Relevant bibliographies by topics / Asymmetric Information

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Asymmetric Information'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 June 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Asymmetric Information"

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Hughes, John S., Jing Liu, and Jun Liu. "Information Asymmetry, Diversification, and Cost of Capital." Accounting Review 82, no. 3 (May 1, 2007): 705–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2007.82.3.705.

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Recently, there has been considerable interest among accounting researchers in the relation between asymmetric information and cost of capital. A number of empirical studies document associations between risk premiums and proxies for asymmetric information such as earnings quality. However, the theoretical foundation for these studies has yet to be fully established. In this study, we consider the effects of private signals that are informative of both systematic factors and idiosyncratic shocks affecting asset payoffs in a competitive, noisy, rational expectations setting. Taking a large economy limit, we show that (1) risk premiums equal products of betas and factor risk premiums, irrespective of information asymmetries; (2) holding total information constant, greater information asymmetry leads to higher factor risk premiums and, thus, higher costs of capital; and (3) controlling for betas, there is no cross-sectional effect of information asymmetries on cost of capital. These results provide guidance in interpreting the findings of existing empirical work and suggest specifications helpful for future research.
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Kahn, Lisa B. "Asymmetric Information between Employers." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 165–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.4.165.

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This study explores whether potential employers have the same information about worker ability as the incumbent firm. I develop a model of asymmetric learning that nests the symmetric learning case and allows the degree of asymmetry to vary. I then show how predictions in the model can be tested with compensation data. Using the NLSY, I test the model and find strong support for asymmetric information. My estimates imply that in one period, outside firms reduce the average expectation error over worker ability by only a third of the reduction made by incumbent firms. (JEL D82, J24, J31, M12)
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SHAO, CHEN-XI, HUI-LING DOU, and BING-HONG WANG. "INFORMATION ASYMMETRY FLOWING IN COMPLEX NETWORKS." International Journal of Modern Physics B 26, no. 31 (December 4, 2012): 1250183. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217979212501834.

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The concept of information asymmetry in complex networks is introduced on the basis of information asymmetry in economics and symmetry breaking. Information flowing between two nodes on a link is bidirectional, whose size is closely related to traffic dynamics on the network. Based on asymmetric information theory, we proposed information flow between network nodes is asymmetrical. We designed two methods to calculate the amount of information flow based on two mechanisms of complex network. Unequal flow of two opposite directions on the same link proved information asymmetry exists in the complex network. A complex network evolution model based on symmetry breaking is established, which is a truthful example for complex network mimicking nature. The evolution mechanism of symmetry breaking can best explain the phenomenon of the weak link and long tail theory in complex network.
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Johansson, Robert C. "Watershed Nutrient Trading Under Asymmetric Information." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 31, no. 2 (October 2002): 221–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500004020.

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This study evaluates first- and second-best trading policies for regulating watershed phosphorus under asymmetric information. The trading policies are differentiated on the degree to which regulators observe point and nonpoint source abatement efforts. The efficiency losses attributable to these informational asymmetries and those of the second-best policies can be measured in social welfare, and provide regulators the shadow value of foregoing first-best measures. Given representative monitoring costs from national water monitoring programs, it is shown that under asymmetric information, the chosen second-best trading policies outperform first-best policies by 11% in the control of watershed nutrient pollution.
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Mæland, Jøril. "Asymmetric Information and Irreversible Investments: an Auction Model." Multinational Finance Journal 14, no. 3/4 (December 1, 2010): 255–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.17578/14-3/4-4.

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Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Sander Onderstal, and Francesco Parisi. "Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems." International Review of Law and Economics 66 (June 2021): 105981. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2021.105981.

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Cox, S. M., and Gary B. Gillis. "Sensory feedback and coordinating asymmetrical landing in toads." Biology Letters 12, no. 6 (June 2016): 20160196. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2016.0196.

