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Academic literature on the topic 'Assurance – Aspect économique'
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Journal articles on the topic "Assurance – Aspect économique"
GROSCLAUDE, Jeanne, and M. THIBIER. "Spécificités de l'élevage de ruminants en montagne." INRAE Productions Animales 27, no. 1 (2014): 3–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.20870/productions-animales.2014.27.1.3048.
Full textLeclerc, Véronique, Alexandre Tremblay, and Chani Bonventre. "Anthropologie médicale." Anthropen, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.17184/eac.anthropen.125.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Assurance – Aspect économique"
Fall, Mouhamadou. "Assurance et tests génétiques." Orléans, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006ORLE0503.
Full textDemolliens, Audrey. "La valeur économique de la vie humaine : une investigation éthique sur les approches économiques." Aix-Marseille 3, 2004. http://www.theses.fr/2004AIX32041.
Full textAfter presenting the main approaches for valuing human life from an economic perspective, we propose an ethical and methodological development of the willingness-to-pay approach. We use a contingent valuation in health economics and estimate the value of life being made up from three values: an individuality value (the willingness-to-pay for one's own mortality risks reduction), a proximity value (the willingness-to-pay for mortality risks reduction of their close relations) and a humanity value (the willingness-to-pay for mortality risks reduction of any human being). The introduction of this last value in the analysis allows us to provide a more appropriate estimation of the value of human life in order to guide the allocation of public life saving resources
Alcenat, Stéphane. "Assurance maladie et tests génétiques." Thesis, Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020UBFCB002.
Full textThis thesis includes three main contributions. The first chapter, an article published in 2019 in the “Revue Française d’Économie n°2/vol XXXIV”, provides a literature review on the implications of genetic testing regulations on the health insurance market. We show that the choice of a regulation results from a trade-off between the maximization of ex-ante social welfare and incentive to undertake prevention actions. Indeed, this trade-off depends on the way information acquisition impacts prevention and revelation behaviors of agents, as well as of its impact on insurance contract. The second chapter studies theoretically how reclassification impacts testing and prevention decision as well as social welfare in the Disclosure Duty regulation. In particular, we show that the incentives of agents to take genetic with reclassification can be higher than without reclassification according to the effort cost. In addition, we show how time preferences affect the incentive to take genetic testing. Finally, we show that the social welfare is strictly higher without reclassification than with reclassification. The last chapter studies and characterizes contracts that can be implemented to develop personalized medicine with highly effective treatment in context of moral hazard about firm effort to improve drug efficacy. It also studies how the non-observability of effort impacts the decision of a health authority to implement personalized medicine with highly effective treatments. We consider a model in which the health authority has three possibilities. It can apply either the same treatment (a standard or a new treatment) to the whole population or implement personalized medicine, i.e., use genetic information to offer the most suitable treatment to each patient. We first characterize the drug reimbursement contract of a firm producing a new treatment with a companion genetic test when the firm can undertake an effort to improve drug quality. Then, we determine the conditions under which personalized medicine should be implemented when this effort is observable and when it is not. Finally, we show how the unobservability of effort affects the conditions under which the health authority implements personalized medicine
Maitre, Grégory. "Analyse économique et responsabilité civile." Paris 1, 2004. http://www.theses.fr/2004PA010316.
Full textBell-Aldeghi, Rosalind. "Analyse économique des systèmes mixtes d'assurance maladie." Thesis, Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017UBFCB002.
Full textIn France, in 2014, health expenditures represented EUR 190 billion. This figure grows year after year; 76.6% is financed by a compulsory social insurance (Assurance Maladie), with contributions proportional to income; 13.5% is financed by private complementary insurances and 8.5% is financed directly by households in the form of out-of-pockets. The relationship between Social Health Insurance (SHI) and Private Health Insurance (PHI) is what characterises a mixed system.Within mixed systems, insurances can complement each other but also interact in inefficient ways. In a first part, I study a system where SHI can be complemented by a complementary or supplementary private insurance. Whereas there was a confusion in the theoretical literature between complementary and supplementary insurances, we find that these insurances can have opposing effects. This model underlines the importance of the nature of the health good (in terms of elasticity) insured by SHI on the optimal rate of social insurance. The higher the rate of low income individual purchasing the socially insured good, the higher the redistributive effect of insurance will be. Marginal utility of poor individuals being higher than high income individuals, I find that using an unweighted additive welfare function, the optimal social insurance rate of insurance is positively related to the redistributive characteristic of insurance.In this first part we underline that the selection of goods that should be insured privately depends on the definition of social insurance. The second part studies what criteria should be used to select the goods to socially insure. At the heart of the selection of goods to socially insure is the possibility of comparing individual preferences debated extensively within welfare economics and formalised by Arrow’s incompatibility theorem. The equivalent income principal developed by Fleurbaey et al. (2013) offers to overcome this limitation. This ordinal criteria, defined as the income in perfect health which yields the same satisfaction as the income in a sick state (i.e. the income in good health minus the willingness to pay to be in good health), allows making interpersonal comparisons. By adapting a theoretical model studying the optimal selection of goods to insure socially (Hoel, 2007) and by using the equivalent income criteria, we find that the introduction of private health insurance decreases the marginal benefit of social insurance. This modifies the ranking function and decreases the optimal social budget, leaving uninsured individuals facing the impossibility to use certain efficient treatments.Whereas the second part revealed what treatment social insurance should first renounce reimbursing in a within a limited budget, the last chapter studies a market characterised by minimal social participation. The market of eyewear (glasses) is characterised by strong asymmetric information and product differentiation. Beyond financing health expenditures, we ask whether, similarly to social insurance, PHI are able to reduce the effects of market failures and manage health expenditures. Following the literature on managed-care and competition for the right to serve a demand, the effect of networks of preferred provides on prices is analysed. Using an exclusive dataset of all purchases in eyewear made by MGEN (Mutuelle Générale de l’Education Nationale) enrollees between 2012 and 2014, we test empirically the effect of the network on the number of purchases and the prices of lenses. The effect of competition for the network and in the market on prices of unifocal and bifocal lenses, within 450 areas of France, is estimated. We find that competition for the network reduces significantly prices of purchases made inside the network and competition in the market reduces prices outside the network
Darjinoff, Karine. "Une étude expérimentale de trois modèles de la demande d'assurance." Paris 1, 1999. http://www.theses.fr/1999PA010071.
