Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Ayatolah Khomeini'

The gathered texts and letters from Ali Ibn Abi Talib, found in the book Nahjul Balagha,constitute one of the most important writings of Shiite Islam, next the hadits and the Quran.Imam Ali´s ethics and moral approach in Nahjul Balagha, is considered by imam Ali, to beseen as a guideline for both individual purposes as for any kind of governance. The esotericteachings, about truth and justice in Nahjul Balagha, should therefore probably have been of agreat concern to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic revolution.This essay will from an deductive approach, on a relatively contemporary historic event, try toanalyze Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini´s interpreting on imam Ali´s texts and preaching inNahjul Balagha. The Islamic revolution, as the Islamic Republic of Iran, led by AyatollahKhomeini, was confirmed as both brutal and violent. My ambition in this essay, will there forconcern a possible interpreting on justice and political rule, from Ayatollah Khomeini and theIslamic Republic of Iran, on imam Ali´s teachings in Nahjul Balagha.

A large part of the Iranian population resented the west, in particular USA and Great Britain, during the Islamic revolution in Iran 1979. The people were also resenting the adverse effects of the trumped up frame made in Iran. The last shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was detested by many in Iran for its west-oriented regime. The resentment among many Iranians is a consequence of the violations of e.g. the lack of political and civil rights, there were no existing legal security in the society, there were no economic distribution and the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah violated the human rights. The resolution from an Iranian perspective for riot is not new, during the last centuries the abomination against the despotic kings have been existing varyingly and big riots have been raised.  The Islamic revolution in 1979 was new because the revolution added adverse effects of west, the population detested west and expressed it by protesting through demonstration.  The significance of the revolution in 1979 was also attributable to Islam. The statements and onsets that raised against west by the citizens of Iran was not merely support of the regime from the west, nevertheless to the same extent also for the western culture and civilization. The proponents of the Islamic revolution were Islamic in spirit, and were against western values, culture, and civilization.  The proponents claimed that the Iranians should not inquire for western civilization. The ideals projected went back in time, namely to the beginning of Islam. The recent government hoped to deviate from the regime of the shah, the new government should be comprised by the divine laws. The thesis will depict why Khomeinism was growing fiercly and in addition illustrate the religious and theological doctrines of Khomeini.

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran many Shia Sufi Orders, who are religious groups that exercise the mystical and spiritual elements of Shia Islam, have been forced to exile due to oppression from the government. The largest Sufi Order, The Nematollahi Soltan Alishahi Gonabadi are still in the country, but are oppressed by the Islamic regime; From an arson attack in central Tehran in 1980; The Iranian government being blamed to have imprisoned 11 members of the Soltan Alishahi Order for peaceful activities in 2013 (HRW, 2013); To the odd arrests and physical abuses of the Order’s members in March 2014. The oppression against this Sufi Order has thus been continuing in the Republic, although it is in contradiction to the written documentations that have been declared in the constitution. Ayatollah Khomeini’s view on Sufism may be a reason to why the Sufi Orders today are oppressed and not perceived as formal citizens of the Republic, since it is his ideology as the founding father and the Supreme Leader that is the map the Republic governs through. The definition of who is a formal citizen in Iran goes under Article 12, 13 and 41; where The Soltan Alishahi Order are members of the Twelver Shia Religion, can be understood as with regard to their treatment by the Iranian government, neither formal nor approved citizens in the eyes of Islamic Republic. A critical discourse analysis have been made from the 21 volume anthology of Khomeini’s speeches, messages, interviews, decrees, religious permissions and letters that are texts written by Khomeini himself. The contexts of the words ‘Sufi’, ‘Dervish’, ‘Gnostic’ and ‘Mystic’ have been the focal point, which are extended words of Sufism.From the result found, it is evident that Khomeini’s perception of Sufism could be a possible reason to why Sufi Orders are oppressed; the words ‘Sufi’ and members of Sufi Orders ‘Dervishes’ are negatively described by Khomeini, whilst ‘Gnostic’ and ‘Mystic’ is almost in every case associated with positive ways of approaching God and Islam. This linguistic distinction by Khomeini can therefore be based upon on a personal hostile stance against Sufism and Sufi Orders, which in turn outflows into the Islamic Republic and the Islamic government of Iran

