Dissertations / Theses: 'Behavioral economics of organization'

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Lauga, Dominique Olié. "Essays in behavioral industrial organization, corruption, and marketing." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/41712.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2007.
Includes bibliographical references.
In Chapter 1, I propose a model in which consumers base their purchasing decisions upon their recollections of the product quality, and in which firms can use persuasive advertising in order to change these recollections. Although consumers are aware that such advertising has occurred and take this into account when updating their beliefs about the product, they cannot prevent their memories from being affected. I analyze which firms engage in persuasive advertising as well as the price level that these firms choose. I show that persuasive advertising may be used in equilibrium even though consumers are fully aware of it, and that persuasive advertising does not always signal high quality products. The model is then extended to incorporate both persuasive and informative advertising, where firms reveal some verifiable information about their products. In that case, persuasive advertising may block the full unraveling of information, and high quality products are not promoted with only one type of advertising - in some cases, persuasive advertising can signal a product of either higher or lower quality than a product promoted with informative advertising. Chapter 2 is the product of joint work with Abhijit Banerjee and develops a model to study the effectiveness of complaints against corruption. A bureaucrat has to decide on a public infrastructure project in a village where a rich and a poor villagers live. A dishonest bureaucrat can be bribed not to choose the surplus maximizing project and instead to choose a project that favors the rich villager. Once the bureaucrat has chosen a project, the villagers can send a costly praising or complaining message to the bureaucrat's supervisor who does not know whether the bureaucrat is honest or dishonest.
(cont.) From his point of view the messages are anonymous; the supervisor does not know who is rich or poor in the village. The only leverage of the supervisor is to transfer the bureaucrat and replace him with another one who will repeat the game in the following period. In any relevant equilibrium no complaints happen and more generally there are no complaints in equilibrium without bribery. We find that complaints will be observed only when they should not be and that the government cannot necessarily get people to complain by cutting the message cost. In addition, lowering that cost may hurt since, when the share of honest bureaucrat is low, the poor are pessimistic about the benefit of complaints while the rich are optimistic and they respond more to a lower cost. Finally, the supervisor cannot fully decide to implement a particular equilibrium as multiple ones coexist. Chapter 3 is the product of joint work with Elie Ofek. We model a duopoly in which ex-ante identical firms need to decide where to direct their innovation efforts. The firms face market uncertainty with respect to consumers' preferences for innovation on two product attributes, and technology uncertainty with respect to the success of their R&D efforts. Firms can conduct costly research to resolve their market uncertainty before setting R&D strategy. We find that the value of market information to a firm depends on whether its rival is also expected to obtain this information in equilibrium. We show that, as a result, one firm may forgo market research even though its rival conducts such research and learns the true state of demand. We examine both vertical and horizontal demand structures. With vertical preferences, firms are a priori uncertain which attribute all consumers will value more.
(cont.) In this case, a firm that conducts market research will always innovate on the attribute it discovers that consumers prefer, and expend more on R&D than a rival that has not conducted market research. With horizontal preferences, distinct segments exist-each cares about innovation on only one attribute-and firms are a priori uncertain how many consumers are in each segment. In this case, a firm that conducts market research may follow a 'niche' strategy and innovate to serve the smaller segment to avoid intense price competition for the larger segment. Consequently, a firm that conducts market research may invest less in R&D and earn lower profits post-launch than a rival that has forgone such research.
by Dominique Olié Lauga.
Ph.D.

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Khachatryan, Karen. "Biased beliefs and heterogeneous preferences : essays in behavioral economics." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Institutionen för Nationalekonomi, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-1867.

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This dissertation is a collection of essays (chapters) on behavioral economics. Behavioral economics—arguably one of the most influential innovations in economics over the last 20 years—is a research paradigm introducing psychologically more realistic assumptions into economics. A common theme throughout the dissertation is the focus on either biased beliefs, or heterogeneous preferences, or both. The first chapter serves as an introduction to some themes in behavioral economics and its implications for market outcomes in industrial organization settings. The next two chapters are theoretical papers on entrepreneurial and managerial overconfidence that can also be thought of as contributions to this newly emerging field of behavioral industrial organization. The last chapter is an empirical contribution on gender differences in preferences and economic behavior at a young age.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2011

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Houdek, Petr. "Essays on Economics and Management: Applications of Behavioral Science in Organizations." Doctoral thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2014. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-262137.

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The thesis consists of four conceptual articles focused on application of theories and findings of behavioral economics and behavioral ethics in the sphere of managerial science (What Comes to a Manager's Mind: Theory of Local Thinking; A Perspective on Consumers 3.0: They Are Not Better Decision-Makers Than Previous Generations; Professional Identity and Dishonest Behavior; Puppet Master: Possible Influence of Parasite Toxoplasma gondii on Managers and Employees). The thesis contains introductory unifying commentary that deals with the replication crisis in management science and then speculates on the possibilities of behavioral organization economics. Introductory commentary contains also a summary of the main ideas presented in the conceptual articles and complementary empirical studies listed in the Appendix.

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Petersen, Michael J. "The Application of Instructional Design Principles in the Development of Sportsmanship Education Software and Its Impact on Children’s Acquisition of Sportsmanlike Attitudes and Behaviors." DigitalCommons@USU, 2012. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/1350.

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Millions of people, young and old, participate in sporting events in the roles of athlete or spectator or both. Sportsmanship affects the experience of both groups of participants. There is an absence of evidence showing that software that is designed using a set of research-based rules, can make a lasting, or even short-term difference in (a) the acquisition of sportsmanship knowledge and attitudes, and (b) the way children respond when placed in sporting situations, either as athletes or as spectators. The purpose of this study was twofold. First, determine whether schoolchildren, grades three through five, who use STAR Sportsmanship, a computer-based software program that was designed using a set of research-based rules and is rich with visual/ auditory examples and nonexamples, will (a) acquire more sportsmanship knowledge and attitudes, and (b) exhibit more sportsmanlike behaviors than those who do not use the software. Second, determine how those two outcomes would be impacted if all visual/ auditory examples (modeling based) were removed and replaced with auditory-only examples (lecture based). Through the use of a pre-post questionnaire of attitudes, and then with observations of behavior while youngsters were engaged in athletic events, changes in sportsmanship knowledge and attitudes were measured. This study compared questionnaire response levels and observation data of participants who either received no treatment or were assigned to use either a modeling-based or a lecture-based version of software that was developed to teach sportsmanship attitudes and behaviors to children. In regards to sportsmanship attitude and understanding, there was no measurable difference when comparing the pooled treatment group scores with the control group. The modeling treatment appeared to have a small effect when compared to both the lecture group and the control group. Furthermore, the findings showed some differences in measured attitudes and understanding between the grades, with the highest levels of sportsmanship understanding in those at the fourth grade. In regards to behavior, placement in either treatment group of the control group did not make a statistically significant impact. Grade placement, however, did however appear to make a significant impact.

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Yakobi, Maxine J. "The Economic and Behavioral Success of Riot Games In an Undifferentiated Video Game Market." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/349.

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The vast success of Riot Games is relatively undisputed amongst financial analysts as well as online communities despite there being little information publicly available that specifically addresses how their game has differentiated itself in a homogenous market. Additionally, there is little information that addresses the opportunity cost of paying money for components within this specific server for advantages within the game. I believe there to be something functionally unique about Riot’s business in particular that allows for it to acquire steady fiscal growth from people investing their money into effectively a “free” online game and I would like to explore what that is. Therefore I wish to answer the question of why is it that Riot, despite having a relatively undifferentiated product within the MOBA game industry, exceeds all other companies in both player commitment and financial investment to their free-to-play product. My surveys will aim to address the reasons why players choose to invest both their time and money into the game and shed more light on the efficacy of the incentive structures in place. Through survey data and information gained through interviews I will form base comparisons between player preferences and then track the incentive structures across the MOBA industry. Using comparative analysis between the player-reported incentives which drive their behavior, the information gained through conducting personal interviews with Riot Representatives, and careful analysis of consumer trends with regards to League of Legends and the eSports franchise as designed by the Riot Games industry, I will attempt to find correlations between the player’s perceptions of Riot’s product and the incentives within the game. If consumption and growth patterns show correlations to the growth exhibited by the company that prove to be significant when compared with player preferences, those points could potentially explain the success that Riot has seen over the duration of the past five years of the company’s existence.

