Academic literature on the topic 'Atlanta Campaign, 1864'

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Journal articles on the topic "Atlanta Campaign, 1864"

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Hagerman, Edward, Albert Castel, and Laura Kriegstrom Poracsky. "Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864." American Historical Review 98, no. 5 (1993): 1688. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2167232.

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Marszalek, John F., and Albert Castel. "Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864." Journal of American History 80, no. 3 (1993): 1102. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2080491.

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Shiman, Philip L., and Albert Castel. "Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864." Journal of Military History 59, no. 1 (1995): 158. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2944381.

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Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. "Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864." History: Reviews of New Books 22, no. 3 (1994): 105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1994.9948944.

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Hallock, Judith Lee. "The Chancellorsville Campaign: March-May, 1863, and: The Atlanta Campaign: May-November, 1864, and: The Wilderness Campaign: May 1864, and: The Gettysburg Campaign: June-July, 1863 (review)." Civil War History 40, no. 4 (1994): 334–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cwh.1994.0053.

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Parrish, T. Michael. "Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 (review)." Civil War History 39, no. 3 (1993): 257–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cwh.1993.0014.

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Shea, William L., Albert Castel, and Laura Kriegstrom Poracsky. "Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864. Modern War Studies." Journal of Southern History 60, no. 2 (1994): 407. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2210126.

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Alston, David. "Scottish Slave-owners in Suriname: 1651–1863." Northern Scotland 9, no. 1 (2018): 17–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/nor.2018.0143.

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This is an account of Scots in the Dutch colony of Suriname from 1651 until the emancipation of slaves in the Dutch Empire in 1863, when Scottish owners of slaves received nine per cent of the compensation paid to slave-owners in the colony by the Dutch Government. Before 1790 the small Scots presence in Suriname was a product of the outward looking nature of the Dutch Atlantic and the willingness of some Scots, most with with family, religious or military ties to the Netherlands, to seize the opportunities this offered. After 1790 the British presence in Suriname expanded, with a significant involvement of Highland Scots who came to work new plantations in the colony from the neighbouring British controlled colonies of Berbice and Demerara. After the emancipation of slaves in the British Empire in 1834, a number of these Scottish slave-owners campaigned against emancipation in the Dutch Empire. Despite buying and selling slaves in breach of British law, and despite public criticism, none of these British-based slave-owners were prosecuted. The article concludes with an examination of the legacies of this Scottish slave-ownership, both in Scotland and in Suriname.
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Kaufmann, Chaim D., and Robert A. Pape. "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade." International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 631–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081899551020.

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Most of the major theoretical traditions in international relations offer little advice on how costly international moral action could be accomplished. The main exception is the constructivist approach that focuses on the spread of cosmopolitan ethical beliefs through transnational interaction. While the logic of this theory does not imply any limit on the scale of goals that might be achieved, most constructivist empirical work so far has focused on relatively inexpensive moral efforts, such as food aid, and so may not identify the conditions under which states will take on much more costly moral projects. In this article, we test the constructivist theory of moral action against the record of the most costly international moral action in modern history: Britain's sixty-year effort to suppress the Atlantic slave trade from 1807 to 1867. We find that the willingness of British abolitionists to accept high costs was driven less by a cosmopolitan commitment to a moral community of all people than by parochial religious imperatives to impose their moral vision on others and, especially, to reform their domestic society. Transnational influences also had no important effect. Rather, the abolitionists' success in getting the British state to enact their program was determined mainly by opportunities provided by the fragile balance of power m British domestic politics. Although testing in more cases is needed, these findings suggest that better explanations of international moral action might be provided by a type of domestic coalition politics model based on what we call “saintly logrolls.”
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Pike, Robert M., and Dwayne Winseck. "Monopoly’s First Moment in Global Electronic Communication: From Private Monopoly to Global Media Reform, Circa 1860-1920." Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 10, no. 1 (2006): 149–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/030512ar.

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Abstract This paper analyses the ownership, control, business practices and ideologies surrounding the creation of a global and imperial underseas cable network between the 1860s and 1920s. A major focus is placed on linkages between governments (notably Britain) and private cable cartels in the formulation of cable policies and on debates that arose between the 1880s and first decade of the twentieth century concerning private versus state ownership of cables and the issue of cable rates. In these debates, Canada was heavily involved in favour of state ownership and stronger imperial ties. The Pacific Cable seen as the first phase in the implementation of an “All Red” cable system, then Canada engaged in a short-lived campaign for reform on the Atlantic route. The paper shows the need to go beyond imperial military motives to explain the net's form and functioning; it also examines similarities between old and new patterns of globalisation in electronic communications.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Atlanta Campaign, 1864"

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Bennett, Stewart L. "A Warfare of Giants: The Battle for Atlanta, July 22, 1864." Fogler Library, University of Maine, 2009. http://www.library.umaine.edu/theses/pdf/BennettSL2009.pdf.

