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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Behavioral game theory

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Academic literature on the topic 'Behavioral game theory'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 11 March 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Behavioral game theory"

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Camerer, Colin F. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 4 (November 1, 1997): 167–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.4.167.

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Behavioral game theory aims to predict how people actually behave by incorporating psychological elements and learning into game theory. With this goal in mind, experimental findings can be organized into three categories: players have systematic 'reciprocated social values,' like desires for fairness and revenge. Phenomena discovered in studies of individual judgments and choices, like 'framing' and overconfidence, are also evident in games. Strategic principles, like irrelevance of strategy labels and timing of moves, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and backward induction, are violated. Future research should incorporate these findings, along with learning and 'pregame theory,' into formal game theory.

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Gintis, Herbert. "The future of behavioral game theory." Mind & Society 10, no. 2 (September 28, 2011): 97–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11299-011-0091-8.

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Gaffar, Mohammad Rizal, Wahyu Rafdinal, Eko Susanto, and Cahaya Juniarti. "Predicting Mobile Game Adoption: Integrating Game Features and Theory of Planned Behavior." SRIWIJAYA INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DYNAMIC ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 6, no. 3 (November 11, 2022): 309. http://dx.doi.org/10.29259/sijdeb.v6i3.309-320.

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This study investigates gamers’ behavior in adopting mobile games by integrating game features and the theory of planned behavior (TPB). This study used 408 samples of Indonesian gamers. A partial least square is applied to examine the influence among subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, attitude, game features, and intention to play mobile games. The results show that the integration between Game features and TPB gives a deeper explanation of gamers’ behavior in adopting mobile games. Considering the factors in gamers’ behavior, this study's results give the base to formulate an implementation strategy for the appropriate game features in attracting gamers’ interest to keep playing mobile games. It is also the first study that integrates Game features and TPB to assess mobile game adoption.

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Coffey, Aodhan L., Tomas E. Ward, and Richard H. Middleton. "Game Theory." International Journal of Ambient Computing and Intelligence 3, no. 3 (July 2011): 43–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jaci.2011070106.

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Designing suitable robotic controllers for automating movement-based rehabilitation therapy requires an understanding of the interaction between patient and therapist. Current approaches do not take into account the highly dynamic and interdependent nature of this relationship. A better understanding can be accomplished through framing the interaction as a problem in game theory. The main strength behind this approach is the potential to develop robotic control systems which automatically adapt to patient interaction behavior. Agents learn from experiences, and adapt their behaviors so they are better suited to their environment. As the models evolve, structures, patterns and behaviors emerge that were not explicitly programmed into the original models, but which instead surface through the agent interactions with each other and their environment. This paper advocates the use of such agent based models for analysing patient-therapist interactions with a view to designing more efficient and effective robotic controllers for automated therapeutic intervention in motor rehabilitation. The authors demonstrate in a simplified implementation the effectiveness of this approach through simulating known behavioral patterns observed in real patient-therapist interactions, such as learned dependency.

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Nikitina, Valentina Sergeevna. "Behavioral modelling of subjects in legal cases-games with imperfect rationality." SHS Web of Conferences 118 (2021): 01011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202111801011.

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Game theory, applied in various fields, including in law, studies conflict game models and searches for their formatted solutions, makes it possible to solve many tasks and problems, predict the behaviour of subjects in various situations, thereby explaining the behavior logic of the individuals in conflict of interests. However, human behavior is not always rational (reasonable), moreover, it can be difficult to predict which strategy the player will choose when making his move in the game. In this regard, it is advisable to consider rational behavior as an accepted and reasonable behavior of game participants and irrational behavior as deviant, unpredictable behavior of players, which relies on the internal regulation of a person (beliefs, intuition, creativity, feelings, emotions, etc.) and which studies one of the developing directions of game theory in modern science – evolutionary game theory. The study aims to determine the types of irrational behavior of players, which puts other players in a difficult position and precludes from determining each other’s optimal strategies for mutual benefit and stability, using the example of legal incidents modeling through games with imperfect rationality. The authors believe, that to achieve this goal using the methods of analysis and modeling, the imperfections of rationality can be considered and studied, the types of irrational behavior of players can be defined using the games with imperfect calculation of the game, imperfect information and changes in goals during the game (with a multipersonal representation of the game) and a complete absence of rationality.