The shu’ubiyya movement originates from the early days of Islam. Its main purpose was to challenge the Arabic elite by showing prominent abilities in non-Arabic groups. The movement disappeared in the eleventh century. In the twentieth century a new wave of shu’ubiyya thoughts reappeared called neo-shu’ubiyya. The twist however was that it was used by the Arabs as derogatory term against their rivals. One accused as a shu’ubiyya was Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution. He never proclaimed to be shu’ubiyya yet the Arabic elite still used it against him. This study compares Ayatollah Khomeini’s speech Message to the Pilgrims from the 1980s with the shu’ubiyya member Ibn Garica’s risala from the eleventh century in al-Andalus. The purpose of the study is to question that Ayatollah Khomeini can be seen as a true shu’ubiyya. By examining their messages the study tries to understand how the shu’ubiyya discourse has evolved in fields such as the sacred, traditions, history and the surrounding world. The result shows that part of Ayatollah Khomeini’s argumentation is similar to that of Ibn Garcia, but that his main purpose deviates too much to be called shu’ubiyya. Ibn Garcia tries to turn the Arabic “us against them” upside down and show how superior the non-Arabs are in comparison. He argues that this should allow the non-Arabs to join the Arabic culture. Ayatollah Khomeini has no desire to enter the Arabic discourse instead he asks all Muslims to unite in his new discourse for the greater god of Islam. The claims of the Arabic elite that Iran is the enemy in a “us against them” scenario is not true according to Ayatollah Khomeini. He tries to change the established view of the Iranian as “them”, and instead make all Muslims “us” and the Americans “them” by showing their evil interactions in the middle east. He wants all Muslims to join together by the core of Islam. The trend goes from a more cultural approach to be completely theological.

Women's rights have been a historically controversial issue. This is no exception in Iran, where the struggle between modernization and keeping with traditional Islamic values has been a topic of constant disagreement between political leaders. Women in Iran have experienced many changes in their personal rights and freedoms throughout the decades. This research focuses on religion and culture, the policies of the main leaders of Iran in the past decades, and the role of non-governmental organizations as factors that expand or limit the rights and freedoms of women. It attempts to identify which factor is mostly responsible for the position that women have been historically placed in. The intent of this thesis is to research the rights and conditions of women in Iran.In general the question could be proposed as "are the lives of women in Iran better off today than in the past?" In the western world there are many stereotypes that are oftentimes attached to women, such as the notions that they are not allowed to pursue an education or career and that they do not have any legal rights. Evidence shows that these notions are not accurate in contemporary Iran, and that women have made significant strides in gaining their rights and freedoms. Through the analysis of several case studies, literature reviews, and statistical evidence, this thesis seeks to identify the factors that most affect women's rights and freedoms. By analyzing the factors that have historically placed women at a disadvantage in Iranian society, and better understanding their lives, this thesis aims to fight the stereotypes placed upon them as well as raise awareness for the continuing plight of women in Iran today.
B.A.
Bachelors
Sciences
International and Global Studies

A full study of the conception of wilāya in a variety of juridical trends, theological schools, and mystical doctrines across the Islamic world in general, and in the Shīʿa intellectual history in particular, is too ambitious a project to undertake in one thesis. Therefore, the author has chosen to limit herself to considering a handful of intellectual developments in the Shīʿa world from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. She addresses a number of issues by delving into the conceptions of wilāya through the examination and interpretation of key texts. The main interest of the author is to study the influence of ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism, with regard to the conception of wilāya, on his Shīʿa successors and expositors in later centuries. This research also discusses the development and transformation of the conception of wilāya over two hundred years. In a corresponding approach to Akbarīan mysticism, wilāya occupies a central place in Ṣadrīan ḥikma, and in the thought of the ḥakīms of the Schools of Tehran and Qum, as the crystallization of this discipline of philosophy. Wilāya is inseparable from imamate and from the status of imāms, namely the walī, ḥujja, and ghawth. In the esoteric School of Shaykhīsm, the conception of wilāya is overshadowed by concepts such as ẓuhūr (appearance), qīyāmat (Day of Judgement), intiẓār (expectation), al-Qāʾim, and is finally replaced by the doctrine of Rukn-i Rābiʿ. A study and critical analysis of Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of wilāyat al-faqīh exposes his fascination for the mysticism of ibn ʿArabī. However, the politicization of wilāya in Khomeini’s theory can be regarded as the climax of jurisdictional developments dating back to the writings of the jurists of the early Qajar period. Unlike mysticism, jurisprudence underwent significant changes and revisions in a number of terms, such as wilāya in socio-political affairs. Khomeini’s theory was challenged by his student, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī who revisited it, placing more emphasis on the role of people and their rights in the Islamic Government. Muntaẓirī’s reform movement was similarly transformed by Muhsin Kadivar, who finally rejected the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh in favour of a democratic government.

