Academic literature on the topic 'Asian Foreign public opinion'

Before 18th century China along with India had 50% share of world economy. It is believed that China will emerge as largest world economy till 2030. Domestic circumstances and public opinion always effected the foreign policies of countries and also are major drivers of foreign attitude of China. South Asia occupies an important place in foreign policy of China which includes Nepal, Bhutan, India and Pakistan having common border with it. India is big South Asian giant and dominating power of the region. Furthermore, South Asian region is also known as Indian backyard and Chinese foreign policy towards the sub region revolves around the India - China relationship. During the initial years of post-cold war era, Chinese export of South Asian states increased from 71,910 million US dollars to 182,917 million US dollars from 1991 to 1997 and import expanded from 63791 million US dollars to 142,189 million US dollars within same span of time.

AbstractDespite Australia's increasing economic ties with Asia, little is known about how it is perceived by the typical citizen in the region. This paper seeks to contribute to the Australian discussion on ‘Asian engagement’, as well as to a general understanding of the structure of foreign policy beliefs, by examining perceptions of Australia's influence among the mass publics of 14 Asian polities. Despite some anxiety in Australia on national op-ed pages and among political leaders over how the country is perceived, we find that the average person in Asia probably does not have a strong or meaningful opinion about Australia's foreign policy. Using survey data covering the years 2006 through 2008 from the AsiaBarometer project, we find that, on average, far more people view Australia's influence on their country favorably (40.5%) than view it unfavorably (6.1%). A similar percentage (41.5%), however, have neutral views of Australia's influence, and 12% of people in Asian nations express no opinion on the topic. We suggest these high frequencies of neutral perceptions and non-response are evidence of considerable indifference towards Australia. Furthermore, we investigate the correlates of perceptions of Australia's influence and find that in almost all cases citizens’ views about US and Chinese influence on their country are much better predictors of their views of Australia's influence than core values, identity, information, and demographic characteristics. We posit that opinions about Australia, even those that are favorable, may have less to do with perceptions of Australia specifically, and more to do with respondents’ general internationalist sentiment or perceptions of major powers.

AbstractUnder pressure to choose between the U.S. and China, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a hedging strategy: deepening economic relations with China while strengthening security cooperation with the U.S. How does the region's public view this strategy? With tensions rising in South China Sea territorial disputes, are more nationalistic individuals more likely to oppose hedging? Using an original public opinion survey conducted in the Philippines, we find that while an overwhelming majority of respondents were concerned about the territorial disputes, more nationalistic Filipinos were no more concerned than less nationalistic ones. Further, more nationalistic Filipinos were more likely to view economic relations with China as important for the Philippines and to approve of Duterte's China policy, which follows the logic of hedging. These surprising findings suggest that under the shadow of great-power competition, the link between domestic politics and foreign policy is nuanced in the Philippines, and Southeast Asia in general.

AbstractThis article provides a framework for the comparative study of international systems. By analyzing how international systems are framed, scripted, and performed, it is possible to understand how interstate relations are interpreted in different historical periods and parts of the world. But such an investigation also has general implications—inter alia for a study of the nature of power, the role of emotions in foreign policymaking, and public opinion formation. Case studies are provided by the Sino-centric, the Tokugawa, and the Westphalian systems. As this study shows, the two East Asian systems were in several respects better adapted than the Westphalian to the realities of international politics in the twenty-first century.

Since “the Belt and Road” initiative was proposed ten years ago, ASEAN has always been a priority region. China and Southeast Asian countries, adhering to the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits, have made significant achievements in political consultation, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, environmental protection, and other aspects. In the new international political and economic situation, both sides are facing challenges from factors such as intervention from foreign powers, political uncertainty within ASEAN countries, competition for economic development space, and misunderstanding and concerns about China’s rise. Nevertheless, China and ASEAN are geographically connected by mountains and rivers, historically by humanities. With the RCEP implemented and the RMB regionalized in ASEAN, cooperation between China and ASEAN in emerging fields such as the digital commerce and green energy will see more benefits. In order to better promote China ASEAN cooperation, China should maintain the regional center status of ASEAN, solidly promote bilateral trade and enterprise investment, through cultural exchanges and international public opinion promotion, tell China’s story well, win the hearts of ASEAN people, and enhance trust between each other.

The article compares the two most significant military conflicts of the Cold War era, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, in terms of their impact on US domestic and foreign policy. To this end, they are analysed on eight key parameters (objectives of the war, changes in foreign policy concepts, economic consequences of the war, public opinion, etc.). Unlike numerous studies on the impact of the US on Asian regions and nations, the main thrust of this study is to focus on the reverse impact of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, namely on the ways these conflicts affected the domestic affairs of the US and altered its foreign policy behaviour. The empirical base for the study encompasses declassified White House and Pentagon papers, memoirs of American presidents, public opinion polls, as well as extensive research literature. The authors conclude that, although the war on the Korean Peninsula was one of the hottest points of the Cold War and had a serious impact on the social and political life of the country, it has in fact turned out to be a “forgotten” event in American history. By contrast, the Vietnam War, although it had a significant impact on the public consciousness of Americans, was on the whole largely a local conflict, failed to substantially change the international situation, and could not impede the policy of détente in international relations, which was essential for both the USA and the USSR.