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Coordinated landing requires anticipating the timing and magnitude of impact, which in turn requires sensory input. To better understand how cane toads, well known for coordinated landing, prioritize visual versus vestibular feedback during hopping, we recorded forelimb joint angle patterns and electromyographic data from five animals hopping under two conditions that were designed to force animals to land with one forelimb well before the other. In one condition, landing asymmetry was due to mid-air rolling, created by an unstable takeoff surface. In this condition, visual, vestibular and proprioceptive information could be used to predict asymmetric landing. In the other, animals took off normally, but landed asymmetrically because of a sloped landing surface. In this condition, sensory feedback provided conflicting information, and only visual feedback could appropriately predict the asymmetrical landing. During the roll treatment, when all sensory feedback could be used to predict an asymmetrical landing, pre-landing forelimb muscle activity and movement began earlier in the limb that landed first. However, no such asymmetries in forelimb preparation were apparent during hops onto sloped landings when only visual information could be used to predict landing asymmetry. These data suggest that toads prioritize vestibular or proprioceptive information over visual feedback to coordinate landing.
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Arbi, Khalil Ahmed, Abdul Rashid Kausar, and Imran Salim. "Minimizing Asymmetric Information in Online Markets through Knowledge Management." International Journal of Management Excellence 8, no. 2 (February 28, 2017): 924–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.17722/ijme.v8i2.885.

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This article is about the role of knowledge management in minimizing the asymmetric information in online business. The asymmetry of information is the prime concern in online markets where consumer and seller are located in distant locations and they cannot see each other. The success of ecommerce business depends heavily on the minimization of asymmetric information between the seller and buyers. As the online business is done through codified knowledge and it is easy to manage the codified knowledge so by efficient use of KM principles and processes it has now become easy to minimize the asymmetric information among the seller and buyers. The article discusses the types of asymmetric information which can ne be minimized through use of codified online knowledge.
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Tian, Jidong, Wenqing Chen, Yitian Li, Caoyun Fan, Hao He, and Yaohui Jin. "Latent Constraints on Unsupervised Text-Graph Alignment with Information Asymmetry." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 37, no. 11 (June 26, 2023): 13655–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i11.26600.

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Unsupervised text-graph alignment (UTGA) is a fundamental task that bidirectionally generates texts and graphs without parallel data. Most available models of UTGA suffer from information asymmetry, a common phenomenon that texts and graphs include additional information invisible to each other. On the one hand, these models fail to supplement asymmetric information effectively due to the lack of ground truths. On the other hand, it is challenging to indicate asymmetric information with explicit indicators because it cannot be decoupled from the data directly. To address the challenge posed by information asymmetry, we propose the assumption that asymmetric information is encoded in unobservable latent variables and only affects the one-way generation processes. These latent variables corresponding to asymmetric information should obey prior distributions recovered approximately from original data. Therefore, we first propose a taxonomy of the latent variable that classifies the latent variable into transferrable (TV) and non-transferable (NTV) variables and further distinguish NTV as the dependent variable (DV) and the independent variable (IV). Next, we propose three latent VAE-based regularizations on TV, DV, and IV to constrain their distributions to well-designed prior distributions to introduce asymmetric information into models and enhance the preservation of shared contents. Finally, we impose the three proposed constraints on a cycle-consistent learning framework, back-translation (BT), named ConstrainedBT. Experimental results on three UTGA tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of ConstrainedBT on the information-asymmetric challenge.
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Hurley, Terrance M., and Jason F. Shogren. "Asymmetric information contests." European Journal of Political Economy 14, no. 4 (November 1998): 645–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(98)00030-5.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Asymmetric Information"

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Häfke, Christian, and Leopold Sögner. "Asset pricing under asymmetric information." SFB Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 1999. http://epub.wu.ac.at/688/1/document.pdf.

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This article investigates the impacts of asymmetric information within a Lucas (1978) asset pricing economy. Asymmetry enters via the assumption that one group of agents is equipped with superior information about the dividend process. The agents maximize their lifetime utility of the underlying consumption process obtained from the agents' budget constraints, where the agents have the opportunity to invest in a risk asset to transfer income from the current to future periods. Since a closed form solution for the market price cannot be derived analytically, projection methods are applied, as described in Judd (1998), to approximate the expectation integrals in the agents' Euler equation. We derive the result that the informed trader only clearly improves his situation as compared to the non-trade situation if the uninformed trader only observes his own endowment but not the endowment of the informed trader. In the case where agents observe each others' endowment trade never results in a Pareto improvement. (auhtor's abstract)
Series: Working Papers SFB "Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science"
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Mongrain, Steeve. "Government interventions under asymmetric information." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape7/PQDD_0004/NQ38321.pdf.

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Neumann, Mark W. "Equity finance under asymmetric information." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape3/PQDD_0015/NQ48683.pdf.

