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Venediktov, S. "TOWARDS THE ISSUE ON THE DENUNCIATION OF THE CONVENTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION." Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Legal Studies, no. 117 (2021): 15–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/1728-2195/2021/2.117-3.
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The article analyzes the legal regulation for the denunciation of the conventions of the International Labour Organization. Both automatic and "pure" denunciations of conventions are examined. Ratified ILO conventions have traditionally been one of the key sources of national labour law. However, over time, some of them have lost their relevance and practical importance. The most common way to waive obligations under ratified conventions is to denounce them. Denunciation is provided for in every ILO convention, with the exception of Conventions Nos. 80 and 116, which contain rules relating to the partial revision of previous conventions. In addition, a mechanism for partial denunciation is provided for certain conventions. Such a mechanism is expressed in the possibility of denunciation of: a) certain sections of the Convention, e.g. Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits Convention, 1967 (No. 128); b) certain categories covered by the scope of the convention, e.g. Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) Convention, 1977 (No. 148). It is determined that most denunciations of ILO conventions occur automatically, due to the country's ratification of more recent conventions. In Ukraine, all denunciation of ILO conventions took place automatically. The "pure" denunciations are more relevant to outdated conventions or conventions that no longer correspond to existing fundamental principles in the world of work. An example is Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1948 (No. 89), which was denounced by Austria, Greece, Italy, Ireland, France, the Czech Republic, etc. The provisions of this Convention are no longer in line with the ILO's existing policy of equal rights and opportunities for men and women in world of work. The practice of denouncing up-to-date ILO conventions should not be called widespread, primarily due to the need for mandatory prior tripartite consultations on this issue, which involves comprehensive consideration of the interests of government, employees and employers. Ratification by the country of the ILO conventions puts national labour legislation in a fairly clear framework, which in some cases may serve as a reason for slowing down specific areas of its further development. After all, certain conventions were adopted at a time when completely different regulatory approaches in the world of work were applied than those that exist today. Resolving this issue is possible through the timely and balanced application of the denunciation procedure. This procedure, provided for in almost all ILO conventions, should be considered as a clear example of the harmonious evolution of international labour standards. Keywords: International Labour Organization, conventions, automatic denunciation, "pure" denunciation, ratification, national legislation.
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Heffes, Ezequiel, and Marcos D. Kotlik. "Special agreements as a means of enhancing compliance with IHL in non-international armed conflicts: An inquiry into the governing legal regime." International Review of the Red Cross 96, no. 895-896 (December 2014): 1195–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383115000788.
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AbstractCommon Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or asui generislegal regime.
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Zimmermann, Andreas. "Humanitarian Assistance and the Security Council." Israel Law Review 50, no. 1 (February 9, 2017): 3–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223716000315.
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Over the years, the Security Council has on several occasions dealt with humanitarian assistance issues. However, it is Security Council Resolution 2165(2014), related to the situation in Syria, that has brought the role of the Security Council to the forefront of the debate. It is against this background that the article discusses the legal issues arising from Security Council action facilitating humanitarian assistance to be delivered in situations of non-international armed conflict.Following a brief survey of relevant practice of the Security Council related to humanitarian assistance, the article considers the relevance, if any, of Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) to humanitarian assistance to be delivered in such situations. It then moves on to analyse whether a rejection by the territorial state of humanitarian aid to be delivered by third parties may amount to a situation under Article 39 of the UN Charter. It then considers in detail whether (at least implicitly) Resolution 2165 has been adopted under Chapter VII and, if this is not the case, whether it can be still considered to be legally binding.The article finally considers what impact the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2165 might have on the interpretation of otherwise applicable rules of international humanitarian law and, in particular, the right of third parties to provide humanitarian assistance in a situation of a non-international armed conflict in spite of the absence of consent by the territorial state, and the obligations that members of the Security Council, permanent and non-permanent, have under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions when faced with a draft resolution providing for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, notwithstanding the absence of consent by the territorial state.
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Roscini, Marco. "The United Nations Security Council and the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law." Israel Law Review 43, no. 2 (2010): 330–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700000790.
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This Article discusses the competences and powers of the UN Security Council in securing compliance with international humanitarian law, in particular through the adoption of the measures provided in Chapter VII of the Charter: The competence of the Council in this field can be founded on several legal grounds: on a broad interpretation of the notion of “threat to the peace” (Article 39 of the Charter), on Article 94(2) with regard to the International Court of Justice's judgments establishing violations of the jus in bello and also on the customary duty to ensure respect for international humanitarian law as reflected in Article 1 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of the Victims of War. In particular, such customary provision empowers the Security Council to react to any violation of international humanitarian law regardless of a nexus with concerns of international stability. Although the Council has adopted a variety of measures in relation to violations of the laws of war, the most incisive ones are those provided in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII, which however are not without problems. The role the Security Council has played in the enforcement of international humanitarian law has been criticized because of its selective and opportunistic approach, which is due to the political nature of the organ. Also, in several instances the Council, far from securing compliance with the jus in bello, has instead interfered with its application. However selective and imperfect the Council's approach might be, though, its power to adopt decisions binding on UN members and its competence to take or authorize coercive measures involving the use of force make it potentially a formidable instrument against serious violations of international humanitarian law, partly remedying the lack of enforcing mechanisms in the treaties on the laws of war.