AbstractIn the aftermath of the Korean War, the People's Republic of China was effectively an international pariah. Accounts of this period in Chinese textbooks emphasize how the Chinese turned this around, either during the Geneva Conference or the Bandung Conference, through deft planning and enterprise. Yet few pay any attention to how such manipulation of world opinion became increasingly difficult for Beijing after that initial success. One outcome of China's public relations campaign meant friendly Afro-Asia leaders voiced their opinions, in alarming numbers, to their Chinese counterparts regarding issues such as Asian security, mainland China's economic development, and the Taiwan problem. Indeed, recently declassified Chinese Foreign Affairs archive documents demonstrate that China tried to marshal such non-Soviet bloc opinions to its advantage during the first Taiwan Strait crisis (1955). Chinese efforts were successful in that there was no lack of volunteers to air dissent with American foreign policy. But these new allies also wished to mediate between the United States and the Republic of China, on the one side, and mainland China on the other. Moreover, such efforts were often at variance with China's domestic and strategic outlook in the region. China thus had to embark upon an active ‘management’ of disparate world opinions, which was an entirely new endeavour. Although China tried to provide a sanitized ‘script’ for its new friends, most had their own ideas. By the time of the second Taiwan Strait crisis (1958), the volume of third party interference had grown. Overwhelmed by such international attention, China responded by openly rejecting unwelcome mediation efforts and demanded outright condemnation of the United States. Thus, ironically, with its growing prominence on the international stage, China found itself unbearably weighted down by the burden of world opinion, a position previously occupied by the United States.

AbstractThis article explores public knowledge creation by examining how the New York Times produced Pakistan news between 1954 and 1971, the formative period of United States of America (USA)–Pakistan relations. These years encapsulate not only the heyday of cooperation between the two governments, but also the American public's first major introduction to the South Asian country by the increasingly intrepid news media. A leader in shaping that introduction was the New York Times. While most studies of the American media focus on measuring the effect of news exposure and content on public opinion, this article focuses on the theoretically underexplored aspect of news production: foreign news gathering. With a lens on South Asia, it shows that foreign news gathering involves the straddling of on-the-ground political and logistical constraints that generate an atmosphere of high uncertainty. By exploring the limitations on news gathering faced by America's leading newspaper's foreign correspondents in Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, this article identifies an important historical source of the ambiguity characterizing USA–Pakistan relations. The findings are based on recently released archival material that offers rare insight into the news-production process.

The purpose of this article is to present a discussion on the main political contradictions (both domestic and international) of post-independence Turkmenistan. As part of a broader effort to understand the social and power dynamics resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union for the countries of Central Asia, we apply a descriptive analysis of some of the principal domestic and foreign policy events involving the Ashkhabad government, as well as the main implications for the lives of Turkmen (and Central Asian) migrants in the Russian Federation, who have chosen to leave their country of origin in search of better economic and educational opportunities. As a result of the present effort, we observe that the Central-Asian country not only became a laboratory for the exercise of a local version of a 'Cult of Personality' of the leader (resembling the phenomenon occurred during the 1930-1950s within Stalin’s Soviet Union), as well as the precarious operationalization on the part of Turkmenistan of its political neutrality in view of an economic dependence from Moscow and, more recently, from China. Furthermore, the present article evidences the difficulties of adaptation and assimilation of Turkmen migrants (and Central Asians more generally) in Russia, due, in part, to a ‘stereotyped’ view about migrants on the part of Russian public opinion.

Many researchers find out that impacted the types of Chinese foreign policy starting in the mid-1990s. However, Chinese foreign policymakers presented "New Grand Strategy" for the 21st century in the mid-1990s. This strategy exceptionally intended to advance and keep up China's image in the abroad. On the other hand, Policy observers contend introducing of the South Asian region that deliberately essential to emerging China. In addition, Chinese vicinity in Sri Lanka that verbalized by policy observers numerous ways. These contentions express that China's soft power in Sri Lanka that ought to be an extraordinary choice in Chinese policy arrangement. This article investigates current appearance of China's goodwill agenda inspecting two strains of Chinese policy in Sri Lanka that breaking point to observe foreign aid and the Confucius institute that lead the Peoples' Republic of China in 2000s. The paper additionally assesses the achievement of this alleged soft power crusade in Sri Lanka utilizing a worldwide overview to figure out whether the new introduction associates with changed Sri Lankan conclusions about China. This article assesses the adequacy of these endeavors by breaking down public opinion survey accumulated by the Gallup surveying in 2011. Information utilized for this article has been gathered from a substantial number of books, periodicals, magazines, journals. My findings demonstrate that the goodwill agenda has been fruitful at enhancing China's reputation in Sri Lanka.

Are foreign policy officials responsive to policy preferences of the mass media and the public in making their decisions? That question has dogged scholars for decades but there has been little agreement among them on what is the true nature of mass media- and public opinion-foreign policy link. In terms of mass media impact, there are two media theories which dominate the debate. First, the CNN Effect theory claims that, by their nature, the mass media have the power to compel policy officials to adopt their policy preferences. Second, the Manufacturing Consent theory counters with the claim that foreign policy is too serious a matter for officials to yield to mass media demands. Scholars are similarly divided on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. Lacking in almost all the known studies is an appreciation that foreign policy emerges out of a process involving policy stages. These policy stages have different characteristics. In addition to the nature of those stages in themselves, relationships between policy actors - including the mass media, the public and officials - are different in those stages. Officials tend to react differently at each stage of policy when pressured by the mass media and public opinion. Therefore, in this study, I propose that we will have a better understanding of mass media and public opinion influence on foreign policy officials if we study official responsiveness or sensitivity at the stages of the foreign policy process - policy initiation, policy implementation and policy review. I further argue that official responsiveness to mass media and public opinion depends largely on the stage of policy. For this research, I carried out a case study of Britain's war with Iraq in 2003 to test my theory. Principally, I tried to answer the question: Does foreign policy officials' responsiveness to mass media and public opinion depend on the stage of policy? I found that official response to the mass media and public opinion was not as precise as suggested by the dominant camps in the debate. More importantly, Official response to mass media and public opinion varied in the stages of policy. Specifically, I found that British officials were most responsive to mass media and public opinion at the policy initiation stage, very unresponsive at the implementation stage and even more unresponsive at the policy review stage. As a result of the variations in official responsiveness at the stages, I argue that there is a need to re-evaluate the way we study mass media- and public opinion-foreign policy link. To better understand the impact of the mass media and public opinion on foreign policy, I conclude that we need to examine how policy actors interact at different stages of the foreign policy process.