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Naranjo, R. Alberto J. "Drugonomics : Industrial Organization of Illegal Drug Markets." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Department of Economics, Stockholm University, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-1372.

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Hoffstein, Brian. "The Evolving Business Landscape: A Synergy of Form, Function, and The Science of Success." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/298.

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Success is ultimately a story about human behavior. Regardless of the specific domain of the endeavor, the outcome is a product of the individuals involved. Businesses are a function of their employees and customers, just as societies are a function of their citizens and institutions. The ability to create a system that promotes human flourishing is one of the most vital tasks for any leader pursuing success. Yet the ability to break down a goal and engineer the proper procedure to achieve success has always been a somewhat daunting task. While many prosperous individuals have attempted to delineate their winning ways, the philosophies they preach sound more like encouraging poetry than a practical guide. Hard-work, ambition, and discipline - these are just some of the banalities used when trying to describe what it takes to win. However, the story behind greatness is more complex than that, and we are finally beginning to understand how and why. Recent scientific discoveries have a sparked an evolution of sorts; one that breaks down success and helps illuminate the conditions that encourage innovation, maximize potential, and drive mankind’s progress.

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Mazza, Mary Carol. "Encouraging Healthful Dietary Behavior in a Hospital Cafeteria: A Field Study Using Theories from Social Psychology and Behavioral Economics." Thesis, Harvard University, 2013. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10870.

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Public policy efforts to curb obesity often adhere to a rational actor model of human behavior, asserting that consumer behavior will change provided proper economic incentives, nutritional information, and health education. However, rigorous academic research related to such questions remains limited in scope and appears inconclusive as to the success of such economic and cognitive interventions. In contrast, research in social psychology and behavioral economics suggests that decision making is partially based on heuristics, or rules of thumb, and susceptible to powerful cognitive biases. External cues can subtly influence decision making in powerful ways. In this paper, after discussing existing policy efforts and their limitations, we use concepts from behavioral decision theory to design interventions related to different psychological domains in hopes of providing a more complete understanding of consumer dietary decision making. We move beyond traditional cognitive methods, namely the provision of nutritional information and economic incentives, to suggest the value of other cognitive, affective, social, and environmental influences in shaping food choices. Over a 21-month period, we tested 9 interventions in a point-of-purchase field study at a hospital cafeteria, focusing on the healthfulness of beverage purchases and chip purchases. Information, in the form of novel, reinforcing health messages, had the most consistently beneficial effect on the healthfulness of purchases. Traffic light colored-nutritional labeling, affect-based cues (smiley faces and frowny faces), and environmental changes including grouping items together based on level of healthfulness ("grouping by healthfulness") and pairing an unhealthy item with a healthier alternative ("healthy substitute pairing") also affected choices. Messages related to social norms had no effect on purchases. Our work adds to existing consumer behavior research and helps to inform health policy of additional cognitive factors and biases that must be taken into account when designing interventions and which can, indeed, be leveraged to influence dietary behavior. This is the first study of which we know to test the relative effects of this number and variety (economic, cognitive, affective, social, and environmental) of theory-based behavioral nudges on food choice in one setting.

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Oberhofer, Harald, and Marian Schwinner. "Do individual salaries depend on the performance of the peers? Prototype heuristic and wage bargaining in the NBA." WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2017. http://epub.wu.ac.at/5553/1/wp247.pdf.

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This paper analyzes the link between relative market value of representative subsets of athletes in the National Basketball Association (NBA) and individual wages. NBA athletes are categorized with respect to multiple performance characteristics utilizing the k-means algorithm to cluster observations and a group's market value is calculated by averaging real annual salaries. Employing GMM estimation techniques to a dynamic wage equation, we find a statistically significant and positive effect of one-period lagged relative market value of an athlete's representative cluster on individual wages after controlling for past individual performance. This finding is consistent with the theory of prototype heuristic, introduced by Kahneman and Frederick (2002), that NBA teams' judgment about an athlete's future performance is based on a comparison of the player to a prototype group consisting of other but comparable athletes.
Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

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Curtis, Wayne R. "Social Entrepreneurship and Wealth-Building Plans: Creative Strategies for Working Class Americans." Antioch University / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=antioch1368636173.

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Ndodjang, ngantchou Peguy. "Impact of the Information and Communication Technologies on workers' behaviors : An experimental investigation." Thesis, Montpellier, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016MONTD028/document.

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Cette thèse explore l’impact des technologies de l'information et de la communication (TIC) sur le comportement des employés. Alors que la théorie néoclassique de la croissance considère les TIC comme un outil utilisé dans le processus de production, nous nous sommes basé sur une théorie qui stipule que les technologies ont deux aspects différents. Les technologies de la communication centralisent la prise de décision tandis que les technologies de l'information déplacent la prise de décision au niveau de l'employé. Nous avons abordé les questions du meilleur type de technologie pour l’amélioration de la performance des employés, des coûts engendrés par l'utilisation de ce type de technologies et de l’impact de la surveillance informatique dans la réduction de ces coûts. Nous avons utilisé la méthode expérimentale pour répondre à ces questions. Nos résultats montrent que les employés préfèrent utiliser les technologies de l'information et ceux qui les utilisent sont plus productifs que les autres. Nous trouvons également que l’environnement de travail et les technologies qui poussent la prise de décision au niveau de l'employé pourraient engendrer des coûts importants pour l’entreprise. Cependant, la surveillance informatique est efficace pour réduire ces coûts mais son effet diminue au fil du temps. Nos résultats montrent que les employés les plus productifs sont ceux qui ont passé le plus de temps sur internet. Donner aux employés les informations constantes et détaillées (sur leur performance) produites par les technologies pourrait être une façon efficace de les sensibiliser sur l’ampleur de la surveillance informatique afin de les rendre plus performants
This dissertation explores the impact of the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) on employees’ behaviors. While the neoclassical growth theory considers ICT as an input used in the production process, we relied on a literature in the organizational economic field which states that technologies have two different key aspects. Information technologies push down the decision making at the employee level while Communication technologies centralize the decision making. We addressed the issue of the more efficient technologies for workers’ performance, the costs generated by using the most efficient type of technologies and how the technology-based monitoring may be useful to reduce those costs. We used the experimental methodology since the collection of individuals and team's production is hard with survey data. Our results show that employees prefer information technologies and those who use it are more productive than others. We also show that work organization and technologies which push down the decision making at the employee level could entail some substantial costs for the firm. Indeed, employees are more willing to engage on time wasting activities in order to influence the principal’s decision when they can participate to the decision making process. However IT monitoring is quite successful at reducing those costs. Technology monitoring implies a disciplining effect at the beginning when the sanction is available but this effect lessens over time. Our results show that employees are more productive when they spend more time on internet. Giving constant heightened feedbacks provided by ICT to employees about their productivity should be the better way to sensitize them about the extent of technology monitoring in order to increase their performance

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Andersson, Johan, and Mikael Finnserud. "The Process of Selecting Project Team Members in a Matrix Organization with Multiproject Environment." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, 2003. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-1689.

