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Journal articles on the topic 'Barriers and incentives'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 16 February 2022

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1

Tenopir, Carol, Carole L. Palmer, Lisa Metzer, Jeffrey van der Hoeven, and Jim Malone. "Sharing data: Practices, barriers, and incentives." Proceedings of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 48, no. 1 (2011): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/meet.2011.14504801026.

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Beamish, Julia O., and Rosemary Carucci Goss. "Introduction Rural Housing: Barriers and Incentives." Housing and Society 21, no. 1 (January 1994): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08882746.1994.11430179.

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Schneckenberg, Dirk. "Strategic Incentive Systems For Open Innovation." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 30, no. 1 (December 30, 2013): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v30i1.8283.

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<p class="AbsKeyBibli">Our paper presents a cross-sectional study of incentive systems for open innovation practices. Organisations face the challenge to design and implement strategic incentive systems which reward active contributions of individuals to open innovation practices. We refer to contributions from psychology and economics to develop a framework for organisational incentive systems. We have conducted semi-structured interviews with 10 experts in Germany and the Netherlands. The experts work in firms which are both international top players and open innovation pioneers in their respective industries. The results show that all organisations in the sample develop incentives for open innovation. The key strategic function of incentive systems is to open mind-sets of the workforce and to overcome mental barriers of the 'not invented here' syndrome. Immaterial and in particular task content incentives have been judged to have a more efficient long-term impact than material incentives. While experts have emphasised the importance of aligning incentives systems to open innovation strategies, in practice many incentive approaches still remain patchwork and lack a clear strategic focus.</p>

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Lobo, Félix, and Isabel Río-Álvarez. "Barriers to Biosimilar Prescribing Incentives in the Context of Clinical Governance in Spain." Pharmaceuticals 14, no. 3 (March 22, 2021): 283. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ph14030283.

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Incentives contribute to the proper functioning of the broader contracts that regulate the relationships between health systems and professionals. Likewise, incentives are an important element of clinical governance understood as health services’ management at the micro-level, aimed at achieving better health outcomes for patients. In Spain, monetary and non-monetary incentives are sometimes used in the health services, but not as frequently as in other countries. There are already several examples in European countries of initiatives searching the promotion of biosimilars through different sorts of incentives, but not in Spain. Hence, this paper is aimed at identifying the barriers that incentives to prescribe biosimilars might encounter in Spain, with particular interest in incentives in the framework of clinical governance. Both questions are intertwined. Barriers are presented from two perspectives. Firstly, based on the nature of the barrier: (i) the payment system for health professionals, (ii) budget rigidity and excessive bureaucracy, (iii) little autonomy in the management of human resources (iv) lack of clinical integration, (v) absence of a legal framework for clinical governance, and (vi) other governance-related barriers. The second perspective is based on the stakeholders involved: (i) gaps in knowledge among physicians, (ii) misinformation and distrust among patients, (iii) trade unions opposition to productivity-related payments, (iv) lack of a clear position by professional associations, and (v) misalignment of the goals pursued by some healthcare professionals and the goals of the public system. Finally, the authors advance several recommendations to overcome these barriers at the national level.

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Brubacher, J. R., C. Renschler, A. M. Gomez, B. Huang, W. C. Lee, S. Erdelyi, H. Chan, and R. Purssell. "P022: Physician reporting of medically unfit drivers: barriers and incentives." CJEM 19, S1 (May 2017): S85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cem.2017.224.

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Introduction: Most medically unfit drivers are not reported to licensing authorities. In BC, physicians are only obligated to report unfit drivers who continue to drive after being warned to stop. This study investigates barriers to and incentives for physician reporting of medically unfit drivers. Methods: We used an online survey to study physician-reported barriers to reporting medically unfit drivers and their idea of incentives that would improve reporting. Email invitations to participate in the survey were sent to all physicians in BC through DoctorsofBC and to all emergency physicians (EPs) in the UBC Department of Emergency Medicine. Results: We received responses from 242 physicians (47% EPs, 40% GPs, 13% others). The most common barrier to reporting was not knowing which unfit drivers continue to drive (79% of respondents). Other barriers included lack of time (51%), lack of knowledge of the process, guidelines, or legal requirement for reporting (51%, 50%, 45% respectively), fearing loss of rapport with patients (48%), pressure from patients not to report (34%), lack of remuneration (27%), and pressure from family members not to report (25%).EPs were significantly less likely than other physicians to cite loss of rapport, pressure from patients, or pressure from family as barriers, but more likely to cite not being aware of drivers who continue to drive after being warned, lack of knowledge (regarding legal requirements to report, guidelines for determining fitness, and the reporting process), and lack of time. Factors that would increase reporting unfit drivers included better understanding of criteria for fitness to drive (70%), more information regarding how to report (67%), more information on when to report (65%), and compensation (43%).Free text comments from respondents identified other barriers/incentives. Reporting might be simplified by telephone hotlines or allowing physician designates to report. Physicians feared legal liability and suggested the need for better medico-legal protection. Loss of patient rapport might be minimized by public education. Failure of response from licensing authorities to a report (long wait times, lack of feedback to physician) was seen as a barrier to reporting. Conclusion: We identified barriers to physician reporting of medically unfit drivers and incentives that might increase reporting. This information could inform programs aiming to improve reporting of unfit drivers.