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Meier, Paul Neal. "Maneuver as a response to technological innovation : Sherman's Georgia campaign of 1864 /." Thesis, This resource online, 1990. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-06082009-170810/.

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Books on the topic "Atlanta Campaign, 1864"

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Scaife, William R. The campaign for Atlanta. 2nd ed. W.R. Scaife, 1985.

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Cannan, John. The Atlanta campaign: May-November, 1864. Combined Books, 1991.

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Books, Time-Life, ed. Atlanta. Time-Life Books, 1996.

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Castel, Albert E. The campaign for Atlanta. Eastern National Park and Monument Association, 1996.

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Hoehling, A. A. Last train from Atlanta. Stackpole Books, 1992.

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Secrist, Philip L. The Battle of Resaca: Atlanta campaign, 1864. Mercer University Press, 1998.

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Secrist, Philip L. The Battle of Resaca: Atlanta Campaign, 1864. Mercer University Press, 2010.

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Cox, Jacob D. Sherman's battle for Atlanta. Da Capo Press, 1994.

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McCarley, J. Britt. The Atlanta and Savannah campaigns, 1864. Center of Military History, United States Army, 2014.

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McCarley, J. Britt. The Atlanta Campaign: A Civil War driving tour of Atlanta-area battlefields. Cherokee Pub. Co., 1989.

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Book chapters on the topic "Atlanta Campaign, 1864"

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Masur, Louis P. "5. 1864." In The U.S. Civil War: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780197513668.003.0006.

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“1864” demonstrates that the Union defeats across Virginia in that year came at a politically precarious time for Abraham Lincoln, with rivals angling for the Republication presidential nomination and Confederates hoping for his defeat. News that Atlanta had fallen revived Northern morale and Lincoln’s chances for re-election. Though the election campaign turned nasty, characterized by race baiting and fears of “miscegenation.” Lincoln was re-elected by an overwhelming margin, supported by the votes of Union soldiers. The new vice-president was Andrew Johnson, a prominent War Democrat. Meanwhile, Jefferson Davis had no choice but to watch Confederate ranks thin as a result of battle, disease, and desertion.
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Holden Reid, Brian. "Slogging on to Atlanta, July–September 1864." In The Scourge of War. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195392739.003.0013.

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This chapter focuses on the Battle of Atlanta in 1864. Far from halting William T. Sherman’s progress, the Battle of Atlanta was in reality a series of tactical successes and in total an operational triumph. Sherman’s campaign demonstrated the value of an offensive strategy and operational plan combined with defensive tactics—notably in trench warfare. He had not set out to mount operations of this kind, but he had quickly grasped how such a combination aided his purpose. He exploited the tactical defensive so that he might take greater operational risks. What Sherman wanted to avoid were fruitless attacks on Atlanta’s defenses or being repulsed in the field; by this date, a setback of any order might not only endanger the integrity of his armies but would certainly seal the doom of the Lincoln administration. Ultimately, Sherman’s capture of the city was his single biggest success and illustrates the intersection of military and political events at this stage of the Civil War.
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Varon, Elizabeth R. "Campaign Season." In Armies of Deliverance: A New History of the Civil War. Oxford University PressNew York, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190860608.003.0012.

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Abstract “Atlanta is ours, and fairly won,” read William Sherman’s September 3, 1864, dispatch to Washington, D.C., announcing his capture of the rebel stronghold. “Since the 5th of May, we have been in one constant battle or skirmish.” Over four months, the Union had sustained 37,000 casualties and inflicted 32,000 on the Confederate army. This news, coming across the telegraph wires just two days after the Chicago convention declared the war effort a failure, could not have come at a more propitious time for Lincoln. In Auburn, New York, at a public celebration of Sherman’s victory, William Seward offered a de facto campaign speech for Lincoln, calling the National Union party the true peace party. Propositions of peace with a restoration of the Union, he explained, would come “not from the Confederates in authority, nor through them, but from citizens and states under and behind them... just so fast as those citizens and states shall have been delivered by the Federal arms from the usurpation by which they are oppressed.” The Union would greet liberated Southerners as “brethren who have come back from their wanderings, to seek a shelter in the common ark of our national security and happiness.” And redeemed white Southerners would do the right thing by dismantling slavery, the “mainspring of the rebellion.” “The Union men in all the slave states that we have delivered are even more anxious than we are to abolish slavery.
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Hess, Earl J. "To the Chattahoochee." In The Battle of Peach Tree Creek. University of North Carolina Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469634197.003.0001.

