Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Auctioneerss / Journal articles

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Auctioneerss.

Journal articles on the topic 'Auctioneerss'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 13 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Auctioneerss.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

MALLEY, NIKKI. "A Sale You Can Dance To: Entrainment, Flexibility, and Improvisation in the Metric Practice of the American Auctioneer." Journal of the Society for American Music 7, no. 3 (2013): 235–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1752196313000217.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractAlthough most auctioneers do not self-identify as musicians, the practice of auctioneering in the United States reveals a sophisticated musical approach to metric improvisation based on the establishment of musical expectation and the strategic thwarting of that expectation through flexible treatment of meter. Auctioneers establish a “referential” meter wherein a consistent organization of the pulse returns repeatedly, alternating with expansions or contractions of that primary meter. Listeners are entrained to expect musical consistency, but through disruptions of familiar musical pat

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Alonso, Estrella, Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, and Juan Tejada. "Mixed Mechanisms for Auctioning Ranked Items." Mathematics 8, no. 12 (2020): 2227. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math8122227.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper deals with the problem of designing and choosing auctioning mechanisms for multiple commonly ranked objects as, for instance, keyword auctions in search engines on Internet. We shall adopt the point of view of the auctioneer who has to select the auction mechanism to be implemented not only considering its expected revenue, but also its associated risk. In order to do this, we consider a wide parametric family of auction mechanisms which contains the generalizations of discriminatory-price auction, uniform-price auction and Vickrey auction. For completeness, we also analyze the Gene

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Mostafavi, Reza, Seyed Naser Razavi, and Mohammad Ali Balafar. "An imperialist competitive algorithm for the winner determination problem in combinatorial auction." Computer Engineering and Applications Journal 4, no. 1 (2015): 19–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.18495/comengapp.v4i1.107.

Full text

Abstract:

Winner Determination problem (WDP) in combinatorial auction is an NP-complete problem. The NP-complete problems are often solved by using heuristic methods and approximation algorithms. This paper presents an imperialist competitive algorithm (ICA) for solving winner determination problem. Combinatorial auction (CA) is an auction that auctioneer considers many goods for sale and the bidder bids on the bundle of items. In this type of auction, the goal is finding winning bids that maximize the auctioneerâ€™s income under the constraint that each item can be allocated to at most one bidder. To d

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Kominers, Scott. "Plunkitt: Won Auctioneers: $2.50." Journal of Political Economy 120, no. 2 (2012): Back Cover. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/666972.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

GONZALEZ, RAUL, KEVIN HASKER, and ROBIN C. SICKLES. "AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN eBAY AUCTIONS." Singapore Economic Review 54, no. 03 (2009): 441–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217590809003422.

Full text

Abstract:

A relatively new type of panel data analysis is becoming more and more topical in the applied econometrics literature as auction mechanisms are being explored in more depth. The typical data utilized in such studies involves repeated measures of auction outcomes, where the variable of interest involves order statistics from the sample of bids from many bids on completed auctions for a particular commodity. This article presents structural estimates of bidding behavior in eBay computer monitor auctions. We exploit characteristics of such repeated measures to analyze the efficiency of private va

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Mchenry, Monica, and Holly Carlson. "The vocal health of auctioneers." Logopedics Phoniatrics Vocology 29, no. 1 (2004): 41–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14015430310022545.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Macdonald, Roderick, and Andree Lajoie. "AUCTIONEERS, FENCE-VIEWERS, POPES – AND JUDGES." Constitutional Forum / Forum constitutionnel 9, no. 1 - 4 (2011): 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.21991/c9z660.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Devi, Monisha, Nityananda Sarma, and Sanjib K. Deka. "Multi-Winner Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Single-Sided Auction Theoretic Modelling Approach with Sequential Bidding." Electronics 10, no. 5 (2021): 602. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics10050602.

Full text

Abstract:

Cognitive radio (CR) has evolved as a novel technology for overcoming the spectrum-scarcity problem in wireless communication networks. With its opportunistic behaviour for improving the spectrum-usage efficiency, CR enables the desired secondary users (SUs) to dynamically utilize the idle spectrum owned by primary users. On sensing the spectrum to identify the idle frequency bands, proper spectrum-allocation mechanisms need to be designed to provide an effectual use of the radio resource. In this paper, we propose a single-sided sealed-bid sequential-bidding-based auction framework that exten

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Heeho Kim and Lee,Jai-Min. "Auction Duration and Attitudes of Auctioneers." KUKJE KYUNGJE YONGU 21, no. 2 (2015): 117–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.17298/kky.2015.21.2.005.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

