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Journal articles on the topic 'Auction Winner'
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1
Rusmana, R. Anggi Gilang, Hagi Muhamad Fauzan Irawan, and Ummi Maskanah. "Legal Protection for Auction Winners Whose Items Are Still Held by The Debtor According to Law Number 4 of 2004 on Auctions." Golden Ratio of Data in Summary 5, no. 1 (2025): 150–59. https://doi.org/10.52970/grdis.v5i1.917.
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This research discusses the legal protection for auction winners whose items are still held by the debtor, analyzed based on Law Number 4 of 2004 on Auctions. An auction is one way to enforce creditors' rights against debtors who cannot fulfill their obligations. In this study, the author examines the provisions in Law Number 4 of 2004, and the applicable legal practices to provide an overview of the legal steps auction winners can take to obtain the items they have won. The research findings indicate that although the auction winner has the right to the items once the auction process is complete, there is a legal protection mechanism that must be followed to obtain those items, including through the execution of goods by the auction official. This study also highlights the importance of legal protection for auction winners so that the applicable procedures can effectively protect their ownership rights over the auctioned items.
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Zuriyah Zuriyah and Nynda Fatmawati O. "Urgensi Perlindungan Hukum terhadap Pemenang Lelang Eksekusi yang Menjadi Korban Tuntutan Hukum Oleh Pihak Debitur." Concept: Journal of Social Humanities and Education 3, no. 1 (2024): 315–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.55606/concept.v3i1.1063.
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Auctions always end with a lawsuit by the Debtor. The basic of his lawsuit is always the classic reason that the Debtor still seeks to pay, that the auctioned object is of low value. This is the trigger for the lawsuit made by the Debtor. The minutes of the auction were not enough for the winner of the auction to stop the Debtor from challenging the verdict. This led to a dispute in court. As the winner of the auction of course it is a matter that is not easy, auction winner needs final legal certainly. The absence of a separate court for the auction lawsuit is a difficult thing for the parties to get a settlement quickly and effectively. Legal protection against the auction winner has been set pasal 6 (UUHT) and Pasal 4 Undang Undang Hak Tanggungan (UUHT) said “apabilah Debitur cidera janji, Pemenang Hak Tanggungan pertama mempunyai hak untuk menjual obyek Hak tanggungan atas kekuasaan sendiri melalui pelelangan umum serta mengambil pelunasan piutangnya dari hasil penjualan”. From the auction results of the execution of Pasal 6 UUHT, the auction official issued an excerpt of the auction minutes which served as an authentic deed of transfer of right. However, this legal protection still open up opportunities for debtors to sue.
3
Adhitya, Bakhtiar Satria, and Jawade Hafidz. "Legal Protection for Winners of Land Rights Auctions That Are the Object of Dispute in Court Cases." Sultan Agung Notary Law Review 6, no. 1 (2024): 21. https://doi.org/10.30659/sanlar.v6i1.35851.
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This study aims to analyze: 1) Legal implications for the implementation of land rights auctions that are still the object of dispute in cases in court. 2) Legal protection for winners of land rights auctions that are the object of dispute in cases in court. The approach method used in this study is a qualitative approach. This type of research is empirical research. The types and sources of data in this study are primary data obtained through interviews and secondary data obtained from literature studies. The analysis in this study is prescriptive. The results of the study concluded: 1) Legal implications for the implementation of land rights auctions that are still the object of dispute in cases in court can include several complex aspects, namely legal uncertainty of land rights, difficulty in obtaining absolute ownership, potential financial losses, obligations to resolve potential further disputes, and the influence of court decisions. Court decisions related to auction results will greatly affect the legal certainty of auction winners, because the filing of lawsuits by other parties after the auction affects the validity of the ownership rights obtained. If the court provides clear certainty regarding land ownership to the auction winner, this will strengthen its legal certainty. However, if there is still uncertainty or disputes regarding ownership, legal certainty can continue to be questioned. 2) Legal protection for the winner of the auction of land rights that are the object of dispute in a case in court, namely: If another party files a lawsuit against the auction object, then the court decides that the auction is legally valid, then in this case the auction winner's rights to the auction object already have permanent legal force and can no longer be challenged by any party. If there is a lawsuit and then the court decides that the auction is void because there is an element of an unlawful act, then the legal protection obtained by the auction winner is to be able to claim back the purchase money for the auction object that has been paid.
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Negara, Okta Vianus Puspa, Zainab Ompu Jainah, and S. Tri Herlianto. "PERLINDUNGAN HUKUM TERHADAP PEMENANG LELANG BARANG RAMPASAN NEGARA BERUPA KENDARAAN RODA DUA YANG DIEKSEKUSI DENGAN CARA LELANG OLEH KEJAKSAAN." PRANATA HUKUM 15, no. 1 (2020): 93–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.36448/pranatahukum.v15i1.221.
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Prosecutors as law enforcement institutions carry out execution of state loot in various ways, one of which is auctioned for the country. One of the loot state executed by the state attorney of Bandar Lampung by means of auction is a unit of vehicle twowheeled vehicles as contained in the quote treatise Number: 908/2016 issued by the State Wealth Service office and auction of Bandar Lampung. The results of this study showed: (1) The protection of the law against the auction winners of the state booty in the form of two-wheeled vehicles executed by way of auction by the attorney in quotation treatise number: 908/2016 can be realized by enforcing legislation or special policies in order to fulfill the right of auction winners to manage and possess vehicle ownership documents both STNK and BPKB. (2) The legal certainty of the winner of the state Booty auction in the form of a two-wheeled vehicle executed by way of auction by the Prosecutor has not materialized because the auction winner cannot take care of and have the vehicle ownership documents both in the form of STNK The winner of the auction in this case only accepts auction treatise quotes number: 908/2016 which serves as a buy and sell deed.
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Sugianto, M. Udik, Florianus Yudhi Priyo Amboro, and Rufinus Hotmaulana Hutauruk. "Pemenang Lelang Eksekusi terhadap Jaminan Tanah yang Belum Bersertifikat." Legal Spirit 7, no. 2 (2023): 143. http://dx.doi.org/10.31328/ls.v7i2.4611.
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The large number of people who do not have proof of land ownership is an obstacle in obtaining credit from banks. However, responding to this, the bank allows the bank to be able to accept credit submitted to it. However, it becomes a problem when the auction winner wants to transfer the rights to the land, it cannot be done because the land has not been certified, which results in the auction winner not being able to pay the BPHTB. The research method used is normative legal research. Legal regulations regarding auctions for land that have not been certified are contained in Article 41 Paragraph 4 of the PP on land registration, Articles 76 and 108 of the Regulation of the Minister of Land Registration, Article 34 of PMK Implementation of auctions. Meanwhile, the conflict that occurred was Article 83 of the PMK for the Implementation of the Auction, which required the auction winner to pay BPHTB, while Article 2 of the BPHTB Law states that land that has not been certified does not include land rights. The solution provided by the author is: the head of the land office and the head of the KPKNL provide concessions for BPHTB payments and change the laws and regulations related to allowing uncertified land to be auctioned.
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Purwoko, Agung. "Excerpts of Execution Auction Minutes in the Process of Transferring Rights for Auction Winners at the Makassar State Assets and Auction Service Office." Sovereign: International Journal of Law 5, no. 3-4 (2023): 177–94. https://doi.org/10.37276/sijl.v5i3-4.45.
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This study aims to determine the process of implementing execution auctions, the issuance of Excerpts from the Auction Minutes, and the process of transferring rights to auctioned objects, as a form of legal protection for the Auction Winner carried out by the Makassar State Assets and Auction Service Office. The type of research used is empirical legal research with a quantitative descriptive approach. This research was conducted at the Makassar State Assets and Auction Service Office. Data collection techniques used in this study were questionnaires, documentation, and literature study. The data analysis technique used was quantitative data analysis. The results showed that the Makassar State Assets and Auction Service Office, in carrying out the auction and issuing the Excerpts from the Auction Minutes, has complied with the provisions of the applicable laws and regulations and has been running effectively. The implementation of auctions that have been carried out in accordance with the regulations cannot be canceled; this is a form of guarantee of legal certainty for all parties. It is expected that Sellers, Auction Officials, and Auction Buyers will be more careful, thorough, meticulous, and understand all regulations related to the implementation of auctions to avoid potential legal loopholes that may arise and could nullify the auction.
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Rini, Tifani, Hasbir Paserangi, Oky Deviany, Maskun Maskun, and Ratnawati Ratnawati. "Maintaining Legal Certainty in Indonesia: The Role of Legal Instruments in Protecting Auction Buyer." Al-Ahkam 34, no. 2 (2024): 393–418. https://doi.org/10.21580/ahkam.2024.34.2.22531.