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In a matrix organization, the process of selecting project team members is a collaboration between the functions and the projects. A project’s success or failure does often depend on that collaboration. This thesis work examines the present situation at Saab Gripen Customer Support. The process is examined from four different perspectives: the roles of the functional and the project manager, competence development, behavioural science team roles and the complexity of the projects. The result shows that the roles of the project manager and the functional manager in their collaboration are not properly defined. The communication between the project manager and the functional manager is insufficient. The competence development during the projects is not fully taken advantage of. There is a need to use behavioural science. Recommendations on how the situation can be improved are given. A model is proposed to give guidance in the process of selecting project team members.

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Cook, Andrew. "Succession Planning in a Global Electronics Company." ScholarWorks, 2015. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/1963.

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Leaders of U.S. companies are unprepared to address a shortage of qualified leaders caused by changing workforce demographics. Despite organizational leaders realizing the importance of talent management to company strategy, there still exists a gap in knowledge regarding its application in practice. The purpose of this case study was to explore what succession planning organizational leaders use to adequately replace departing leaders with qualified new leaders. The findings demonstrated support for Shields' practical ideal type conceptual framework adapted to succession planning, which holds that succession planning requires various elements working together to achieve succession goals. Data were obtained through semistructured interviews of 5 organizational leaders who are responsible for succession planning at a global electronics company. Upon analysis of the semistructured interview data using triangulation with company succession planning matrix documents, 4 primary themes emerged: employee development activities that support effective succession planning; practices and processes critical for effective succession planning; the relationship between succession planning, talent management strategy, and organizational strategy; and barriers and challenges to effective succession planning. Recommendations from the study include developing effective ways to replace departing leaders by succession planning and considering investing in resources that focus on succession planning. The findings may lead to social change by providing employees with goals of achieving higher positions within their organizations, which may motivate employees to excel in their workplaces and contribute to their communities.

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Dhir, Saloni. "The changing nature of work, leadership, and organizational culture in future ready organizations." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2064.

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Abstract The relationship between individual and organizational performance is a key challenge for leaders in modern organizations, especially with the current disruption in technology and innovation. This thesis is a literature review and compilation of the relevant empirical evidence on various processes of industrial groups and organizational characteristics such as the changing nature of work, leadership, and company culture in detail. I investigate the complex challenges that millennials and organizations are facing in the current VUCA work environment as well as their potential responses to these changes. I map out the evolution of the concept of work and compare changes in the workplace environment of the past, present, and future. Additionally, this thesis reviews the literature on organizational culture models, cultural fit and clash. I explore the intertwined differences and commonalities between management and leadership and also consider a gradual shift to a model of managerial-leadership in 21st century organizations. Furthermore, the research closely examines cultural change management through the lens of mergers and acquisitions. It also discusses next steps, like job redesign, team reorganization, and cultural reconciliation, to increase job satisfaction, employee motivation, and performance in future-ready organizations.

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Fallon-Cyr, Daniel. "Revenue Incentives and Referee Propensity to Make Foul Calls in the NBA Finals." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1599.

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In this study I examine foul calls by NBA referees alongside the difference in aggressiveness of twelve NBA basketball teams as they compete for the Championship Title. I aim to identify referee biases that increase the likelihood of the NBA Finals ending in a later game due to league revenue incentives. My data consists of 91 individual NBA Finals games played between the 2001 and 2016 NBA Finals. After controlling for changes in play as well as the difference in aggressiveness, I find that NBA referee’s foul calls are more dependent on a call on the opposing team in situations with a larger series score spread. Additionally, I identify a consistent officiating bias towards the home team. My results imply an effort by the NBA to increase the probability of the series ending in a later game, possibly motivated by increased revenues for the league and all parties involved.

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Denrell, Jerker. "Essays on the economic effects of vanity and career concerns." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Institute of International Business (IIB), 1998. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-1376.

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Burton, Donald. "Educational & Family Status Constraints on Female Income Operating Through the Labor Market." TopSCHOLAR®, 1989. https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/2184.

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The earnings gap between men and women has long been a problem of interest to sociologists. Using data provided by the General Social Survey, this thesis addresses this problem by utilizing a causal model that conceptualizes the labor market sector as intervening in the relationships between education and income, and between the absence or presence of children and income among women. The impact of age on these relationships is also considered. Women who have children and a lower educational level do not, it was found, make as much money and work more in the secondary sector than childless, better-educated women. The labor market sector was fund to be an important variable in terms of its impact on the relationships between educational level, the presence of children, and income. However, the labor market sector did not entirely mediate the relationship between the presence of children and income or educational level and income. Direct associations were found between the presence of children and income and educational level and income, but these relationships varied by sector and age. The presence of children did not effect the income of older women in the secondary sector, but did in the primary sector. Educational level did not effect income for either younger or older women in the secondary sector, but did in the primary. The relationship between educational level and income remained strong in the primary sector regardless of age group. An additional difference was found due to age. Younger women were found to have fewer children than older women. Previous research that has been conducted on women and the labor force was reviewed and critiqued and may be useful in more clearly explaining issues related to women's success in the job market.

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Angelovski, Andrej. "Experimental studies on organizational behavior." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/283365.