The Islamic Republic of Iran‟s alleged pursuit of nuclear missile capabilities is proving in-creasingly problematic for the international community, which places the country in a sig-nificant position in world politics. In turn, the world‟s attention towards the thirty-year-old Republic established by the late Ayatollah Khomeini has resurged. The Republic of Iran based on Ayatollah Khomeini‟s interpretation of Islam has long stood in the spotlight of both public and scholastic scrutiny, particularly due to its perceivably radical manoeuvres on the international stage. However, as the focus of these scrutinizing views has been the Iranian unwillingness to subdue and conform to western norms, the issue of the „Islamicness‟ of the Republic has been overlooked.

Hence, this thesis seeks to draw further attention to this question - whether Iran can truly be regarded as an Islamic State - in order to ensure a deeper and more accurate under-standing of the Republic of Iran. The purpose of this paper is thus to investigate and re-flect on the theory of Islamic governance promoted by Ayatollah Khomeini and the politi-cal system of the Islamic Republic through the prism of Islamic history. The theory of the Islamic State and the Shia Islamic leadership has been and continues to be central in Aya-tollah Khomeini‟s and the Islamic Republic‟s official rhetoric, being claimed as the sole foundation of the „new‟ Iranian system. In consequence, this paper delves into the Islamic theory of State and the concept of the Imamate in order to critically analyze Ayatollah Khomeini‟s theory and the Islamic Republic. This is aimed at yielding a conclusion whether Iran is justly labeled an Islamic State.

By performing this norm-fulfilling analysis of the subject in question reliant on a qualitative data collection, the thesis has found that the correlation between the two theories of Islam-ic governance is one of considerable disputability. The paper has, based on the investigated material, been able to conclude that the Islamic Republic of Iran holds a political structure lent from non-Islamic sources, but that its personnel and political field of contest can still be considered Islamic. What the paper has thus revealed is that Khomeini‟s reasoning con-stitutes a novel and unique form of Islamic fundamentalism formed in conjuncture with political ideas of modern and non-Islamic nature. Hence, the results of the study suggests that the Islamic Republic of Iran is in need of serious reconsideration as the Iranian model of Islamic governance remains a source of contention because of the significant deviations from what it claims as its sole basis.

Den Islamiska Republiken Irans påstådda strävan att uppnå kärnvapen kapacitet har visat sig vara ett stort problem för det internationella samfundet, vilket har gett landet en bety-dande position i världspolitiken. Detta har i sin tur medfört att Iran återigen har fått värl-dens uppmärksamhet riktat mot sig, endast trettio år efter Ayatollah Khomeinis upprättan-de av den Islamiska Republiken. Irans statsskick, som uteslutet bygger på Ayatollah Kho-meinis egen tolkning av Islam, har länge stått i fokus för både offentlig och akademisk granskning, i synnerhet på grund av dess tillsynes radikala manövrar på den internationella scenen. Men eftersom fokuset för denna granskning har varit Irans ovilja att rätta sig efter västerländska normer så har frågan om Irans Islamiska natur förbisetts.