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Sally, David. "Risky speech: behavioral game theory and pragmatics." Journal of Pragmatics 35, no. 8 (August 2003): 1223–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0378-2166(02)00170-4.

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Tyran, Jean-Robert. "Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction." Journal of Socio-Economics 32, no. 6 (December 2003): 717–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2003.10.009.

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Egashira, Mahiro, Daisuke Son, and Arisa Ema. "Serious Game for Change in Behavioral Intention Toward Lifestyle-Related Diseases: Experimental Study With Structural Equation Modeling Using the Theory of Planned Behavior." JMIR Serious Games 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2022): e28982. http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/28982.

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Background Health activities should be tailored to individual lifestyles and values. To raise awareness of health behaviors, various practices related to health education, such as interactive activities among individuals with different backgrounds, have been developed. Moreover, serious games have been used as a tool for facilitating communication. However, there have been few investigations that are based on the framework of the theory of planned behavior on the mechanisms of health-related behavioral intention change from playing serious games. Objective We aimed to investigate the mechanisms of behavioral intention change among various age groups after an intervention using a serious game to increase awareness of lifestyle-related diseases. Methods Adults, undergraduates, and high school students played a serious game, called Negotiation Battle, and answered a questionnaire—Gaming Event Assessment Form for Lifestyle-related Diseases—before, immediately after, and 2-4 weeks after the game. The questionnaire was composed of 16 items based on the theory of planned behavior. We used structural equation modeling to compare responses from the 3 groups. Results For all 3 age groups (adults: mean 43.4 years, range 23-67 years; undergraduates: mean 20.9 years, range 19-34 years; high school students: mean 17.9 years, 17-18 years), perceived behavior control was the key factor of behavioral intention change. Immediately after the game, causal relationships between perceived behavioral control and behavioral intention were enhanced or maintained for all groups—adults (before: path coefficient 1.030, P<.001; after: path coefficient 2.045, P=.01), undergraduates (before: path coefficient 0.568, P=.004; after: path coefficient 0.737, P=.001), and high school students (before: path coefficient 14.543, P=.97; after: path coefficient 0.791, P<.001). Analysis of free descriptions after intervention suggested that experiencing dilemma is related to learning and behavioral intention. Conclusions The study revealed that the serious game changed the behavioral intention of adolescents and adults regarding lifestyle-related diseases, and changes in perceived behavioral control mediated the alteration mechanism.

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Ross, Don. "The game-theoretic innocence of experimental behavioral psychology." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 3 (June 2001): 426–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01484147.

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Hertwig and Ortmann imply that failure of many behavioral psychologists to observe several central methodological principles of experimental economics derives mainly from differences in disciplinary culture. I suggest that there are deeper philosophical causes, based (ironically) on a legacy of methodological individualism in psychology from which economists have substantially cured themselves through use of game theory. Psychologists often misidentify their objects of study by trying to wrench subjects out of their normal behavioral contexts in games.

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Faizullin, Rinat. "Game Reproduction of the Queuing System as an Economic Laboratory Experiment." SHS Web of Conferences 110 (2021): 01050. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202111001050.

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This article presents the results of an economic laboratory experiment based on a queuing system. The “classical” problem of the theory of mass service, known as the Erlang problem, with the aim of studying the behavioral theory of games reproduced in this article. It is based on the theory of queuing, which allows the company to avoid inefficient organization of customer service. Considerable attention is paid to the provisions of the behavioral theory of games as a method of making management decisions and their practical application. A mathematical model of decision making studied by queuing theory was compiled. There are Conclusions about the behavior in real economic situations. The experiment presented in the form of a game can be used as an original method of teaching economics.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Behavioral game theory"

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Cox, Caleb A. "Essays in Behavioral Game Theory." The Ohio State University, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1365163152.

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Iriberri, Nagore. "Essays in behavioral game theory : auctions, hide and seek, and coordination /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF formate. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2006. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3244177.

