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Journal articles on the topic 'Behavioral game theory'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 11 March 2023

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1

Camerer, Colin F. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 4 (November 1, 1997): 167–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.4.167.

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Behavioral game theory aims to predict how people actually behave by incorporating psychological elements and learning into game theory. With this goal in mind, experimental findings can be organized into three categories: players have systematic 'reciprocated social values,' like desires for fairness and revenge. Phenomena discovered in studies of individual judgments and choices, like 'framing' and overconfidence, are also evident in games. Strategic principles, like irrelevance of strategy labels and timing of moves, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and backward induction, are violated. Future research should incorporate these findings, along with learning and 'pregame theory,' into formal game theory.

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2

Gintis, Herbert. "The future of behavioral game theory." Mind & Society 10, no. 2 (September 28, 2011): 97–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11299-011-0091-8.

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Gaffar, Mohammad Rizal, Wahyu Rafdinal, Eko Susanto, and Cahaya Juniarti. "Predicting Mobile Game Adoption: Integrating Game Features and Theory of Planned Behavior." SRIWIJAYA INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DYNAMIC ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 6, no. 3 (November 11, 2022): 309. http://dx.doi.org/10.29259/sijdeb.v6i3.309-320.

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This study investigates gamers’ behavior in adopting mobile games by integrating game features and the theory of planned behavior (TPB). This study used 408 samples of Indonesian gamers. A partial least square is applied to examine the influence among subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, attitude, game features, and intention to play mobile games. The results show that the integration between Game features and TPB gives a deeper explanation of gamers’ behavior in adopting mobile games. Considering the factors in gamers’ behavior, this study's results give the base to formulate an implementation strategy for the appropriate game features in attracting gamers’ interest to keep playing mobile games. It is also the first study that integrates Game features and TPB to assess mobile game adoption.

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Coffey, Aodhan L., Tomas E. Ward, and Richard H. Middleton. "Game Theory." International Journal of Ambient Computing and Intelligence 3, no. 3 (July 2011): 43–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jaci.2011070106.

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Designing suitable robotic controllers for automating movement-based rehabilitation therapy requires an understanding of the interaction between patient and therapist. Current approaches do not take into account the highly dynamic and interdependent nature of this relationship. A better understanding can be accomplished through framing the interaction as a problem in game theory. The main strength behind this approach is the potential to develop robotic control systems which automatically adapt to patient interaction behavior. Agents learn from experiences, and adapt their behaviors so they are better suited to their environment. As the models evolve, structures, patterns and behaviors emerge that were not explicitly programmed into the original models, but which instead surface through the agent interactions with each other and their environment. This paper advocates the use of such agent based models for analysing patient-therapist interactions with a view to designing more efficient and effective robotic controllers for automated therapeutic intervention in motor rehabilitation. The authors demonstrate in a simplified implementation the effectiveness of this approach through simulating known behavioral patterns observed in real patient-therapist interactions, such as learned dependency.

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Nikitina, Valentina Sergeevna. "Behavioral modelling of subjects in legal cases-games with imperfect rationality." SHS Web of Conferences 118 (2021): 01011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202111801011.

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Game theory, applied in various fields, including in law, studies conflict game models and searches for their formatted solutions, makes it possible to solve many tasks and problems, predict the behaviour of subjects in various situations, thereby explaining the behavior logic of the individuals in conflict of interests. However, human behavior is not always rational (reasonable), moreover, it can be difficult to predict which strategy the player will choose when making his move in the game. In this regard, it is advisable to consider rational behavior as an accepted and reasonable behavior of game participants and irrational behavior as deviant, unpredictable behavior of players, which relies on the internal regulation of a person (beliefs, intuition, creativity, feelings, emotions, etc.) and which studies one of the developing directions of game theory in modern science – evolutionary game theory. The study aims to determine the types of irrational behavior of players, which puts other players in a difficult position and precludes from determining each other’s optimal strategies for mutual benefit and stability, using the example of legal incidents modeling through games with imperfect rationality. The authors believe, that to achieve this goal using the methods of analysis and modeling, the imperfections of rationality can be considered and studied, the types of irrational behavior of players can be defined using the games with imperfect calculation of the game, imperfect information and changes in goals during the game (with a multipersonal representation of the game) and a complete absence of rationality.

