Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Auction Winner'

A seleção de fornecedores de transporte é um desafio cada vez maior. O crescimento da rede de clientes a ser coberta demanda uma alocação eficiente em termos de custo não suprida por mecanismos tradicionais de negociação. Neste âmbito, o leilão combinatório torna-se uma alternativa de negociação ao permitir capturar sinergias entre os trajetos que devem ser atendidos. Em conseqüência disso, diminui-se o custo de transporte do fornecedor que se reflete nos menores preços de suas propostas e finalmente no custo total de compra do serviço. Por outro lado, esta decisão envolve fatores além do custo total; a mensuração destes torna-se importante para identificar fornecedores que melhor se ajustam aos requerimentos do comprador. No entanto, é fundamental escolher um método adequado para sua avaliação porque este influência a decisão final. Este problema de compra de serviços de transporte é conhecido na literatura como Winner Determination Problem (WDP) que, devido a sua complexidade, possui uma resolução limitada. Após revisão teórica, foi observado que os estudos relacionados à área de transporte focalizavam o desenvolvimento de modelos matemáticos que fossem representativos da realidade. Alguns destes modelos abordam a utilização de múltiplos critérios atribuindo um coeficiente que pondera cada critério. Evidenciou-se a necessidade do desenvolvimento de um algoritmo alternativo que além de facilitar sinergias entre trajetos, fosse abrangente o suficiente para tratar múltiplos critérios em instâncias compatíveis com problemas reais. Logo, com o intuito de contribuir com a literatura foi adaptado um algoritmo matemático otimizante ao problema de compras de fornecedores de transporte com base no algoritmo de Sandholm (2002). Este algoritmo aplica leilão combinatório de compras, apoiando-se na teoria da análise de decisão para mensurar critérios relevantes do comprador. Inicialmente, o algoritmo minimiza o custo total do comprador designando combinações de trajetos e fornecedores; depois é modificado para o tratamento multi-critério. Os resultados obtidos foram comparados com o software comercial CPLEX.<br>Selecting suppliers is a crescent challenge for the enterprises. The extent of the client web that needs to be served demands efficient allocations, in terms of cost, that are not addressed by traditional mechanisms. In this scenario, another mechanism came to be: the combinatorial auction. In this one, suppliers can express their synergies on routes they wish to supply. This leads to lowering their transportation costs, which is reflected in lower bidding prices as well as in the total cost of service. On the other hand, the selection of a supplier involves other criteria besides cost. The definition of these is essential to define which supplier fits the needs of the buyer. That is why it is of most importance to choose the right method to evaluate these needs, as it defines the final choice. This problem is known as Winner Determination Problem (WDP) and due to its complexity, possesses a feeble solution. After compiling what has been done about the subject, it was noticed that in the field of transport, studies are focused on mathematical models that represent reality. Some models address criteria assigning coefficients to the objective function by weighting on it. Clearly, there was a need for alternative algorithms that would, besides promoting synergies on routes, also treat multi-criteria problems close to reality. Therefore, searching for a valid contribution in the field, an adaption of an optimizing algorithm based on Sandholm (2002)s was made. The algorithm applies combinatorial auction, supported by decision analysis for measuring relevant buyers criteria. First, the main algorithms objective is to minimize buyers costs by combining routes and suppliers; then, a modified approach considers multi criteria. Results were then compared to the commercial software CPLEX.

By the emergence of electronic commerce and low transaction costs on the Internet, an interest in the design of new auction mechanisms has been arisen. Recently many researchers in computer science, economics, business, and game theory have presented many valuable studies on the subject of online auctions, and auctions theory. When faced from a computational perspective, combinatorial auctions are perhaps the most challenging ones. Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-item multi-unit situations where the agents&rsquo<br>valuations of the items are not additive. However, determining the winners to maximize the revenue is NP-complete. In this study, we first analyze the existing approaches for combinatorial auction problem. Based on this analysis, we then choose three different approaches, which are search approach, descending simultaneous auctions approach, and IP (Integer Programming) formulation approach to build our models. The performances of the models are compared using computer simulations, where we model bandwidth allocation system. Finally a combinatorial auction tool is built which can be used for online auctions and e-procurement systems.