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The implementation of a mortgage auction carries a high potential for lawsuits to cancel the auction due to objections from the debtor. This study analyzes the rights of heirs over assets encumbered with a mortgage based on credit agreements, aiming to provide legal certainty for auction winners and protection for mortgage auction winners. The research is normative with a legislative and conceptual approach. The findings show that inherited property mortgaged by the deceased, the heirs must fulfill the obligations. If they refuse, the bank can auction the property. However, auction winners often face legal disputes from heirs. For example, in Case No. 453/Pdt.G/2021/PN Mks, heirs sued Bank BRI and the auction winner, claiming ownership of the mortgaged property, despite the auction winner having valid proof. A similar issue occurred in Case No. 240/ Pdt.G/2019/PN Mks, where heirs sued PT Penanaman Modal Madani and the auction winner over a mortgaged asset due to non-performing loans. In both cases, auction winners encountered conflicts and difficulties in executing their rights despite winning the auction legally. This highlights that auction winners often lack adequate legal protection, especially in disputes with heirs. Despite existing auction regulations, legal uncertainty remains, and protection for auction winners needs improvement.
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Utami, Siti Azwita, Yuslim Yuslim, and Beatrix Benni. "The Position of Auction Treatise Deed in The Process of Motor-Vehicle Title Transfer (The Case Study in Pekanbaru)." International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding 6, no. 2 (2019): 268. http://dx.doi.org/10.18415/ijmmu.v6i2.685.
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The auction process is regulated in Minister of Finance Regulation Number 27/PMK.06/2016 concerning instructions for conducting the auction. The existence of treatise on the law of auction is certainly essential for the seller and the buyer since it is related to the need for proof of legal ownership of the object being auctioned for both movable and immovable properties. A proof of transfer of ownership of motor-vehicles is in the form of treatise of auction made by auction officials. It serves as a valid sale and purchase deed and as the basis for the title transfer of the auction winner. However, in fact, in Pekanbaru there are still many non-execution auction winners who do not transfer the title based on the auction treatise but instead use receipts. Based on this fact, the researcher formulates the research problems: (1) How is the process of transferring the title of a motor-vehicle through a non-execution auction in Pekanbaru? (2) How is the position of a auction treatise deed in the process of transferring the name of a motor-vehicle in Pekanbaru? The research method in this study is empirical juridical research. Based on the results of the study: 1) In Pekanbaru, the auction winner transfers the title with the help of the bureau or the used car showroom. The unit and the proof of motor-vehicle ownership are already in the hands of the auction winner, thus transferring the title does not require an auction treatise copy. 2) The auction treatise is the basis for transferring the title / the rights in accordance with the items stated in the auction treatise to the authorized institution. However, in fact, the winner of the motor-vehicle auction does not use the auction treatise in transferring the title. The auction treatises are only used to transfer the title of the government auction, while the terms for the title transfer of the private auction has the same terms as the ordinary trading.
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Saputra, Dimas Almeida, Zaenal Arifin, Kukuh Sudarmanto, and Wijayono Hadi Sukrisno. "Perlindungan Hukum Terhadap Pemenang Lelang Benda Bergerak Non Eksekusi Sukarela di Balai Lelang Swasta." Journal Juridisch 2, no. 3 (2025): 198–210. https://doi.org/10.26623/jj.v2i3.9854.
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This research aims to analyze the process of implementing a voluntary non-execution movable object auction at PT JBA Indonesia Semarang City Branch. As well as to analyze legal protection for winners of non-voluntary execution movable object auctions at PT JBA Indonesia Semarang City Branch. The urgency of this research is so that auction winners are not deceived by the condition of movable objects when they are declared to have won the auction. And so that the auction winner gets legal protection and understands the legal standing at the time of the auction. This writing is empirical juridical research with a statutory approach and a case approach. The research specifications used in this research are analytical descriptive. The data collection method used by the author is by examining primary data obtained through interviews with employees and assistants to the leadership of the private auction house PT JBA Indonesia, Semarang City Branch, which was conducted directly at the PT JBA Indonesia Semarang City Branch office and secondary data obtained from materials. References. The results of the research explain that the auction implementation at the private auction center PT JBA Indonesia uses a voluntary non-execution auction type, then the auction implementation is also divided into several categories, namely pre-auction, during the auction, and post-auction. There are several categories of legal protection for winners of auctions for non-voluntary movable objects, namely disclosure of information about auction winners, private auction houses daring to take responsibility for errors in auction implementation and special complaints regarding auction implementation.
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Hapsari, Recca Ayu, and Ersa Marcellina. "KEPASTIAN HUKUM BAGI PEMENANG LELANG UNTUK DAPAT MENGUASAI OBJEK LELANG (Studi Pada: Grosse Risalah Lelang KPKNL Provinsi Lampung Nomor.044/20/2018)." JURNAL ILMIAH ADVOKASI 10, no. 1 (2022): 67–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.36987/jiad.v10i1.2447.
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Auctions usually must be carried out in an open manner as a form of sales effort for goods or an object and must be carried out in public by using the bidding method at predetermined prices in written form or it can also be orally to get a fixed price. the highest authority in carrying out the auction in carrying out the auction mechanism who has the authority to make a legal deed in accordance with the current regulations, the auction official. Authentic Deed is one of the tools of proof that is so strong or ordinary what is meant by the term Risallah Auction and has a legal protection for the auction winner who will get legal protection related to the object that has been won in an auction. In the acquisition of the object and the right to the object, the winner of the auction has full rights to the object. Where the object is recognized by law. As well as the Accountability of the Auction Officer for the Process of Implementing the Mastery of the Auction.Keywords: Legal Protection; Auction; Auction Winner
11
Putra, Ade Muhammad Syamkirana, and Tri Lisiani Prihatinah. "Perlindungan Hukum Bagi Konsumen Sebagai Pemenang Lelang Eksekusi Hak Tanggungan atas Penguasaan Obyek Lelang." Kosmik Hukum 22, no. 1 (2022): 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.30595/kosmikhukum.v22i1.12271.
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AbstractLegal protection for the auction buyer/auction winner means that there is legal certainty of the auction winner's rights to the goods he bought through the auction, obtaining the goods and material rights to the goods he purchased or in other words the auction winner can control the auction object which he has legally and materially. And if there is a lawsuit, the winner of the auction should not participate as a defendant. This study discusses how the legal protection for the auction winner of the execution of mortgage over the control of the auction object and the obstacles experienced in the legal protection for the auction winner of the execution of the mortgage over the mastery of the auction object. The method used in this research is the normative juridical method, carried out through a literature study which examines mainly secondary data. The law has guaranteed legal certainty for auction buyers which is clearly stated in Vendu Reglement, HIR, and PMK Number 106/PMK.06/2013 concerning Amendments to PMK Number 93/PMK.06/2010 and PMK Number 93/PMK.06 /2010 Concerning Auction Implementation Guidelines. The Vendu Reglement is a regulation that regulates the basic principles of auction which has been in effect since April 1, 1908. In general, the Vendu Reglement only regulates the implementation of auctions, the auctioneer or currently referred to as the auction official, the parts and contents of the auction minutes. Article 42 of the Vendu Regulation states that the winner of the auction has the right to obtain a quote from the minutes of the auction as a deed of sale and purchase of the object of the auction. The excerpt of the minutes of the auction which will later be used as a deed of sale and purchase for the benefit of changing the name of the auction object if the object being auctioned is an immovable object. Keywords: Execution, Mortgage, Legal Protection, Auction Winner. AbstrakPerlindungan hukum terhadap pembeli lelang/pemenang lelang berarti adanya kepastian hukum hak pemenang lelang atas barang yang dibelinya melalui lelang, memperoleh barang dan hak kebendaan atas barang yang dibelinya atau dengan kata lain pemenang lelang dapat menguasai obyek lelang yang telah dimilikinya secara yuridis maupun secara materiil. Dan apabila terjadi gugatan, seharusnya pemenang lelang tidak turut serta sebagai tergugat. Penelitian ini membahas bagaimana perlindungan hukum bagi pemenang lelang eksekusi hak tanggungan atas penguasaan obyek lelang dan hambatan-hambatan yang dialami dalam perlindungan hukum bagi pemenang lelang eksekusi hak tanggungan atas penguasaan obyek lelang. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini yaitu Metode yuridis normatif dilakukan melalui studi pustaka yang menelaah terutama data sekunder. Undang-undang telah menjamin kepastian hukum bagi pembeli lelang yang secara jelas dinyatakan dalam Vendu Reglement, HIR, serta PMK Nomor 106/PMK.06/2013 Tentang Perubahan Atas PMK Nomor 93/PMK.06/2010 dan PMK Nomor 93/PMK.06/2010 Tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Lelang. Vendu Reglement merupakan peraturan yang mengatur prinsip-prinsip pokok tentang lelang yang telah berlaku sejak 1 April 1908. Secara umum Vendu Reglement hanya mengatur tentang penyelenggaraan lelang, juru lelang atau saat ini disebut sebagai pejabat lelang, bagian-bagian serta isi dari risalah lelang. Dalam Pasal 42 Vendu Reglement, menyatakan bahwa pemenang lelang berhak memperoleh kutipan risalah lelang sebagai akta jual beli obyek lelang. Kutipan risalah lelang mana nantinya akan dipergunakan sebagai akta jual beli untuk kepentingan balik nama obyek lelang apabila yang dilelang adalah benda tidak bergerak.Kata kunci: Eksekusi, Hak Tanggungan, Perlindungan Hukum, Pemenang Lelang
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Putra, Ade Muhammad Syamkirana, and Tri Lisiani Prihatinah. "Perlindungan Hukum Bagi Konsumen Sebagai Pemenang Lelang Eksekusi Hak Tanggungan atas Penguasaan Obyek Lelang." Kosmik Hukum 22, no. 1 (2022): 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.30595/kosmikhukum.v22i1.12271.