Utifrån detta så ämnar denna uppsats att uppmärksamma och belysa frågan om Iran verkli-gen kan betraktas som en islamisk stat, vilken är en nödvändighet för en djupare och mer korrekt förståelse av landet. Syftet med denna studie är således att undersöka och reflektera över teorin om Islamiskt styre som Ayatollah Khomeini främjar och hans senare republik genom att jämföra dessa med deras påstådda grundpelare: Islamisk statsteori och dess le-darskap. Islamisk statsteori och det shia Islamska ledarskapet har alltid varit centralt i Aya-tollah Khomeinis och den Islamiska Republikens officiella retorik, där de hävdas vara den enda inspirationen för Irans statsskick. Detta är dock något som denna uppsats ifrågasätter, och den har därav undersökt Islamisk statsteori och dess ledarskap för att i sin tur kritiskt granska Ayatollah Khomeinis teori och den Islamska Republiken Iran. Denna studie har därav gett upphov till en slutsats om Iran är rättvist märkt ‟en Islamisk stat‟.

Denna studie har genom att utföra en norm-uppfyllande analys av ämnet i fråga, vilande på en kvalitativ datainsamling, funnit endast en vag korrelation mellan de två modellerna för Islamiskt styre. Baserat på det undersökta materialet så har studien kunnat konstatera att Iran har en politisk struktur som lånats från icke-islamiska källor, men att dess aktörer och politiska ‟spel‟ trots det är av en islamisk natur. Vad som därav har påvisats i denna uppsats är att Ayatollah Khomeinis teori och stat utgör en ny och unik form av Islamisk fundamen-talism som skapats i konjunktur med moderna och icke-islamiska idéer. Resultaten av den-na undersökning indikerar på så vis att den Islamiska Republiken Iran är i behov av en om-prövning i förhållande till dess Islamiska natur, vilket är speciellt tydligt då Iran visar prov på betydande avvikelser från dess påstådda grundpelare.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD
The year 1924, which coincided with the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate and more recently, the Arab Spring which started in Tunisia in December 2010, and spread across much of north Africa and parts of the Middle East, has captured the attention of worldwide audiences, but also policy makers from the West to relook at the masses in the Muslim world as not politically acquiescent, even ignorant, but also, and more importantly as to which forms of government these regions would adopt, secular or Shari‘ah based (Islamic Law), or a combination of the two. The proposed research will examine and compare the views of the Shī‘i Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Egyptian Sunni intellectual and Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, Sayyid Quţb regarding the form of government and its source of authority. Both scholars agreed on the sovereignty of the Sharỉ‘ah. Khomeini stressed the centrality of the establishment of an Islamic government and the concept of Wilāyat al-faqīh in his book of Ḥukūmah al-Islamiyyah (Khomeini, undate). Therefore, Khomeini’s doctrine of Wilāyat al-faqīh argues that the government should be run in accordance with the Shari‘ah. For this to happen, a high-ranking cleric (Islamic jurist) should provide political guardianship over the people in the absence of and until the reappearance of the Hidden Imām. Sayyid Quţb stressed the establishment of an Islamic society before attempting to codify the Sharī‘ah (Quţb, 1981:76). His writing on politics and government does not lay out a comprehensive plan for Islamic governance. He does however; provide a foundation and three sub-principles that help determine its powers and structure. He declared that the foundation of Islamic political rule is Ulūhiyya (servitude) and Al-ḥākimiyya (sovereignty of Sharī‘ah) of Allah. This means that the Islamic government is the rule of God (Loboda, 2004: 25) Furthermore, Quţb, argues that Islam does not provide man with sovereignty, but Allah (God) is the only sovereign. In addition, he clarifies that an Islamic form of government itself is not divine as past Christian governments considered their kings to be divinely ordained. Instead, any rule with reference to Al-ḥākimiyya and based on three subprinciples is Islamic rule (Quţb, 1993). The three sub-principles for Islamic political rule indicated by Sayyid Quţb are as follows. Firstly, the rulers should be just. Secondly, the people should be obedient to the ruler as long as he submits to the sovereignty of Allah and implements the Sharī‘ah. Thirdly, there should be consultation between the rulers and the community. However Sayyid Quţb does not indicate a clear method of consultation between the ruler and the people. Instead, he leaves it up to the local conditions of the community. In the third principle, Quţb indicated that the importance of consultation encompasses the entire concept of Islamic rule and Muslim community life (Quţb, 1993:45). This means Sayyid Quţb "indirectly states that rulers should be elected by democratic vote" (Loboda. 2004:28).