This dissertation consists of two essays on the topic of bidding in multi-unit common value auction. Essay one examines the role of capacity constraint on the auction results and bidding behavior. We consider a general case where bidders are unconstrained, and a second setting where bidders are capacity constrained. We document downward sloping demand curves for individual bidders. Bidders shade their bids by submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading their bids. The winner's curse is strong in the unconstrained treatment, but we find no evidence of the winner's curse when bidding constraints are imposed. Unconstrained bidders shade bids significantly more and their quantity-weighted prices are much lower than those in the constrained treatment. Interacting with the information structure, the capacity constraint has a significant impact on the auction results including the market clearing price, market efficiency, and the degree of market concentration. We provide evidence that efficient price discovery in multi-unit auctions with diverse information is possible, but careful attention to auction design will make this outcome more likely. Essay two examines how the introduction of a noncompetitive bidding option affects outcomes in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The experimental design incorporates many of the characteristics of the markets that pertain to the issuance of new equity securities. Important features of the bidding environment include endogenous bidder entry, costly information acquisition, bidders that differ by capacity constraint, and substantial uncertainty with respect to the intrinsic value. We use a standard uniform-price auction as our baseline setting where only competitive bids are accepted. Our results show that introducing the noncompetitive bidding option improves auction performance by increasing revenue and reducing price error. Underpricing is found in both treatments, but is less severe in the presence of the noncompetitive bidding option. The incorporation of this option significantly increases both the small bidder participation rate and allocation, and reduces the incentive for small bidders to free ride by submitting extremely high bids. Under both treatments, information acquisition increases large bidders' profits but proves unprofitable for small bidders, and pricing accuracy is increasing in the rate of information acquisition.<br>Ph.D.<br>Department of Finance<br>Business Administration<br>Business Administration PhD

<p>Railways have played an important role for the Swedish economy throughout the 20th into the 21st century since it provides good connections between urban and rural regions and also within them. However, it has been very costly for the state to run this activity and a significant effort to reduce costs and to increase the efficiency for this sector was to introduce procurement auctions where also private firms are invited to lay bids.</p><p>Four auctions have taken place in Jönköpings Län since its introduction in 1990. It has been a turbulent time economically for the winning bidders and the phenomena winner’s curse is evident where the bidder with highest over-estimate wins and therefore faces high costs or low returns.</p><p>This study points at flaws in the auction design as the reason for the economical difficulties for the winning firms. If second-price sealed bid auctions or first-price sealed bid auctions were used instead of a combination of first-price sealed auction and English auction, the winner’s curse phenomena could be reduced or even eliminated.</p>