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AbstractLegal protection for the auction buyer/auction winner means that there is legal certainty of the auction winner's rights to the goods he bought through the auction, obtaining the goods and material rights to the goods he purchased or in other words the auction winner can control the auction object which he has legally and materially. And if there is a lawsuit, the winner of the auction should not participate as a defendant. This study discusses how the legal protection for the auction winner of the execution of mortgage over the control of the auction object and the obstacles experienced in the legal protection for the auction winner of the execution of the mortgage over the mastery of the auction object. The method used in this research is the normative juridical method, carried out through a literature study which examines mainly secondary data. The law has guaranteed legal certainty for auction buyers which is clearly stated in Vendu Reglement, HIR, and PMK Number 106/PMK.06/2013 concerning Amendments to PMK Number 93/PMK.06/2010 and PMK Number 93/PMK.06 /2010 Concerning Auction Implementation Guidelines. The Vendu Reglement is a regulation that regulates the basic principles of auction which has been in effect since April 1, 1908. In general, the Vendu Reglement only regulates the implementation of auctions, the auctioneer or currently referred to as the auction official, the parts and contents of the auction minutes. Article 42 of the Vendu Regulation states that the winner of the auction has the right to obtain a quote from the minutes of the auction as a deed of sale and purchase of the object of the auction. The excerpt of the minutes of the auction which will later be used as a deed of sale and purchase for the benefit of changing the name of the auction object if the object being auctioned is an immovable object. Keywords: Execution, Mortgage, Legal Protection, Auction Winner. AbstrakPerlindungan hukum terhadap pembeli lelang/pemenang lelang berarti adanya kepastian hukum hak pemenang lelang atas barang yang dibelinya melalui lelang, memperoleh barang dan hak kebendaan atas barang yang dibelinya atau dengan kata lain pemenang lelang dapat menguasai obyek lelang yang telah dimilikinya secara yuridis maupun secara materiil. Dan apabila terjadi gugatan, seharusnya pemenang lelang tidak turut serta sebagai tergugat. Penelitian ini membahas bagaimana perlindungan hukum bagi pemenang lelang eksekusi hak tanggungan atas penguasaan obyek lelang dan hambatan-hambatan yang dialami dalam perlindungan hukum bagi pemenang lelang eksekusi hak tanggungan atas penguasaan obyek lelang. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini yaitu Metode yuridis normatif dilakukan melalui studi pustaka yang menelaah terutama data sekunder. Undang-undang telah menjamin kepastian hukum bagi pembeli lelang yang secara jelas dinyatakan dalam Vendu Reglement, HIR, serta PMK Nomor 106/PMK.06/2013 Tentang Perubahan Atas PMK Nomor 93/PMK.06/2010 dan PMK Nomor 93/PMK.06/2010 Tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Lelang. Vendu Reglement merupakan peraturan yang mengatur prinsip-prinsip pokok tentang lelang yang telah berlaku sejak 1 April 1908. Secara umum Vendu Reglement hanya mengatur tentang penyelenggaraan lelang, juru lelang atau saat ini disebut sebagai pejabat lelang, bagian-bagian serta isi dari risalah lelang. Dalam Pasal 42 Vendu Reglement, menyatakan bahwa pemenang lelang berhak memperoleh kutipan risalah lelang sebagai akta jual beli obyek lelang. Kutipan risalah lelang mana nantinya akan dipergunakan sebagai akta jual beli untuk kepentingan balik nama obyek lelang apabila yang dilelang adalah benda tidak bergerak.Kata kunci: Eksekusi, Hak Tanggungan, Perlindungan Hukum, Pemenang Lelang
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Dian Pratiwi, Rizky Melani, Hanif Nur Widhiyanti, and Diah Aju Wisnuwardhani. "Legal Protection for Buyers of Mortgage Rights Execution Auctions in the Case of Blocking the Certificate of Ownership which becomes the Object of the Auction." Batulis Civil Law Review 4, no. 2 (2023): 129. http://dx.doi.org/10.47268/ballrev.v4i2.1713.
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Introduction: Article 45 paragraph 1 letter e creates legal uncertainty regarding the rights of the auction winner in terms of transfer of rights and control of the auction object due to a blockade from the debtor or other party.Purposes of the Research: The purpose of this research is to examine the legal certainty of Article 45 Paragraph 1 Letter e of Government Regulation No. 24 of 1997 concerning Land Registration against blocking of auction objects and legal protection for auction winners executing mortgage rights in the event of blocking of auction objects.Methods of the Research: The research method used is normative legal research.Results of the Research: The results of the study show that the form of legal protection for the auction winner is preventive legal protection, in which the name transfer process by the auction winner should still be carried out by understanding the meaning of Article 45 paragraph 1 lettere, namely the material claim or dispute referred to is limited to ownership disputes, not debts. Furthermore, legal protection is repressive, i.e. the auction winner can request assistance from the District Court to empty the object. The auction winner can hold the seller accountable in the form of compensation, and the auction winner can file a lawsuit against the unlawful act against the blockade applicant and the Land Office as the institution authorized to carry out block records.
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Octavian, Verri. "Legal Protection of Auction Winners Against the Execution of Dependent Rights." Advances In Social Humanities Research 2, no. 6 (2024): 798–813. http://dx.doi.org/10.46799/adv.v2i6.251.
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According to Article 14 of the Law on Dependency Rights, dependency right enforcement can be executed through a parate of execution or a fiat execution by State courts. However, legal certainty is not absolute; if a debtor fails to repay the debt, the creditor's liability is settled by selling the secured object through a public auction. This study investigates the legal consequences of the auction process, particularly the transfer of auctioned property rights to the winner. Using empirical juris and analytical descriptive research, primary and secondary data were gathered through library research and qualitatively analyzed. Auction winners may request the local state court to vacate the object if possession is unattainable under the law. An auction letter, as an authentic act, protects auction winners against normative enforcement of dependency rights. Nonetheless, the law lacks explicit protection for third parties and auction winners regarding possession, resulting in legal uncertainty.
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Feige, Uriel, Gil Kalai, and Moshe Tennenholz. "The Cascade Auction — A Mechanism for Deterring Collusion in Auctions." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 27, no. 1 (2013): 313–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8560.
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We introduce a sealed bid auction of a single item in which the winner is chosen at random among the highest k bidders according to a fixed probability distribution, and the price for the chosen winner is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves price. We call such an auction a cascade auction. Our analysis suggests that this type of auction may give higher revenues compared to second price auction in cases of collusion.
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Devina, Mohan, and KM Vineeth. "Validity of Winner's Curse Hypothesis: Evidence from Indian Stock Market IPOs during 2018-19." RESEARCH REVIEW International Journal of Multidisciplinary 4, no. 6 (2019): 68–70. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3247225.
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The winner’s curse is a tendency for the winning bid in an auction to exceed the intrinsic value or true worth of an item. Because of incomplete information, emotions or any other number of factors regarding the being auctioned, bidders can have a difficult time determining the item’s intrinsic value. As a result, the largest overestimation of an item’s valued ends up winning the auction. Accordingly, the winner will be "cursed" in one of two ways: either the winning bid will exceed the value of the auctioned asset making the winner worse off in absolute terms, or the value of the asset will be less than the bidder anticipated, so the bidder may garner a net gain but will be worse off than anticipated. This paper examines the validity of Winners’ Curse Hypothesis in Indian IPOs during 2018-19. 10 out 11 IPOs during the period of which data are available are analysed in this aspect and it could be found that Winners’ Curse do exist in the Indian IPOs.