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Una creciente literatura explora cómo las personas son afectadas por la organización, y también cómo las personas afectan a la organización con sus decisiones. Mi tesis contribuye a esta parte de la literatura investigando temas en este campo utilizando métodos experimentales. Más específicamente, mi trabajo examina cómo las personas son afectadas por ciertos sesgos y cómo estos sesgos afectan a los demás, así como a la organización; cómo eliminar el sesgo; Cómo se comportan las personas cuando se enfrentan con el dilema de contribuir a dos diferentes bienes públicos de eficiencia diferente; Cómo diferentes niveles de comunicación pueden ayudar a resolver o entorpecer este dilema; el efecto de interdependencia en el diseño organizacional en el funcionamiento; y el efecto de la desigualdad de pago en este tipo de diseño organizacional. En el segundo capítulo llevamos a cabo un experimento para estudiar si la manera en la que los empleados son asignados a un gerente afecta a las evaluaciones subjetivas que tienen los gerentes y los demás empleados sobre un empleado. Los empleados son o contratados por el gerente, o explícitamente no contratados por él y sin embargo asignados a él, o exógenos a él. Para los tres tipos nos encontramos con sesgo de escalada por los gerentes y demás empleados. Los gerentes exhiben un sesgo positivo hacia aquellos empleados que ha contratado él mismo, o una negativa hacia aquellos que no ha contratado explícitamente. El capítulo 3 es un estudio de seguimiento del capítulo dos. Con el presente capítulo se pretende añadir a estas conclusiones observando desde el punto de vista de los empleados que tienen que seguir trabajando en un entorno donde están positivamente o negativamente sesgados y cómo afecta a su rendimiento y decisiones futuras. Además, intentamos eliminar el sesgo y lo conseguimos. También encontramos que tener un gerente de positivamente sesgado hacia un empleado tiene un efecto positivo sobre el desempeño futuro de ese empleado, aun cuando el empleado es consciente de que la evaluación no está justificada. Estando negativamente sesgado en contra, sin embargo, no tiene ningún impacto significativo sobre el desempeño futuro del empleado, sin embargo aumenta la probabilidad de tomar la decisión de abandonar o sabotear, la cual costosa para todos los participantes. El capítulo cuatro reporta un conjunto de experimentos de bienes públicos, que realizamos, en el cual los participantes pertenecen tanto a un pequeño grupo "local" como a un grupo “global” más grande, y tienen diversos grados de comunicación dentro y entre estos grupos. Los resultados muestran que, cuando los participantes sólo pueden contribuir al bien público global, sube el nivel de las contribuciones a la misma vez que sube el nivel de comunicación. También encontramos que cuando se proporciona la opción de contribuir a ambos bienes públicos pero sin posibilidad de comunicación, los participantes prefieren mayoritariamente contribuir al bien público local, el cual es menos eficiente. Sin embargo, en la medida que los niveles de comunicación se agregan, tanto la contribución total como la contribución al bien público "global” aumentan. En el capítulo final, pretendemos crear un paradigma en el cual una única combinación común de tareas interdependientes y secuenciales pueda ser estudiada fácilmente. También intentamos determinar la importancia de la igualdad de pago bajo dos niveles diferentes de asignación justa en posiciones en nuestra tarea altamente interdependiente. Nuestros resultados muestran que incluso la desigualdad extrema en el pago no afecta significativamente una actuación de grupos de trabajo en tareas de esfuerzo real con alta interdependencia. Además, diferentes métodos de asignación de posiciones pueden efectuar al rendimiento en ciertas etapas de la cadena de producción, aunque no al rendimiento final.
Organizational behavior looks at how individuals behave in organizational settings, how they interact with other individuals within the setting, as well as how they behave with the organization itself. A growing literature explores how people are affected by the organization, as well as how they affect it with their decision making. My dissertation contributes to this body of literature by investigating topics in this field using experimental methods. More specifically, my work looks at how people are affected by certain biases and how these biases affect the others as well as the organization; ways to eliminate the bias; how individuals behave when faced with the dilemma of contributing to two different public goods of different efficiency; how different levels of communication within an organization can help solve or hinder this dilemma; the effect of interdependence in organizational design on performance; and the effect of payment inequality in this type of organizational design. In the second chapter of the thesis we conduct an experiment to study whether the way employees are assigned to a manager affects managers’ and co-employees’ subjective evaluations of employees. Employees are either be hired by the manager, explicitly not hired by him and nevertheless assigned to him, or exogenously assigned to him. For all three we find escalation bias both by managers and by co-employees. Managers exhibit a positive bias towards those employees they have hired or a negative one towards those they have explicitly not hired. Chapter three is a follow-up study to chapter two. The aim with this chapter is to add to those findings by looking at the bias from the point of view of the employees who have to continue working in an environment where they are positively or negatively biased against, and how it affects their future performance and decisions. Additionally, attempt to eliminate the bias, and succeed. We also find that having a manager being positively biased towards an employee has a positive effect on that employee’s future performance, even though the employee is aware that the evaluation is not justified. Being negatively biased against, though, does not have any significant impact on future performance, however it increases the likelihood of making a decision to leave or sabotage which is costly to all participants. Chapter four reports on a set of public goods experiments we conducted in which participants belong to both a smaller “local” group, and a larger “global” group and have various degrees of communication within and between these groups. The results show that, when participants can only contribute to the global public good, the level of contributions goes up as the level of communication goes up. We also found that when the option to contribute to both public goods is provided with no communication, participants heavily prefer to contribute to the less efficient local public good, however as levels of communication are added both the total contribution and the contribution into the “global” public good go up. In chapter five we aim to create a paradigm in which a unique yet common combination of sequential and pooled task interdependence can be studied naturally. We also aim to determine the importance of payment equality under two different levels of fair allocation into positions in our highly interdependent task. Our results show that even extreme payment inequality does not significantly affect a work-groups performance in real effort tasks with high interdependence. Additionally, different methods of allocating into positions can effect performances at certain stages of the production line, though not the final performance.

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Rodríguez-Camacho, Javier A. "Information acquisition, expertise, and consumer behavior in markets with informational asymmetries." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/392738.

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En esta tesis estudiamos mercados con asimetrías informativas desde la perspectiva de la teoría microeconómica. Primero analizamos la manera en que las asimetrías informativas afectan las decisiones de los médicos cuando estos compiten en precios y la calidad del servicio que ofrecen. En segundo lugar examinamos el papel que juegan los expertos y las reseñas de usuarios en un mercado de bienes de experiencia. En la primera aplicación que presentamos, analizamos el comportamiento de los pacientes en un mercado médico, cuando estos necesitan visitar a un médico pero desconocen su habilidad. Cada paciente estima la habilidad de los médicos mediante las anécdotas que obtiene de sus familiares y amigos. Nos concentramos en el efecto que tienen estas estimaciones en las estrategias de los médicos, tanto en términos del precio que fijan como de su habilidad. Encontramos que mayor disponibilidad informativa conduce a mayor diferenciación en habilidades, con un nivel promedio más bajo. Si la información sobre los dos médicos es fácil de obtener, uno de ellos fija la habilidad máxima y el otro un nivel inferior. Al contrario, ambos eligen la habilidad máxima en el equilibrio si la información de al menos uno de ellos no es fácil de conseguir. Estos resultados son novedosos por dos razones: Primero, porque caracterizamos un equilibrio en el cual todos los médicos fijan habilidades máximas a pesar del procedimiento racionalmente acotado que siguen los pacientes para decidir su participación. Segundo, porque encontramos un equilibrio en el que las habilidades de equilibrio son homogéneas a pesar de las heterogeneidades de los médicos. Más adelante extendemos el modelo para incluir un coste en la decisión de habilidades de los médicos. Encontramos que se establece una diferenciación en habilidades en todos los niveles de visibilidad, donde la visibilidad representa cuán fácil es encontrar anécdotas sobre un médico en particular. Siendo específicos, el médico con una visibilidad más alta tiende a fijar una habilidad mayor entre más pequeña sea la visibilidad de su rival. De todas formas, si los niveles de visibilidad no son tan distintos, dos equilibrios robustos en habilidades se establecen. El coste de la habilidad es el principal factor en la aparición de habilidades bajas en el equilibrio. Es decir, mientras más costosa sea la habilidad, menores serán las habilidades promedio. En cuanto a los mercados de experiencia, examinamos el efecto que tienen las reseñas de usuarios sobre los expertos que operan en tales mercados. La ventaja informativa que poseen los expertos es menoscabada por la aparición de reseñas de usuarios como una fuente alternativa de información, si bien inferior en calidad, gratuita. Esto afecta las decisiones de los expertos. Desarrollamos un modelo de bienes diferenciados horizontal y verticalmente, donde los consumidores conocen su tipo pero no pueden observar la calidad del bien. Un experto ofrece revelar la calidad del bien a cambio de un pago. Encontramos que los expertos incrementan el bienestar de los consumidores, si bien no inducen mayor demanda para la empresa. Un mercado intermedio se forma entre el experto y los consumidores, mayor en tamaño que el mercado del propio bien. Luego introducimos las reseñas de usuarios en el mercado. Estas incrementan el bienestar de los consumidores, mientras la empresa se mantiene indiferente. En conclusión, tanto los expertos como las reseñas de usuarios incrementan el bienestar de los consumidores respecto a un escenario en el que no existe información previa. Los expertos son sensibles a fuentes de información rivales, sirviendo una demanda menor, cobrando precios más bajos y obteniendo menos beneficios en tales casos. Si ambas fuentes de información están disponibles simultáneamente, el bienestar de la sociedad se incrementa. Por tanto, podemos decir que un mayor acceso a información es beneficioso para los consumidores en un mercado de bienes de experiencia.
In this thesis we study markets with asymmetric information from a microeconomic theory perspective. First, we analyze the way information asymmetries affect the decisions of physicians competing in prices and the quality of the service they offer. Second, we examine the role expert services and user reviews play in a market for experience goods. In the first application we look at healthcare markets to study the behavior of patients who need to visit a physician whose ability they do not know, instead building an estimate using anecdotes gathered from close acquaintances. We then concentrate on the effect these estimates have on the ability and pricing strategies of the physicians. We find that more information availability leads to more differentiation in abilities and a lower average value. When information on both physicians is readily available, one of them sets the maximum level while the rival chooses a lower value. Conversely, an equilibrium where both physicians choose a maximum ability level occurs when information on at least one of them is not widely available. Our result is novel for two reasons: First, because it characterizes an equilibrium where all the physicians in a market set maximum ability levels despite the anecdote-based procedure followed by patients. Second, because we are able to find conditions under which physicians who compete with heterogeneous visibilities set homogeneous ability choices in equilibrium. We later extend this model to include a costly ability choice for the physicians. We find that ability differentiation appears at all visibility levels, where visibility represents how easy it is to find an anecdote for a given physician. In particular, the physician with a higher visibility tends to set a high ability the lower the rival's visibility is. However, if the visibility levels are not far apart, two robust equilibria in abilities are found. The ability cost is the main driver for low-ability decisions in the equilibrium. That is, the costlier it is for a physician to choose a high ability, the lower the average equilibrium ability found in the market. Regarding the market for experience goods, we examine the effect of freely available reviews on experts’ behavior. The fact that experts must compete with costless user-generated content, though arguably of a lesser quality, undermines the informational advantage central to the service they provide, influencing their pricing strategies. We begin by developing a model for a market of horizontally and vertically differentiated goods where the consumers know how much their type aligns with the good's but cannot observe the quality. An expert is present in the market and offers to reveal the quality in exchange for a fee. We find expert services to increase the consumers' welfare, although no demand-attraction effect takes place. An intermediate market arises between the expert and the consumers, bigger than the demand faced by the firm. Next we introduce free-to-access user reviews in the market. User reviews increase the consumers' surplus, though the firm remains indifferent. Hence, both expert services and user reviews increase the welfare with respect to a benchmark where such agents decide based exclusively on their priors. Expert services are sensitive to competing sources of information, serving a smaller demand, charging a lower fee, and obtaining less profits when user reviews become available. When both are simultaneously present, the social welfare significantly improves. We can therefore say that more information is beneficial to the consumers in a market for experience goods. We discuss this market using the film industry as an illustration.