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Skokova, Liudmyla. "Cultural participation in Ukraine: barriers and incentives." Ukrainian society 2018, no. 2 (July 10, 2018): 66–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/socium2018.02.066.

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Duffy, Marie T., Mary Ann Friesen, Karen Gabel Speroni, Diane Swengros, Laura A. Shanks, Pamela A. Waiter, and Michael J. Sheridan. "BSN Completion Barriers, Challenges, Incentives, and Strategies." JONA: The Journal of Nursing Administration 44, no. 4 (April 2014): 232–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/nna.0000000000000054.

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8

Buchanan, Robert A. "Library Assistant Training: Perceptions, Incentives, and Barriers." Journal of Academic Librarianship 31, no. 5 (September 2005): 421–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.acalib.2005.05.003.

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Wymer, Scott, and Elizabeth A. Regan. "Influential Factors in the Adoption and Use of E-Business and E-Commerce Information Technology (EEIT) by Small & Medium Businesses." Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations 9, no. 1 (January 2011): 56–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jeco.2011010104.

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This study addresses factors commonly examined in the research concerning adoption and use of e-business and e-commerce information technology (EEIT) by small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The primary objectives are to determine: 1) what barriers and incentives SMEs perceive in adopting EEIT; 2) how the level of adoption of EEIT influences perceptions of incentives and barriers; and 3) whether results vary depending on demographic characteristics of size, geographic market scope, or industry sector. This paper also examines how homogenous SMEs’ perceptions are in their consideration of EEIT adoption factors. Data were collected from 290 U.S. SMEs. The findings revealed that among 25 factors identified in the research literature as incentives or barriers to adoption of EEIT by SMEs, only 16 factors were significant in the population studied, 12 as incentives and four as barriers. Factors were perceived differently as incentives or barriers by adopters, intended adopters, and non-adopters of EEIT. A number of differences were found among SMEs based on demographic characteristics, particularly size and industry-sector.

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Årdal, Christine, Yohann Lacotte, Suzanne Edwards, and Marie-Cécile Ploy. "National Facilitators and Barriers to the Implementation of Incentives for Antibiotic Access and Innovation." Antibiotics 10, no. 6 (June 21, 2021): 749. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/antibiotics10060749.

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Prominent reports have assessed the challenges to antibiotic innovation and recommended implementing “pull” incentives, i.e., mechanisms that give increased and predictable revenues for important, marketed antibiotics. We set out to understand countries’ perceptions of these recommendations, through frank and anonymous dialogue. In 2019 and 2020, we performed in-depth interviews with national policymakers and antibiotic resistance experts in 13 countries (ten European countries and three non-European) for a total of 73 individuals in 27 separate interviews. Interviewees expressed high-level support for antibiotic incentives in 11 of 13 countries. There is recognition that new economic incentives are needed to maintain a reliable supply to essential antibiotics. However, most countries are uncertain which incentives may be appropriate for their country, which antibiotics should be included, how to implement incentives, and how much it will cost. There is a preference for a multinational incentive, so long as it is independent of national pricing, procurement, and reimbursement processes. Nine countries indicated a preference for a model that ensures access to both existing and new antibiotics, with the highest priority for existing antibiotics. Twelve of thirteen countries indicated that shortages of existing antibiotics is a serious problem. Since countries are skeptical about the public health value of many recently approved antibiotics, there is a mismatch regarding revenue expectations between policymakers and antibiotic innovators. This paper presents important considerations for the design and implementation of antibiotic pull mechanisms. We also propose a multinational model that appears to match the needs of both countries and innovators.