The 1648 landmark signing of the Westphalian Treaties which famously implemented the principle of cuius regio, eius religio has, for International Relations (IR), meant that relatively little attention has been paid to religion as an influential force in international relations. A “turn to religion” amongst a growing body of IR scholars, fueled by post-Cold War studies and empirical events, has sought to change this by placing religion within the study of IR. With a view of adding to this debate, this thesis examines the role of religion in Israeli, Iranian and Saudi Arabian foreign policy during the respective leaderships of Menachem Begin (1977-84), Ayatollah Khomeini (1979-89) and Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1975-1995). It does so by drawing on extensive primary material, including private and public discourse of the leaders in question, as well as existing literature from, primarily, Middle East Studies and Religious Studies. The thesis argues, and shows with reference to its empirical findings, that the leaders’religious beliefs shaped their respective world-views and, by extension, their foreign policy doctrines and foreign policy outcomes. Moreover, it shows that religion played an important role in legitimizing the leaders themselves as well as their respective foreign policies. In this context, the thesis furthermore shows that, for the foreign policy leaders, religion assumed distinct meanings which were seemingly shaped according the context in which they operated. Importantly, the thesis argues, this does not uncritically support the long-standing assumption in IR scholarship that religion is epiphenomal, and/or a tool of instrumentalisation. With reference to Constructivist literature and a dynamic definition of religion developed for this project, the thesis rather explains that the malleable nature of religion can and does interact with variables like material security to shape, and sometimes drive, conceptualisations of national interest and foreign policy outcomes. The project concludes that religion’s role is multi-faceted, and, more to it, that the foreign policies of Khomeini’s Iran, Begin’s Israel and Fahd’s Saudi Arabia cannot be fully understood without it.

Le moins qu’on puisse dire est que l’Iran depuis la prise de pouvoir par les Ayatollahs en 1979 est un pays qui intéresse les hebdomadaires français et plus généralement les journalistes de notre pays. Une approche quantitative des articles consacrés à ce pays le prouve aisément. Mais il est particulièrement intéressant de constater que chacun des hebdomadaires français étudiés apporte une vision assez spécifique de ce qui caractérise l’Iran d’aujourd’hui. Toutefois, si la plupart des hebdomadaires sont d’accord pour reconnaître la complexité du problème iranien et de la société perse, "Valeurs Actuelles" par exemple va stigmatiser la barbarie du régime en place alors que"Courrier International", à l’inverse, va s’efforcer d’offrir un kaléidoscope d’opinions souvent contradictoires sur cette république islamique. De même, "Le Point" insiste sur la dangerosité de l’Iran d’aujourd’hui alors que "L’Express" met surtout l’accent sur les problèmes de nucléaire. "Marianne" pour sa part offre une étude équilibrée des problèmes tant internes qu’externes de l’Iran des Ayatollahs. En réalité, on peut constater un consensus des journalistes français spécialistes du monde persan sur le fait qu’en matière de politique intérieure, l’Iran ne cesse d’osciller entre démocratie et totalitarisme alors même que le pays semble avoir fait de la possession de l’arme nucléaire le futur point d’ancrage de sa politique extérieure à l’échelle internationale et de la sous-région
The least we can say is that Iran since the seizure of power by the Ayatollahs in 1979 is a country that interests French weekly magazines and journalists. A quantitative approach of the articles concerning this country proves this assertion easily. But it is particularly interesting to note that each of the French weekly magazines provides a fairly specific approach that characterizes today's Iran. Nevertheless most French magazines recognize the complexity of the problems of Iran and Persian society. However, Valeurs Actuelles stigmatizes the barbaric regime while Courrier International, conversely provides a kaleidoscope of rather conflicting opinions on this Islamic republic. Similarly, Le Point emphasizes the danger of Iran today while L'Express focuses primarily on nuclear issues. Marianne on the other hand offers a balanced study of both internal and external problems of this country ruled by Ayatollahs. In reality, there may be a consensus among French journalists who are specialists of the Persian world due to the fact that concerning its domestic policy Iran continues to oscillate between democracy and totalitarianism even though the country seems to consider the possession of nuclear weapons as the future anchor of its foreign policy and sub-regional diplomatic role