McKendrick, Ewan. "Auctioneers, ‘Sleepers’ and Actions in Negligence." International Journal of Cultural Property 1, no. 1 (1992): 207–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0940739192000183.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Bag, Samiran, Feng Hao, Siamak F. Shahandashti, and Indranil Ghosh Ray. "SEAL: Sealed-Bid Auction Without Auctioneers." IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 15 (2020): 2042–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2019.2955793.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Davis, Andrew M., Elena Katok, and Anthony M. Kwasnica. "Do Auctioneers Pick Optimal Reserve Prices?" Management Science 57, no. 1 (2011): 177–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1258.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel. "Competition among auctioneers in large markets." Journal of Economic Theory 121, no. 1 (2005): 107–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.001.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Hagedorn, Marcus. "The value of information for auctioneers." Journal of Economic Theory 144, no. 5 (2009): 2197–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.04.002.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Tsung, Chen-Kun, Hann-Jang Ho, and Sing-Ling Lee. "A Game Theoretical Approach for Solving Winner Determination Problems." Journal of Applied Mathematics 2014 (2014): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/845071.

Full text

Abstract:

Determining the winners in combinatorial auctions to maximize the auctioneer's revenue is an NP-complete problem. Computing an optimal solution requires huge computation time in some instances. In this paper, we apply three concepts of the game theory to design an approximation algorithm: the stability of the Nash equilibrium, the self-learning of the evolutionary game, and the mistake making of the trembling hand assumption. According to our simulation results, the proposed algorithm produces near-optimal solutions in terms of the auctioneer's revenue. Moreover, reasonable computation time is

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Lacetera, Nicola, Bradley J. Larsen, Devin G. Pope, and Justin R. Sydnor. "Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8, no. 4 (2016): 195–229. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150020.

Full text

Abstract:

Auction design has been studied extensively; however, within a given design, does the process of how an auction is conducted matter as well? We address this question by looking for heterogeneity in the performance of auctioneers in English auctions. We analyze over 850,000 wholesale used car auctions and find significant differences across auctioneers in outcomes for otherwise similar cars. The performance heterogeneities are stable across time and correlate with subjective evaluations by the auction house. We discuss the mechanisms driving differential performance and find evidence suggesting

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Annable, James. "Another auctioneer is missing." Journal of Macroeconomics 10, no. 1 (1988): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(88)90002-x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Akbarpour, Mohammad, and Shengwu Li. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma." Econometrica 88, no. 2 (2020): 425–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta15925.

Full text

Abstract:

Consider an extensive‐form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with bidders. Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single bidder detects the deviation. A mechanism is credible if it is incentive‐compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay, under symmetric independent private values. The first‐price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The ascending auction is the unique credible strategy‐proof mechanism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Meisel, Frank. "Auctioneers and Misdescription: Between Scylla and Charybdis." Modern Law Review 73, no. 6 (2010): 1036–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00830.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Isaac, R. Mark, Svetlana Pevnitskaya, and Timothy C. Salmon. "Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers?" Experimental Economics 13, no. 1 (2009): 14–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9227-7.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

GUHA, SAIKAT, TAD HOGG, DAVID FATTAL, TIMOTHY SPILLER, and RAYMOND G. BEAUSOLEIL. "QUANTUM AUCTIONS USING ADIABATIC EVOLUTION: THE CORRUPT AUCTIONEER AND CIRCUIT IMPLEMENTATIONS." International Journal of Quantum Information 06, no. 04 (2008): 815–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219749908004183.

Full text

Abstract:

We examine a proposed auction algorithm using quantum states to represent bids and distributed adiabatic search to find the winner.1 When the auctioneer follows the protocol, the final measurement giving the outcome of the auction also destroys the bid states, thereby preserving the privacy of losing bidders. We describe how a dishonest auctioneer could alter the protocol to violate this privacy guarantee, and present methods by which bidders can counter such attacks. We also suggest possible quantum circuit implementations of the auction protocol, and quantum circuits to perpetrate and to cou

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Ausubel, Lawrence M. "An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities." American Economic Review 96, no. 3 (2006): 602–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.602.

Full text

Abstract:

This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders. The auctioneer announces a vector of current prices, bidders report quantities demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts the prices. Units are credited to bidders at the current prices as their opponents' demands decline, and the process continues until every commodity market clears. Bidders, rather than being assumed to behave as price-takers, are permitted to strategically exercise their market power. Nevertheless, t

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Scolding, N. J., S. M. Smith, S. Sturman, G. B. Brookes, and A. J. Lees. "Auctioneer's jaw: A case of occupational oromandibular hemidystonia." Movement Disorders 10, no. 4 (1995): 508–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mds.870100418.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

McEuen, Duncan. "The auctioneer and his catalogue." Art Libraries Journal 29, no. 2 (2004): 10–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0307472200013547.