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Yakobi, Maxine J. "The Economic and Behavioral Success of Riot Games In an Undifferentiated Video Game Market." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/349.

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The vast success of Riot Games is relatively undisputed amongst financial analysts as well as online communities despite there being little information publicly available that specifically addresses how their game has differentiated itself in a homogenous market. Additionally, there is little information that addresses the opportunity cost of paying money for components within this specific server for advantages within the game. I believe there to be something functionally unique about Riot’s business in particular that allows for it to acquire steady fiscal growth from people investing their money into effectively a “free” online game and I would like to explore what that is. Therefore I wish to answer the question of why is it that Riot, despite having a relatively undifferentiated product within the MOBA game industry, exceeds all other companies in both player commitment and financial investment to their free-to-play product. My surveys will aim to address the reasons why players choose to invest both their time and money into the game and shed more light on the efficacy of the incentive structures in place. Through survey data and information gained through interviews I will form base comparisons between player preferences and then track the incentive structures across the MOBA industry. Using comparative analysis between the player-reported incentives which drive their behavior, the information gained through conducting personal interviews with Riot Representatives, and careful analysis of consumer trends with regards to League of Legends and the eSports franchise as designed by the Riot Games industry, I will attempt to find correlations between the player’s perceptions of Riot’s product and the incentives within the game. If consumption and growth patterns show correlations to the growth exhibited by the company that prove to be significant when compared with player preferences, those points could potentially explain the success that Riot has seen over the duration of the past five years of the company’s existence.

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Rampal, Jeevant. "Behavioral Economic Theory and Experimental Investigation." The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1491972688590258.

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Mezhvinsky, Dimitry. "Essays in Microeconomic Theory and Behavioral Economics." The Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1429802856.

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Cardella, Eric. "An Investigation of Behavioral Influences in Strategic Decision Making." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/222632.

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In this dissertation, I study the impact of behavioral influences on strategic economic decision making in three essays.The first essay explores the interpersonal implications of guilt aversion in strategic settings. In doing so, I first introduce a stylized 2-player game where one players has an opportunity to induce guilt upon the other player in a manner derived from findings in the psychology literature. I then develop an experimental design, centered around this game, that allows me to test (i) whether agents attempt to induce guilt upon others in self-serving ways, (ii) whether agents are susceptible to the guilt induction of others, and (iii) whether agents are more trusting when they have an opportunity to induce guilt upon others. Furthermore, I theoretically show, via an application of the Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) model of simple guilt, that effective guilt induction can be supported as an equilibrium of the game considered.In the second essay, I explore the influence of posted price fairness concerns in bilateral negotiation settings. In doing so, I propose a price fairness model where, in addition to their material payoff, buyers receive disutility from engaging in negotiations, and aggressively negotiating, when the price is fair. As a result, the model predicts that buyers will negotiate less aggressively and possibly even forgo profitable negotiations when the posted price is fair, which is consistent with prior survey evidence on negotiation behavior. I also include a thorough discussion of the differences between the price fairness model and main alternative approaches to modeling fairness that exists in the literature.In the third essay, I experimentally investigate how the decision making quality of an agent's opponent influences learning in strategic games. In particular, I test whether learning-by-doing and learning-by-observing become more effective in games when agents face an optimal decision making opponent. To test these hypotheses, I propose a novel experimental design that enables me to measure strategic decision making quality and control the decision making quality of the opponent.

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Peysakhovich, Alexander. "Essays in Behavioral Economics." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10686.