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Shay, L. Aubree, Kilian J. Kimbel, Caitlin N. Dorsey, Leslie C. Jauregui, Sally W. Vernon, Jeffrey T. Kullgren, and Beverly B. Green. "Patients’ Reactions to Being Offered Financial Incentives to Increase Colorectal Screening: A Qualitative Analysis." American Journal of Health Promotion 35, no. 3 (January 28, 2021): 421–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0890117120987836.

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Purpose: To explore financial incentives as an intervention to improve colorectal cancer screening (CRCS) adherence among traditionally disadvantaged patients who have never been screened or are overdue for screening. Approach: We used qualitative methods to describe patients’ attitudes toward the offer of incentives, plans for future screening, and additional barriers and facilitators to CRCS. Setting: Kaiser Permanente Washington (KPWA). Participants: KPWA patients who were due or overdue for CRCS. Method: We conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with 37 patients who were randomized to 1 of 2 incentives (guaranteed $10 or a lottery for $50) to complete CRCS. Interview transcripts were analyzed using a qualitative content approach. Results: Patients generally had positive attitudes toward both types of incentives, however, half did not recall the incentive offer at the time of the interview. Among those who recalled the offer, 95% were screened compared to only 25% among those who did not remember the offer. Most screeners stated that staying healthy was their primary motivator for screening, but many suggested that the incentive helped them prioritize and complete screening. Conclusions: Incentives to complete CRCS may help motivate patients who would like to screen but have previously procrastinated. Future studies should ensure that the incentive offer is noticeable and shorten the deadline for completion of FIT screening.

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Atkin, David, Azam Chaudhry, Shamyla Chaudry, Amit K. Khandelwal, and Eric Verhoogen. "Organizational Barriers to Technology Adoption: Evidence from Soccer-Ball Producers in Pakistan*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 132, no. 3 (March 9, 2017): 1101–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx010.

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Abstract This article studies technology adoption in a cluster of soccer-ball producers in Sialkot, Pakistan. We invented a new cutting technology that reduces waste of the primary raw material and gave the technology to a random subset of producers. Despite the clear net benefits for nearly all firms, after 15 months take-up remained puzzlingly low. We hypothesize that an important reason for the lack of adoption is a misalignment of incentives within firms: the key employees (cutters and printers) are typically paid piece rates, with no incentive to reduce waste, and the new technology slows them down, at least initially. Fearing reductions in their effective wage, employees resist adoption in various ways, including by misinforming owners about the value of the technology. To investigate this hypothesis, we implemented a second experiment among the firms that originally received the technology: we offered one cutter and one printer per firm a lump-sum payment, approximately a month’s earnings, conditional on demonstrating competence in using the technology in the presence of the owner. This incentive payment, small from the point of view of the firm, had a significant positive effect on adoption. The results suggest that misalignment of incentives within firms is an important barrier to technology adoption in our setting.

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Li, Wenbo, Muyi Yang, and Suwin Sandu. "Electric vehicles in China: A review of current policies." Energy & Environment 29, no. 8 (June 12, 2018): 1512–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0958305x18781898.

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Prompted by the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the transport sector, the Chinese government has set ambitious targets for the uptake of electric vehicles. To achieve these targets is however a challenging task, due to various barriers in the uptake of electric vehicles, at both micro- and macro-levels. A range of monetary and non-monetary incentives has been implemented, or being considered for implementation, to overcome these barriers. This paper reviews these incentives with a view to assess the extent to which they are likely to remove the barriers in the uptake of electric vehicles. The review suggests that the primary focus of these incentives is to remove the micro-level barriers, such as high upfront costs, poor technical performance, and insufficient charging infrastructure. Limited attention has been paid to the macro-level barriers (for example, fragmented authority and local protectionism), despite ample evidence suggesting that these barriers could significantly impede the uptake of electric vehicles. Further, these incentives have tended to rely on regulation-based measures to remove the barriers. Only in the recent years, there appears to be a gradual shift towards market-based measures. This shift could improve the effectiveness of electric vehicle policies. The effectiveness of these policies could be enhanced if one recognizes the underlying macro-level barriers that are likely to protract or distort the implementation of market-based measures. This paper also provides some recommendations to remove these macro-level barriers.

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Washio, Yukiko. "Incentive Use for Improving Maternal Health: Perspective From Behavioral Science." Psychological Reports 121, no. 1 (July 14, 2017): 42–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0033294117720937.

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Incentive use to improve maternal health behavior has been controversial, and guidelines to effectively design and implement such an intervention have been published. This commentary briefly describes a perspective from behavioral science for the existing guideline on the development of an incentive-based intervention to change maternal health behaviors. It is recommended to emphasize the saliency of incentives as an important variable to maintain the intervention effect while addressing barriers to feasibility and sustainability.