Full text

Abstract:

The auctioneer walks into the room, glances at his auction book and picks up his gavel. In this account of the process that lies behind the familiar sales catalogues held in so many art library collections the author highlights the differences between the sales of nearly 250 years ago and those of today. And it is clear that there can be occasions when all does not go quite as smoothly as intended.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Carrier, David. "Will chaos kill the auctioneer?" Review of Political Economy 5, no. 3 (1993): 299–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538259300000019.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Lorentziadis, Panos L. "Bidding under auctioneer default risk." Omega 49 (December 2014): 123–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2014.05.005.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Potter, Stephen, and Chris Lovatt. "Let the auctioneer/manager beware." Management Research News 25, no. 6/7 (2002): 50–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01409170210783304.

Full text

Abstract:

Analyses the law covering the role of the management of auction sales and the implications they bring. Explores the legal obligations of the parties to an auction sale with specific reference to the newly defined liability of the managers of the auction where articles or property are sold “without reserve”. Concludes that it is now clear that if an auctioneer refuses to sell to the highest bidder then he will incur liability to the bidder. States that this could have dire consequences. Examines existing case law and new precedent materials to draw such conclusions and provides some recommendat

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Vagstad, Steinar. "Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?" International Journal of Industrial Organization 25, no. 3 (2007): 597–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.06.006.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Hu, Luke. "Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly." B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 13, no. 1 (2013): 179–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0015.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThis paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, publicly pledge to pay a financial reward to every contractor he has invited to bid, as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for short-listed bidders are costly. Nevertheless, it is generally optimal for the procurer to credibly implement the same restriction of the number of bidders that is optimal under full commitment.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Higgins, Mark L., and Koenraad Kuiper. "Smooth Talkers: The Linguistic Performance of Auctioneers and Sportscasters." Language 73, no. 2 (1997): 460. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/416088.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Mohanty, Suneeta, Prasant Kumar Pattnaik, and G. B. Mund. "Privacy Preserving Auction Based Virtual Machine Instances Allocation Scheme for Cloud Computing Environment." International Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering (IJECE) 7, no. 5 (2017): 2645. http://dx.doi.org/10.11591/ijece.v7i5.pp2645-2650.

Full text

Abstract:

<p>Cloud Computing Environment provides computing resources in the form of Virtual Machines (VMs), to the cloud users through Internet. Auction-based VM instances allocation allows different cloud users to participate in an auction for a bundle of Virtual Machine instances where the user with the highest bid value will be selected as the winner by the auctioneer (Cloud Service Provider) to gain more. In this auction mechanism, individual bid values are revealed to the auctioneer in order to select the winner as a result of which privacy of bid values are lost. In this paper, we proposed

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Kuiper, Koenraad, and Frederick Tillis. "The Chant of the Tobacco Auctioneer." American Speech 60, no. 2 (1985): 141. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/455302.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Albin, Peter, and Duncan K. Foley. "Decentralized, dispersed exchange without an auctioneer." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 18, no. 1 (1992): 27–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(92)90051-c.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

BOYD, J. "VIRTUAL ORALITY: HOW EBAY CONTROLS AUCTIONS WITHOUT AN AUCTIONEER'S VOICE." American Speech 76, no. 3 (2001): 286–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00031283-76-3-286.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Bapna, Ravi, Paulo Goes, and Alok Gupta. "Replicating Online Yankee Auctions to Analyze Auctioneers' and Bidders' Strategies." Information Systems Research 14, no. 3 (2003): 244–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/isre.14.3.244.16562.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Hexom, Shelley. "Consider Hiring an Auctioneer for Your Event." Successful Fundraising 24, no. 3 (2016): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sfr.30332.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Hexom, Shelley. "Consider Hiring an Auctioneer For Your Event." Special Events Galore 16, no. 4 (2016): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/speg.30307.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

MA, Jun, Yonghong ZHANG, and Shengheng LIU. "Improvement of Auctioneer's Revenue under Incomplete Information in Cognitive Radio Networks." IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems E99.D, no. 2 (2016): 533–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1587/transinf.2015edl8140.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Kanoria, Yash, and Hamid Nazerzadeh. "Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions." Operations Research 69, no. 2 (2021): 509–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2007.

Full text

Abstract:

How can an auctioneer optimize revenue by learning the reserve prices from the bids in the previous auctions? How should the long-term incentives and strategic behavior of the bidders be taken into account? Motivated in part by applications in online advertising, in “Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions,” Kanoria and Nazerzadeh investigate these questions. They show that if a seller attempts to dynamically update a common reserve price using the bidding history, buyers will shade their bids, which can hurt the revenue. However, when there is more than one buyer

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

NAKAMURA, Makoto, Hiromitsu OHTA, Yuichiro TAIRA, et al. "Analysis of the Quality Evaluation of Fresh Fish by Skillful Auctioneers." Japanese Journal of Ergonomics 48, no. 3 (2012): 142–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5100/jje.48.142.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Li, Zhuoshu, and Sanmay Das. "Revenue Enhancement via Asymmetric Signaling in Interdependent-Value Auctions." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (July 17, 2019): 2093–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012093.