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Essays in this dissertation cover three topics in behavioral economics: social preferences, ambiguity aversion and self-control. The first essay, based on work with Aurelie Ouss, studies the behavior of individuals making decisions to punish norm violators. It addresses two types of questions. First, what parameters affect these punishment decisions? Second, what do outcomes look like when these decisions are aggregated? Experimental data show that individual punishment decisions appear to respond to individual cost and not necessarily social cost. Additionally, individuals appear not to take the probability that violators will be apprehended into account. Finally, punishment by others does not act as a perfect substitute for own punishment. These combined effects mean that aggregate levels of punishment rarely resemble those in line with commonly used benchmarks such as optimal deterrence. The second essay, based on work with Uma Karmarkar, studies how information affects valuation of ambiguous financial prospects. Experimental results show that across several domains individual valuations appear to react much more strongly to favorable information than unfavorable information. Additional studies indicate that this effect is driven by two mechanisms. The first is a bias towards the integration of favorable information. The second is an effect of ambiguity aversion, individuals appear to be averse to subjective ignorance and so unfavorable information has a positive component: it removes some of this uncertainty. The final essay looks at how dual-self (Fudenberg-Levine (2006)) decision makers can use commitment contracts to combat self-control problems and implement long-run optimal behavior. The main results show that both stick contracts, which levy a fine when an individual gives in to a temptation, and carrot contracts, which give rewards for resisting, can simulate binding commitments. However, carrots have several advantages over sticks. Sticks create a temptation to cancel the contract, carrots are less vulnerable to trembles and finally carrots allow for more flexibility.
Economics

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Berger, Ulrich, Silva Hannelore De, and Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling. "Cognitive Hierarchies in the Minimizer Game." WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2016. http://epub.wu.ac.at/4805/1/wp211.pdf.

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Experimental tests of choice predictions in one-shot games show only little support for Nash equilibrium (NE). Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy (PCH) and level-k (LK) are behavioral models of the thinking-steps variety where subjects differ in the number of levels of iterated reasoning they perform. Camerer et al. (2004) claim that substituting the Poisson parameter tau = 1.5 yields a parameter-free PCH model (pfPCH) which predicts experimental data considerably better than NE. We design a new multi-person game, the Minimizer Game, as a testbed to compare initial choice predictions of NE, pfPCH and LK. Data obtained from two large-scale online experiments strongly reject NE and LK, but are well in line with the point prediction of pfPCH.
Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

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Konovalov, Arkady. "Essays in Behavioral Economics." The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1494436077382145.

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Bilal, Ahmed. "Counterfactual conditional analysis using the Centipede Game." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2252.

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The Backward Induction strategy for the Centipede Game leads us to a counterfactual reasoning paradox, The Centipede Game paradox. The counterfactual reasoning proving the backward induction strategy for the game appears to rely on the players in the game not choosing that very same backward induction strategy. The paradox is a general paradox that applies to backward induction reasoning in sequential, perfect information games. Therefore, the paradox is not only problematic for the Centipede Game, but it also affects counterfactual reasoning solutions in games similar to the Centipede Game. The Centipede Game is a prime illustration of this paradox in counterfactual reasoning. As a result, this paper will use a material versus subjunctive/counterfactual conditional analysis to provide a theoretical resolution to the Centipede Game, with the hope that a similar solution can be applied to other areas where this paradox may appear. The solution involves delineating between the epistemic systems of the players and the game theorists.

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Books on the topic "Behavioral game theory"

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Williams, Kenneth C. Introduction to game theory: A behavioral approach. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

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1945-, Sigmund Karl, ed. Evolutionary game dynamics: American Mathematical Society Short Course, January 4-5, 2011, New Orleans, Louisiana. Providence, R.I: American Mathematical Society, 2011.

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Levine, David K., ed. Is Behavioral Economics Doomed?: The Ordinary versus the Extraordinary. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2012.

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Crisman, Karl-Dieter, and Michael A. Jones. The mathematics of decisions, elections, and games. Providence, Rhode Island: American Mathematical Society, 2014.

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Gintis, Herbert M. The bounds of reason: Game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2009.

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Tremblay, Victor J. New perspectives on industrial organization: With contributions from behavioral economics and game theory. New York: Springer, 2012.

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Bonato, Anthony. The game of cops and robbers on graphs. Providence, R.I: American Mathematical Society, 2011.

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Y, Narahari, ed. Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions. London: Springer, 2009.

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KARDARAS, IOANNIS KARATZAS; CONSTANTINOS. PORTFOLIO THEORY AND ARBITRAGE. [S.l.]: AMS, 2021.