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Lindblad, Anne S., Pam Zingeser, and Nil Sismanyazici-Navaie. "Incentives and barriers to neurological clinical research participation." Clinical Investigation 1, no. 12 (December 2011): 1663–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.4155/cli.11.153.

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Webb, Judith, Ruth Palan Lopez, and A. J. Guarino. "Incentives and Barriers to Precepting Nurse Practitioner Students." Journal for Nurse Practitioners 11, no. 8 (September 2015): 782–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nurpra.2015.06.003.

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Sabagh, Zaynab, and Alenoush Saroyan. "Professors' Perceived Barriers and Incentives for Teaching Improvement." International Education Research 2, no. 3 (September 28, 2014): 18–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.12735/ier.v2i3p18.

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Beatty, Kate E., Jeffrey Mayer, Michael Elliott, Ross C. Brownson, Safina Abdulloeva, and Kathleen Wojciehowski. "Barriers and Incentives to Rural Health Department Accreditation." Journal of Public Health Management and Practice 22, no. 2 (2016): 138–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/phh.0000000000000264.

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Petrun, Elizabeth L., Irina Iles, Holly Roberts, Brooke Fisher Liu, and Gary Ackerman. "Diffusing Controversial Technology: Barriers, Incentives, and Lessons Learned." Review of Communication 15, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 140–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15358593.2015.1058410.

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Reinsberger, Kathrin, and Alfred Posch. "Bottom-up Initiatives for Photovoltaic: Incentives and Barriers." Journal of Sustainable Development of Energy, Water and Environment Systems 2, no. 2 (June 2014): 108–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.13044/j.sdewes.2014.02.0010.

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Alit, Rus. "Barriers and incentives: Experience of small scale developments." Solar & Wind Technology 7, no. 1 (January 1990): 93–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0741-983x(90)90019-x.

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Judah, Gaby, Ara Darzi, Ivo Vlaev, Laura Gunn, Derek King, Dominic King, Jonathan Valabhji, et al. "Incentives in Diabetic Eye Assessment by Screening (IDEAS) trial: a three-armed randomised controlled trial of financial incentives." Health Services and Delivery Research 5, no. 15 (March 2017): 1–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.3310/hsdr05150.

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BackgroundThe UK national diabetic eye screening (DES) programme invites diabetic patients aged > 12 years annually. Simple and cost-effective methods are needed to increase screening uptake. This trial tests the impact on uptake of two financial incentive schemes, based on behavioural economic principles.ObjectivesTo test whether or not financial incentives encourage screening attendance. Secondarily to understand if the type of financial incentive scheme used affects screening uptake or attracts patients with a different sociodemographic status to regular attenders. If financial incentives were found to improve attendance, then a final objective was to test cost-effectiveness.DesignThree-armed randomised controlled trial.SettingDES clinic within St Mary’s Hospital, London, covering patients from the areas of Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster.ParticipantsPatients aged ≥ 16 years, who had not attended their DES appointment for ≥ 2 years.Interventions(1) Fixed incentive – invitation letter and £10 for attending screening; (2) probabilistic (lottery) incentive – invitation letter and 1% chance of winning £1000 for attending screening; and (3) control – invitation letter only.Main outcome measuresThe primary outcome was screening attendance. Rates for control versus fixed and lottery incentive groups were compared using relative risk (RR) and risk difference with corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CIs).ResultsA total of 1274 patients were eligible and randomised; 223 patients became ineligible before invite and 1051 participants were invited (control,n = 435; fixed group,n = 312; lottery group,n = 304). Thirty-four (7.8%, 95% CI 5.29% to 10.34%) control, 17 (5.5%, 95% CI 2.93% to 7.97%) fixed group and 10 (3.3%, 95% CI 1.28% to 5.29%) lottery group participants attended. Participants offered incentives were 44% less likely to attend screening than controls (RR 0.56, 95% CI 0.34 to 0.92). Examining incentive groups separately, the lottery group were 58% less likely to attend screening than controls (RR 0.42, 95% CI 0.18 to 0.98). No significant differences were found between fixed incentive and control groups (RR 0.70, 95% CI 0.35 to 1.39) or between fixed and lottery incentive groups (RR 1.66, 95% CI 0.65 to 4.21). Subgroup analyses showed no significant associations between attendance and sociodemographic factors, including gender (female vs. male, RR 1.25, 95% CI 0.77 to 2.03), age (≤ 65 years vs. > 65 years, RR 1.26, 95% CI 0.77 to 2.08), deprivation [0–20 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) decile vs. 30–100 IMD decile, RR 1.12, 95% CI 0.69 to 1.83], years registered [mean difference (MD) –0.13, 95% CI –0.69 to 0.43], and distance from screening location (MD –0.18, 95% CI –0.65 to 0.29).LimitationsDespite verification, some address details may have been outdated, and high ethnic diversity may have resulted in language barriers for participants.ConclusionsThose receiving incentives were not more likely to attend a DES than those receiving a usual invitation letter in patients who are regular non-attenders. Both fixed and lottery incentives appeared to reduce attendance. Overall, there is no evidence to support the use of financial incentives to promote diabetic retinopathy screening. Testing interventions in context, even if they appear to be supported by theory, is important.Future workFuture research, specifically in this area, should focus on identifying barriers to screening and other non-financial methods to overcome them.Trial registrationCurrent Controlled Trials ISRCTN14896403.FundingThis project was funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Services and Delivery Research programme and will be published in full inHealth Services and Delivery Research; Vol. 5, No. 15. See the NIHR Journals Library website for further project information.