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Ozdemir, Duygu. "Essays on behavioural and organizational economics." Thesis, University of Essex, 2018. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/22114/.

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This thesis consists of three self-contained experimental studies focusing on conformity behavior in the leader appointment process, self-group risk preferences of elected leaders and performance feedback mechanisms. In Chapter 1, I investigate discrimination against women in election settings and whether group dynamics undermine women’s chances to become leaders. I conduct a voting experiment which tests the effect of the candidate’s gender on voting behavior, and the role of conformity. Consistent with the predictions of a simple model, subjects tend to vote for candidates who exhibit similar (risk) preferences. Information on the gender of the candidates mitigates proximity concerns of the voter especially in favor of the male candidate. Yet, there is no conclusive result for the gender bias. The results also confirm that conformity is a significant factor in group decision-making. In Chapter 2, I analyze the mechanism which induces the difference between self and group risk attitudes of elected leaders. I focus on two motivations: a “leadership effect”, that is created by the competition and the sense of responsibility of the leadership status, and a “group concern” of the leader. The results show that elected leaders significantly become more risk-seeking when deciding on behalf of a group compared to their individual decisions. Meeting the expectations of group members seems the main driver of this observed behavioral change. In Chapter 3, in a setting where feedback is given strategically by a supervisor, we theoretically and experimentally analyze how employees interpret the received feedback in forming beliefs of themselves and whether feedback communicates the iv actual performance information truthfully. We found that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedback mechanisms and private-verifiable is the most informative mechanism. We observed lying-aversion among principles: the results indicate a lying cost, and there is a tendency to send the true information where lying is profitable.

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Vesey, Reed. "Does Sex Discrimination Exist in Faculty Salaries at Western Kentucky University? An Empirical Examination of the Wage Gap." TopSCHOLAR®, 1992. http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/1841.

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This thesis examines wage differentials between male and female faculty salaries at Western Kentucky University. A human capital model of salary determination is examined by using regression analysis on relevant personal and job characteristics of faculty members. A large portion of the wage gap between men and women is explained through differences in the personal and job characteristics. A portion of the wage gap remains unexplained, however, the probability of discrimination playing a substantial role in salary is very small.

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Anand, Gopesh J. "Continuous improvement and operations strategy focus on six sigma programs /." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1151427239.

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Perdikis, Dionysios. "Functionnal organization of complex behavioral processes." Thesis, Aix-Marseille 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011AIX22050/document.

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Selon des études comportementales, les comportements complexes sont des processus multi-échelles, souvent composés de sous-éléments (unités fonctionnelles ou primitives). Cette thèse propose des architectures fonctionnelles afin de représenter la structure dynamique des unités fonctionnelles ainsi que celle des comportements multi-échelles résultants. Dans un premier temps, des unités fonctionnelles sont modélisées comme des flux structurés de faible dimension dans l'espace de phase (modes de fonctionnement). Des dynamiques supplémen-taires (signaux opérationnels) opèrent sur ces modes de fonctionnement faisant émerger des comportements complexes et sont classifiés selon la séparation entre leur échelle temporelle et celle des modes. Ensuite, des mesures de complexité, appliquées sur des architectures dis-tinctes composant un mouvement simple, révèlent un compromis entre la complexité des modes de fonctionnement et celle des signaux opérationnels. Celui-ci dépend de la séparation entre leurs échelles temporelles et soutient l'efficacité des architectures utilisant des modes non triviaux. Dans un deuxième temps, une architecture pour le comportement séquentiel (ici l'écriture) est construite via le couplage des modes de fonctionnement (réalisant des lettres) et des signaux opérationnels, ceux-ci beaucoup plus lents ou beaucoup plus rapides. Ainsi, l'importance des interactions entre les échelles temporelles pour l'organisation du comporte-ment est illustrée. Enfin, les contributions des modes et des signaux sur la sortie de l'architec-ture sont déterminées. Ceci semble être uniquement possible grâce à l'analyse du flux de phase (c'est-à-dire, non pas à partir des trajectoires dans l'espace de phase ni des séries temporelles)
Behavioural studies suggest that complex behaviours are multiscale processes, which may be composed of elementary ones (units or primitives). Traditional approaches to cognitive mod-elling generally employ reductionistic (mostly static) representations and computations of simplistic dynamics. The thesis proposes functional architectures to capture the dynamical structure of both functional units and the composite multiscale behaviours. First, a mathe-matical formalism of functional units as low dimensional, structured flows in phase space is introduced (functional modes). Second, additional dynamics (operational signals), which act upon functional modes for complex behaviours to emerge, are classified according to the separation between their characteristic time scale and the one of modes. Then, complexity measures are applied to distinct architectures for a simple composite movement and reveal a trade off between the complexities of functional modes and operational signals, depending on their time scale separation (in support of the control effectiveness of architectures employing non trivial modes). Subsequently, an architecture for serial behaviour (along the example of handwriting) is demonstrated, comprising of functional modes implementing characters, and operational signals much slower (establishing a mode competition and ‘binding’ modes into sequences) or much faster (as meaningful perturbations). All components being coupled, the importance of time scale interactions for behavioural organization is illustrated. Finally, the contributions of modes and signals to the output are recovered, appearing to be possible only through analysis of the output phase flow (i.e., not from trajectories in phase space or time)

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Lu, Jin. "Social security reform and it's impact on Chinese firms during transition." The Ohio State University, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1179774647.

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Sánchez, Moscona Daniel. "Essays on behavioral economics." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/670190.