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Martinez, Silvia Dominguez. "Decision making with asymmetric information." [Amsterdam] : Rotterdam : Thela Thesis ; Erasmus University [Host], 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9843.

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Aney, Madhav Shrihari. "Institutional design under asymmetric information." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2009. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3001/.

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This thesis contributes to the literature that seeks to understand institutions. In particular the aim of this thesis is to shed light on how certain institutions arise in society as a result of collective choice, how in turn they shape behaviour of agents, and finally what their welfare properties are. These questions are tackled using the methodology of microeconomic theory where agent preferences, the state of technology, and the informational environment are taken as exogenous. In particular it is argued that the existence of different constraints on the informational environment can give rise to a rich theory of institutions that can explain why inefficient and seemingly inefficient institutions arise in a second best world. The first chapter of this thesis is concerned with the incidence of costly dispute resolution in society. The question of why agents fail to revolve disputes costlessly is tackled. This contributes to the positive theory of individual behaviour given the existence of certain institutions. The second chapter of this thesis tackles the question of why the judiciary is characterised by certain inherently costly attributes. This contributes to the normative theory of institutional choice. The last chapter deals with the positive question of how institutions are chosen. A model is presented where the political alignments in a society are endogenously generated and the effect of varying the informational environment on these alignments is analysed. These three chapters collectively contribute to the incipient theory of institutions that comprises of two elements; first where the existence of institutional structure arises as an equilibrium interplay between individual choices and technological and informational constraints, and second where conversely, individual games are shaped by the structure of existing institutions.
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Vetter, Henrik. "Wage determination with asymmetric information." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1991. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88516/.

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This thesis contains 5 independent chapters together with an Introduction and a General Conclusion. All five chapters consider the problem of wage determination in an economy characterized by asymmetric information. The solution which is implemented, for example a pair consisting of the wage and the level of employment, is restricted to elicit all possible relevant information. This forces some additional constraints upon the optimization problem of the agents. Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that since the firm does not voluntarily share its information with other agents, the level of employment is not efficient. In both a separating and a pooling equilibrium, underemployment is the case. Note here that the equilibrium obtained changes qualitatively from Chapter 2 to Chapter 3. We return to this in the General Conclusion. Chapter 4 elaborates upon Chapter 2. It is shown that in an otherwise competitive economy, employment and investment are lowered since they are used as signalling devices, compared to the case of symmetric and perfect information. In a model characterized by monopoly, this conclusion is no longer true. The effect upon investment is no longer unambiguous. We also return to this in the General Conclusion. Chapters 5 and 6 consider economic policy in the case of a separating, respectively, pooling equilibrium. It is shown that in the case of a separating equilibrium, taxation can improve upon the situation. For a pooling equilibrium we show the existence of multipliers. General for these models is that the introduction of asymmetric information certainly does have an effect, but also that the results are possibly non-robust to assumptions with respect to the market form.
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Yilmaz, Sabri. "Trade Networks under Asymmetric Information." OpenSIUC, 2012. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/516.

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Buyer and seller interactions are analyzed with intermediaries called traders using a network structure. Goods are traded in the market through those networks. Each seller and buyer is linked to a trader through a network. We introduce asymmetric information on the valuation of goods by sellers and buyers. We deal with a two-stage game with incomplete information. The trader tries to maximize his profit. In Chapter 1, we analyze even network structures with one seller-one trader-one buyer and two buyers-one trader-two sellers and the asymmetric network cases with one seller-one trader-two buyers and two sellers-one trader-one buyer. We find that he sometimes offers different prices to sellers or to buyers when the penalty is almost zero in the second even network. We obtain that the trader sometimes offers the same price to all three parties to receive the maximum profit in the second asymmetric case. In Chapter 2, we allow there to be multiple traders and analyze how buyer and seller prices are influenced by competition among traders in a model of uncertainty. Sometimes, the seller and buyer both benefit from the competition between the two traders. The traders compete in the sense of a Bertrand duopoly to choose the price where each trader aims to maximize his profit. In other network structures, we note that the sellers who are not subject to the competition between two traders suffer from the consequences of the monopoly competition. We obtain that there will not be one fixed price that the traders offer the second seller and the second buyer in the last two network structures depending on the conditions on the valuations for the traded good. Middlemen, either as individuals or realtors, seem to have influential effects on the pricing strategy in the housing market. In Chapter 3, we analyze the contribution of the middlemen in the housing market as an application to trade networks. We work on a specific dataset related to the housing prices for two main neighborhoods in Atlanta, Georgia. The characteristics of those neighborhoods differ in terms of its distance to downtown or high-valued residential houses. We compare and contrast the returns for those two neighborhoods with distinct properties in order to investigate if any of these neighborhoods yield higher returns for the middlemen.
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KARLSSON, Martin. "On asymmetric information and health." Doctoral thesis, European University Institute, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7003.