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Birkeland, Janis. "Challenging policy barriers in sustainable urban design." Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series 40, no. 40 (June 1, 2018): 41–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/bog-2018-0013.

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AbstractIn built environment design, codes set minimum health and safety requirements, policies set aspirational targets, and incentives such as green building rating schemes set design standards. These approaches have failed to provide universal well-being and environmental justice (i.e. intra-generational equity), or increases in the natural life-support system that exceed depletion rates (i.e. inter- generational equity). Governments that do not ensure all citizens can obtain basic needs, life quality and resource security fail to meet their basic responsibilities. Two recent documents, one representing sustainable urban policy and principles, the other representing urban biodiversity standards, are examined against the Positive Development Test (whether the development increases the public estate, ecological base and future public options). The discussion suggests that contemporary policies and incentive schemes, as presently conceived, cannot provide the basic physical preconditions for sustainability, let alone address socio-economic inequities. An alternative design-based approach is presented to address the issues the paper identified.

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Jaffee, Lynn, Judy Mahle Lutter, Jeanna Rex, Catherine Hawkes, and Patricia Bucaccio. "Incentives and Barriers to Physical Activity for Working Women." American Journal of Health Promotion 13, no. 4 (March 1999): 215–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.4278/0890-1171-13.4.215.

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Spotts, Thomas H., and Mary Ann Bowman. "Increasing Faculty Use of Instructional Technology: Barriers and Incentives." Educational Media International 30, no. 4 (December 1993): 199–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0952398930300403.

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Sweaney, Anne L., Kelly S. Manley, Jorge H. Atiles, Douglas C. Bachtel, Brenda J. Cude, Mick G. Ragsdale, Thomas F. Rodgers, Karen L. Tinsley, Janet S. Valente, and Gladys G. Shelton. "Rural Workforce Housing: Perceived Barriers and Incentives for Development." Housing and Society 31, no. 1 (January 2004): 15–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08882746.2004.11430495.

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Ergibi, Mohamed, and Hayley Hesseln. "Awareness and adoption of FireSmart Canada: Barriers and incentives." Forest Policy and Economics 119 (October 2020): 102271. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2020.102271.

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Hudson, Heather E. "Barriers and incentives to telecommunications investment in developing countries." Telematics and Informatics 4, no. 2 (January 1987): 99–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0736-5853(87)90002-5.

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Burszta-Adamiak, Ewa, and Wiesław Fiałkiewicz. "A review of green roof incentives as motivators for the expansion of green infrastructure in European cities." Przegląd Naukowy Inżynieria i Kształtowanie Środowiska 28, no. 4 (December 29, 2019): 641–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.22630/pniks.2019.28.4.58.

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Nowadays green roofs play a key role in alleviating the negative effects of urbanization. Despite investors awareness of the advantages of green roofs, there are still some barriers that hinder investments on a large scale. As a result a financial and non-financial incentives are implemented. The review presented in this paper allowed to identify the most popular initiatives and to formulate recommendations for creating incentive supporting implementation of green roofs in urban areas.

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Cheung, Kei Long, Silvia M. A. A. Evers, Hein de Vries, and Mickaël Hiligsmann. "MOST IMPORTANT BARRIERS AND FACILITATORS REGARDING THE USE OF HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT." International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 33, no. 2 (2017): 183–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266462317000290.