L’Iran a toujours été un pays important pour de multiples raisons. Sa position géostratégique l’a placé au croisement de trois mondes, slave, turc et arabe, et ses ressources naturelles sont convoitées par les pays occidentaux. Entre 1969 et 1979, l’Iran est devenu une puissance régionale et la France une puissance moyenne mondiale. Les rapports entre Paris et Téhéran, pendant cette durée, évoluent progressivement. Le pétrole iranien s’échange avec la technologie nucléaire et les produits agroalimentaire français. À compter de 1969, la France entre en compétition avec ses partenaires européens, américains et japonais pour bénéficier du fleurissant marché de consommation iranien ; d’autre part, elle résiste à l’invasion culturelle anglo-saxonne pour conserver son influence culturelle et linguistique traditionnelle en Iran, par une coopération culturelle multifacette. L’Iran promeut sa présence culturelle dans les milieux universitaires et artistiques en France. Bien que les années 1969-1979 prolongent quatre siècles de contacts bilatéraux, celles-ci sont également marquées par l’accueil de l’opposant politique au Shah, l’Ayatollah Khomeiny. Ce dernier a très adroitement profité de la liberté d’expression en France afin de mobiliser les Iraniens et renverser le régime impérial de Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, avec lequel le président Valéry Giscard d’Estaing avait tissé les meilleures relations. Après 1979, les rapports bilatéraux sont devenus complexes pendant trois décennies
Iran has always been an important country for many reasons. Its geostrategic position which has placed it at the crossroads of three worlds; Slavic, Turkish and Arab, and its natural resources, which covets the Western countries. During the period of our research Iran has become a regional power and France a world average power. Relations between Paris and Tehran over this period of time have been progressively evolving. Iranian oil traded with nuclear technology and French agrifood products. In the duration of our study, on the one hand France took offendive against its European, American and Japanese partners to benefit from the flourishing Iranian consumer market, on the other hand it had to resist in the face of Anglo-Saxon cultural invasions to maintain its traditional cultural and linguistic influence in Iran. It carried out the second task through a multi-faceted cultural cooperation. Iran, for its part, promoted its cultural presence in academic and artistic circles in France. Although the period from 1969 to 1979 was the extension of four centuries of bilateral contacts, it was a laps of time at the end of which France unwittingly welcomed the archi political opponent of the Shah of Iran ; Ayatollah Khomeini, who very cleverly took advantage of freedom of expression in France to mobilize the Iranians to overthrow the imperial regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, with whome President V. Giscard d'Estaing had established the best relations. After the 1979 Revolution, the calm river of bilateral relations transformed into a tumultuous obscure river, dangerously navigable for the diplomats of the two countries, at least for three decades

