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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Atlantic burden-sharing

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Academic literature on the topic 'Atlantic burden-sharing'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 18 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Atlantic burden-sharing"

1

Chalmers, Malcolm. "The Atlantic burden-sharing debate-widening or fragmenting?" International Affairs 77, no. 3 (July 2001): 569–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00207.

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Zyla, Benjamin. "Eclecticism and the future of the burden-sharing research programme: Why Trump is wrong." International Political Science Review 41, no. 4 (August 16, 2019): 507–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512119863132.

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Since the birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Europeans and the Americans have disagreed about who should share how much of the collective security burden. The input side of alliance burden sharing – that is, how many troops a member state contributes to the alliance – has been the privileged variable, both at the political as well as the academic levels. Other output variables (e.g. numbers of troops deployed to a particular mission) are highly contested. This article offers an analytically eclecticist framework for studying Atlantic burden sharing that allows combining variables on the input and output sides of the alliance burden sharing debate with those that consider it a social practice.

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Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger. "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War." International Organization 48, no. 1 (1994): 39–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300000813.

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Why do states contribute to alliances? Is relative size the principal factor influencing the size of contributions, as many studies suggest, or are perceptions of threat, dependencies on other alliance members, and domestic institutions and policies equally important? These questions hold unusual interest in the wake of the cold war. The end of bipolarity promises more ad hoc coalitions, which will widen opportunities for research on alliance burden-sharing beyond the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the same time, because the political fault lines of the cold war have disappeared, there are few accepted political criteria for sharing those security burdens that are perceived collectively.

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Becker, Jordan. "Rusty guns and buttery soldiers: unemployment and the domestic origins of defense spending." European Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (March 30, 2021): 307–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773921000102.

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AbstractScholars and practitioners continue to debate transatlantic burden sharing, which has implications for broader questions of collective action and international organizations. Little research, however, has analyzed domestic and institutional drivers of burden-sharing behavior; even less has disaggregated defense spending to measure burden sharing more precisely. This paper enhances understanding of the relationship between national political economies and burden shifting, operationalizing burden shifting as the extent to which a country limits or decreases defense expenditures, while at the same time favoring personnel over equipment modernization and readiness in the composition of defense budgets. Why do countries choose to allocate defense resources to personnel, rather than equipment modernization? I find that governments slightly decrease top-line defense spending in response to unemployment while shifting much more substantial amounts within defense budgets from equipment expenditures into personnel. This research highlights the intimate connection between Europe’s economic fortunes, transatlantic security, and burden sharing in North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union – of particular interest as a pandemic buffets the transatlantic economy. It also points policy analysts toward factors more amenable to political decisions than the structural variables generally associated with burden sharing, bridging significant gaps between defense economics, security studies, and comparative political economy.

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Oneal, John R. "The theory of collective action and burden sharing in NATO." International Organization 44, no. 3 (1990): 379–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300035335.

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Mancur Olson's theory of collective action could account for much of the variance in the defense burdens of the allied nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early years of the Cold War, but the association between economic size (gross domestic product, or GDP) and defense burden (the ratio of military expenditures to GDP) has declined to insignificant levels. Two influences are shown to be important in producing this change: the increased pursuit of private goods by Greece, Turkey, and Portugal and the growing cooperation among the other European allies. Since cooperation in the military realm has not provided the Europeans with credible means of self-defense, it appears to be a consequence of the general growth of interdependence in Europe during the postwar period. NATO is still essentially a uniquely privileged group producing a relatively pure public good. Accordingly, the theory of collective action continues to provide valuable insights into the operation of the alliance.

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Wenger, Andreas. "Crisis and Opportunity: NATO's Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968." Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (January 2004): 22–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152039704772741588.