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This thesis consists of three independent essays on behavioral economic theory. The rst article (Chapter 2) builds a framework of rational decision-making with conformity. The approach in this chapter is axiomatic. I show that, based on a set of reasonable axioms, preferences can be represented by a simple utility speci cations that is easy to use in applications. The essay nally proposes two distinct ways to measure individual conformity and discusses the advantages and drawbacks in each case. Chapter 3 applies the framework developed in Chapter 2 to analyze the e ects of social norm marketing as a policy instrument. I show that, by publishing the frequency with which each alternative is chosen in society, the government is able to alter the choices of individuals in its interest. Finally, Chapter 4 provides a model of dynamic discrete choice in which preferences are assumed to be history-dependent. The essay lays out the outlines the optimal behavior that a monopolist facing such type of consumers should follow in order to maximize pro ts.
Aquesta tesi està composta per tres assajos independents sobre economia del comportament, des d’una perspectiva teòrica. El primer article (Capítol 2) construeix un marc de presa de decisions racional en el qual s’assumeix a l’individu una tendència a inherent a la conformitat. L’enfocament en aquest capítol és axiomàtic. Demostro que, en base a un conjunt d’axiomes raonables, les preferències poden representar-se mitjançant especificacions d’utilitat simples que són fàcils d’usar en les aplicacions. L’assaig finalment proposa dues maneres diferents de mesurar la conformitat individual i analitza els avantatges i els inconvenients en cada cas. El tercer capítol aplica el marc indicat en el capítol 2 per analitzar els efectes del màrqueting de normes socials com a instrument de política. Demostro que, al publicar la freqüència amb què cada alternativa és triada en la societat, el govern pot alterar les eleccions dels individus en el seu interès. Finalment, el capítol 4 proporciona un model d’elecció discreta dinàmica en què se suposa que les preferències depenen de la història de consum. L’assaig exposa les línies generals de ’comportament òptim que ha de seguir un monopolista que s’enfronta a aquest tipus de consumidors per maximitzar els seus beneficis.

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Peysakhovich, Alexander. "Essays in Behavioral Economics." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10686.

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Essays in this dissertation cover three topics in behavioral economics: social preferences, ambiguity aversion and self-control. The first essay, based on work with Aurelie Ouss, studies the behavior of individuals making decisions to punish norm violators. It addresses two types of questions. First, what parameters affect these punishment decisions? Second, what do outcomes look like when these decisions are aggregated? Experimental data show that individual punishment decisions appear to respond to individual cost and not necessarily social cost. Additionally, individuals appear not to take the probability that violators will be apprehended into account. Finally, punishment by others does not act as a perfect substitute for own punishment. These combined effects mean that aggregate levels of punishment rarely resemble those in line with commonly used benchmarks such as optimal deterrence. The second essay, based on work with Uma Karmarkar, studies how information affects valuation of ambiguous financial prospects. Experimental results show that across several domains individual valuations appear to react much more strongly to favorable information than unfavorable information. Additional studies indicate that this effect is driven by two mechanisms. The first is a bias towards the integration of favorable information. The second is an effect of ambiguity aversion, individuals appear to be averse to subjective ignorance and so unfavorable information has a positive component: it removes some of this uncertainty. The final essay looks at how dual-self (Fudenberg-Levine (2006)) decision makers can use commitment contracts to combat self-control problems and implement long-run optimal behavior. The main results show that both stick contracts, which levy a fine when an individual gives in to a temptation, and carrot contracts, which give rewards for resisting, can simulate binding commitments. However, carrots have several advantages over sticks. Sticks create a temptation to cancel the contract, carrots are less vulnerable to trembles and finally carrots allow for more flexibility.
Economics

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Kőszegi, Botond. "Essays in behavioral economics." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74883.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2000.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 141-149).
Chapter 1: This chapter examines the logical consequences of the rather unsurprising notion that humans care about and manage their self-image, a notion long taken for granted by psychologists. I model this by assuming that decisionmakers derive utility from positive views about the self, holding constant standard utilitarian outcomes usually assumed relevant in economics. Other than this, agents are timeconsistent expected utility maximizers, are constrained in their updating by Bayes' rule, and can manipulate their beliefs only by controlling the flow of information that they receive. The motive to maintain a favorable self-image leads to a systematic rejection of free information about the self in certain states of the world and eventually to overconfident beliefs. Economically relevant decisions are affected by this overconfidence as well as the incentive to gather information about and make decisions so as to optimally manage beliefs. Agents might avoid informative actions when satisfied with their current beliefs ('self-image protection'), and seek out activities in which they can prove themselves when they are not ('self-image enhancement'), even if these choices are otherwise poor. These motives lead to a whole host of effects on behavior that other models have trouble explaining in a unified framework. The model can also make testable predictions on how these effects play themselves out across different categories of tasks and within a category of tasks over time. Applications to stock market participation, the choice between salaried and self-employment, career choice, manager behavior, and employee motivation are discussed. Chapter 2: This chapter starts from the same premise as the previous one, the assumption that agents care about their self-image, but examines its consequences in a different information structure. Agents can improve financial decisions by making subjective judgments about their payoffs, while they derive ego utility from their perceptions regarding this ability. If the agent has a self-image protection motive, she will as a result be averse to making a subjective judgment and reviewing it later, since this combination is informative about ability. The consequence could be a sluggishness in responding to new information, procrastination in making up one's mind, or the reliance on inferior objective information. Possible remedies and applications are discussed, with particular attention to anxiety about health. Chapter 3 (with Peter Diamond): There is overwhelming psychological evidence that some people run into self-control problems regularly, yet the effect of these findings on major life-cycle decisions hasn't been studied in detail. This paper extends Laibson's quasi-hyperbolic discounting savings model, in which each intertemporal self realizes that her time discount structure will lead to preference changes, and thus plays a game with her future selves. By making retirement endogenous, savings affect both consumption and work in the future. From earlier selves' points of view, the deciding self tends to retire too early, so it is possible that the self before saves less to induce her to work. However, still earlier selves think the pre-retirement self may do this too much, leading to possible higher saving on their part and eventual early retirement. Thus, the consumption path exhibits observational non-equivalence with exponential discounting. Observational non-equivalence also obtains on a number of comparative statics questions. For example, a self could have a negative marginal propensity to consume out of changes in future income. The outcome with naive agents, who fail to realize their self-control problem, is also briefly discussed. In that case, the deciding self's potential decision to retire despite earlier selves' plans results in a downward updating of available lifetime resources, and an empirically observed downward jump in the consumption path.
by Botond Kőszegi.
Ph.D.

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Nardotto, Mattia <1982&gt. "Essays in behavioral economics." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2011. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/4084/.

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In this work we conduct an experimental analysis on different behavioral models of economic choice. In particular, we analyze the role of overconfidence in shaping the beliefs of economics agents about the future path of their consumption or investment. We discuss the relevance of this bias in expectation formation both from a static and from a dynamic point of view and we analyze the effect of possible interventions aimed to achieve some policy goals. The methodology we follow is both theoretical and empirical. In particular, we make large use of controlled economic field experiments in order to test the predictions of the theoretical models we propose. In the second part of the thesis we discuss the role of cognition and personality in affecting economic preferences and choices. In this way we make a bridge between established psychological research and novel findings in economics. Finally, we conduct a field study on the role of incentives on education. We design different incentive schemes and we test, on randomized groups of students, their effectiveness in improving academic performance.

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Roel, Marcus. "Essays in behavioral economics." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2018. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3743/.

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This thesis contains two theoretical essays on reciprocity and one that analyzes the effects of perception biases on learning and decision-making. In the first chapter, I propose a new theory of intention-based reciprocity that addresses the question of when a mutually beneficial action is kind. When both benefit from the action, a player’s motive is unclear: he may be perceived as kind for improving the other player’s payoff, or as self-interested and not-kind for improving his own. I use trust as an intuitive mechanism to solve this ambiguity. Whenever a player puts himself in a vulnerable position by taking such an action, he can be perceived as kind. In contrast, if this action makes him better off than his alternative actions do, even if it is met by the most selfish response, he cannot be kind. My model explains why papers in the literature fail to find (much) positive reciprocity when players can reward and punish. The second chapter extends my theory of reciprocity to incomplete information. I outline how reciprocity can give rise to pay-what-you-want pricing schemes. In the classic bilateral trade setting, I show that sequential interactions can be more efficient than normal form mechanisms when some people are motivated by reciprocity. Reciprocity creates incentives for information sharing. The last chapter is co-authored with Manuel Staab. We study the effects of perception biases and incorrect priors on learning behavior, and the welfare ranking of information experiments. We find that both types of biases by themselves reduce expected utility in a model where payoff relevant actions also generate informative signals, i.e. when actions constitute information experiments. However, experiments can be affected to different degrees by these biases. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when any binary ranking of action profiles can be reversed. Building on these findings, we show that an agent can be better off suffering from both biases rather than just one.