In this study, we explore models for optimal bidding in auctions on the bond market using data gathered from the Bloomberg Fixed Income Trading platform and MIFID II reporting. We define models that aim to fulfill two purposes. The first is to hit the best competitor price, such that a dealer can win the trade with the lowest possible margin. This model should also take into account the phenomenon of the Winner's Curse, which states that the winner of a common value auction tends to be the bidder who overestimated the value. We want to avoid this since setting a too aggressive bid could be unprofitable even when the dealer wins. The second aim is to define a model that estimates a quote that allows the dealer to win a certain target ratio of trades. We define three novel models for these purposes that are based on the best competitor prices for each trade, modeled by a Skew Exponential Power distribution. Further, we define a proxy for the Winner's Curse, represented by the distance of the estimated price from a reference price for the trade calculated by Bloomberg which is available when the request for quote (RFQ) arrives. Relevant covariates for the trades are also included in the models to increase the specificity for each trade. The novel models are compared to a linear regression and a random forest regression method using the same covariates. When trying to hit the best competitor price, the regression models have approximately equal performance to the expected price method defined in the study. However, when incorporating the Winner's Curse proxy, our Winner's Curse adjusted models are able to reduce the effect of the Winner's Curse as we define it, which the regression methods cannot. The results of the models for hitting a target ratio show that the actual hit ratio falls within an interval of 5% of the desired target ratio when running the model on the test data. The inclusion of covariates in the models does not impact the results as much as expected, but still provide improvements with respect to some measures. In summary, the novel methods show promise as a first step towards building algorithmic trading for bonds, but more research is needed and should incorporate more of the growing data set of RFQs and MIFID II recorded transaction prices.<br>I denna studie utforskar vi modeller för optimal budgivning för auktioner på obligationsmarknaden med hjälp av data som samlats in från plattformen Bloomberg Fixed Income Trading och MIFID II-rapportering. Vi definierar modeller som ämnar att uppfylla två syften. Det första är att träffa det bästa konkurrentpriset så att en handlare kan vinna auktionen med minsta möjliga marginal. Denna modell bör också ta hänsyn till fenomenet Winner's Curse, som innebär att vinnaren av en så kallad common value auction tenderar att vara den budgivare som överskattat värdet. Vi vill undvika detta eftersom det kan vara olönsamt att skicka ett alltför aggressivt bud även om handlaren vinner. Det andra syftet är att definiera en modell som uppskattar ett pris som gör det möjligt för handlaren att vinna en viss andel av sina obligationsaffärer. Vi definierar tre nya modeller för dessa ändamål som bygger på de bästa konkurrentpriserna för varje transaktion vi har data på. Dessa modelleras av en Skew Exponential Power-fördelning. Vidare definierar vi en variabel som indirekt mäter fenomenet Winner's Curse, representerad av budprisets avstånd från ett referenspris för transaktionen beräknad av Bloomberg som är tillgänglig när en request for quote (RFQ) anländer. Relevanta kovariat för transaktionen implementeras också i modellerna för att öka specificiteten för varje transaktion. De nya modellerna jämförs med en linjärregression och en random forest-regression som använder samma kovariat. När målet är att träffa det bästa konkurrentpriset ger regressionsmodellerna ungefär samma resultat som expected price-modellen som definieras i denna studie. När man däremot integrerar effekten av Winner's Curse med den definierade indirekta variablen kan vår Winner's Curse-justerade modell minska effekten av Winner's Curse, vilket regressionsmetoderna inte kan. Resultaten av modellerna som ämnar vinna en förbestämd andel av transaktionerna visar att den faktiska andelen transaktioner som man vinner faller inom ett intervall på 5% kring den önskade andelen när modellen körs på testdata. Att inkludera kovariat i modellerna påverkar inte resultaten till den grad som uppskattades, men ger mindre förbättringar med avseende på vissa mättal. Sammanfattningsvis visar de nya metoderna potential som ett första steg mot att bygga algoritmisk handel för obligationer, men mer forskning behövs och bör utnyttja mer av den växande datamängden av RFQs och MIFID II-rapporterade transaktionspriser.