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This article discusses how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) overcame the challenged posed by France in the mid to late 1960s. French President Charles de Gaulle's decision to withdraw France's remaining forces from NATO's integrated military commands, and his visit to Moscow shortly thereafter, exposed the alliance to unprecedented tension. Yet as NATO moved toward a crisis, opportunities arose to define a new vision for the alliance in a time of détente. Trilateral talks among the United States, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany forged a consensus on strategy, force levels, burden sharing, and nuclear consultation a consensus that was endorsed by the other member-states. The Harmel exercise in 1967 restored NATO's political purpose, expanding its political role as an instrument of peace. By 1968 NATO had evolved into a less hierarchical military alliance of fourteen and a more political and participatory alliance offifteen (including France). This successful transformation of NATO moved the process of détente from the bilateral superpower accommodation of 1963 to the multilateral European rapprochement of the 1970s.

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7

Henke, Marina E. "Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building." International Security 43, no. 4 (April 2019): 128–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00345.

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Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are “paid” to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. An examination of hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews relating to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations–African Union operation in Darfur, and the African Union operation in Somalia reveals that these payment practices follow a systematic pattern: pivotal states provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. These findings provide a novel perspective on what international burden sharing looks like in practice. Moreover, they raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment practices in multilateral military deployments.

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8

Morison, James, Jeremy Wilkinson, Matthew Alkire, Frank Nilsen, Igor Polyakov, William Smethie Jr., Peter Schlosser, et al. "The North Pole Region as an Indicator of the Changing Arctic Ocean: The Need for Sustaining Observations." ARCTIC 71, no. 5 (April 10, 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.14430/arctic4601.

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Sustained observations of environmental conditions in the North Pole region are critical to understanding the changing Arctic Ocean. The Transpolar Drift conduit of sea ice and freshened upper-ocean waters across the Arctic Ocean passes over the North Pole region on its way to the North Atlantic through Fram and Nares Straits. The exported ice and freshened water stratifies the sub-Arctic seas and limits the vertical convection that ventilates the world ocean. Key variables such as ice thickness, bottom pressure, and hydrography in the North Pole region are thus sensitive indicators of changes over the whole Arctic Basin and how these affect the global ocean. Drifting buoys installed in the North Pole region by Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. address what would otherwise be a dearth of ocean, ice, and atmosphere observations in the central Arctic. A suite of satellite remote sensing tools such as ICESat/ICESat-2 from the U.S., GRACE from the U.S. and Germany, and CryoSat2 from the European Union extend the conclusions from central Arctic Ocean in situ observations to other regions. Detecting and understanding climate change requires observations over decadal and longer scales. We propose an international program as the key to sustaining these observations in the North Pole region. Such an international program would help immeasurably by 1) facilitating financial sharing of the burden of long-term measurements among several nations, (2) reducing logistics costs through economies of scale, and 3) providing a buffer against national funding, logistics, and geopolitical difficulties.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Atlantic burden-sharing"

1

Martello, Charles P. "NATO burden-sharing redefinition for a changing European threat /." Thesis, Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School, 1990. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA242560.

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Thesis (M.S. in Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 1990.
Thesis Advisor(s): Gates, William. Second Reader: Doyle, Richard. "December 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 2, 2010. DTIC Identifier(s): NATO, Defense Planning, Industrial Production, Economics, Burden Sharing, Defense Industries, Sharing, Costs, Military Forces (Foreign), Military Forces (United States), Military Equipment, Mathematical Models, Military Reserves, Industrial Capacity. Author(s) subject terms: Burden-sharing, NATO. Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-80). Also available in print.

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2

Kim, Ilsuk. "A study on alliance burden sharing : a test of an alternative frame work to the public economics approach, with emphasis on an asymmetric alliance model in the case of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)." Thesis, Lancaster University, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.309020.

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3

Brianas, Jason John. "NATO, Greece and the 2004 Summer Olympics." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2004. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/04Dec%5FBrianas.pdf.

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4

Chalmers, Malcolm G. "The Atlantic burden-sharing debate - widening or fragmenting?" 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/3696.