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Sally, David. "Risky speech: behavioral game theory and pragmatics." Journal of Pragmatics 35, no. 8 (August 2003): 1223–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0378-2166(02)00170-4.

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7

Tyran, Jean-Robert. "Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction." Journal of Socio-Economics 32, no. 6 (December 2003): 717–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2003.10.009.

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8

Egashira, Mahiro, Daisuke Son, and Arisa Ema. "Serious Game for Change in Behavioral Intention Toward Lifestyle-Related Diseases: Experimental Study With Structural Equation Modeling Using the Theory of Planned Behavior." JMIR Serious Games 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2022): e28982. http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/28982.

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Background Health activities should be tailored to individual lifestyles and values. To raise awareness of health behaviors, various practices related to health education, such as interactive activities among individuals with different backgrounds, have been developed. Moreover, serious games have been used as a tool for facilitating communication. However, there have been few investigations that are based on the framework of the theory of planned behavior on the mechanisms of health-related behavioral intention change from playing serious games. Objective We aimed to investigate the mechanisms of behavioral intention change among various age groups after an intervention using a serious game to increase awareness of lifestyle-related diseases. Methods Adults, undergraduates, and high school students played a serious game, called Negotiation Battle, and answered a questionnaire—Gaming Event Assessment Form for Lifestyle-related Diseases—before, immediately after, and 2-4 weeks after the game. The questionnaire was composed of 16 items based on the theory of planned behavior. We used structural equation modeling to compare responses from the 3 groups. Results For all 3 age groups (adults: mean 43.4 years, range 23-67 years; undergraduates: mean 20.9 years, range 19-34 years; high school students: mean 17.9 years, 17-18 years), perceived behavior control was the key factor of behavioral intention change. Immediately after the game, causal relationships between perceived behavioral control and behavioral intention were enhanced or maintained for all groups—adults (before: path coefficient 1.030, P<.001; after: path coefficient 2.045, P=.01), undergraduates (before: path coefficient 0.568, P=.004; after: path coefficient 0.737, P=.001), and high school students (before: path coefficient 14.543, P=.97; after: path coefficient 0.791, P<.001). Analysis of free descriptions after intervention suggested that experiencing dilemma is related to learning and behavioral intention. Conclusions The study revealed that the serious game changed the behavioral intention of adolescents and adults regarding lifestyle-related diseases, and changes in perceived behavioral control mediated the alteration mechanism.

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9

Ross, Don. "The game-theoretic innocence of experimental behavioral psychology." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 3 (June 2001): 426–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01484147.

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Hertwig and Ortmann imply that failure of many behavioral psychologists to observe several central methodological principles of experimental economics derives mainly from differences in disciplinary culture. I suggest that there are deeper philosophical causes, based (ironically) on a legacy of methodological individualism in psychology from which economists have substantially cured themselves through use of game theory. Psychologists often misidentify their objects of study by trying to wrench subjects out of their normal behavioral contexts in games.

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Faizullin, Rinat. "Game Reproduction of the Queuing System as an Economic Laboratory Experiment." SHS Web of Conferences 110 (2021): 01050. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202111001050.

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This article presents the results of an economic laboratory experiment based on a queuing system. The “classical” problem of the theory of mass service, known as the Erlang problem, with the aim of studying the behavioral theory of games reproduced in this article. It is based on the theory of queuing, which allows the company to avoid inefficient organization of customer service. Considerable attention is paid to the provisions of the behavioral theory of games as a method of making management decisions and their practical application. A mathematical model of decision making studied by queuing theory was compiled. There are Conclusions about the behavior in real economic situations. The experiment presented in the form of a game can be used as an original method of teaching economics.