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Ayu Rachmawati, Dwi, Nurini Aprilianda, and Siti Noer Endah. "Legal Protection For The Winner Of Execution Auction Over The Auction Object That Sued Before District Court." Unram Law Review 2, no. 2 (2018): 141–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.29303/ulrev.v2i2.46.
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In the process of auction execution often arise a lawsuit over the auction implementation, this is because the auction of execution is done not on the willingness of the owner of the goods themselves but because the law gives authority to the creditors to conduct public auction on the guarantee of debtors that default. So in the process of conveyance of auction object from the seller to the auction buyer often cause a problem, such as can not be mastered by auction winner the auction object. The purpose of this research is to know how to find out how the legal protection for the winner of the auction of execution of mortgage rights in mastering the auction object on the auction object which filed the lawsuit to the state court. This research is done by normative method. Based on the research that has been done, the winner of the auction can not be directly mastering the auction object because there is a civil suit over the auction object are expanding following. This is as article 3 paragraph (1), (2), and subsection (3) of the regulation of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial/head of the national land Agency number 13 Year 2017 on The Block and confiscation who explains that if there is a dispute or conflict over land rights law the land that became the object of the auction then blocking would have done. And the protection of the law against the winner of the auction provided by regulation of the Minister of finance Number 27/PMK. 06/2016 Hints would about implementation of auctions, HIR. In addition, in article 19 paragraph (1) of law No. 8 Year 1999 on the protection of Consumers and in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court's verdict against RI No. 1068 K/Pdt/2008 Dated January 21, 2009 in National Conference MA Year 2011.
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Rizky Melani Dian Pratiwi, Hanif Nur Widhiyanti, and Diah Aju Wisuwardani. "Legal Protection for the Winners of the Execution of Mortgage Rights in the Auction Case of Blocking of Property Rights Certificates (SHM) which Become the Object of the Auction." Jurnal Multidisiplin Madani 3, no. 6 (2023): 1380–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.55927/mudima.v3i6.4127.
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The purpose of this study is to examine the meaning of the phrase "object of dispute in court" in the provisions of Article 45 paragraph 1 letter e of Government Regulation No. 24 of 1997 concerning Land Registration and In the event that the auction object is blocked, the winning bidders have legal protection when exercising their mortgage rights. Researchers employed a normative juridical research style in this study. The study's findings demonstrate that various parties have different interpretations of Letter E of Article 45 of PP Number 24 of 1997. Land Offices, so that any object of claim including objections to auctions because the limit value is considered low is still used as a reason to refuse registration of a rights transfer by auction. The type of law protection for auction winners, namely preventive protection which is preventive in nature, is still very weak, where The only thing the auction winner can do is wait for the Court's ultimate ruling. Taking legal action is another option to restrictive legal protection. The winning bidder may seek the District Court for help in removing the item. The auction winner can sue Perbuatan Melawan Hukum (PMH) against the Blocking Applicant and The representative for the to conduct the auction is the Land Office. in order to make the seller accountable through payment of damages. the blocking record
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Hafalir, Isa, and Vijay Krishna. "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale." American Economic Review 98, no. 1 (2008): 87–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.87.
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We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post-auction trade which, in our model, takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. We show (a) a first-price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium; and (b) with resale, the expected revenue from a first-price auction exceeds that from a second-price auction. The inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a general revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded. (JEL D44)
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Haruvy, Ernan, and Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc. "A Study of Bidding Behavior in Voluntary-Pay Philanthropic Auctions." Journal of Marketing 82, no. 3 (2018): 124–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jm.16.0476.
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The authors investigate compliance behavior and revenue implications in winner-pay and voluntary-pay auctions in charity and noncharity settings. In the voluntary-pay format, the seller asks all bidders to pay their own high bid. The authors explore motives and boundary conditions for compliance behavior based on internal and external triggers of social norms. The voluntary-pay format generates higher revenue than the winner-pay format for charity auctions, despite imperfect compliance, but it generates lower revenues in noncharity settings. To characterize bidding strategy, the authors study time to bid, auction choice, and jump bidding and find evidence that bidders in voluntary-pay auctions more commonly use jump bidding and late entry. The findings have important implications for marketing managers, augmenting the growing stream of empirical auction studies and work on corporate social responsibility. Specifically, combining an auction with a charitable cause may result in increased revenues, but managers should ensure that they are accounting for differential compliance rates between auction formats. Even if low-compliance bidders can be identified and screened out, doing so is not advantageous, because noncompliant bidders bid up prices.
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Putra, Ade Muhammad Syamkirana, and Siti Kunarti. "Legal Protection to the Auction Winner with Good Intentions of Mortgage Rights on Grosse Minutes of Auction Number 780/14/2019." Kosmik Hukum 22, no. 3 (2022): 246. http://dx.doi.org/10.30595/kosmikhukum.v22i3.13507.
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The government has provided legal protection to auction winners who take part in the auction with good intentions and in line with the rules, including those that are specifically regulated in the Regulation of the Minister of Finance Number 27/PMK.06/2016 concerning Auction Implementation Guidelines. The auction winner of Grosse Minutes of Auction Number: 780/44/2019 felt helpless and burdened by not being able to own the tangible object of what he purchased in the auction because the previous owner or mortgage giver objected to emptying the tangible object voluntarily. This problem made the auction winner burdened to forcibly vacate the tangible object from the auction he won and results in new legal actions. This research was conducted through library research to collect secondary data from primary, secondary, and tertiary legal sources. The owner of the Grosse Minutes of Auction number 780/44/2019, who won this auction and had good intentions, should be provided legal protection. This is done to uphold the principles of justice and give the auction winner legal security over his ownership of the tangible auction objects (land and building) that had been purchased. Article 1977, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code (hereafter referred to as the Civil Code) provides legal protection for purchasers who have good intentions. In essence, this article protects purchasers of movable property. According to Article 1977, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code, whoever controls movable property that is not in the form of interest and receivables that are not required to be paid to the bearer is declared to be the ownerKeywords: Legal Protection, Auction Winner, Grosse Minutes of Auction
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Hetharie, Yosia. "Legal Status of Execution of Liability Auction Winner through Parate Executie." Damhil Law Journal 3, no. 2 (2023): 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.56591/dlj.v3i2.1939.
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<em><span lang="EN-US">Based on the Mortgage Law, there are three types of execution of mortgage rights, namely executorial title, parate executie, and underhand execution. Parate executie is carried out by the holder of the first mortgage right if the debtor defaults through the State Property and Auction Service Office. The provisions and procedures for conducting an auction are regulated in the Regulation of the Minister of Finance Number 213/PMK.06/2020 Concerning Instructions for Conducting Auctions. However, in practice there are still many problems or conflicts and many obstacles that occur. For example, there is no legal certainty for auction winners who have good intentions because they cannot immediately obtain their rights legally and materially. The type of research used in this study is normative juridical research which is descriptive analytical using a qualitative approach. The sources of legal materials used are primary legal materials, secondary legal materials and tertiary legal materials through library research. Based on the research results, the Auction Winner as a buyer in good faith has a position as the right holder of the auction object both formally and physically as a mortgage object. Therefore, the winner of the auction with good faith is entitled to all of his rights both in terms of formal juridical evidence and the physical object of the mortgage object. In this position, the KPKNL has the responsibility of examining all sales conditions and fulfilling all stages and appointing an auction official as the executor of the sale so that as long as the requirements and processes are carried out according to the instructions for conducting the auction.</span></em>
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Fattabania, M. Rizal, Maryano Maryano, and Yurisa Martanti. "Perlindungan Hukum Dan Penyelesaian Sengketa Terhadap Pemenang Lelang Yang Tidak Dapat Menguasai Objek Lelang." SALAM: Jurnal Sosial dan Budaya Syar-i 9, no. 5 (2022): 1389–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/sjsbs.v9i5.27435.