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Objectives: Several studies have reported multiple barriers to and facilitators for the uptake of health technology assessment (HTA) information by policy makers. This study elicited, using best-worst scaling (BWS), the most important barriers and facilitators and their relative weight in the use of HTA by policy makers.Methods: Two BWS object case surveys (one for barriers, one for facilitators) were conducted among sixteen policy makers and thirty-three HTA experts in the Netherlands. A list of twenty-two barriers and nineteen facilitators was included. In each choice task, participants were asked to choose the most important and the least important barrier/facilitator from a set of five. We used Hierarchical Bayes modeling to generate the mean relative importance score (RIS) for each factor and a subgroup analysis was conducted to assess differences between policy makers and HTA experts.Results: The five most important barriers (RIS > 6.00) were “no explicit framework for decision-making process,” “insufficient support by stakeholders,” “lack of support,” “limited generalizability,” and “absence of appropriate incentives.” The six most important facilitators were: “availability of explicit framework for decision making,” “sufficient support by stakeholders,” “appropriate incentives,” “sufficient quality,” “sufficient awareness,” and “sufficient support within the organization.” Overall, perceptions did not differ markedly between policy makers and HTA experts.Conclusions: Our study suggests that barriers and facilitators related to “policy characteristics” and “organization and resources” were particularly important. It is important to stimulate a pulse at the national level to create an explicit framework for including HTA in the decision-making context.

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Kerr, William A., Laura J. Loppacher, and Richard R. Barichello. "Disease Management, Economic Incentives and Trade." Outlook on Agriculture 38, no. 3 (September 2009): 259–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5367/000000009789396847.

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Barriers to trade can be imposed if a threat of importing a disease exists. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures have historically been applied on a national basis, even though regions in an exporting country may have very different disease profiles. The World Trade Organization's 1995 Agreement on SPS Measures included a provision for exports from disease-free subnational areas. Regionalization has been explored in depth by many countries from a scientific disease control perspective, but not from an economic perspective, and negotiations have been exclusively science-focused. As yet, little progress has been made towards correcting this provision. This article examines the question of creating a sustainable subnational disease-free area approved for export from an economic perspective. The analysis shows that there may be significant benefits from applying regionalization to international trade, but these benefits are not guaranteed. Recognition of economic incentives provides the key to creating sustainable disease-free subnational regions. In particular, removing the incentive to smuggle between regions is an essential requirement of an exporter's domestic policy. Economic incentives have largely been ignored both by the responsible domestic agencies and by international negotiators, but until the question of economic incentives is included in the international agenda, little progress can be expected.

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Johnson, Matthew, Liz Cross, Nick Sandison, Jamie Stevenson, Thomas Monks, and Michael Moore. "Funding and policy incentives to encourage implementation of point-of-care C-reactive protein testing for lower respiratory tract infection in NHS primary care: a mixed-methods evaluation." BMJ Open 8, no. 10 (October 2018): e024558. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024558.

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ObjectivesUtilisation of point-of-care C-reactive protein testing for lower respiratory tract infection has been limited in UK primary care, with costs and funding suggested as important barriers. We aimed to use existing National Health Service funding and policy mechanisms to alleviate these barriers and engage with clinicians and healthcare commissioners to encourage implementation.DesignA mixed-methods study design was adopted, including a qualitative survey to identify clinicians’ and commissioners’ perceived benefits, barriers and enablers post-implementation, and quantitative analysis of results from a real-world implementation study.InterventionsWe developed a funding specification to underpin local reimbursement of general practices for test delivery based on an item of service payment. We also created training and administrative materials to facilitate implementation by reducing organisational burden. The implementation study provided intervention sites with a testing device and supplies, training and practical assistance.ResultsDespite engagement with several groups, implementation and uptake of our funding specification were limited. Survey respondents confirmed costs and funding as important barriers in addition to physical and operational constraints and cited training and the value of a local champion as enablers.ConclusionsAlthough survey respondents highlighted the clinical benefits, funding remains a barrier to implementation in UK primary care and appears not to be alleviated by the existing financial incentives available to commissioners. The potential to meet incentive targets using lower cost methods, a lack of policy consistency or competing financial pressures and commissioning programmes may be important determinants of local priorities. An implementation champion could help to catalyse support and overcome operational barriers at the local level, but widespread implementation is likely to require national policy change. Successful implementation may reproduce antibiotic prescribing reductions observed in research studies.

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Mansfield, Edward D., and Marc L. Busch. "The political economy of nontariff barriers: a cross-national analysis." International Organization 49, no. 4 (1995): 723–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300028496.