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Collins, Andrew J., and Sheida Etemadidavan. "Humans and the core partition: An agent-based modeling experiment." PLOS ONE 17, no. 9 (September 1, 2022): e0273961. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0273961.

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Although strategic coalition formation is traditionally modeled using cooperative game theory, behavioral game theorists have repeatedly shown that outcomes predicted by game theory are different from those generated by actual human behavior. To further explore these differences, in a cooperative game theory context, we experiment to compare the outcomes resulting from human participants’ behavior to those generated by a cooperative game theory solution mechanism called the core partition. Our experiment uses an interactive simulation of a glove game, a particular type of cooperative game, to collect the participant’s decision choices and their resultant outcomes. Two different glove games are considered, and the outputs from 62 trial games are analyzed. The experiment’s outcomes show that core coalitions, which are coalitions in a core partition, are found in about 42% of games. Though this number may seem low, a trial’s outcome is more complex than whether the human player finds a core coalition or not. Finding the core coalition depends on factors such as the other possible feasible solutions and the payoffs available from these solutions. These factors, and the complexity they generate, are discussed in the paper.

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Kariv, Shachar. "Book Reviews: Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction." Economica 71, no. 282 (May 2004): 319–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.372_1.x.

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Shefrin, Hersh. "Behavioral decision making, forecasting, game theory, and role-play." International Journal of Forecasting 18, no. 3 (July 2002): 375–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0169-2070(02)00021-3.

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Baltz, Konstantin. "Colin Camerer: Behavioral game theory, experiments in strategic interaction." Politische Vierteljahresschrift 45, no. 3 (September 2004): 446–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11615-004-0067-y.

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15

Cooper, David J. "An introduction to the symposium on behavioral game theory." Economic Theory 33, no. 1 (March 13, 2007): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0220-0.

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Kostelić, Katarina. "Game Awareness: A Questionnaire." Games 12, no. 4 (December 3, 2021): 90. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12040090.

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This paper deals with one of the possible methodological approaches to an empirical examination of game awareness. Such an outline should enable the gathering of a deeper understanding of individuals’ awareness. The questionnaire is based on a scenario technique, and it is focused on game awareness in situations with possible strategic interactions. The goal is to assess the instrument regarding its reliability and validity. Internal reliability is assessed using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. A k-nn analysis was used to estimate divergent construct validity and criterion validity, and nonparametric factor analysis was used to estimate convergent construct validity. The questionnaire satisfies the requirements of reliability and validity. Moreover, there is an indication that each of the eight scenarios may be used separately, as they also meet the criteria for reliability and validity. Possible practical and theoretical implications involve questionnaire use as a basis for educational intervention, other instruments’ development, as well as for the collection and publication of behavioral insights about game awareness. Behavioral insights should enrich the theory and incite behavioral game theory models of game awareness and its implications.

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Suleiman, Ramzi. "Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions." Games 13, no. 3 (April 21, 2022): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13030034.

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Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models are short of providing a general theory of behavior in economic interactions. In two previous articles, we proposed a rational theory of behavior in non-cooperative games, termed Economic Harmony theory (EH). In EH, we retained the rationality principle but modified the players’ utilities by defining them as functions of the ratios between their actual and aspired payoffs. We also abandoned the equilibrium concept in favor of the concept of “harmony,” defined as the intersection of strategies at which all players are equally satisfied. We derived and tested the theory predictions of behavior in the ultimatum game, the bargaining game with alternating offers, and the sequential common-pool resource dilemma game. In this article, we summarize the main tenets of EH and its previous predictions and test its predictions for behaviors in the public goods game and the trust game. We demonstrate that the harmony solutions account well for the observed fairness and cooperation in all the tested games. The impressive predictions of the theory, without violating the rationality principle nor adding free parameters, indicate that the role of benevolent sentiments in promoting fairness and cooperation in the discussed games is only marginal. Strikingly, the Golden Ratio, known for its aesthetically pleasing properties, emerged as the point of fair demands in the ultimatum game, the sequential bargaining game with alternating offers, and the sequential CPR dilemma game. The emergence of the golden ratio as the fairness solution in these games suggests that our perception of fairness and beauty are correlated. Because the harmony predictions underwent post-tests, future experiments are needed for conducting ex ante tests of the theory in the discussed games and in other non-cooperative games. Given the good performance of economic harmony where game theory fails, we hope that experimental economists and other behavioral scientists undertake such a task.