Theodore Roosevelt is considered by many historians to have been one of the most skilled practitioners of foreign policy in American history. But while he continues to draw � considerable interest from scholars, one facet of his diplomacy continues to be poorly understood: the impact of public opinion. There was a discernable evolution in his relationship with public opinion over the course of his tenure, even if many core ideas and practices were already present when he took office. The President was often discouraged by the state of public opinion. In his view, Congress was often a poor partner in conducting foreign policy; sensationalist newspapers had considerable influence; the ideas and policy preferences of many Eastern elites were usually ill-conceived; and the broader public's ignorance and apathy about international affairs were troublesome. But these concerns were balanced by other factors. He had a better working relationship with the Senate than he was willing to admit. He had more success in gaining favourable newspaper coverage than all but . a few Presidents. And he believed strongly in the American system of governance and had faith in the common sense of most of his countiymen. Given these multifaceted ideas about the nature of American opinion, it is not surprising that Roosevelt placed considerable importance upon shaping and educating it. This was both a means to facilitating his foreign policy goals and a way to build and maintain political supp01t. In fact, the two were closely linked. While he enjoyed considerable success in shaping opinion, he also suffered notable setbacks. In the final analysis, public opinion played a key role in Roosevelt's conduct of foreign policy, though its degree of influence in his decision-making process varied according to circumstances. Three main variables seemed to have shaped his behaviour: the impo11ance of a policy to Roosevelt, his perception about the intensity and sources of opposition to it and the level of suppo11 among the broader public.

This thesis seeks to be a contribution to a broader debate on how public opinion builds up its perceptions on foreign policy and foreign affairs. Its two main objectives are to examine: (a) which are the determinants that explain public opinion knowledge on foreign affairs; and (b) whether public opinion is sensitive to framing effects on this issue. The analysis was done by mixing quantitative methods and survey experiments, while its novelty is that brings unprecedent evidence from Latin America. The main findings of the thesis are two-fold. On the one hand, Latin American public opinion knowledge on foreign affairs is low. In this regard, both traditional individual variables and contextual ones, namely the size of the city, are useful to predict a person\'s knowledge. On the other, public opinion perceptions regarding foreign policy, either presented on a general or specific way, are sensitive to framing effects.
Esta tese procura ser uma contribuição para um debate mais amplo sobre como a opinião pública constrói suas percepções sobre política externa e assuntos internacionais. Os dois principais objetivos são examinar: (a) quais são os determinantes que explicam o conhecimento da opinião pública a respeito de assuntos internacionais; e (b) se a opinião pública é sensível a efeitos de enquadramento sobre esta questão. A análise foi feita misturando métodos quantitativos e pesquisas de opinião pública experimentais, enquanto sua novidade é que traz evidências sem precedentes da América Latina. As principais conclusões da tese são duplas. Por um lado, o conhecimento da opinião pública latino-americana sobre assuntos externos é baixo. A este respeito, tanto as variáveis individuais tradicionais como as contextuais - o tamanho da cidade - são úteis para prever o conhecimento de uma pessoa. Por outro lado, as percepções da opinião pública em relação à política externa, apresentadas de forma geral ou específica, são sensíveis aos efeitos de enquadramento.

The purpose of this thesis is to test the ‘rational public’ theory first espoused by Page and Shapiro (1988) for the Australian case. I aim to ascertain whether the Australian public, at the aggregate level, has the capacity to form ‘rational’ opinions on foreign policy issues. I do this by testing three major hypotheses using collective opinion data from the Australian Election Study (AES) 1987 – 2010: 1) opinion will be durable, or stable over time, 2) opinion will be coherent, and 3) opinion will respond reasonably, as predicted, to such triggers as changing international situations, elite cues, and particular events or trends. I found considerable support for all three hypotheses. Aggregate Australian opinion was as stable as US, Canadian, German, French, Italian, and Dutch opinion when using comparable measures, and more stable when using methods specific to the AES dataset. Opinion was also coherent, and, in most cases, responded to available directly and indirectly experienced triggers, as posited. I also performed a sub-set of tests for all three of these major hypotheses on the group of respondents who professed to have ‘no interest’ in politics, often referred to as the inattentive public, and found they held slightly less stable and coherent opinions overall, but were more responsive: results which lend further weight to the overall ‘rational public’ hypothesis. These results for the Australian case enable cross-national comparison to determine whether the ‘rational public’ thesis is generalisable, or whether it is dependent on such factors as a state’s position in the international system, its political institutions, or its political culture. I also envisage this thesis as providing a basis for further research into the functioning of Australian democracy as regards the public opinion, media, and policy-making nexus, incorporating further cross-national comparison. PAGE, B. I. & SHAPIRO, R. Y. 1988. Foreign policy and the rational public. Journal of conflict resolution, 32, 211-247.