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The object of the mortgage guarantee is regulated in Article 6 of Law Number 4 of 1996. In practice, discrepancies have been found regarding the auction. Many auction winners cannot control the auction objects they have won. The method used in this research is the normative legal method with the type of normative juridical research, namely library law research or secondary data with primary, secondary and tertiary legal sources. From the results of the study, it can be obtained that dispute resolution can be carried out through litigation and non-litigation and legal protection of the auction winner in article 25 PMK 213/PMK.06/2020 auctions that have been carried out in accordance with the provisions of the legislation, cannot be canceled. Therefore, if the winner of the auction cannot control the object, he can sue through litigation or non-litigation and legal protection here should be if the winner of the auction has been determined then the object of the auction has been owned.Keywords: Mortgage; Auction; Dispute Resolution; Legal Protection AbstrakObjek jaminan hak tanggungan diatur dalam pasal 6 Undang-Undang Nomor 4 tahun 1996. Dalam praktik ditemukan adanya ketidaksesuaian mengenai lelang. Banyak pemenang lelang tidak dapat mengusai objek lelang yang telah dimenangkannya. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode hukum normatif dengan jenis penelitian yuridis normative, yaitu penelitian hukum kepustakaan atau data sekunder dengan sumber bahan-bahan hukum primer, sekunder dan tersier. Dari hasil penelitian dapat diperoleh yaitu penyelesaian sengketa dapat dilakukan melalui jalur litigasi dan non litigasi dan perlindungan hukum pemenang lelang dalam pasal 25 PMK 213/PMK.06/2020 lelang yang telah dilaksanakan sesuai dengan ketentun peraturan perundangan-undangan, tidak dapat dibatalkan. Oleh karena itu pemenang lelang jika tidak bisa menguasai objeknya dapat menggugat melalui jalur litigasi maupun jalur non litigasi dan perlindungan hukum disini seharusnya jika pemenang lelang sudah ditentukan maka objek lelang telah dimiliknya.Kata Kunci: Hak Tanggungan; Lelang; Penyelesaian Sengketa; Perlindungan Hukum
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Norbertus, Simon. "Bank Responsibility for Coverage Rights Auction Objects That Cannot be Controlled by the Auction Winner." International Journal of Social Science And Human Research 06, no. 06 (2023): 3337–44. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8021484.
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Article entitled Bank Responsibility for Objects of Mortgage Auctions That Cannot Be Controlled by the Auction Winners. The transaction process for the transfer of land and building rights through an auction is quite easy and simple. As long as the parties involved fulfill their respective rights and obligations in accordance with the provisions of the applicable laws and regulations. Based on the explanation of Article 20 paragraph (1) of Minister of Finance Regulation Number 213/06.PMK/2020 regarding instructions for implementing auctions, auctions must run efficiently, effectively and provide legal certainty. This study aims to develop knowledge regarding bank responsibilities and legal protection for buyers of goods who are unable to exercise control over the object of the mortgage execution auction object. The form of research used in this research is normative, which is researched on legal principles, which are carried out on positive laws made in writing. The conclusion of this study: The bank is fully responsible for the juridical and physical leveraging of the auction object to the auction winner, based on Article 17 of the 2016 Auction Guidelines and Article 13 of the 2020 Auction Guidelines stating that the Seller, in this case Bank X, is responsible for the delivery of movable objects and/or immovable objects. Because basically, the law has regulated that the seller is obliged to guarantee the possession of the goods being sold safely and securely to the buyer. This form of accountability can be in the form of providing mediation so that the debtor wants to vacate the auction object voluntarily or by providing proper direction and coordination to the buyer to apply for an emptying execution or if as a last option, namely by returning payment of the auction price paid by the auction buyer. So that in the future the bank can facilitate the levering process and participate in guaranteeing the mastery of the collateral to hand over the auction object as a form of accountability, it is necessary to make a statement stating that if the debtor defaults, the debtor is obliged to voluntarily vacate the land and building of the mortgage, so that in the future the bank can obtain convenience in handing over the auction object and is also free from claims for compensation filed by the buyer.
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Maskanah, Ummi, Siti Nurhasanah, and Muhammad Akhmal Avshary. "Legal Power of Proof of Auction Minutes Deed in Electronic Implementation." Golden Ratio of Data in Summary 5, no. 1 (2025): 84–92. https://doi.org/10.52970/grdis.v5i1.905.
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Auction is basically an act of buying and selling, where there are elements of price and goods, the difference is that the auction requires the presence of an auction official, with the stipulation of PMK 122/2023 concerning the implementation of electronic auctions, the auction can be carried out without the presence of an auction official, with the absence of the auction official contradicting the validity and strength of the auction minutes deed which still creates doubts for the auction winner in the implementation of the electronic auction. This study uses normative legal research that analyzes applicable laws and regulations and is applied in certain legal problems by analyzing laws and regulations relating to legal protection and electronic auctions, the results of the study obtained are the validity and legal force of the auction minutes deed can still be accepted as an authentic deed because it can be accounted for and the truth of the authentic deed by the auction official without deviating from the provisions of applicable laws and regulations.
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Asli, Larbi, Méziane Aïder, and El-Ghazali Talbi. "Solving a dynamic combinatorial auctions problem by a hybrid metaheuristic based on a fuzzy dominance relation." RAIRO - Operations Research 53, no. 1 (2019): 207–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2018051.
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This paper introduces a bi-objective winner determination problem which is based on English auctions. Most models of combinatorial auctions (winner determination problem) do not allow the bidder to update his offer, due to the fact that these mechanisms are static. However in reality bidders are in rough competition while there is time for auction. In this work we give a mathematical formulation of the dynamic model of the bi-objective winner determination problem, where the objectives are: (i) maximization of the total income, (ii) maximization of the number of items sold. This problem is based on the English auction mechanism, which allows bidders to renew their bids until the end of the exercise period. Then the solution is proposed by giving an algorithm based on an hybridization of a metaheuristic with a fuzzy dominance relation. A numerical experimentation using this algorithm on simulated data gives rise to satisfactory results.
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Nugraha, Tarmizi, and Guntur Simamora. "Legal Aspects Of Execution Of Dependent Rights Against Auction Buyers In Indonesia." International Asia Of Law and Money Laundering (IAML) 1, no. 1 (2022): 64–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.59712/iaml.v1i1.12.
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The right of mortgage arises because of an agreement, that is, an agreement between the parties. Legal protection of the winner of the auction means the existence of legal certainty over the rights of the buyer / winner of the auction on the object purchased through the auction. In the auction process that has been carried out in practice will cause legal consequences, namely the transfer of the rights of the auction object from the seller to the buyer/winner of the auction as regulated in law no. 4 Of 1996 On The Rights Of Dependents On Land And Objects Related To The Land. In the transition of the rights of the auction object is not uncommon to cause a problem, such as the inability to control the auction object by the buyer/winner of the auction, which the owner of the auction object does not want to voluntarily vacate the auction object.
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Arrol Vastie Prabamantya and Soegianto Soegianto. "Perlindungan Hukum Pemenang Lelang Eksekusi Hak Tanggungan dalam Sengketa Penguasaan Objek oleh Debitur." Khatulistiwa: Jurnal Pendidikan dan Sosial Humaniora 5, no. 2 (2025): 238–52. https://doi.org/10.55606/khatulistiwa.v5i2.5832.
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This research discusses the legal protection of the winner of the mortgage execution auction in the dispute over the control of the object by the debtor, focusing on three problem formulations: the legal position of the auction winner, the form of legal protection available, and the role and responsibility of the judiciary in resolving the dispute. The method used is empiri juridical with an analytical descriptive approach, which examines legal norms and their implementation in practice. Data were obtained through literature study and analyzed qualitatively based on theory and applicable laws and regulations. The results showed that the winner of the auction has a legal position and is in good faith. legal position and good faith, but often face obstacles due to the physical control of the object by the debtor, which creates legal uncertainty. Legal protection provided by the state must be implementative, not only normative, through mechanisms such as execution, lawsuit, mediation, and compensation. The judiciary has an important role in enforcing and implementing the rights of the winner of the auction, so that justice and legal certainty can be achieved. auction winners, so that justice and legal certainty can be realized effectively.
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Ma, Benjiang, Zhongmin Zhou, Muhammad Farhan Bashir, and Yuanji Huang. "A Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Model on Margin Bidding." Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 37, no. 06 (2020): 2050032. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217595920500323.
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Multi-attribute reverse auction has many advantages for the buyer with the multi-dimensional attribute requirements. However, it is hard to design an optimal auction mechanism for the scenario in practice. Therefore, this paper presents a method transforming multi-attribute auction into single-attribute auction by bidding in deposit. The analysis indicates that our method can reduce not only the transaction risk caused by the supplier’s bid abandonment but also the operating cost and complexity of the multi-attribute auction. Besides, our method meets the incentive compatibility and participation constraint conditions by promising that the highest bidding supplier is the winner in the Auction and can obtain higher expected profits than traditional auctions for the buyer.