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Nontariff barriers to trade are most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups, when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection, and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives. Statistical results based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s support the argument that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge. More attention should be devoted to the interaction between societal and statist factors in cross-national studies of trade policy.

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Boloori, Alireza, Bengt B. Arnetz, Frederi Viens, Taps Maiti, and Judith E. Arnetz. "Misalignment of Stakeholder Incentives in the Opioid Crisis." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 20 (October 16, 2020): 7535. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17207535.

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The current opioid epidemic has killed more than 446,000 Americans over the past two decades. Despite the magnitude of the crisis, little is known to what degree the misalignment of incentives among stakeholders due to competing interests has contributed to the current situation. In this study, we explore evidence in the literature for the working hypothesis that misalignment rooted in the cost, quality, or access to care can be a significant contributor to the opioid epidemic. The review identified several problems that can contribute to incentive misalignment by compromising the triple aims (cost, quality, and access) in this epidemic. Some of these issues include the inefficacy of conventional payment mechanisms in providing incentives for providers, practice guidelines in pain management that are not easily implementable across different medical specialties, barriers in adopting multi-modal pain management strategies, low capacity of providers/treatments to address opioid/substance use disorders, the complexity of addressing the co-occurrence of chronic pain and opioid use disorders, and patients’ non-adherence to opioid substitution treatments. In discussing these issues, we also shed light on factors that can facilitate the alignment of incentives among stakeholders to effectively address the current crisis.

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Teachout, David J. "Incentives and Barriers for Potential Music Teacher Education Doctoral Students." Journal of Research in Music Education 52, no. 3 (2004): 234. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3345857.

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Carter, Timothy. "Developing conservation subdivisions: Ecological constraints, regulatory barriers, and market incentives." Landscape and Urban Planning 92, no. 2 (September 2009): 117–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2009.03.004.

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Moffatt, Jenny, Rosemary Whip, and Jenny Moffatt. "The Struggle to Quit: Barriers and Incentives to Smoking Cessation." Health Education Journal 63, no. 2 (June 2004): 101–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001789690406300202.

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Hogan, H., I. Basnett, and M. McKee. "Consultants’ attitudes to clinical governance: Barriers and incentives to engagement." Public Health 121, no. 8 (August 2007): 614–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2006.12.013.

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Siikamäki, Juha, and Kris Wernstedt. "Turning Brownfields into Greenspaces: Examining Incentives and Barriers to Revitalization." Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 33, no. 3 (May 9, 2008): 559–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/03616878-2008-008.

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Jones, Helen, and Andrea Cipriani. "Barriers and incentives to recruitment in mental health clinical trials." Evidence Based Mental Health 22, no. 2 (April 25, 2019): 49–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/ebmental-2019-300090.

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Bateganya, M., A. Hagopian, P. Tavrow, S. Luboga, and S. Barnhart. "Incentives and barriers to implementing national hospital standards in Uganda." International Journal for Quality in Health Care 21, no. 6 (September 30, 2009): 421–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/intqhc/mzp044.

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BUTTERWORTH, D. "Changes in Heat Exchangers for Process Applications: Incentives and Barriers." Heat Transfer Engineering 8, no. 4 (January 1987): 19–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01457638708962811.

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Carree, Martin, and Roy Thurik. "Entry and exit in retailing: Incentives, barriers, displacement and replacement." Review of Industrial Organization 11, no. 2 (April 1996): 155–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00157664.

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Shivdasani, Anil, and Wei-Ling Song. "Breaking down the barriers: Competition, syndicate structure, and underwriting incentives☆." Journal of Financial Economics 99, no. 3 (March 2011): 581–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.09.006.

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Ramaseshan, B., and Geoffrey N. Soutar. "Combined effects of incentives and barriers on firms' export decisions." International Business Review 5, no. 1 (February 1996): 53–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0969-5931(95)00032-1.

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Griffith, R. Stephen, and Paul A. Williams. "BARRIERS AND INCENTIVES OF PHYSICIANS AND PATIENTS TO CANCER SCREENING." Primary Care: Clinics in Office Practice 19, no. 3 (September 1992): 535–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0095-4543(21)00937-4.

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Thornton, Gareth, Paul Nathanail, and Bernard Vanheusden. "Are Incentives for Brownfield Regeneration Sustainable? A Comparative Survey." Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law 2, no. 5 (2005): 350–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187601005x00363.