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Goeree, Jacob K., and Philippos Louis. "M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games." American Economic Review 111, no. 12 (December 1, 2021): 4002–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201683.

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We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered unrelated. M equilibrium is empirically robust and, despite being set-valued, falsifiable. Results from a series of experiments that compare M equilibrium to leading behavioral game theory models demonstrate its virtues in predicting observed choices and stated beliefs. Data from experimental games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and multiple M equilibria exhibit coordination problems that could not be anticipated through the lens of existing models. (JEL C72, C90, D83)

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Camuñas-García, Daniel, María Pilar Cáceres-Reche, and María de la Encarnación Cambil-Hernández. "Maximizing Engagement with Cultural Heritage through Video Games." Sustainability 15, no. 3 (January 27, 2023): 2350. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su15032350.

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This paper aims to provide a framework for creating and analyzing cultural heritage games, with the intention of maximizing players’ cognitive, emotional, and behavioral engagement with digital heritage. To achieve this, a set of game design characteristics was identified through semi-structured interviews with experts (n = 16) and subsequently validated through a discussion with university students (n = 19). Grounded theory was then applied to the comments of the experts to create a framework of ten fundamental characteristics, divided into three dimensions: cognitive, emotional, and behavioral. Additionally, an assessment of the literature was conducted to explain and support the inclusion of each game component.

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Makhmudova, Sh D., A. D. Makhmudov, and A. N. Urazgalieva. "Sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium in the form of Hamilton-Jacobi equations." Bulletin of the National Engineering Academy of the Republic of Kazakhstan 84, no. 2 (June 15, 2022): 183–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.47533/2020.1606-146x.167.

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The article discusses the application of the theory of optimal control for solving Hamilton-Jacob equations with phase constraints. A method for constructing generalized solutions using optimal control problems is proposed. The results and analysis of numerical experiments, conditions for the existence of equilibrium situations in noncooperative differential games of several persons, namely the conditions for the existence of equilibrium situations in noncooperative differential games of several persons, defining the action according to Hamilton, are stated. Necessary conditions in the form of Hamilton-Jacobi equations are obtained. Game theory as an applied mathematical theory is used to understand and explain the mechanisms that are used when people make decisions. The theory contributes to the functioning of the logic of strategic planning and the relationship between individuals. Game theory as a method of applied mathematics is used for behavioral studies in various conditions, and helps understand the behavior of economic agents. The theory has many applications and can be used in different areas such as: strategy games, administration, economics and artificial intelligence research. The article describes a mathematical method for studying optimal situations in game theory.

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Gintis, Herbert. "The contribution of game theory to experimental design in the behavioral sciences." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 3 (June 2001): 411–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01314140.

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Methodological practices differ between economics and psychology because economists use game theory as the basis for the design and interpretation of experiments, while psychologists do not. This methodological choice explains the “four key variables” stressed by Hert-wig and Ortmann. Game theory is currently the most rigorous basis for modeling strategic choice.

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Gu, Qianqian, Lei Hang, and Shaorong Sun. "Behavioral Game Theory Model in Pollution Control with Additional Supervision." Algorithms 15, no. 5 (April 21, 2022): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/a15050137.