The United States has been increasingly concerned with the transnational threat posed by infectious diseases. Effective policy implementation to contain the spread of these diseases requires active engagement and support of the American public. To influence American public opinion and enlist support for related domestic and foreign policies, both domestic agencies and international organizations have framed infectious diseases as security threats, human rights disasters, economic risks, and as medical dangers. This study investigates whether American attitudes and opinions about infectious diseases are influenced by how the issue is framed. It also asks which issue frame has been most influential in shaping public opinion about global infectious diseases when people are exposed to multiple frames. The impact of media frames on public perception of infectious diseases is examined through content analysis of newspaper reports. Stories on SARS, avian flu, and HIV/AIDS were sampled from coverage in The New York Times and The Washington Post between 1999 and 2007. Surveys of public opinion on infectious diseases in the same time period were also drawn from databases like Health Poll Search and iPoll. Statistical analysis tests the relationship between media framing of diseases and changes in public opinion. Results indicate that no one frame was persuasive across all diseases. The economic frame had a significant effect on public opinion about SARS, as did the biomedical frame in the case of avian flu. Both the security and human rights frames affected opinion and increased public support for policies intended to prevent or treat HIV/AIDS. The findings also address the debate on the role and importance of domestic public opinion as a factor in domestic and foreign policy decisions of governments in an increasingly interconnected world. The public is able to make reasonable evaluations of the frames and the domestic and foreign policy issues emphasized in the frames.

This thesis considers the ways in which Australia has been publicly represented in ten Asian societies in the twentieth century. It shows how these representations are at odds with Australian opinion leaders’ assertions about being a multicultural society, with their claims about engagement with Asia, and with their understanding of what is ‘typically’ Australian. It reviews the emergence and development of Asian regionalism in the twentieth century, and considers how Occidentalist strategies have come to be used to exclude and marginalise Australia. A historical survey outlines the origins of representations of Australia in each of the ten Asian countries, detecting the enduring influence both of past perceptions and of the interests of each country’s opinion leaders. Three test cases evaluate these findings in the light of events in the late twentieth century: the first considers the response in the region to the One Nation party, the second compares that with opinion leaders’ reaction to the crisis in East Timor; and the third presents a synthesis of recent Asian Australian fiction and what it reveals about Asian representations of Australia from inside Australian society. The thesis concludes that Australian policies and practices enable opinion leaders in the ten countries to construct representations of Australia in accordance with their own priorities and concerns, and in response to their agendas of Occidentalism, racism, and regionalism.

This thesis examines the historical problem of determining the relationship between a government's perception of public opinion and the decisions it takes. We introduce evidence for the social habits of the Cabinet in order to suggest new formulations of 'élite' and 'mass' public opinion. We argue that parliamentary opinion was generally more important in decision-making for the Cabinet, except at moments of extreme crisis when a conception of 'mass' opinion became equally significant. These characterization of mass opinion were drawn from a set of stereotypes about public opinion which academic and political theorization had produced. It is argued that this theorization was stimulated by ongoing debates about mass communication, the importance of the ordinary man in democracy and the outbreak of the first world war during the inter-war period. The thesis begins with an introduction to the methodological problems involved, followed by one chapter on theorization about public opinion in the inter-war period. Three diplomatic crises are considered in the case study chapters: the withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference in 1933, the German reoccuption of the Rhineland in 1936 and the threat of invasion of the Sudetenland in 1938. Two further chapters examine the role of public opinion in protests to Germany about the treatment of the Jews in 1933 and in 1938. It is argued that perceptions of public opinion played a much more important role in decision-making than has hiterto been thought. The most significant argument posits that perceptions of public opinion were equally as important as military considerations in the decision to refuse the Godesberg terms in 1938. More generally, the way in which politicians used public opinion rhetorically is described and the limits of the usefulness of the term for historians are suggested.

The activity of companies with foreign capital is more often in the center of attention of the public opinion, researchers and public authorities considering the positive effects but also the negative externalities that it generates on the economies of the host countries. With the liberalization of capital movements, FDI was consider the panacea that could solve all economic, environmental and social problems in the host less developed countries, but the reality is much more complex. In order to test if foreign direct investment (FDI) is caused by competitiveness in case of Romania, we considered FDI inflows externalities for national economy, net inflows (% of GDP) and Competitiveness index for the time period 2007-2018. The econometric methodology used to model FDI and Competitiveness Index is Granger Causality. The results of the study suggest that there is a unidirectional causality, flowing from Competitiveness Index to foreign direct investment. Thus, in case of Romania, foreign direct investment represents the result of competitiveness, FDI does not influence Competitiveness index.

North China Herald is the first commercial English newspaper founded by British businessmen in Shanghai. Its editorial group is closely related to the British business community. Based on the historical materials of North China Herald's newspapers and magazines, this study discusses the role of public opinion in modern British trade with China and analyzes the basic views of foreign businessmen on China. Focusing on the interpretation of the historical materials of the North China Herald, this paper collates the public opinion of the North China Herald towards China after the Second Opium War, studies the changes in the attitude and position of foreign businessmen towards China at that time, and judges the function realization of North China Herald in cross-cultural communication.