Submitted by Otávio Menezes Damé (omenezes@fgvmail.br) on 2015-03-25T16:46:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese-otavio.pdf: 1370659 bytes, checksum: 924be04b7a6bae788714a583878c9ce3 (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2015-03-31T14:12:14Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese-otavio.pdf: 1370659 bytes, checksum: 924be04b7a6bae788714a583878c9ce3 (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-04-14T11:47:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese-otavio.pdf: 1370659 bytes, checksum: 924be04b7a6bae788714a583878c9ce3 (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T11:47:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese-otavio.pdf: 1370659 bytes, checksum: 924be04b7a6bae788714a583878c9ce3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-12-11<br>Brazilian government recently passed legislation instituting a new regulatory framework for the pre-salt reserves. These areas should be negotiated through a profit-share bidding auction. Motivated by this new rules, we present a model of share bidding auction under affiliation, demonstrating the existence of a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in this structure and characterize its equilibrium bidding function. In addition, we prove that it generates an expected revenue at least as large as the usual fee bidding auction. Next, we introduce in the models a function representing a royalty rate that is contingent to the value of the object. This instrument permits an improvement of expected revenue of both models, making the gap between them shrink. Finally, analyzing this new regulatory framework from the viewpoint of the theoretical and numerical results obtained, we conclude that the former oil regime was more appropriate and lucrative to Brazilian government.<br>O governo brasileiro recentemente aprovou uma legislação instituindo um novo marco regulatório para as reservas petrolíferas do pré-sal. Segundo as novas regras, estas áreas deverão ser licitadas mediante um leilão de partilha de lucro. Motivado por esta mudança, apresentamos um modelo de leilão de partilha sob afiliação, demonstrando a existência de um equilíbrio monótono em estratégias puras e caracterizando a solução. Alem disso, provamos que este mecanismo gera receita esperada maior ou igual a um leilão de primeiro preço usual. Em seguida, introduzimos no modelo uma função representando taxas de royalties que dependem do valor do objeto. Este instrumento permite uma elevação na receita esperada de ambos os modelos, fazendo com que a diferença entre eles encolha. Finalmente, analisando o novo marco regulatório sob o ponto de vista dos resultados obtidos, concluímos que o antigo modelo de concessão utilizado pelo governo brasileiro é mais adequado e lucrativo.

Cette thèse traite des enjeux environnementaux et sanitaires de l’agriculture sous l’angle de l’économie comportementale. En partant de l’exemple emblématique fourni par la contestation sociale de l’usage des pesticides dans la filière vin, nous montrons pourquoi la réorientation durable du système productif ne peut s’affranchir d’une analyse des arbitrages effectués par les agents économiques. Du côté de la demande, nous mesurons expérimentalement l’effet concurrentiel des certifications (agriculture biologique) et des innovations technologiques (e.g. cépages résistants, réduction des sulfites) sur les préférences des consommateurs. Nous observons que ceux-ci sont prêts à revoir en partie leurs exigences gustatives en faveur d’un niveau élevé de qualité environnementale, mais que leurs motivations sont en partie liées à des attentes sanitaires, générant des signaux contradictoires pour l’offre. Le faible niveau d’information auquel ils ont accès constitue par ailleurs un frein à la sélection des meilleurs produits. Au niveau de l’offre, nous soutenons que la réponse à cette demande reste fortement limitée par l’inertie du système productif. Celle-ci peut être attribuée à une aversion au risque mais aussi, de nouveau, à un déficit informationnel, bien plus qu’à des comportements déviants liés au mimétisme, souvent incriminé en agriculture. Ce déficit porte cette fois sur les possibilités d’action de l’amont de la filière, dans notre cas les viticulteurs. Nous donnons alors des pistes d’orientation des politiques publiques de régulation, au niveau global ou au niveau plus local de la gouvernance d’entreprise, pour faciliter l’adéquation entre offre et demande sociétale<br>This thesis deals with the impact of agriculture on health and the environment from a behavioural economics perspective. Focusing on the controversial use of pesticides in the winegrowing industry, I demonstrate the importance of considering the trade-offs made by economic actors in order to understand the obstacles hindering a shift to sustainable production. On the consumer side, I experimentally measure the competitive effect of certification (organic farming) and technological innovations (e.g. resistant grapevines, reduction of sulphites) on consumers’ preferences. I observe that consumers are partly willing to review their taste requirements in exchange for high environmental quality level, but that their motives are essentially health-oriented, generating contradictory signals towards producers. Besides, selecting the best products is hampered by the little information consumers are provided with. On the supply side, I argue that ability to meet demand is strongly limited by the inertia of the production system. This inertia can be attributed to risk aversion but again, to a large extent, to a lack of information, rather than being, as is often suggested in an agricultural context, the result of imitation. This lack of information this time concerns the various options available upstream, in this instance, on the part of winegrowers. I then provide guidelines for public regulatory policies, at global level or at more local level of corporate governance, to enable a match between supply and societal demand