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AbstractReusing brownfields for new purposes is frequently not enabled by the economic, environmental and social barriers present at the site. Therefore, the European Commission and its Member States try to intervene by using different financial and legal incentives. This contribution presents the existing incentives on European Union level, in Germany, the UK, and Belgium, discusses the effects and gaps, and makes suggestions for more effective instruments for the promotion of sustainable brownfield regeneration. The European incentives are compared to the existing financial and legal incentives in the US.

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Mello, Michelle M. "Barriers to Ensuring Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs." Annual Review of Pharmacology and Toxicology 60, no. 1 (January 6, 2020): 275–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-pharmtox-010919-023518.

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High and rising prescription drug costs have become a preoccupying policy problem in the United States. Notwithstanding broad, bipartisan interest in finding effective policy solutions, several aspects of the drug affordability problem make it an uncommonly difficult one to solve. This article reviews the moral, market, and political factors contributing to the difficulty. Among the moral problems is lack of agreement about how to weigh the fundamental tradeoff involved in regulating drug prices—affordability versus incentives for innovation—and about what constitutes a fair price. Market-related factors include the lack of price transparency and a myriad of perverse incentives in the system through which prescription drugs are supplied to patients. Finally, current policy choices are constrained by past political compromises, and an atmosphere of scandal focusing on egregious instances of price gouging has made rational deliberation about fixes to deeper problems in the system difficult.

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McElfish, Pearl A., Christopher R. Long, Laura P. James, Aaron J. Scott, Elizabeth Flood-Grady, Kim S. Kimminau, Robert L. Rhyne, Mark R. Burge, and Rachel S. Purvis. "Characterizing health researcher barriers to sharing results with study participants." Journal of Clinical and Translational Science 3, no. 6 (October 4, 2019): 295–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cts.2019.409.

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AbstractIntroduction:Research participants want to receive results from studies in which they participate. However, health researchers rarely share the results of their studies beyond scientific publication. Little is known about the barriers researchers face in returning study results to participants.Methods:Using a mixed-methods design, health researchers (N = 414) from more than 40 US universities were asked about barriers to providing results to participants. Respondents were recruited from universities with Clinical and Translational Science Award programs and Prevention Research Centers.Results:Respondents reported the percent of their research where they experienced each of the four barriers to disseminating results to participants: logistical/methodological, financial, systems, and regulatory. A fifth barrier, investigator capacity, emerged from data analysis. Training for research faculty and staff, promotion and tenure incentives, and funding agencies supporting dissemination of results to participants were solutions offered to overcoming barriers.Conclusions:Study findings add to literature on research dissemination by documenting health researchers’ perceived barriers to sharing study results with participants. Implications for policy and practice suggest that additional resources and training could help reduce dissemination barriers and increase the return of results to participants.

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Hutchins, Andrea, Jinette Fellows, and Donna Winham,. "Training Interns in Nutrition and Dietetics: Barriers and Motivators to Being a Preceptor." Current Developments in Nutrition 4, Supplement_2 (May 29, 2020): 602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cdn/nzaa048_008.

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Abstract Objectives Identify the perceptions and attitudes associated with the preceptor role and incentives that might encourage precepting among nutrition and dietetics professionals in the United States. Methods A random sample of RDN and NDTR professionals from the Commission on Dietetic Registration credentialed practitioner database were invited to complete an online survey about knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions of the preceptor role. The survey was adapted from previous published instruments and validated via external content review, pretesting and post-test evaluation with pilot respondents. Results A total of 311 of 2464 invited eligible participants completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 12.6%. The majority of the sample was white, non-Hispanic with an average age of 44 years. More participants had never served as a preceptor (41%) compared to those that were current preceptors (38%) or former preceptors (21%). Respondents were asked what types of incentives would encourage them to continue to train interns or to consider precepting. The top incentives for all participants were the opportunity to earn continuing education units (65.9%) and having expenses paid to attend a national conference (49.5%). Significantly more (P < .001) former preceptors and those that never precepted reported the ability to choose when to take an intern, training on how to teach and communicate with interns and access to an “on-call” specialist for help or assistance with issues when they arise as incentives compared to current preceptors. Significantly more (P < .01) participants who have never precepted reported training on the internship expectations and the ability to provide input on intern selection process were incentives compared to current or former preceptors. Conclusions Incentives to serve as a preceptor differ based on current, former or never served as a preceptor status. Our results suggest promoting and strategizing solutions to the current imbalance between dietetic internship applicants and qualified preceptors should be targeted based on current, former or never precepted status in order to retain current preceptors, encourage former preceptors to return to precepting and recruit professionals that have never served as preceptors. Funding Sources None

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