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No
The Atlantic burden-sharing debate during the early part of the twenty-first century is shaping up to be very different from those of NATO's first fifty years. The resources needed for direct defence of western Europe have fallen sharply, and further cuts are possible. The gradual strengthening of European cooperation means that the EU is becoming an actor in its own right in many international regimes. Debates about which countries are pulling their weight internationally are also taking into account contributions to non-military international public goods¿financing EU enlargement, aiding the Third World, reducing emissions of climate-damaging pollutants. In this new multidimensional debate, it becomes more apparent that states that contribute more to one regime often do less than most in another. Germany, for example, is concerned about its excessive contribution to the costs of EU enlargement, but it spends considerably less than France and the UK on defence. European countries contribute three times as much as the United States to Third World aid, and will soon pay almost twice as much into the UN budget. Yet they were dependent on the US to provide most of the military forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and would be even more dependent in the event of a future Gulf war. This widening of the burden-sharing debate contains both dangers and opportunities. It could lead to a fragmentation of the Atlantic dialogue, with each side talking past the other on an increasing number of issues, ranging from global warming to Balkan peacekeeping. In order to avoid such a dangerous situation, the US and European states should maintain the principle that all must make a contribution to efforts to tackle common problems, whether it be through troops in Kosovo or commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there should also be some flexibility in defining who does how much. The preparedness of some countries to lead, by doing more, will be essential if international cooperation is to have a chance to work.

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5

Kunertova, Dominika. "The politics of Burden-Sharing : three essays on NATO, Canada, and fair-share." Thèse, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/20782.

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Books on the topic "Atlantic burden-sharing"

1

A, Cooper Charles. Perceptions of NATO burden-sharing. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1989.

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2

1954-, Jones David, and Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.), eds. Burden sharing: The wrong issue. Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989.

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3

Weber, Shlomo. Burden sharing in NATO: An economic analysis. Toronto: York University, Dept. of Economics, 1989.

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4

J, Cimbala Stephen, ed. The US, NATO, and military burden-sharing. New York, NY: F. Cass, 2005.

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5

Zycher, Benjamin. A generalized approach for analysis of alliance burden-sharing. Santa Monica, CA (1700 Main St., Santa Monica 90406-2138): RAND, 1990.

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6

Harris, Paul G. Sharing the burden?: The Euro-Atlantic community and global environmental change. Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico (FI): European University Institute, 2002.

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7

Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute and Army War College (U.S.). Press, eds. Stepping up: Burden sharing by NATO's newest members. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014.

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8

Kent, Forster Peter, ed. Multinational military intervention: NATO policy, strategy and burden sharing. Farnham, England: Ashgate Pub. Co., 2010.

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9

Cimbala, Stephen J. Multinational military intervention: NATO policy, strategy, and burden sharing. Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Pub. Co., 2010.

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10

Sharing the burden-- sharing the lead?: Euro-atlantische Arbeitsteilung im Zeichen des allianzinternen Sicherheitsdilemmas. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010.

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Book chapters on the topic "Atlantic burden-sharing"

1

Rupp, Rainer W. "Burden Sharing and the Southern Region of the Alliance." In Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance, 27–45. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08493-7_3.

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Rynning, Sten. "Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia." In NL ARMS, 29–45. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_3.

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AbstractThe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is back in the business of deterring aggression on the part of Russia. This return to great power deterrence has brought widely acknowledged military challenges related to power projection, force modernization, and burden sharing but also and notably a political challenge of defining NATO’s collective political ambitions for a continental order in which Russia will not become like the West. Like during the Cold War, the most convincing posture for NATO has become one of deterrence by punishment, building on a fairly dynamic military ability to strike Russia at a point of choosing, as opposed to defending every entry point to Alliance territory. However, NATO, not sure of what political order it represents, struggles to read Russia’s political character and intent and size its military posture accordingly. NATO’s political deficit effectively robs it of a middle ground from where it can build its military posture and invest in its upkeep. In the 1960s, NATO forged such a middle ground as an essential platform for strategic adaptation; today, NATO’s full deterrence posture is suffering from the absence of such a middle ground. Thus, a comprehensive politico-military posture of deterrence vis-à-vis Russia will require NATO’s reengagement with its own political fundamentals.

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