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1962-, Dugatkin Lee Alan, and Reeve Hudson Kern, eds. Game theory & animal behavior. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

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Book chapters on the topic "Behavioral game theory"

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Patterson, Wayne, and Cynthia E. Winston-Proctor. "Game Theory." In Behavioral Cybersecurity, 69–79. First edition. | Boca Raton : CRC Press, 2021.: CRC Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003052029-9.

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Patterson, Wayne, and Cynthia E. Winston-Proctor. "Game Theory." In Behavioral Cybersecurity, 95–110. Boca Raton : Taylor & Francis, CRC Press, 2019.: CRC Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9780429461484-13.

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Angner, Erik. "Behavioral Game Theory." In A Course in Behavioral Economics, 240–53. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-51293-2_11.

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Wilkinson, Nick, and Matthias Klaes. "Behavioral Game Theory." In An Introduction to Behavioral Economics, 348–98. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52413-3_9.

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Wilkinson, Nick, and Matthias Klaes. "Behavioral Game Theory." In An Introduction to Behavioral Economics, 334–90. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-39103-1_9.

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Angner, Erik. "Analytical Game Theory." In A Course in Behavioral Economics, 221–39. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-51293-2_10.

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Sandholm, William H. "Evolutionary Game Theory." In Complex Social and Behavioral Systems, 573–608. New York, NY: Springer US, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_188.

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Sotomayor, Marilda, and David Pérez-Castrillo. "Game Theory, Introduction to." In Complex Social and Behavioral Systems, 3–7. New York, NY: Springer US, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_240.

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Wooten, Jadrian. "Game theory and behavioral economics." In Parks and Recreation and Economics, 73–80. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. |: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003094906-10.

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Chatterjee, Kalyan, and Hamid Sabourian. "Game Theory and Strategic Complexity." In Complex Social and Behavioral Systems, 639–58. New York, NY: Springer US, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_241.

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Conference papers on the topic "Behavioral game theory"

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Cachon, Gerard P. "Game theory and operations management." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807458.

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Pass, Rafael, and Joe Halpern. "Game theory with costly computation." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807495.

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Zhang, Jun. "Reflexive theory-of-mind reasoning in games." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807435.

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van Ryzin, Garrett. "Game theory and the practice of revenue management." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807424.

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Amir, Rabah. "Discounted stochastic games with strategic complementarities." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807432.

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Cartwright, Edward, and Myrna Wooders. "Correlated equilibrium, conformity and stereotyping." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807419.

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Jackson, Matthew O. "Games and social network structure." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807407.

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Mertikopoulos, Panayotis, and Aris Moustakas. "Balancing traffic in networks." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807408.

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Melo, Emerson. "Oligopoly pricing in congested networks." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807409.

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Hoefer, Martin. "Coalitions and dynamics in network routing games." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807410.

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Reports on the topic "Behavioral game theory"

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Aruguete, Natalia, Ernesto Calvo, Carlos Scartascini, and Tiago Ventura. Trustful Voters, Trustworthy Politicians: A Survey Experiment on the Influence of Social Media in Politics. Inter-American Development Bank, July 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003389.

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Recent increases in political polarization in social media raise questions about the relationship between negative online messages and the decline in political trust around the world. To evaluate this claim causally, we implement a variant of the well-known trust game in a survey experiment with 4,800 respondents in Brazil and Mexico. Our design allows to test the effect of social media on trust and trustworthiness. Survey respondents alternate as agents (politicians) and principals (voters). Players can cast votes, trust others with their votes, and cast entrusted votes. The players rewards are contingent on their preferred “candidate” winning the election. We measure the extent to which voters place their trust in others and are themselves trustworthy, that is, willing to honor requests that may not benefit them. Treated respondents are exposed to messages from in-group or out-group politicians, and with positive or negative tone. Results provide robust support for a negative effect of uncivil partisan discourse on trust behavior and null results on trustworthiness. The negative effect on trust is considerably greater among randomly treated respondents who engage with social media messages. These results show that engaging with messages on social media can have a deleterious effect on trust, even when those messages are not relevant to the task at hand or not representative of the actions of the individuals involved in the game.

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