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Defence date: 15 January 2007
Examining Board: Pedro Barros (Universidade Nova de Lisboa) ; Tor Iversen (Helath Economics Research Programme at the University of Oslo) ; Massimo Motta (European University Institute) ; Karl Schlag (European University Institute)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
The topic of this thesis is optimal reimbursement of healthcare providers.
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Lassenius, Kramp Paul. "Topics in asymmetric information and cascades /." Copenhagen, 2005. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/481986413.pdf.

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Jones, Malachi G. "Asymmetric information games and cyber security." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/50284.

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A cyber-security problem is a conflict-resolution scenario that typically consists of a security system and at least two decision makers (e.g. attacker and defender) that can each have competing objectives. In this thesis, we are interested in cyber-security problems where one decision maker has superior or better information. Game theory is a well-established mathematical tool that can be used to analyze such problems and will be our tool of choice. In particular, we will formulate cyber-security problems as stochastic games with asymmetric information, where game-theoretic methods can then be applied to the problems to derive optimal policies for each decision maker. A severe limitation of considering optimal policies is that these policies are computationally prohibitive. We address the complexity issues by introducing methods, based on the ideas of model predictive control, to compute suboptimal polices. Specifically, we first prove that the methods generate suboptimal policies that have tight performance bounds. We then show that the suboptimal polices can be computed by solving a linear program online, and the complexity of the linear program remains constant with respect to the game length. Finally, we demonstrate how the suboptimal policy methods can be applied to cyber-security problems to reduce the computational complexity of forecasting cyber-attacks.
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Books on the topic "Asymmetric Information"

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Nguyen, Anh Hong. Essays on Asymmetric Information. [New York, N.Y.?]: [publisher not identified], 2018.

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Conference, Indian Economic Association. Economics of asymmetric information. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 2006.

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The economics of asymmetric information. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

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Frankel, Jeffrey A. Country funds and asymmetric information. Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth, 1998.

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Cosci, Stefania. Credit rationing and asymmetric information. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993.

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Hillier, Brian. The Economics of Asymmetric Information. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25485-9.

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Clemenz, Gerhard. Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45614-5.

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Saïd, Karim, and Fadia Bahri Korbi. Asymmetric Alliances and Information Systems. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119335689.

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Clemenz, Gerhard. Credit markets with asymmetric information. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1986.

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Min, Sungky. Asymmetric information and shareholders' wealth. New York: Garland Pub., 1997.

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Book chapters on the topic "Asymmetric Information"

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Brown, Alexander L. "Asymmetric Information." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 69–74. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_458.

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Asai, Kentaro. "Asymmetric Information." In Corporate Finance and Capital Structure, 49–58. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003016380-6.

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Postlewaite, A. "Asymmetric Information." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 510–13. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_265.

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Postlewaite, A. "Asymmetric Information." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–3. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_265-1.

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Brown, Alexander L. "Asymmetric Information." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 1–6. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_458-1.

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Png, Ivan. "Asymmetric information." In Managerial Economics, 247–68. 6th ed. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003239857-14.

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Postlewaite, A. "Asymmetric Information." In Allocation, Information and Markets, 35–38. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_3.

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Kopec, Andrew. "Asymmetric Information." In The Routledge Companion to Literature and Economics, 167–77. Abingdon, Oxon : New York, NY; Routledge, 2019.: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315640808-16.

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Watt, Richard. "Asymmetric information: Adverse selection." In The Microeconomics of Risk and Information, 138–72. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-34420-4_6.

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Watt, Richard. "Asymmetric information: Moral hazard." In The Microeconomics of Risk and Information, 173–88. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-34420-4_7.

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Conference papers on the topic "Asymmetric Information"

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Singh, Vartika, and Veeraruna Kavitha. "Asymmetric Information Acquisition Games." In 2020 59th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc42340.2020.9304126.