Multilingualism in urban spaces is mainly studied as an oral practice. Nevertheless, linguistic landscape studies can serve as a good explorative method for studying multilingualism in written practices. Moreover, resent research on linguistic landscapes (Blommaert 2013; Shohamy et. al. 2010; Backhaus 2006) have shed some light on the power relations between different ethnic groups in urban public space. Multilingual practices exist in a certain ideological context, and not only official language policy but speaker linguistic stereotypes and attitudes can influence and modify those practices. Historically, South Korea tended to be oriented towards monolingualism; one nation-one people-one language ideology was domineering public discourse. However, globalization and recent increase in migration resulted in gradual changes in attitudes towards multilingualism (Lo and Kim 2012). The linguistic landscapes of Seoul, on the one hand, reflect these changes, and However, they demonstrates pragmatic inequality of languages other than South Korean in public use. This inequality, though, is represented differently in certain spatial urban contexts. The proposed paper aims at analyzing data on linguistic landscapes of Seoul, South Korea ,with the focus on different contexts of language use and different sets of norms and ideological constructs underlying particular linguistic choices. In my presentation I will examine data from three urban contexts: ‘general’ (typical for most public spaces); ‘foreign-oriented’ (seen in tourist oriented locations such as airport, expensive hotels, or popular historical sites, which dominates the Itaewon district); and ‘ethnic-oriented’ (specific for spaces created by and for ethnic minority groups, such as Mongolian / Central Asian / Russian districts near the Dongdaemun History and Culture Park station). I will show that foreign languages used in public written communication are embedded into different frameworks in these three urban contexts, and that the patterns of their use vary from pragmatically oriented ones to predominately symbolic ones, with English functioning as a substitution for other foreign languages, as an emblem of ‘foreignness.’

This paper focuses on the influence of French language on the naming of shops and commercial products that are found in public spaces in Japan. The contemporary urban environment promotes linguistic signs, which themselves designate the names of shops or products on storefronts and packages and constitute the ‘text’ of an urban space. As Barthes (1970) observed, Japanese modern life is a remarkable source generating a multiplicity of signs. However, in the current globalization, such a process gives rise to a massive presence of foreign languages in public space, such as French in Japan. Data collected through fieldwork is analysed to show features specific to Japanese society and/or language (e.g. word coinages, affection of Japanese words, a primary form of creolization). Although these linguistic signs contain regularities and variations as a device of ‘hypocorrection,’ the paper argues that French is becoming a specific register in Japan, and that people have begun to assimilate its formal part, in enriching their lexicon with a certain epilinguistic dimension. The motivation and identity of stakeholders behind such a process will be also discussed.

A puzzle in the sociolinguistic history of Sanskrit is that texts with authenticated dates first appear in the 2nd century CE, after five centuries of exclusively Prakrit inscriptions. Various hypotheses have tried to account for this fact. Senart (1886) proposed that Sanskrit gained wider currency through Buddhists and Jains. Franke (1902) claimed that Sanskrit died out in India and was artificially reintroduced. Lévi (1902) argued for usurpation of Sanskrit by the Kshatrapas, foreign rulers who employed brahmins in administrative positions. Pisani (1955) instead viewed the “Sanskrit Renaissance” as the brahmins’ attempt to combat these foreign invaders. Ostler (2005) attributed the victory of Sanskrit to its ‘cultivated, self-conscious charm’; his acknowledgment of prior Sanskrit use by brahmins and kshatriyas suggests that he did not consider the victory a sudden event. The hypothesis that the early-CE public appearance of Sanskrit was a sudden event is revived by Pollock (1996, 2006). He argues that Sanskrit was originally confined to ‘sacerdotal’ contexts; that it never was a natural spoken language, as shown by its inability to communicate childhood experiences; and that ‘the epigraphic record (thin though admittedly it is) suggests … that [tribal chiefs] help[ed] create’ a new political civilization, the “Sanskrit Cosmopolis”, ‘by employing Sanskrit in a hitherto unprecedented way’. Crucial in his argument is the claim that kāvya literature was a foundational characteristic of this new civilization and that kāvya has no significant antecedents. I show that Pollock’s arguments are problematic. He ignores evidence for a continuous non-sacerdotal use of Sanskrit, as in the epics and fables. The employment of nursery words like tāta ‘daddy’/tata ‘sonny’ (also used as general terms of endearment), or ambā/ambikā ‘mommy; mother’ attest to Sanskrit’s ability to communicate childhood experiences. Kāvya, the foundation of Pollock’s “Sanskrit Cosmopolis”, has antecedents in earlier Sanskrit (and Pali). Most important, Pollock fails to show how his powerful political-poetic kāvya tradition could have arisen ex nihilo. To produce their poetry, the poets would have had to draw on a living, spoken language with all its different uses, and that language must have been current in a larger linguistic community beyond the poets, whether that community was restricted to brahmins (as commonly assumed) or also included kshatriyas (as suggested by Ostler). I conclude by considering implications for the “Sanskritization” of Southeast Asia and the possible parallel of modern “Indian English” literature.

English language skills are an important factor that should be assessed in the context of foreign students studying for a degree in higher education in another country. Previous research has mainly been conducted in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, as these are global study destinations. The aim is to investigate whether English language skills affect foreign students’ learning outcomes in Latvia. The research question intends to find out what the English proficiency is in class, determine the English test at the time of admission, and whether the previous learning of English at the general level of education affects the learning outcomes in higher education. The research sample involves South Asian and Central Asian students. In the first stage of the study, the focus group method was used with the academic staff to find out English proficiency in class. In the second stage, interviews were conducted with representatives of higher education institutions to determine the English test at the time of admission. In the third stage, interviews were conducted with nationals of India, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan to find out the English language training of their countries of origin in general education. As a result, it can be concluded – foreign students’ use of English differs according to the school (public or private) where they have studied general education before. Lecturers and representatives of higher education institutions indicate that English is not the determining factor, but rather knowledge and understanding of the topic and content regarding learning outcomes, while nationals agree that English is the determining factor affecting learning outcomes.