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McGee, Peter. "Essays in Behavioral Economics." The Ohio State University, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1305559183.

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Gotthard, Real Alexander. "Essays in Behavioral Economics." The Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1429818327.

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Sengupta, Arjun. "Essays on Behavioral Economics." The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1469274781.

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Bhattacharya, Puja Bhattacharya. "Essays on Behavioral Economics." The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1497529184398851.

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Konovalov, Arkady. "Essays in Behavioral Economics." The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1494436077382145.

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Chakraborty, Anujit. "Essays in behavioral economics." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/62173.

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This thesis studies individual choice in both individualistic and interactive decisions, under different situations of risk, uncertainty and time delay. The first chapter of my dissertation investigates the tendency of human beings to make choices that are biased towards alternatives in the present. I characterize the general class of utilities which are consistent with present-biased behavior. I show that any present-biased preference has a subjective max-min representation, which can be cognitively interpreted as the decision maker considering the most conservative “present equivalents” in the face of subjective uncertainty about future tastes. The second chapter of my thesis provides desiderata of choice consistency that experimenters should employ while estimating time preferences from choice data. We also show how application of this desiderata can help us learn new insights from previous experimental studies. The third chapter of my thesis establishes a tight relation between non-standard behaviors in the domains of risk and time by considering a decision maker with non-expected utility preferences who believes that only present consumption is certain while any future consumption is uncertain. We provide the first complete characterization of the two-way relations between i) certainty effect and present bias, and, ii) common ratio effect and the common difference effect. A corollary to our results is that hyperbolic discounting implies the Common Ratio Effect and that quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies the Certainty Effect. In the fourth chapter of my thesis, I use variation in experimental design (time-discounting) and belief data from subjects to investigate the determinants of behavior in Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games.
Arts, Faculty of
Vancouver School of Economics
Graduate

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Sebald, Alexander LE. "Essays in behavioral economics." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210389.

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Traditionally economics is based on very narrow presumptions about human behavior, namely selfishness. In the last 20 years, however, experimental research has accumulated overwhelming evidence that is at odds with these classical assumptions. It has been shown that people very often care about the distributional consequences of their actions and intentions.

Against this background, in this thesis the impact of broader models of human behavior on decision making and human interactions is studied, for example the impact of indirect reciprocity on human relationships. If educational expenditures of parents into children depend on grandparents' investments into the parent’s education, then private educational spending is inefficiently low and should be supported by the state. This finding stands in contrast to earlier results that show that parents might invest optimally into the education of their children out of pure altruism or strategic transfer motives.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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Isom, Carole A. "Not So Black and White: The Color of Perception in Corporate Layoffs." Antioch University / OhioLINK, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=antioch1290134052.

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Gamp, Tobias [Verfasser]. "Essays in Behavioral Industrial Organization / Tobias Gamp." Bonn : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2016. http://d-nb.info/1122193750/34.

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Lara, Córdova Edgardo Amílcar. "Essays on behavioral health economics." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/457777.

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En este trabajo, se aplican herramientas de la Economía Conductual al sector de la salud. En primer lugar, el mercado de Planes Médicos genera una distancia temporal entre la firma del contrato y la prestación de los servicios médicos contratados. Por lo tanto, los consumidores a la hora de decidir firmar un contrato de servicios médicos están obligados a crear previsiones para elegir. Es natural suponer que los consumidores carecen de los conocimientos y sofisticación para predecir con precisión sus necesidades futuras, pues las predicciones de demanda de servicios médicos requieren un considerable nivel de conocimientos y un suficiente acceso a la información. Por lo tanto, las decisiones en este mercado dependen de manera importante de las creencias de los consumidores, sin hablar de la multiplicidad de creencias existente. En el capítulo 2 se estudia dicho mercado cuando los consumidores tienen creencias sesgadas sobre la probabilidad de su estado de salud futuro. Es decir, que sobre o subestiman el riesgo de contraer una enfermedad Se deducen las implicaciones que tienen las creencias sesgada sobre los Planes Médicos públicos y privados. Se encuentra que cuando los consumidores mantienen creencias sesgadas, los proveedores privados pueden capitalizar tales sesgos. Estos sesgos son una de las posibles explicaciones a la contratación de Planes Médicos que proporcionan niveles de tratamiento distintos a los eficientes. Se explora la interacción entre los proveedores de planes públicos y privados. Para ello se derivan los contratos óptimos de un proveedor público y se demuestra que las creencias sesgadas dan lugar a la entrada de proveedores privados, que aprovechan los sesgos para obtener ganancias estrictamente positivas. También se analiza cómo reacciona el proveedor público a la presencia de los proveedores privados. En segundo lugar, se estudia la elección de proveedores de servicios médicos (médicos, hospitales o planes de salud), la cual implica un proceso de recopilación de información y un mecanismo para estimar y evaluar la calidad de dichos proveedores. Estos procesos también están sujetos a sesgos. Específicamente, en el tercer y cuarto capítulo del presente trabajo se analizan las fuentes de información que los clientes utilizan para hacer juicios sobre la calidad de los médicos. Nos centramos en la manera en que esto afecta a la calidad de los médicos. Es decir, en los capítulos 3 y 4 se estudian las elecciones de calidad y precios de doctores que operan en un mercado donde los consumidores basan sus decisiones en anécdotas. Los consumidores se percatan de la existencia de únicamente algunos de los médicos en el mercado y estiman sus habilidades tomando una muestra entre los pacientes anteriores de cada médico. Estas decisiones basadas en anécdotas tienen dos peculiaridades: un exceso de confianza en muestras pequeñas y la limitada disponibilidad de información. Se encuentra que, a mayor disponibilidad de información, mayor diferenciación en calidad y menor el nivel de calidad promedio en el mercado. La aplicación de modelos económicos tradicionales, basados en la maximización de la utilidad por parte de consumidores perfectamente informados ha contribuido grandemente en el diseño e implementación de políticas públicas en el sector salud. Sin embargo, la aplicación de herramientas de la Economía Conductual puede ser fructífera para profundizar en el análisis de sector salud. El presente trabajo es un intento de contribuir con algunas ideas al desarrollo de una comprensión más completa de algunas situaciones en el sector de la salud que se caracterizan, al menos parcialmente, por involucrar sesgos conductuales.
In this work, we apply Behavioral Economic models and tools to the healthcare sector. First, the Health Plan market naturally generates a time gap between the acceptance of the Health Plan contract and the delivery of the contracted services. Therefore, in decisions regarding the signing of Health Plan contracts consumers are required to create forecasts to choose their supplier. It is natural to assume that consumers lack the knowledge and apparatus to accurately predict their future needs for medical services, as predictions of such ilk demand a considerable level of expertise and access to relevant information. Therefore, decisions in this market depend to a large extent on the beliefs hold by consumers. Moreover, consumers are very diverse in terms of such beliefs. In chapter 2 we study the Health Plan market in presence of consumers with biased beliefs on the likelihood of their future health status. That is, they over or underestimate the probability for them to contract a disease. We derive the implications of biased risk-of-disease estimations on the private and public healthcare systems. We find that when consumers hold biased beliefs, private providers can capitalize on such biases. Biased beliefs then become relevant as they could be a reason to offer Health Plan contracts that provide treatment quantities that differ from efficient levels. We explore the interaction that arises between private and public healthcare provision under such circumstances. For this we compute the contracts offered by a public provider and show that the presence of biased beliefs create room for the entrance of private providers, who take advantage of consumers biases to make strictly positive profits. We also analyze how the public provider reacts to the presence of private providers. Second, the choice of medical services providers (physicians, hospitals or Health Plans) involves a process of gathering information and a mechanism for estimating and evaluating the quality of said providers. These processes and mechanisms are also subject to behavioral biases. Specifically, in the third and fourth chapter of the present work we analyze the sources of information that consumers use to make judgments about the quality of physicians. We mainly focus in the manners in which the environment affects the physicians' choice of quality. Namely, in chapters 3 and 4 we study the ability choices and pricing strategies of physicians who operate in a market where consumers base their decisions on anecdotes. The consumers are aware of only some of the physicians in the market and estimate their abilities by taking a sample from the patients a given physician has previously treated. Consumers' decisions based on anecdotal evidence entail two hindrances: an over-reliance on small samples and the limited availability of information. In this setting, situations arise where physicians have incentives to choose low levels of ability even when it is costless. More information availability leads to more ability differentiation and a lower average ability level. The application of traditional economic models relying on rational, utility-maximizing agents with perfect information, has greatly contributed to the design and implementation of public policy in healthcare. Yet, we belief that the application of the tools from Behavioral Economics can be fruitful in further advancing the analysis of healthcare markets and institutions, particularly when one considers the peculiarities inherent to the sector. The present work is an attempt to contribute with some insights that could be helpful in developing a fuller understanding of some situations in the healthcare market which we believe to be shaped, at least partially, by behavioral biases.