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Dermawan, Dodi, Khusnul Ashar, Iswan Noor, and Asfi Manzilati. "Asymmetric Information of Sharing Economy." In 23rd Asian Forum of Business Education(AFBE 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200606.005.

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Mohajer, Soheil, Chao Tian, and Suhas Diggavi. "Asymmetric Gaussian multiple descriptions and asymmetric multilevel diversity coding." In 2008 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - ISIT. IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isit.2008.4595338.

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Cheng Liu, Lan Tian, Yuting Huangfu, and Lili Chen. "Stock price fluctuation under asymmetric information." In 2015 International Conference on Logistics, Informatics and Service Sciences (LISS). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/liss.2015.7369616.

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Ma, Zhonghua. "Trade Credit Contracts under Asymmetric Information." In 2009 International Conference on Wireless Networks and Information Systems (WNIS). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wnis.2009.85.

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Nayyar, Ashutosh, and Tamer Basar. "Dynamic stochastic games with asymmetric information." In 2012 IEEE 51st Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2012.6426857.

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Bae, Joonheui, Dong-Mo Koo, and Kyung Hoon Kim. "ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION PLATFORMS." In Bridging Asia and the World: Global Platform for Interface between Marketing and Management. Global Alliance of Marketing & Management Associations, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.15444/gmc2016.01.01.03.

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Kavitha, Veeraruna, Mayank Maheshwari, and Eitan Altman. "Acquisition Games with Partial-Asymmetric Information." In 2019 57th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/allerton.2019.8919935.

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Li, Jianing, and Houcai Shen. "Procurement Contracts Under Asymmetric Yield Information." In 2018 15th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsssm.2018.8465060.

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He, Qifan, and Mohammed F. Daqaq. "Influence of Potential Function Asymmetries on the Performance of Nonlinear Energy Harvesters Under White Noise." In ASME 2014 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2014-34397.

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To improve the broadband transduction capabilities of vibratory energy harvesters (VEHs) under random and non-stationary excitations, many researchers have resorted to purposefully introducing nonlinearities into the restoring force of the harvester. While performing this task, it is often very challenging to maintain a perfectly symmetric restoring force which usually yields a VEH with an asymmetric potential energy function. This paper investigates the influence of potential function asymmetries on the performance of nonlinear VEHs under white noise inputs. To that end, a quadratic nonlinearity is introduced into the restoring force of the harvester and its influence on the mean power for both mono- and bi-stable potentials is investigated. It is shown that, for VEHs with a mono-stable potential function, the mean output power increases with the degree of potential function asymmetry. On the other hand, for energy harvesters with a bi-stable potential function, asymmetries in the restoring force appear to worsen performance especially for low to moderate noise intensities. When the noise intensity becomes sufficiently large, the influence of the potential function’s asymmetry on the mean power diminishes. Results also reveal that a VEH with a symmetric bi-stable potential function produces higher mean power levels than the one with the most asymmetric mono-stable potential. As such, it is concluded that a VEH with a bi-stable symmetric potential is most desirable to improve performance under white noise.
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Reports on the topic "Asymmetric Information"

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Arnott, Richard, and Joseph Stiglitz. Randomization with Asymmetric Information. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2507.

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Grossman, Sanford, and Motty Perry. Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/t0056.

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Betts, D. C., and Joseph H. Haslag. Government Debt, Output, and Asymmetric Information. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.1987.003.

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Razin, Assaf, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuen. Excessive FDI Flows Under Asymmetric Information. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7400.

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Aizenman, Joshua. Country Risk, Asymmetric Information and Domestic Policies. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1880.

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Hu, Luojia, and Christopher Taber. Displacement, Asymmetric Information, and Heterogeneous Human Capital. W.E. Upjohn Institute, June 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.17848/wp07-136.

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Attanasio, Orazio, and Sonya Krutikova. Consumption Insurance in Networks with Asymmetric Information. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27290.

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8

Patterson, LaWarren V. Information Operations and Asymmetric Warfare...Are We Ready? Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada402007.

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Lucas, Deborah, and Robert McDonald. Bank Financing and Investment Decisions with Asymmetric Information. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2422.

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Svensson, Lars E. O., and Michael Woodford. Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy under Asymmetric Information. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w8255.

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