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Gouin, Frédéric. "Prisonniers de Guerre aux Mains de Leur Puissance D’origine : Pour Une Application des Conventions de Genève Jusqu’à Leur « Libération et Rapatriement Définitifs »." Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 27, no. 2 (October 1, 2009): 321. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/wyaj.v27i2.4530.
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This paper assumes that at least some of the persons detained within the framework of the global confrontation against terrorism should have been granted the status of prisoners of war. This raises the question of what should be happening to these prisoners of war once they are transferred to their country of origin. Persons deprived of freedom within the framework of theglobal confrontation against terrorism are considered as enemies by both the detaining authorities and the authorities from their country of origin. This is happening either because the latter changed between the moment they were made prisoners and the moment they were transferred (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq) or because the have always been part of the opposition to their authorities. Being transferred to a country which should have offered them at least consular protection, and did not, means that they are once again jailed, abused, tortured, threatened, deprived of contacts with their family, etc. This paper argues that prisoners of war should continue to benefit from this status if they are transferred to a country that will continue to detain them essentially because of their participation to an armed conflict, even if the receiving country is the prisoner of war’s country of origin. This position is founded on three arguments: (1) the Geneva POW Convention specifies it continues to apply until “final release and repatriation”; (2) international obligations forbid transferring someone to a country where they fear persecution; (3) loyalty instead of nationality should be the basis to determine whether an individual is entitled to the protection of the Geneva POW Convention.Dans cet article, on présume que le statut de prisonnier de guerre aurait dû être accordé à au moins certaines personnes détenues dans le cadre de la confrontation globale contre le terrorisme. Cela soulève la question à savoir ce qui devrait arriver à ces prisonniers de guerre une fois qu’ils sont transférés à leur pays d’origine. Les personnes privées de leur liberté dans le cadre de la confrontation globale contre le terrorisme sont considérées comme des ennemis et par les autorités qui les détiennent et par les autorités de leur pays d’origine. Cela est le cas soit parce que celles-ci ont changé entre le moment qu’on en a fait des prisonniers et le moment de leur transfert (ex. l’Afghanistan, l’Irak) soit parce qu’ils ont toujours fait partie de l’opposition à leurs autorités. Le transfert à un pays qui aurait dû leur offrir au moins la protection consulaire, et ne l’a pas fait, signifie qu’ils sont encore une fois mis en prison, abusés, torturés, menacés, privés de contact avec leur famille, etc. Dans cet article, on soutient que les prisonniers de guerre devraient continuer à bénéficier de ce statut si ils sont transférés à un pays qui va continuer à les détenir essentiellement à cause de leur participation à un conflit armé, même si le pays qui les reçoit est le pays d’origine du prisonnier de guerre. Cette position repose sur trois arguments : (1) la Convention de Genève sur les prisonniers de guerre précise qu’elle continue à s’appliquer jusqu’à «la libération et le rapatriement définitifs»; (2) les obligations internationales interdisent de transférer quelqu’un à un pays où il ou elle craint être persécuté; (3) la loyauté plutôt que la nationalité devrait être la base pour déterminer si un individu a droit à la protection de la Convention de Genève sur les prisonniers de guerre.
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Earnest, Darrell. "Clock Work: How Tools for Time Mediate Problem Solving and Reveal Understanding." Journal for Research in Mathematics Education 48, no. 2 (March 2017): 191–223. http://dx.doi.org/10.5951/jresematheduc.48.2.0191.
Full textAbstract:
This article reports on elementary students' understanding of time in the context of common classroom manipulatives and notational systems. Students in Grades 2 (n = 72) and 4 (n = 72) participated in problem-solving interviews involving different clocks. Quantitative results revealed that students' performances were significantly different as a function of the tool available. Descriptive case studies of 3 Grade 4 students are presented in which students demonstrated competencies in conventions related to benchmark numeric conversions between hours and minutes and counting by 5s around the clock, yet only partial competencies related to the integral relationship between hours and minutes. Implications for theory and the treatment of time in curriculum and instruction are discussed.
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Rogovets, Anastasia S. "“What is Your Good Name?”: on Translating Multicultural Literature." Polylinguality and Transcultural Practices 16, no. 3 (December 15, 2019): 406–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2618-897x-2019-16-3-406-414.
Full textAbstract:
The article discusses distinguishing features of speech etiquette in Indian English and certain aspects of its translation into Russian. The relevance of this research topic is determined by the current spread of English as an international language and by the emergence of the World Englishes paradigm. In India there are a lot of cultural conventions that do not have English equivalents and, thus, cannot be expressed adequatelyby means of the English language. As a result of the language contact, Indian English has got an impact on its linguistic setting from Hindi and other regional languages. This linguistic transfer from Indian languages can be seen at various levels, including the use of politeness formulas. In this article the focus is made on the politeness formula “What is your good name?”, which is a polite way of asking someone’s name. This etiquette question is one of the most common Indian English politeness patterns, generalized all over India. The article analyzes the etymology of this expression and explains why it is frequently encountered in the speech of Indian English users, as well as to show the important role of such an analysis in overcoming translation difficulties.