Full text

Abstract:

We consider the problem of designing the information environment for revenue maximization in a sealed-bid second price auction with two bidders. Much of the prior literature has focused on signal design in settings where bidders are symmetrically informed, or on the design of optimal mechanisms under fixed information structures. We study commonand interdependent-value settings where the mechanism is fixed (a second-price auction), but the auctioneer controls the signal structure for bidders. We show that in a standard common-value auction setting, there is no benefit to the auctioneer in term

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Yen, Li-Hsing, and Guang-Hong Sun. "Decentralized Auctioneerless Combinatorial Auctions for Multi-Unit Resource Allocation." IEEE Access 7 (2019): 78625–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2922688.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

XU, GUO-AI, ZHI-WEN ZHAO, XIU-BO CHEN, and YI-XIAN YANG. "CRYPTANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE SECURE QUANTUM SEALED-BID AUCTION WITH POSTCONFIRMATION." International Journal of Quantum Information 09, no. 06 (2011): 1383–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219749911008076.

Full text

Abstract:

In this paper, the cryptanalysis about the quantum sealed-bid auction, whose feature is that by introducing a postconfirmation mechanism the malicious bidders cannot collude with auctioneers, is given. We found that a malicious bidder can obtain the other bidders' bids with a probability of 0.854. Moreover, there will be a higher probability if some bidders collude to attack the other bidders' bids. To prevent such attacks, we propose an effective improvement by means of the hash function.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Lei Pang, Zhe Jia Shoushan Luo, Bai Wang, and Yang Xin. "M+1-st Price Auction without Auctioneers Based on Threshold ElGamal Encryption." International Journal of Advancements in Computing Technology 3, no. 9 (2011): 219–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.4156/ijact.vol3.issue9.27.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Beltrán, Fernando, and Natalia Santamaría. "A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem." Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences 2006 (September 18, 2006): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/jamds/2006/27417.

Full text

Abstract:

One not-so-intuitive result in auction theory is the revenue equivalence theorem, which states that as long as an auction complies with some conditions, it will on average generate the same revenue to an auctioneer as the revenue generated by any other auction that complies with them. Surprisingly, the conditions are not defined on the payment rules to the bidders but on the fact that the bidders do not bid below a reserve value—set by the auctioneer—the winner is the one with the highest bidding and there is a common equilibrium bidding function used by all bidders. In this paper, we verify s

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Rao, Congjun, Yong Zhao, Junjun Zheng, Mark Goh, and Cheng Wang. "Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism." Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 34, no. 06 (2017): 1750028. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217595917500282.

Full text

Abstract:

Multiple equilibria (equilibrium excursion) affects the auction proceeds, and is bad for estimating auction efficiency. This paper examines the relationship between bidding behavior and equilibrium excursion. We analyze a uniform price auction mechanism based on a rationing strategy and common value information. In this uniform price auction mechanism, bidders (strategic and non-strategic) participate in an auction simultaneously, and the auctioneer rations the strategic bidders after observing their bids. The conclusions drawn suggest that a rationing strategy can effectively limit the strate

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Lucking-Reiley, David. "Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce." Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (2000): 183–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.3.183.

Full text

Abstract:

William Vickrey (1961) proposed an auction mechanism in which bidders submit sealed bids, and the highest bidder wins the good in return for payment of the second-highest bid amount. For decades, economists have credited Vickrey with inventing this auction format, and have believed that the Vickrey auction is rarely used in practice. This paper presents evidence that Vickrey auctions have long been the predominant auction format for mail sales of collectible postage stamps. Stamp auctioneers developed this auction format on their own, as early as 1893, even before Vickrey was born.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Gustafson, Tim. "The Banker Leads The Auctioneer Through The Machine Shed." Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies 1997, no. 16 (1997): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.17077/2168-569x.1233.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

D’Souza, Clare, and David Prentice. "Auctioneer strategy and pricing: evidence from an art auction." Marketing Intelligence & Planning 20, no. 7 (2002): 417–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02634500210450855.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Moser-Mercer, Barbara. "Review of Kuiper (1996): Smooth talkers. The linguistic performance of auctioneers and sportscasters." Interpreting. International Journal of Research and Practice in Interpreting 1, no. 2 (1996): 267–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/intp.1.2.08mos.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!