The article explores the key vocabulary of 2020 in the network space of Ukraine. Texts of journalistic, official-business style, analytical publications of well-known journalists on current topics are analyzed. Extralinguistic factors of new word formation, their adaptation to the sphere of special and socio-political vocabulary of the Ukrainian language are determined. Examples show modern impressions in the media, their stylistic use and impact on public opinion in a pandemic. New meanings of foreign expressions, media terminology, peculiarities of translation of neologisms from English into Ukrainian have been clarified. According to the materials of the online media, a «dictionary of the coronavirus era» is provided. The journalistic text functions in the media on the basis of logical judgments, credible arguments, impressive language. Its purpose is to show the socio-political problem, to sharpen its significance for society and to propose solutions through convincing considerations. Most researchers emphasize the influential role of journalistic style, which through the media shapes public opinion on issues of politics, economics, education, health care, war, the future of the country. To cover such a wide range of topics, socio-political vocabulary is used first of all – neutral and emotionally-evaluative, rhetorical questions and imperatives, special terminology, foreign words. There is an ongoing discussion in online publications about the use of the new foreign token «lockdown» instead of the word «quarantine», which has long been learned in the Ukrainian language. Research on this topic has shown that at the initial stage of the pandemic, the word «lockdown» prevailed in the colloquial language of politicians, media personalities and part of society did not quite understand its meaning. Lockdown, in its current interpretation, is a restrictive measure to protect people from a dangerous virus that has spread to many countries; isolation of the population («stay in place») in case of risk of spreading Covid-19. In English, US citizens are told what a lockdown is: «A lockdown is a restriction policy for people or communities to stay where they are, usually due to specific risks to themselves or to others if they can move and interact freely. The term «stay-at-home» or «shelter-in-place» is often used for lockdowns that affect an area, rather than specific locations». Content analysis of online texts leads to the conclusion that in 2020 a special vocabulary was actively functioning, with the appropriate definitions, which the media described as a «dictionary of coronavirus vocabulary». Media broadcasting is the deepest and pulsating source of creative texts with new meanings, phrases, expressiveness. The influential power of the word finds its unconditional embodiment in the media. Journalists, bloggers, experts, politicians, analyzing current events, produce concepts of a new reality. The world is changing and the language of the media is responding to these changes. It manifests itself most vividly and emotionally in the network sphere, in various genres and styles.

This study is an effort to identify the process by which firms venture into GVCs and the obstacles faced by firms once they have been immersed in it. We have focused on two particular GVCs: the aerospace GVC and the software and IT services GVC. Through the case studies, we analyzed the nature of inter-firm linkages and how they affected the potential of scaling up by local suppliers in the value-added chain, the particular role of firms in the value chain in Mexico and the achievements and limitations of governmental policies as tools to facilitate the entrance of MNCs' subsidiaries and to create the conditions for the entrance and scaling up of local firms in the value chain. We found that geopolitical factors were important, in particular NAFTA, but these advantages are only part of explanation for the insertion of Mexican industry in both GVCs. In our opinion, this could not have happened without an effort of public policy at different levels to attain this goal on the part of the Mexican government. Nevertheless, there is a notorious unbalance between efforts to secure investment from foreign firms and certification and long-term financing initiatives. In our view, the latter has not been properly addressed and it is a major problem for the scaling up of local firms in the value chain.