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Ray, Abhishek, Mario Ventresca, and Karthik Kannan. "A Graph-Based Ant Algorithm for the Winner Determination Problem in Combinatorial Auctions." Information Systems Research 32, no. 4 (2021): 1099–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/isre.2021.1031.
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Iterative combinatorial auctions are known to resolve bidder preference elicitation problems. However, winner determination is a known key bottleneck that has prevented widespread adoption of such auctions, and adding a time-bound to winner determination further complicates the mechanism. As a result, heuristic-based methods have enjoyed an increase in applicability. We add to the growing body of work in heuristic-based winner determination by proposing an ant colony metaheuristic–based anytime algorithm that produces optimal or near-optimal winner determination results within specified time. Our proposed algorithm resolves the speed versus accuracy problem and displays superior performance compared with 20 past state-of-the-art heuristics and two exact algorithms, for 94 open test auction instances that display a wide variety in bid-bundle composition. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature in two predominant ways: first, we represent the winner determination problem as one of finding the maximum weighted path on a directed cyclic graph; second, we improve upon existing ant colony heuristic–based exploration methods by implementing randomized pheromone updating and randomized graph pruning. Finally, to aid auction designers, we implement the anytime property of the algorithm, which allows auctioneers to stop the algorithm and return a valid solution to the winner determination problem even if it is interrupted before computation ends.
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Rudy, Irnawaty, Zulkifli Makkawaru, and Andi Tira. "Perlindungan Hukum Terhadap Hak Pemenang Lelang Atas Tanah." Clavia 19, no. 3 (2021): 329–38. https://doi.org/10.56326/clavia.v19i3.1283.
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Auction is the sale of goods that are open to the public with a written and/or verbal price offer that is increasing or decreasing to reach the highest price, which is preceded by the announcement of the auction. This study aims to determine the legal protection measures against the winner of the land auction. The research method used is empirical legal research by collecting systematic data, recording, interpreting, and critically analyzing facts or data as well as making reports and information on symptoms studied from various aspects to find conclusions. All data that has been obtained are then analyzed and described in a qualitative descriptive manner. The results showed that the auction rules were not implemented in practice. Makassar District Court Decision No. 278/Pdt.G/2018/Pn.Mks cancel the SHM owned by the Auction Winner because the SHM is manipulative. The lack of in-depth data analysis and the application of the rules of the auction procedure on Mortgage are the factors that cause the winner of the auction to lose his rights. One of the actions that can guarantee legal protection for the winner of the auction is through the courts. Where in this case, the auction winner can make the decision of the case his basis for demanding accountability for the parties involved in the auction process for the land object. Such as KPNL and BPN carry out administrative responsibility and the seller (Bank) compensates for all costs that the winner of the auction redeems in the auction process. Keywords: Auction, Dispute, Accountability
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Zannuar, Pusdika Eka Anggara Moch. Najib Imanullah Pujiyono. "The Effectiveness of Legal Protection for Auction Winners Who Cannot Control the Object of Mortgage Right Guarantee." Multicultural Education 7, no. 8 (2021): 702. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5297020.
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<em>This paper examined the effectiveness of legal protection for auction winners who cannot control the object. The research method was normative juridical. This normative juridical research used library law research. The data analysis employed a descriptive qualitative approach, namely data analysis that cannot be calculated. The legal material obtained was then discussed. In conclusion, the effectiveness of the legal protection that occurs for the winner of the auction object who cannot enjoy the results of the object has been going well but cannot be said to be effective because the heirs reject the result of the case decision. This is, of course, as stated in the Case Number: 18/Pdt.G/2018/PN.Cms. In this case, the auction winner who has good faith is sued by a third party to the court, and the third party is the heir. This can result in the auction object of mortgage right guarantee that the auction winner does not enjoy. The execution of the mortgage right guarantee case became protracted for up to four years.</em>
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Lu, Yixin, Alok Gupta, Wolfgang Ketter, and Eric van Heck. "Information Transparency in Business-to-Business Auction Markets: The Role of Winner Identity Disclosure." Management Science 65, no. 9 (2019): 4261–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3143.
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One of the central issues in auction design is how much information should be disclosed to bidders. In this paper, we examine bidder's identity disclosure in sequential business-to-business (B2B) auctions. Specifically, we compare two information disclosure policies, one that publicly discloses winners’ identities (the status quo) and an alternative policy that conceals winners’ identities. Using a large-scale field experiment in the Dutch flower auction market, we find that concealing winners’ identities can significantly increase the average winning price and thereby raise the seller’s revenue. We further explore the underlying mechanism that drives the observed effect. The empirical analysis of bidding behavior in these auctions suggests that bidders tend to imitate some of their competitors who have won in previous rounds of auctions and shade their bids accordingly. Concealing winners’ identities can disrupt such imitation heuristic, which in turn mitigates the price-declining trend in sequential rounds. Our findings have important implications for the design of information disclosure policies in B2B auction markets. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.
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Susanawati, U. Azizah, and N. Man. "Performance effectiveness of the Puncak Merapi Horticultural Farmer association as a red chili auction market in the Sleman Production Center Indonesia." IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1413, no. 1 (2024): 012108. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/1413/1/012108.
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Abstract This research aims to gain a better understanding of the Puncak Merapi Horticultural Farmer Association (PPHPM) in Sleman Regency, its member profiles, its auction process, its effectiveness, and the relationship between its effectiveness and its member profiles. A total of 150 farmers made up the sample, gathered using proportional random sampling from each assembly point. Descriptive analysis and research scale were employed as the data analysis model. The analysis unveiled that PPHPM’s members, the farmers, and its profile as an auction market supported red chili auctions. The auctions began with farmers delivering red chilies to the assembly points, followed by weighing, sorting, grading, calculating the net weight, and entering data into the diPanen.id application, traders entering prices into the application, packaging, announcing the winner, payment, and the distribution of auction results. Relationships in the auction market, auction market output, and auction market flexibility were the top indicators of PPHPM’s effectiveness as a red chili auction market in Sleman Regency, placing it in the high category. A solid relationship existed between the member profiles and the effectiveness of PPHPM.
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Iswara, Firda Ramadhanty, and Rusdianto Sesung. "ANALISIS YURIDIS EKSEKUSI JAMINAN KREDITUR LELANG HAK TANGGUNGAN TERHADAP OBJEK BERPENGHUNI." Perspektif 27, no. 3 (2022): 191–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.30742/perspektif.v27i3.839.
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Pembayaran hutang kreditur dilaksanakan dengan objek jaminan hak tanggungan yang dilakukan berdasarkan pelelangan umum. Pelelangan merupakan perbuatan hukum yang memaksa dan berperan penting untuk penyelesaian permasalahan perdata dapat dilaksanakan di Pengadilan Negeri dan KPKNL. Dalam pelaksanaannya kedudukan dalam mengeksekusi jaminan kredit yang tidak melakukan prestasi dapat dilaksanakan melalui kantor lelang dilakukan secara terbuka akan sangat menguntungkan. Namun problematika terhadap kegiatan lelang seringkali rumit, dikarenakan objek pelelangan adalah jaminan terhadap kredit yang tetap tidak dalam pemenuhan prestasi. Hal itu dikarenakan pemenang lelang objek dengan hak jaminan terhadap suatu kredit yang tidak terpenuhi prestasinya diambilalihkan tetapi dalam kenyataannya objek lelangnya berpenghuni. Sepanjang terdapat itikad baik dari semula oleh pembeli dan persyaratan pembeliannya sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan, hukum akan melindungi hak dari pembeli lelang dan pemenang yang mendapatkan objek lelang eksekusi dengan hak tanggungan berpatokan pada grosse atau akta kutipan risalah lelang.Payment of creditors’ debts is carried out with the object of guarantee of mortgages which is carried out through public auctions. The auction is a legal act that compels and its very important role in resolving civil problems can be carried out by the District Court and the KPKNL. In practice, the position of executing credit guarantees that do not perform well can be implemented through the auction office carried out openly will be very profitable. However, the problem with auction activities is often complicated, because the object being auctioned is a guarantee for credit which is still not fulfilling the achievement. This is because the winner of the auction of the object with collateral rights for a credit whose achievements are not fulfilled is taken over but in reality the object of the auction is inhabited. As long as there is good faith from the beginning by the buyer and the purchase requirements are in accordance with the laws and regulations, the law will protect the rights of the auction buyer and the winner / who gets the object of the execution auction with the mortgage based on the grosse or the deed of quotation of the minutes of the auction.