Full textPrieto, Ana. "Dégressivité des allocations chômage et taux de retour à l'emploi : une analyse empirique sur les données de l'Unédic." Paris 10, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA100150.
Full textMichel-Kerjan, Erwann. "Contributions à l'économie des "risques à grande échelle" : essais sur le partage des risques catastrophiques." Aix-Marseille 2, 2002. http://www.theses.fr/2002AIX24010.
Full textLagasnerie, Grégoire de. "Trois essais en économie de la santé sur la régulation de la demande de soins de ville s'appuyant sur la méthode de micro-simulation." Paris, EHESS, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013EHES0093.
Full textThis thesis sheds light on various issues in health economics (reimbursement system of care, sensitivity of the demand for health care prices , prediction of the dynamics of care expenses ) through the technique of micro -simulation. This thesis is composed of three articles. The first two articles of this thesis contribute to improved understanding of the mechanism related to the regulation of health care demand through the reimbursement system. The last article analyzes the evolution of the demand for care in the medium and long term. The first article focuses on the analysis in term of equity and hedging of reform of the reimbursement system of healthcare services in France. The second article examines the implications for health insurance and the insured of changes in consumption behavior of insured following a reform of the reimbursement system of cafe in France. The third article, from the study of different methods of projections in the economic literature analyzes the dynamic of outpatient healthcare expenditure related to the ageing population
Blasco, Sylvie. "The take-up of the unemployment insurance in France." Paris, EHESS, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009EHES0060.
Full textA significant share of the unemployed workers do not register at the national unemployment agency, preventing them from receiving job search assistance and financial compensation when eligible. In this thesis, we measure the registration rates in France and provide theoretical and empirical elements to explain this behaviour. The analysis roots in the rational choice framework in the sense that eligible job seekers claim if gains, monetary or not, outweigh costs associated with participation. Following the take-up literature, we consider monetary incentives, imperfect information about entitlement, administrative barriers and stigma. To highlight the endogenous link between benefits take-up and job search activity, and to distinguish temporary from permanent non take-up, we propose a job search model wherein the worker needs to exert a claiming effort to be insured. Using both surveys and matched administrative data, we conduct a duration analysis and structural estimations. Quick returns to employment and frictions in the claiming process explain low take-up rates. We also tackle the behaviour of registered unemployed workers with respect to job search assistance. We use the 2001 reform, which made job search assistance an integral part of the French unemployment insurance. We examine whether workers who were registered at the time of the reform decided or not to enter in the new system We find a significant, but small, non take-up rate and evidence of self-selection. Stigma, informational issues and expectation of a short unemployment spell are found to explain non participation, but these effects are not high enough to prevent participation for most of the workers
Books on the topic "Assurance – Aspect économique"
Corak, Miles. Influences intergénérationnelles sur la perception de prestations d'assurance-chômage au Canada et en Suède. Direction des études analytiques, Statistique Canada, 2000.
Sicard, Didier. Santé: L'heure des choix : entretiens avec Bernard Geidel et Catherine Le Borgne. Desclée de Brouwer, 2004.
Valade, Gilles. Modules sur l'assurance à l'intention des entreprises de tourisme de plein air. Commission canadienne du tourisme, 2003.
Task Force on Incomes and Adjustment in the Atlantic Fishery (Canada). Task Force Secretariat. Fishermen, plant employees and UI: Program review and experience, 1981-1990. Communications Directorate, Dept. of Fisheries and Oceans, 1994.
Gephart, William Franklin. Effects of the war upon insurance, with special reference to the substitution of insurance for pensions. Oxford University Press, 1997.
London, Caroline. Environnement et stratégie de l'entreprise: Dix concepts clefs. Éditions Apogée, 1993.
Medical malpractice: Theory, evidence, and public policy. Harvard University Press, 1985.
Danzon, Patricia Munch. Medical malpractice: An overview of the issues. Law and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1987.
Fondation européenne pour l'amélioration des conditions de vie et de travail. Un modèle innovant d'incitations économiques pour améliorer les conditions de travail: Évaluation en France. Fondation européenne pour l'amélioration des conditions de vie et de travail, 1996.
Le problème de l'assurance dans le secteur du tourisme de plein air et les solutions de rechange. Commission canadienne du tourisme, 2003.