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Ebering, Alexander. "Behavioral economics : Konzepte und Anwendungen." Lohmar Eul, 2005. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2659994&prov=M&dokv̲ar=1&doke̲xt=htm.

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Reggiani, Tommaso <1983&gt. "Essays in Behavioral Personnel Economics." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2012. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/5059/.

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The thesis contemplates 4 papers and its main goal is to provide evidence on the prominent impact that behavioral analysis can play into the personnel economics domain.The research tool prevalently used in the thesis is the experimental analysis.The first paper provide laboratory evidence on how the standard screening model–based on the assumption that the pecuniary dimension represents the main workers’choice variable–fails when intrinsic motivation is introduced into the analysis.The second paper explores workers’ behavioral reactions when dealing with supervisors that may incur in errors in the assessment of their job performance.In particular,deserving agents that have exerted high effort may not be rewarded(Type-I errors)and undeserving agents that have exerted low effort may be rewarded(Type-II errors).Although a standard neoclassical model predicts both errors to be equally detrimental for effort provision,this prediction fails when tested through a laboratory experiment.Findings from this study suggest how failing to reward deserving agents is significantly more detrimental than rewarding undeserving agents.The third paper investigates the performance of two antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on schooling achievement.The study is conducted through a field experiment.Students randomized to the main treatments have been incentivized to cooperate or to compete in order to earn additional exam points.Consistently with the theoretical model proposed in the paper,the level of effort in the competitive scheme proved to be higher than in the cooperative setting.Interestingly however,this result is characterized by a strong gender effect.The fourth paper exploits a natural experiment setting generated by the credit crunch occurred in the UK in the2007.The economic turmoil has negatively influenced the private sector,while public sector employees have not been directly hit by the crisis.This shock–through the rise of the unemployment rate and the increasing labor market uncertainty–has generated an exogenous variation in the opportunity cost of maternity leave in private sector labor force.This paper identifies the different responses.

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Maréchal, Michel André. "Behavioral economics in the wild /." [St. Gallen : s.n.], 2007. http://aleph.unisg.ch/hsgscan/hm00205275.pdf.

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Nord, Christina M. "The Behavioral Economics of Effort." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2014. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc699857/.

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Although response effort is considered a dimension of the cost to obtain reinforcement, little research has examined the economic impact of effort on demand for food. The goal of the present study was to explore the relationship between effort and demand. Three Sprague Dawley rats were trained to press a force transducer under a series of fixed-ratio schedules (1, 10, 18, 32, 56, 100, 180, 320, and 560) under different force requirements (5.6 g and 56 g). Thus, nominal unit price (responses / food) remained constant while minimal response force requirements varied. Using a force transducer allowed the measurement of responses failing to meet the minimal force requirement (i.e. “subcriterion responses”), an advantage over prior approaches using weighted levers to manipulate effort. Consistent with prior research, increasing the unit price decreased food consumption, and raising minimum force requirements further reduced demand for food. Additionally, increasing the force requirement produced subcriterion responses. Analysis indicated that subcriterion responses did not create incidental changes in unit price. Obtained force data revealed that including obtained forces in unit price calculations provided better predictions of consumption when compared to using criterion force requirements.

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Iris, Haydar Doruk. "Four essays in behavioral economics." Doctoral thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11843.

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Berezin, Peter. "Spatial organization in international economics." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape3/PQDD_0019/NQ53727.pdf.

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Larsen, Bradley Joseph. "Essays on industrial organization economics." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/81045.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2013.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 189-201).
The first chapter quantifies the efficiency of a real-world bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987) derived the theoretical efficient frontier for bilateral trade under two-sided uncertainty, but little is known about how well real-world bargaining performs relative to the frontier. The setting is wholesale used-auto auctions, an $80 billion industry where buyers and sellers participate in alternating-offer bargaining when the auction price fails to reach a secret reserve price. Using 300,000 auction/bargaining sequences, this study nonparametrically estimates bounds on the distributions of buyer and seller valuations and then estimates where bargaining outcomes lie relative to the efficient frontier. Findings indicate that the observed auction-followed-by-bargaining mechanism is quite efficient, achieving 88-96% of the surplus and 92-99% of the trade volume which can be achieved on the efficient frontier. This second chapter examines a common form of entry restriction: occupational licensing. The chapter studies how occupational licensing laws affect the distribution of quality and how the effects of licensing on quality vary across regions of differing income levels. The study uses variation in state licensing requirements for teachers and two national datasets on teacher qualifications (input quality) and student test scores (output quality) from 1983-2008. Results show that more restrictive licensing may lead first-year teachers of high input quality to opt out of the occupation. For teachers who remain in the occupation longer, stricter licensing increases input quality at most quantiles. The distribution of student test scores increases with stricter licensing, primarily in the upper half of the distribution. For most forms of licensing studied, input and output quality improvements due to stricter licensing occur in high-income rather than low-income districts. The third chapter (co-authored with Denis Chetverikov and Christopher Palmer) proposes a simple approach for estimating distributional effects of a group-level treatment when there are unobservable components at the group level which may be correlated with the treatment. Standard quantile regression techniques are inconsistent in this setting, while grouped instrumental variables quantile regression is consistent. The study illustrates the estimation approach with several examples, including applications from the first two chapters of this thesis.
by Bradley Joseph Larsen.
Ph.D.

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Wang, Hao. "Three essays in industrial organization." Connect to resource, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view.cgi?acc%5Fnum=osu1261316064.

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Wilmes, Burkhard Wolf [Verfasser]. "Behavioral compliance : corporate compliance meets behavioral economics / Burkhard Wolf Wilmes." Paderborn : Universitätsbibliothek, 2018. http://d-nb.info/1153462680/34.

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Mollerstrom, Johanna Britta. "Essays in Behavioral and Experimental Economics." Thesis, Harvard University, 2013. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10760.

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Olimov, Jafar M. "Three Essays on Industrial Organization." The Ohio State University, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1366979858.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Behavioral economics of organization'

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