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Handayani, Dwi, Muhammad Ilyas, and Teguh Kuncoro. "Analyzing Legal Ramifications for Auction Winners: A Case Study of Bekasi and Makassar Court Decisions on Auction Cancellations." Unnes Law Journal 9, no. 2 (2023): 441–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/ulj.v9i2.75560.
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This article starts with the auction of the valid execution and in accordance with the minutes of auction of the Bekasi State Wealth and Auction Service Office (KPKNL) Number 225/2013 with the winner of the auction in good faith, but the auction was canceled by the court in the decision of the Bekasi State Court Number 412/Pdt.G/2015/PN.Bks on the claim of the legal owner of the collateral object against Auction applicant. The creditor filed for the execution of the dependent rights under Article 6 of the Law on Dependent Rights Number 4/1996 on the basis of default. Furthermore, the decision was appealed and then continued with cassation and finally the Review of case Number 664PK/PDT/2020 with the decision to reject the application for cassation and Judicial Review. Weaknesses in the auction rules result in the rights of auction winners not being accommodated and not protected by law. This article is interesting to researched and is the first time it has happened and has not been regulated in the Technical Guidelines of the Minister of Finance Regulation Number 213/PMK.06/2020. As a comparison, the case in Makassar State Court Number 73/Pdt.G/2023. With the method of statutory approach, cases, and theories of laws, then analyzed in the way of legal reasoning, and interpretation of laws. The results showed the legal consequences of the rights of the auction winners due to court decisions, namely experiencing material losses that must be borne by the Bekasi District Court decision. Solutions offered, updating the Vendu Reglement Ordonantie on the conduct of auctions in Indonesia; perfecting PMK Number 2013/PMK.06/2020 concerning technical guidelines legal. The purpose of the study, to examine the legal consequences of the rights of auction winners because the court decision that decided the auction has no legal force.
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Nanda, Fenta Saputra Pujiyono Arief Suryono. "Legal Protection Of Auction Winner On Minutes Of Auction Canceled By Court (Case Study Decision No.31/Pdt.G/2015/PN.Jmb)." Multicultural Education 7, no. 7 (2021): 167. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5090739.
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<em>In the case of an auction that is cancelled by the court, it is often considered that the aggrieved party is the debtor, but if you look at it from another point of view, the winner of the auction also bears the loss in terms of time, energy, and costs for the transfer of names and taxes. This article aims to discuss the legal protection of the auction winner for the auction cancelled by the court. This research uses normative juridical research. This research specification uses an analytical perspective type, namely research by knowing facts or actual conditions. Collecting research data using literature studies on primary law, secondary legal materials, and non-legal materials. The data analysis technique in this study is a prescriptive analysis using a statutory approach. Several articles that can be used by the auction winner to claim compensation for the minutes of the auction cancelled by the court are Article 1365, Article 1457, Article 1473, Article 1474, Article 1479, Article 1480, Article 1266, and Article 1267 of the Civil Code. This article concludes that there is a need for compensation to be given to the auction winner for the auction cancelled by the court, because just like the debtor who suffered losses due to the limit value being too low, the auction winner also suffered losses in terms of time, effort, and costs for the cancellation.</em>
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Damainingrum, Vania Diva, and Hanin Alya' Labibah. "The Auction System in the Practice of Motorcycle Arisan Reviewed from the Minister of Finance Regulation Number 122 of 2023 Concerning Auction Implementation Guidelines." Journal of Development Research 8, no. 2 (2024): Process. http://dx.doi.org/10.28926/jdr.v8i2.372.
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Auction in motorcycle arisan are organized by a business entity without interference from the government with the aim of selling goods, namely motorcycles. Motorcycle arisan adopts an auction system to be used as the determination of the winner of the arisan. This study aims to determine the implementation of auction in motorcycle arisan in terms of the regulation of the minister of finance regarding auction implementation guidelines. The auction conducted in motorcycle arisan is actually used for business purposes for the organizer of the arisan, which auction team was formed independently by the organizer of the arisan without Auction Officials. In the implementation of motorcycle arisan, if it seen from the goal is to sale motorcycles with an auction system, so it is included in the category of voluntary auctions, where the implementation stage is regulated in the ministerial regulation. Business entities as organizer of motorcycle arisan with an auction system need to pay attention to auction activities so that their implementation is adjusted to that has been regulated in laws and regulations.
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Kurniawan, Faizal, Xavier Nugraha, Ardhana Christian Noventri, and Qona’aha Noor Maajid. "Auction Winner as A New Criteria in The Concept of Good Faith Buyer in Indonesia." Jambe Law Journal 4, no. 2 (2021): 171–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.22437/jlj.4.2.171-190.
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Good faith is a principle embodied under Article 1338 Paragraph (3) of the Indonesian Civil Code, which is required in every stage of a contract, including in a land sale and purchase contract. Under several decisions of the Supreme Court, good faith is considered to exist, for instance, when a buyer purchased a land through the auction of the State Receivables Affairs Committee (PUPN). Nevertheless, based on a conviction in the judicial practices, this article believes that purchases through official auctions are not necessarily the indicators for the existence of good faith principle in a land sale and purchase contract. Therefore, this study is focused on the concept of good faith buyer with a land object as well as the characteristic of auction winner as a good faith buyer protected by law. In conclusion, parties of a land sale and purchase contract through auction can be considered to have performed in good faith when they have fulfilled the criteria under Supreme Court Circular Letter and other criteria such as purchasing through state auction office in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations, purchasing in a reasonable price, and the auction winner is not the creditor himself who purchases at a price far below the collateral limit price.
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Zhang, Mingwu, and Bingruolan Zhou. "PP-VCA: A Privacy-Preserving and Verifiable Combinatorial Auction Mechanism." Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2020 (October 19, 2020): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8888284.
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Combinatorial auctions can be employed in the fields such as spectrum auction, network routing, railroad segment, and energy auction, which allow multiple goods to be sold simultaneously and any combination of goods to be bid and the maximum sum of combinations of bidding prices to be calculated. However, in traditional combinatorial auction mechanisms, data concerning bidders’ price and bundle might reveal sensitive information, such as personal preference and competitive relation since the winner determination problem needs to be resolved in terms of sensitive data as above. In order to solve this issue, this paper exploits a privacy-preserving and verifiable combinatorial auction protocol (PP-VCA) to protect bidders’ privacy and ensure the correct auction price in a secure manner, in which we design a one-way and monotonically increasing function to protect a bidder’s bid to enable the auctioneer to pick out the largest bid without revealing any information about bids. Moreover, we design and employ three subprotocols, namely, privacy-preserving winner determination protocol, privacy-preserving scalar protocol, and privacy-preserving verifiable payment determination protocol, to implement the combinatorial auction with bidder privacy and payment verifiability. The results of comprehensive experimental evaluations indicate that our proposed scheme provides a better efficiency and flexibility to meet different types of data volume in terms of the number of goods and bidders.
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Moktar, Brilian, Elfira Fitriyani Pakpahan, Kartina Pakpahan, Ok Isnainul, and Tommy Leonard. "Legal Protection of Auction Winners of Agraria Disputes of Confiscated Assets through KPKNL." CSR International Journal 1, no. 1 (2021): 29–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.35307/csrij.v1i1.14.
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It is important to know the rights of the auction winner in every auction procedure. This includes legal protection for the winning bidder for assets confiscated through the State Wealth and Auction Service Office (KPKNL). This research will reveal the legal protection section of agrarian disputes over the auction of bppn confiscated assets through KPKNL in Medan City. Data collection used Normative Juridical review. Research informants only focus on employees and parties who have problems related to the agrarian suspicion of the auction of confiscated assets by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency, confiscate through KPKNL in the Medan branch. The conclusion is that legally the auction, there are inappropriate regulations by the Central KPKNL and the Medan city area. There are also problems with policies made by agraria confiscate, where the regulations are not well integrated. KPKNL has conducted an auction, but has not provided certainty for the auction winner. In this case, the auction winner gets a loss because he has followed all procedures and did not receive what has been stipulated by KPKNL.
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HOGG, TAD, PAVITHRA HARSHA, and KAY-YUT CHEN. "QUANTUM AUCTIONS." International Journal of Quantum Information 05, no. 05 (2007): 751–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219749907003183.
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We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition. Thus, non-winning bids are never revealed. Participants can use entanglement to arrange for correlations among their bids, with the assurance that this entanglement is not observable by others. This protocol is useful for information hiding applications, such as partnership bidding with allocative externality or concerns about revealing bidding preferences. The protocol applies to a variety of auction types, e.g. first or second price, and to auctions involving either a single item or arbitrary bundles of items (i.e. combinatorial auctions). We analyze the game-theoretical behavior of the quantum protocol for the simple case of a sealed-bid quantum, and show how a suitably designed adiabatic search reduces the possibilities for bidders to game the auction. This design illustrates how incentive rather that computational constraints affect quantum algorithm choices.