Banco de la República is celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2023. This is a very significant anniversary and one that provides an opportunity to highlight the contribution the Bank has made to the country’s development. Its track record as guarantor of monetary stability has established it as the one independent state institution that generates the greatest confidence among Colombians due to its transparency, management capabilities, and effective compliance with the central banking and cultural responsibilities entrusted to it by the Constitution and the Law. On a date as important as this, the Board of Directors of Banco de la República (BDBR) pays tribute to the generations of governors and officers whose commitment and dedication have contributed to the growth of this institution.1 Banco de la República’s mandate was confirmed in the National Constitutional Assembly of 1991 where the citizens had the opportunity to elect the seventy people who would have the task of drafting a new constitution. The leaders of the three political movements with the most votes were elected as chairs to the Assembly, and this tripartite presidency reflected the plurality and the need for consensus among the different political groups to move the reform forward. Among the issues considered, the National Constitutional Assembly gave special importance to monetary stability. That is why they decided to include central banking and to provide Banco de la República with the necessary autonomy to use the instruments for which they are responsible without interference from other authorities. The constituent members understood that ensuring price stability is a state duty and that the entity responsible for this task must be enshrined in the Constitution and have the technical capability and institutional autonomy necessary to adopt the decisions they deem appropriate to achieve this fundamental objective in coordination with the general economic policy. In particular, Article 373 established that “the State, through Banco de la República, shall ensure the maintenance of the purchasing power of the currency,” a provision that coincided with the central banking system adopted by countries that have been successful in controlling inflation. In 1999, in Ruling 481, the Constitutional Court stated that “the duty to maintain the purchasing power of the currency applies to not only the monetary, credit, and exchange authority, i.e., the Board of Banco de la República, but also those who have responsibilities in the formulation and implementation of the general economic policy of the country” and that “the basic constitutional purpose of Banco de la República is the protection of a sound currency. However, this authority must take the other economic objectives of state intervention such as full employment into consideration in their decisions since these functions must be coordinated with the general economic policy.” The reforms to Banco de la República agreed upon in the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 and in Act 31/1992 can be summarized in the following aspects: i) the Bank was assigned a specific mandate: to maintain the purchasing power of the currency in coordination with the general economic policy; ii) the BDBR was designatedas the monetary, foreign exchange, and credit authority; iii) the Bank and its Board of Directors were granted a significant degree of independence from the government; iv) the Bank was prohibited from granting credit to the private sector except in the case of the financial sector; v) established that in order to grant credit to the government, the unanimous vote of its Board of Directors was required except in the case of open market transactions; vi) determined that the legislature may, in no case, order credit quotas in favor of the State or individuals; vii) Congress was appointed, on behalf of society, as the main addressee of the Bank’s reporting exercise; and viii) the responsibility for inspection, surveillance, and control over Banco de la República was delegated to the President of the Republic. The members of the National Constitutional Assembly clearly understood that the benefits of low and stable inflation extend to the whole of society and contribute mto the smooth functioning of the economic system. Among the most important of these is that low inflation promotes the efficient use of productive resources by allowing relative prices to better guide the allocation of resources since this promotes economic growth and increases the welfare of the population. Likewise, low inflation reduces uncertainty about the expected return on investment and future asset prices. This increases the confidence of economic agents, facilitates long-term financing, and stimulates investment. Since the low-income population is unable to protect itself from inflation by diversifying its assets, and a high proportion of its income is concentrated in the purchase of food and other basic goods that are generally the most affected by inflationary shocks, low inflation avoids arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth.2 Moreover, low inflation facilitates wage negotiations, creates a good labor climate, and reduces the volatility of employment levels. Finally, low inflation helps to make the tax system more transparent and equitable by avoiding the distortions that inflation introduces into the value of assets and income that make up the tax base. From the monetary authority’s point of view, one of the most relevant benefits of low inflation is the credibility that economic agents acquire in inflation targeting, which turns it into an effective nominal anchor on price levels. Upon receiving its mandate, and using its autonomy, Banco de la República began to announce specific annual inflation targets as of 1992. Although the proposed inflation targets were not met precisely during this first stage, a downward trend in inflation was achieved that took it from 32.4% in 1990 to 16.7% in 1998. At that time, the exchange rate was kept within a band. This limited the effectiveness of monetary policy, which simultaneously sought to meet an inflation target and an exchange rate target. The Asian crisis spread to emerging economies and significantly affected the Colombian economy. The exchange rate came under strong pressure to depreciate as access to foreign financing was cut off under conditions of a high foreign imbalance. This, together with the lack of exchange rate flexibility, prevented a countercyclical monetary policy and led to a 4.2% contraction in GDP that year. In this context of economic slowdown, annual inflation fell to 9.2% at the end of 1999, thus falling below the 15% target set for that year. This episode fully revealed how costly it could be, in terms of economic activity, to have inflation and exchange rate targets simultaneously. Towards the end of 1999, Banco de la República announced the adoption of a new monetary policy regime called the Inflation Targeting Plan. This regime, known internationally as ‘Inflation Targeting,’ has been gaining increasing acceptance in developed countries, having been adopted in 1991 by New Zealand, Canada, and England, among others, and has achieved significant advances in the management of inflation without incurring costs in terms of economic activity. In Latin America, Brazil and Chile also adopted it in 1999. In the case of Colombia, the last remaining requirement to be fulfilled in order to adopt said policy was exchange rate flexibility. This was realized around September 1999, when the BDBR decided to abandon the exchange-rate bands to allow the exchange rate to be freely determined in the market.Consistent with the constitutional mandate, the fundamental objective of this new policy approach was “the achievement of an inflation target that contributes to maintaining output growth around its potential.”3 This potential capacity was understood as the GDP growth that the economy can obtain if it fully utilizes its productive resources. To meet this objective, monetary policy must of necessity play a countercyclical role in the economy. This is because when economic activity is below its potential and there are idle resources, the monetary authority can reduce the interest rate in the absence of inflationary pressure to stimulate the economy and, when output exceeds its potential capacity, raise it. This policy principle, which is immersed in the models for guiding the monetary policy stance, makes the following two objectives fully compatible in the medium term: meeting the inflation target and achieving a level of economic activity that is consistent with its productive capacity. To achieve this purpose, the inflation targeting system uses the money market interest rate (at which the central bank supplies primary liquidity to commercial banks) as the primary policy instrument. This replaced the quantity of money as an intermediate monetary policy target that Banco de la República, like several other central banks, had used for a long time. In the case of Colombia, the objective of the new monetary policy approach implied, in practical terms, that the recovery of the economy after the 1999 contraction should be achieved while complying with the decreasing inflation targets established by the BDBR. The accomplishment of this purpose