碩士<br>國立高雄大學<br>資訊工程學系碩士班<br>104<br>Resource allocation problem is to allocate limited resources to users so as to meet the system’s requirements. A potential solution to this problem is via auction mechanism. Combinatorial auction mechanism allows bidders to bid multiple items with a single bid. The design of a combination auction mechanism involves two tasks: how to determine winners and how to determine payments. The former is to decide the set of winners in a combinatorial auction to maximize the auctioneer's revenue. The latter is to determine the payments of winners. Previous mechanisms have some shortcomings like poor scalability, bid not faithfully reflecting the bidder’s valuation of resources, and to-be-improved auctioneer’s revenue. This paper focuses on winner determination that maximizes auctioneer’s revenue. Unlike previous studies, we utilization called conflict number and propose three different winner determination methods, namely, BOCN, BRAC, and PLOBOCN, together with a centralized algorithm. We ensure that bidders would place bids that faithfully reflect the bidder’s valuation of resources. This paper also uses game theory to develop synchronous and asynchronous distributed algorithms, and ensures the convergence of these algorithms. Our experimental results show that, compared with prior work, the proposed methods effectively increase total revenue of auctioneer. We also compared the performance between centralized and distributed algorithms. The results show no significant performance gap. The convergence time is low in distributed algorithms.

碩士<br>國立臺灣大學<br>財務金融學系<br>85<br>An Empirical test on Taiwan government bond auction is reported, focusing on differences in performance uner uniform- price versus diwcriminatory-price formats and the Winner''s Curse". When the assumption of Revenue Equivalent Theorem is released, the auction format would affect biddingbehavior and seller''s revenue. This study examines Taiwan government bond auction for period 1995-96. The auctioneer''s revenues from government bond primary market as a discriminatory auction versus a uniform-price auction are compared, results suggest the uniform-price auction will yield higher revenue thought it''s not significant. Results also suggest that under discriminatory- price format bidders account for the winner''s curse and bid morecautiously, and finally this results in the centralizationof bidding distribution.

by Kam Ka Yan, Karen, Tan Wai Hon.<br>Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaf 50).<br>ABSTRACT --- p.ii<br>TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii<br>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS --- p.iv<br>LIST OF TABLES --- p.v<br>Chapter<br>Chapter I --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1<br>Red Wine from the French Bordeaux --- p.1<br>Top five Bordeaux wine --- p.2<br>Chapter II --- ABOUT WINE AUCTION --- p.4<br>Wine auction --- p.4<br>Factors affecting the hammer price in wine auction --- p.5<br>Chapter III --- METHODOLOGY --- p.7<br>Objective and hypothesis --- p.7<br>Data collection and translation --- p.12<br>Chapter IV --- FINDINGS --- p.15<br>Regression analysis of model1 --- p.15<br>Chateau Lafite --- p.15<br>Chateau Latour --- p.17<br>Chateau Haut Brion --- p.19<br>Chateau Margaux --- p.21<br>Chateau Mouton Rothschild --- p.23<br>Combined Data --- p.25<br>Regression analysis of Model2 --- p.27<br>Chateau Haut Brion --- p.27<br>Chateau Latour --- p.29<br>Chateau Margaux --- p.31<br>Chapter V --- CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS --- p.33<br>APPENDIX --- p.35<br>BIBILIOGRAPHY --- p.50

This thesis aims to provide new insights into consumers’ preferences and their willingness to pay for sustainability (animal welfare, organic status), nutritional content (calories), and “typical” taste (autochthonous versus international varieties). Specifically, this thesis consists of three papers that make use of two laboratory experiments (second-price experimental auction and Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism) and one online experiment (choice experiment). The foods under study are eggs, wine and chocolate snacks.