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William T. Sherman's conduct of the Atlanta campaign from the first week of May until he reached the Chattahoochee River by mid-July 1864 was highly successful. Relying on his railroad link with Louisville, Kentucky, Sherman refused to risk his men in repeated or heavy frontal attacks against the well-fortified positions Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston established at Dalton, Resaca, New Hope, Pickett's Mill, and Kennesaw Mountain. Although Sherman experimented with a few attacks along the way, most notably at Resaca and Kennesaw Mountain, his failure did not result in crippling losses like those suffered by Ulysses S. Grant at the same time in Virginia. Johnston's tendency to evacuate his strong positions at the slightest sign of Union flanking moves, or because his corps leaders thought those positions untenable, not only contributed to Sherman's success but tremendously increased the morale of Union soldiers to the point where they were supremely confidence in their leader and in the eventual success of the campaign. In contrast, when Johnston fell back across the Chattahoochee River on July 9, Confederate President Jefferson Davis lost all patience with his Fabian strategy in Georgia and came to the conclusion that he had to be replaced. Johnston failed to protect all the possible crossings of the Chattahoochee that could be used by the Federals. As a result, Sherman was able to secure two bridgeheads on the south side of the river, well north of its junction with Peach Tree Creek, in the days following Johnston's fall back.
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"We have Taken Fort Fisher." In Lamson Of The Gettysburg, edited by James M. McPherson and Patricia R. McPherson. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195116984.003.0010.

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Abstract On September 17, 1864, the Navy Department removed Samuel Phillips Lee from command of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron and appointed David G. Farragut in his place. Farragut declined, citing poor health, so the Department named David Dixon Porter (1813—91) instead. As commander of the Mississippi Squadron, Porter had worked with both Farragut and Grant in campaigns to gain control of the Mississippi River, including the capture of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, for which Porter was rewarded with promotion to rear admiral. Lee was named commander of the Mississippi Squadron to succeed Porter, so in effect the two men exchanged places. But the switch was something of a demotion for Lee, for the Union’s complete control of the Mississippi made it a quiet theater, while the plan to attack Fort Fisher turned the North Atlantic Squadron into the theater of greatest naval activity.
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Pettinger, Alasdair. "The Voyage." In Frederick Douglass and Scotland, 1846. Edinburgh University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474444255.003.0001.

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Introduces Frederick Douglass in the context of his incident-packed voyage on the Cunard ship Cambria from Boston in August 1845 during which some racist passengers tried to prevent him from delivering a lecture at the invitation of the Captain. Summarising his early experiences, the chapter goes on to explain how Douglass escaped from slavery and, though a fugitive, became a leading antislavery campaigner in Massachusetts and why he and other black abolitionists crossed the Atlantic in the 1830s and 1840s. Douglass would spend nearly two years away from his family in Britain and Ireland, a third of that time in Scotland, and frequently remarked on the relative freedom he enjoyed in public spaces there.
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Hunt-Kennedy, Stefanie. "Bondsman or Rebel." In Between Fitness and Death. University of Illinois Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252043192.003.0006.

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This chapter explores the relationships between disability, amelioration, and abolition from the 1770s to the slave trade’s legal end in 1807. It reveals that both opponents and supporters of slavery utilized notions of disability and invoked concepts of monstrosity in their respective campaigns. Revolutionary emancipation, from Tacky’s War in Jamaica (1760) to the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804), gave rise to the gendered image of the armed, able-bodied, dangerous, and revolutionary black man, an image that circulated throughout the Atlantic world and haunted both pro- and anti-slavery discourse. Antislavery campaigners countered with the figure of the broken and beaten bondsperson as a way of envisioning a subject who in her or his freedom presented no physical threat to white society.
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Mcpherson, James M. "The Saratoga That Wasn’t: The Impact of Antietam Abroad." In This Mighty Scourge. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195313666.003.0005.

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Abstract The Campaign And Battle Of Antietam had consequences that reached far beyond the mountains and valleys and fields of western Maryland where the fighting took place. Indeed, the battle’s reverberations were heard across the Atlantic in London and Paris. Like the secessionists of 1776 who founded the United States, the secessionists of 1861 who founded the Confederate States counted on foreign aid to help them win their independence. In the Revolution they got what they hoped for after the battle of Saratoga. French recognition of the fledgling United States and subsequent financial and military support were crucial to American success. In the Civil War the Confederates failed to achieve foreign recognition, which might have been crucial to Confederate success if it had happened. The outcome of the fighting near Sharpsburg was the main reason it did not happen; in that respect Antietam could be described as a failed Saratoga.
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Reports on the topic "Atlanta Campaign, 1864"

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Elam, Mark G. Transforming Under Fire: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864. Defense Technical Information Center, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada428991.

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Ritter, Wayne L., and Jr. The Union's Atlantic Blockade Campaign of 1861. Defense Technical Information Center, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada297851.

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