Depuis la révolution iranienne de 1979, la diplomatie du régime en place semble marquer une rupture avec un anti-occidentalisme affiché –l’affrontement sous forme de guerre asymétrique avec les USA-, un antisionisme déclaré-les déclarations du Président Ahmadinejad- et le réveil de la vieille rivalité arabo-musulmane –Guerre Iran/Irak et perturbations par des fidèles iraniens du pèlerinage de la Mecque. Des moyens conventionnels et non conventionnel sont employés, du terrorisme avec de nombreux attentats, au pan chiisme avec l’utilisation à des fins politiques de communautés chiites dans les pays du Golfe, en passant par le chantage de la fermeture du détroit d’Ormuz où transitent près de 40 % du pétrole de la planète. Pourtant, cette attitude, si ambiguë et si violente par certains égards, semble n’est que le reflet de la continuité diplomatique, au regard de l’histoire de cette antique civilisation. La peur de l’éclatement interne, comme d’ailleurs celle des pays limitrophes, ont poussé ce pays depuis des millénaires à adopter une diplomatie de l’équilibre, dans une sorte de diplomatie des 4 points cardinaux. De plus, la Perse puis l’Iran a toujours possédé un désir hégémonique régional au niveau du Golfe persique, désir qui s’est traduit par de nombreuses guerres avec ses voisins, notamment avec l’ex Mésopotamie- L’Irak. Cela s’est traduit par la recherche d’une armée puissante, le nucléaire n’étant qu’un moyen pour affirmer sa grandeur ou diplomatie de la synthèse. Les négociations actuelles placent la République islamique d’Iran au centre du grand jeu asiatique où s’affrontent deux supers puissance en devenir, l’Inde et la Chine. Offrir la possibilité à l’Iran d’être reconnu comme un acteur civil du nucléaire la positionne comme une référence vis-à-vis des pays arabes : l’Iran devient , de facto , hégémonique Les ruptures ne sont en fait que des continuités liées aux valeurs perses, fondées sur l’indépendance, le désir de briller et de dominer. L’histoire, la religion, et l’Iranité sont la source de ces valeurs identitaires, terreau et fondement de la diplomatie de la République islamique d’Iran
Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the diplomacy of the regime seems to mark a break with an anti-Westernism -l'affrontement displayed in the form of asymmetric war with the USA-a-Zionism declared presidential statements and waking Ahmadinejad- the old Arab-Muslim rivalry -Guerre Iran / Iraq and disturbances by Iranian faithful pilgrimage to Mecca. Conventional and non-conventional means are employed, with many terrorist attacks in Shia pan with the use for political purposes Shiite communities in the Gulf, through blackmail closing the Strait of Hormuz where handling approximately 40% of the oil on the planet. Yet this attitude, so ambiguous and so violent in some ways seem is but a reflection of the diplomatic continuity, in terms of the history of this ancient civilization. Fear of the internal breakdown, as also that of neighboring countries has driven this country for thousands of years to adopt a diplomacy of balance, in a kind of diplomacy 4 cardinal points. Furthermore, Persia and Iran has always had a regional hegemonic desire in the Persian Gulf, a desire that has led many wars with its neighbors, including the former Mésopotamie- Iraq. This was reflected by the search of a powerful army, nuclear being a means to assert its size or diplomacy synthesis. The current negotiations put the Islamic Republic of Iran at the center of the great Asian game where two great power clash in the making, India and China. Provide an opportunity for Iran to be recognized as a civil nuclear player in the position as vis-à-vis the reference of Arab countries: Iran becomes de facto hegemonic Ruptures are in fact only continuities related to Persian values, based on independence, the desire to shine and dominate. The history, religion, and Iranianness are the source of these identity values, soil and foundation of the diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

This thesis delineates the transformation of Iran’s so-called post-revolutionary ‘religious intellectuals’ (rowshanfekran-e dini) from ideological legitimators within the political class of the newly-established theocratic-populist regime to internal critics whose revised vision for the politico-religious order coalesced and converged with the growing disillusionment and frustration of the ‘Islamic left’, a constellation of political forces within the governing elite of the Islamic Republic, that following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini increasingly felt itself marginalised and on the outskirts of power. The historical evolution of this complex, quasi-institutionalised and routinized network, encompassing theologians, jurists, political strategists and journalists, which rose to prominence in the course of the 1990s, and its critical engagement with the ruling political theology of the ‘guardianship of the jurist’, the supremacy of Islamic jurisprudence, political Islamism and all forms of ‘revolutionary’ and ‘utopian’ political and social transformation, are scrutinised in detail. In this vein, the thesis examines the various issues provoked by the rowshanfekran-e dini’s strategic deployment and translation of the concepts and ideas of a number of Western thinkers, several of which played a pivotal role in the assault on the ideological foundations of Soviet-style communism in the 1950s and 1960s. It then moves to show how this network of intellectuals and politicos following the election of Mohammad Khatami to the presidency in May 1997 sought to disseminate their ideas at the popular level by means of the press and numerous party and political periodicals, and thereby achieve ideological and political hegemony. The thesis proceeds to demonstrate the intimate connection between the project of ‘religious intellectualism’ and elite-defined notions of ‘democracy’, ‘electoral participation’, ‘reform’ and ‘political development’ as part of an effort to accumulate symbolic capital and assert their intellectual and moral leadership of the polity.