was remarkable. In the first half of the first decade of the 2000s, economic activity recovered significantly and reached a growth rate of 6.8% in 2006. Meanwhile, inflation gradually declined in line with inflation targets. That was how the inflation rate went from 9.2% in 1999 to 4.5% in 2006, thus meeting the inflation target established for that year while GDP reached its potential level. After this balance was achieved in 2006, inflation rebounded to 5.7% in 2007, above the 4.0% target for that year due to the fact that the 7.5% GDP growth exceeded the potential capacity of the economy.4 After proving the effectiveness of the inflation targeting system in its first years of operation, this policy regime continued to consolidate as the BDBR and the technical staff gained experience in its management and state-of-the-art economic models were incorporated to diagnose the present and future state of the economy and to assess the persistence of inflation deviations and expectations with respect to the inflation target. Beginning in 2010, the BDBR established the long-term 3.0% annual inflation target, which remains in effect today. Lower inflation has contributed to making the macroeconomic environment more stable, and this has favored sustained economic growth, financial stability, capital market development, and the functioning of payment systems. As a result, reductions in the inflationary risk premia and lower TES and credit interest rates were achieved. At the same time, the duration of public domestic debt increased significantly going from 2.27 years in December 2002 to 5.86 years in December 2022, and financial deepening, measured as the level of the portfolio as a percentage of GDP, went from around 20% in the mid-1990s to values above 45% in recent years in a healthy context for credit institutions.Having been granted autonomy by the Constitution to fulfill the mandate of preserving the purchasing power of the currency, the tangible achievements made by Banco de la República in managing inflation together with the significant benefits derived from the process of bringing inflation to its long-term target, make the BDBR’s current challenge to return inflation to the 3.0% target even more demanding and pressing. As is well known, starting in 2021, and especially in 2022, inflation in Colombia once again became a serious economic problem with high welfare costs. The inflationary phenomenon has not been exclusive to Colombia and many other developed and emerging countries have seen their inflation rates move away from the targets proposed by their central banks.5 The reasons for this phenomenon have been analyzed in recent Reports to Congress, and this new edition delves deeper into the subject with updated information. The solid institutional and technical base that supports the inflation targeting approach under which the monetary policy strategy operates gives the BDBR the necessary elements to face this difficult challenge with confidence. In this regard, the BDBR reiterated its commitment to the 3.0% inflation target in its November 25 communiqué and expects it to be reached by the end of 2024.6 Monetary policy will continue to focus on meeting this objective while ensuring the sustainability of economic activity, as mandated by the Constitution. Analyst surveys done in March showed a significant increase (from 32.3% in January to 48.5% in March) in the percentage of responses placing inflation expectations two years or more ahead in a range between 3.0% and 4.0%. This is a clear indication of the recovery of credibility in the medium-term inflation target and is consistent with the BDBR’s announcement made in November 2022. The moderation of the upward trend in inflation seen in January, and especially in February, will help to reinforce this revision of inflation expectations and will help to meet the proposed targets. After reaching 5.6% at the end of 2021, inflation maintained an upward trend throughout 2022 due to inflationary pressures from both external sources, associated with the aftermath of the pandemic and the consequences of the war in Ukraine, and domestic sources, resulting from: strengthening of local demand; price indexation processes stimulated by the increase in inflation expectations; the impact on food production caused by the mid-2021 strike; and the pass-through of depreciation to prices. The 10% increase in the minimum wage in 2021 and the 16% increase in 2022, both of which exceeded the actual inflation and the increase in productivity, accentuated the indexation processes by establishing a high nominal adjustment benchmark. Thus, total inflation went to 13.1% by the end of 2022. The annual change in food prices, which went from 17.2% to 27.8% between those two years, was the most influential factor in the surge in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Another segment that contributed significantly to price increases was regulated products, which saw the annual change go from 7.1% in December 2021 to 11.8% by the end of 2022. The measure of core inflation excluding food and regulated items, in turn, went from 2.5% to 9.5% between the end of 2021 and the end of 2022. The substantial increase in core inflation shows that inflationary pressure has spread to most of the items in the household basket, which is characteristic of inflationary processes with generalized price indexation as is the case in Colombia. Monetary policy began to react early to this inflationary pressure. Thus, starting with its September 2021 session, the BDBR began a progressive change in the monetary policy stance moving away from the historical low of a 1.75% policy rate that had intended to stimulate the recovery of the economy. This adjustment process continued without interruption throughout 2022 and into the beginning of 2023 when the monetary policy rate reached 12.75% last January, thus accumulating an increase of 11 percentage points (pp). The public and the markets have been surprised that inflation continued to rise despite significant interest rate increases. However, as the BDBR has explained in its various communiqués, monetary policy works with a lag. Just as in 2022 economic activity recovered to a level above the pre-pandemic level, driven, along with other factors, by the monetary stimulus granted during the pandemic period and subsequent months, so too the effects of the current restrictive monetary policy will gradually take effect. This will allow us to expect the inflation rate to converge to 3.0% by the end of 2024 as is the BDBR’s purpose.Inflation results for January and February of this year showed declining marginal increases (13 bp and 3 bp respectively) compared to the change seen in December (59 bp). This suggests that a turning point in the inflation trend is approaching. In other Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil, Perú, and Mexico, inflation has peaked and has begun to decline slowly, albeit with some ups and downs. It is to be expected that a similar process will take place in Colombia in the coming months. The expected decline in inflation in 2023 will be due, along with other factors, to lower cost pressure from abroad as a result of the gradual normalization of supply chains, the overcoming of supply shocks caused by the weather, and road blockades in previous years. This will be reflected in lower adjustments in food prices, as has already been seen in the first two months of the year and, of course, the lagged effect of monetary policy. The process of inflation convergence to the target will be gradual and will extend beyond 2023. This process will be facilitated if devaluation pressure is reversed. To this end, it is essential to continue consolidating fiscal sustainability and avoid messages on different public policy fronts that generate uncertainty and distrust. 1 This Report to Congress includes Box 1, which summarizes the trajectory of Banco de la República over the past 100 years. In addition, under the Bank’s auspices, several books that delve into various aspects of the history of this institution have been published in recent years. See, for example: Historia del Banco de la República 1923-2015; Tres banqueros centrales; Junta Directiva del Banco de la República: grandes episodios en 30 años de historia; Banco de la República: 90 años de la banca central en Colombia. 2 This is why lower inflation has been reflected in a reduction of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient that went from 58.7 in 1998 to 51.3 in the year prior to the pandemic. 3 See Gómez Javier, Uribe José Darío, Vargas Hernando (2002). “The Implementation of Inflation Targeting in Colombia”. Borradores de Economía, No. 202, March, available at: https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5220 4 See López-Enciso Enrique A.; Vargas-Herrera Hernando and Rodríguez-Niño Norberto (2016). “The inflation targeting strategy in Colombia. An historical view.” Borradores de Economía, No. 952. https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/6263 5 According to the IMF, the percentage change in consumer prices between 2021 and 2022 went from 3.1% to 7.3% for advanced economies, and from 5.9% to 9.9% for emerging market and developing economies. 6 https://www.banrep.gov.co/es/noticias/junta-directiva-banco-republica-reitera-meta-inflacion-3