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Beltrán, Fernando, and Natalia Santamaría. "A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem." Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences 2006 (September 18, 2006): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/jamds/2006/27417.
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One not-so-intuitive result in auction theory is the revenue equivalence theorem, which states that as long as an auction complies with some conditions, it will on average generate the same revenue to an auctioneer as the revenue generated by any other auction that complies with them. Surprisingly, the conditions are not defined on the payment rules to the bidders but on the fact that the bidders do not bid below a reserve value—set by the auctioneer—the winner is the one with the highest bidding and there is a common equilibrium bidding function used by all bidders. In this paper, we verify such result using extensive simulation of a broad range of auctions and focus on the variability or fluctuations of the results around the average. Such fluctuations are observed and measured in two dimensions for each type of auction: as the number of auctions grows and as the number of bidders increases.
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Kuehn, Joseph. "Estimating Auctions with Externalities: The Case of USFS Timber Auctions." Review of Economics and Statistics 101, no. 5 (2019): 791–807. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00810.
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I introduce an empirical auction model where in addition to the private value that each bidder receives upon winning the auction, losing bidders incur a negative externality that depends on the identity of the rival winner. I show how the externalities and private value distributions can be identified and estimated in such a model. I then apply the model to U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. I find that mill bidders impose significant externalities on one another of between 10% and 22% of the heterogeneous portion of their valuation. This leads the timber tracts to be misallocated in 5.2% of the auctions in my sample.
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Fathimah Azzahra, Salsabila, and Siti Malikhatun Badriyah. "Perlindungan Hukum Terhadap Pemenang Lelang Atas Objek Eksekusi Hak Tanggungan." Jurnal Lex Renaissance 8, no. 1 (2023): 167–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.20885/jlr.vol8.iss1.art10.
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Carrying out an auction is the payment of the auction object from the buyer to the auction seller, with the aim of paying off the debtor's debt to the creditor. However, in its implementation obstacles often arise such as the auction object cannot be controlled by the winning party. This research aims to determine legal protection for auction winners, as well as other obstacles faced by auction winners. In this research, the approach methods applied include: case approach methods through court decisions and statutory regulations. The legal materials used in this research use secondary legal materials in the form of primary legal materials, secondary legal materials and tertiary legal materials. The results of this research are legal protection for the rights of auction winners in the form of repressive protection contained in HIR, Vendu Regulation, PMK No. 213/PMK.06./2020, and the Civil Code. To obtain their rights, they can make real execution efforts. Meanwhile, in this research, the obstacles that influence the auction winner are non-juridical obstacles.
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Carroll, Gabriel, and Ilya Segal. "Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities." Review of Economic Studies 86, no. 4 (2018): 1527–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy041.
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Abstract The standard revenue-maximizing auction discriminates against a priori stronger bidders so as to reduce their information rents. We show that such discrimination is no longer optimal when the auction’s winner may resell to another bidder, and the auctioneer has non-Bayesian uncertainty about such resale opportunities. We identify a “worst-case” resale scenario, in which bidders’ values become publicly known after the auction and losing bidders compete Bertrand-style to buy the object from the winner. With this form of resale, misallocation no longer reduces the information rents of the high-value bidder, as he could still secure the same rents by buying the object in resale. Under regularity assumptions, we show that revenue is maximized by a version of the Vickrey auction with bidder-specific reserve prices, first proposed by Ausubel and Cramton (2004). The proof of optimality involves constructing Lagrange multipliers on a double continuum of binding non-local incentive constraints.
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Chakraborty, Soumyakanti, Anup Kumar Sen, and Amitava Bagchi. "Experimenting with Proxy Agents in Online Combinatorial Auctions." International Journal of Intelligent Information Technologies 10, no. 2 (2014): 56–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijiit.2014040104.
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To promote online eBay-like combinatorial auctions, the authors experiment with a distributive agent based mechanism PRACA which attempts to address two research issues. First, the scheme uses an algorithm CompDL to incrementally solve the Winner Determination Problem under limited memory for any package that the bidder may be interested to bid at any time. This helps the bidder to bid effectively knowing the current state of the auction. CompDL thereby allows a large number of items to be put on auction. Second, PRACA supplies an autonomous proxy agent to each bidder who logs in to an ongoing auction; this agent bids on the bidder's behalf and relays data on requested packages to the bidder. Therefore, PRACA helps in reducing operational overheads of seller and bidder in online combinatorial auctions. Both schemes have been implemented and the efficacy of the approach is demonstrated by experiments.
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Mohanty, Suneeta, Prasant Kumar Pattnaik, and G. B. Mund. "Privacy Preserving Auction Based Virtual Machine Instances Allocation Scheme for Cloud Computing Environment." International Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering (IJECE) 7, no. 5 (2017): 2645. http://dx.doi.org/10.11591/ijece.v7i5.pp2645-2650.
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<p>Cloud Computing Environment provides computing resources in the form of Virtual Machines (VMs), to the cloud users through Internet. Auction-based VM instances allocation allows different cloud users to participate in an auction for a bundle of Virtual Machine instances where the user with the highest bid value will be selected as the winner by the auctioneer (Cloud Service Provider) to gain more. In this auction mechanism, individual bid values are revealed to the auctioneer in order to select the winner as a result of which privacy of bid values are lost. In this paper, we proposed an auction scheme to select the winner without revealing the individual bid values to the auctioneer to maintain privacy of bid values. The winner will get the access to the bundle of VM instances. This scheme relies on a set of cryptographic protocols including Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol and Yao’s protocol to maintain privacy of bid values.</p>
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Salem, Deni Alfiando, and S. Sumarlin. "SISTEM PENDUKUNG KEPUTUSAN UNTUK MENENTUKAN PEMENANG LELANG TENDER PROYEK MENGGUNAKAN METODE PERBANDINGAN EKSPONENTIAL PADA KANTOR DINAS PEKERJAAN UMUM TIMOR TENGAH UTARA." Jurnal Ilmiah Flash 8, no. 1 (2023): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.32511/flash.v8i1.949.
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Tenders or auctions in the construction industry are often held, either public or open or closed depending on the owner and the project to be carried out. Tenders or auctions are needed because in the implementation of a project, both government projects and private projects, the owner expects the best bid for the project. A tender committee is an organization established and endorsed which is responsible for the successful auction of a tender. The tender or auction in the north middle Timor regency is held every year after the local government proposes the project procurement in the budget session with the DPR. Project procurement is proposed at the hearing in the form of the location and amount of the project budget, during the budget session. The amount of budget proposed by the government can be reduced and the project procurement can be canceled unilaterally by the DPR, after the budget session is over and the project procurement has been approved, the project will be posted on the LPSE (Electronic Procurement Service) website of north middle Timor regency. In determining the tender winner, at the final determination stage, is still done manually so there are a lot of cheats and frequent human errors, therefore an application is needed to assist and facilitate decision-making in determining the winner of the project tender. This research produces a decision support system application to determine the winner of the project tender that can assist the committee in determining decision-making using the Exponential Comparison Method. The result of the system implementation is that the system can assist and facilitate decision-making in determining the project tender winner. The decision support system for determining the winner of this project tender can assist the committee in determining decision-making using the Exponential Comparison Method. Measuring the accuracy of determining the project tender winner between the Public Works Agency ranking with the Exponential Comparison Method (MPE) algorithm ranking, obtained an accuracy rate of 100%, so that the Exponential Comparison Method algorithm is feasible to be implemented in making a decision support system for determining project tender winners at the office North Middle Timor Regency Public Works.
 
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Ball, Michael O., Alexander S. Estes, Mark Hansen, and Yulin Liu. "Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots." Transportation Science 54, no. 4 (2020): 858–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2020.0995.
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In this paper, we define and investigate quantity-contingent auctions. Such auctions can be used when there exist multiple units of a single product and the value of a set of units depends on the total quantity sold. For example, a road network or airport will become congested as the number of users increase so that a permit for use becomes more valuable as the total number allocated decreases. A quantity-contingent auction determines both the number of items sold and an allocation of items to bidders. Because such auctions could be used by bidders to gain excessive market power, we impose constraints limiting market power. We focus on auctions that allocate airport arrival and departure slots. We propose a continuous model and an integer programming model for the associated winner determination problem. Using these models, we perform computational experiments that lend insights into the properties of the quantity-contingent auction.