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The work is devoted to the study of the impact of external control on the strategies of pollutant discharge enterprises and government regulators in the field of environmental protection. The authors construct a model of the relationship between these entities. It is an evolutionary game in which the players are entities that generate pollutants and the government departments that implement pollution supervision. The choice of strategies of both of these entities and the evolutionary stability of the system controlled by different regulatory efforts, i.e., a third party, are analyzed. The authors then verify the evolutionary paths and evolutionary results of the model under different conditions using simulation analysis based on this model. The conducted research shows that the weak power of third-party supervision is not enough to promote the evolution of the behavioral decisions of the government and enterprises. An appropriate increase in the power of third-party supervision will change the choice of the government and enterprises strategies in the short term; however, due to the mutual influence of the strategies between both sides of the game, in this situation, the evolutionary system does not pursue a stable state. The strong power of third-party supervision will push enterprises to choose a pollution control strategy, change the intensity of government supervision, and replace government supervision to a certain extent. It is an interesting example of modeling the relationship of this system on the basis of evolutionary game theory. The findings can be regarded as a theoretical reference for environmental pollution control of enterprises.

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Kuzmanovic, Marija. "Behavioral influences on strategic interactions outcomes in game theory models." Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research, no. 00 (2020): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/yjor191115023k.

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Traditional decision-making models assume the full rationality of all actors. Nevertheless, the practice has shown that the behavior and choices of actors are influenced by many factors such as motives, beliefs, opinions, personal and social preferences, as well as cognitive biases. Moreover, it has already been proven that people have limitations in their ability to collect relevant information and respond to them, i.e. they are bounded rational. All this has contributed to the development of behavioral models in many disciplines including game theory. This paper provides a detailed review of the literature regarding behavioral models of strategic decision making. Bounded rationality and other cognitive biases in the strategic interactions are illustrated through the findings of numerous experimental studies.

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Prosch, Bernhard. "Colin F. Camerer: Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategie Interaction." AUC PHILOSOPHICA ET HISTORICA 2004, no. 1 (January 12, 2018): 139–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.14712/24647055.2018.28.

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BIETA, VOLKER, UDO BROLL, HELLMUTH MILDE, and WILFRIED SIEBE. "THE NEW BASEL ACCORD AND THE NATURE OF RISK: A GAME THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE." Annals of Financial Economics 04, no. 01 (June 2008): 0850003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010495208500036.

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Basel II changes risk management in banks strongly. Internal rating procedures would lead one to expect that banks are changing over to active risk control. But, if risk management is no longer a simple "game against nature", if all agents involved are active players then a shift from a non-strategic model setting (measuring event risk stochastically) to a more general strategic model setting (measuring behavioral risk adequately) comes true. Knowing that a game is any situation in which the players make strategic decisions — i.e. decisions that take into account each other's actions and responses — game theory is a useful set of tools for better understanding different risk settings. Embedded in a short history of the Basel Accord in this article we introduce some basic ideas of game theory in the context of rating procedures in accordance with Basel II. As well, some insight is given how game theory works. Here, the primary value of game theory stems from its focus on behavioral risk: risk when all agents are presumed rational, each attempting to anticipate likely actions and reactions by its rivals.

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Balogh, Tamás László, and János Kormos. "A computational model of outguessing in two-player non-cooperative games." Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Informatica 6, no. 1 (June 1, 2014): 71–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ausi-2014-0019.

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Abstract Several behavioral game theory models aim at explaining why “smarter“ people win more frequently in simultaneous zero-sum games, a phanomenon, which is not explained by the Nash equilibrium concept. We use a computational model and a numerical simulation based on Markov chains to describe player behavior and predict payoffs.

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Golman, Russell. "New Directions in Behavioral Game Theory: Introduction to the Special Issue." Games 11, no. 4 (November 1, 2020): 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g11040050.

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Markman, Arthur B. "The limitations of unification." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 33–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07000763.

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There are two roadblocks to using game theory as a unified theory of the behavioral sciences. First, there may not be a single explanatory framework suitable for explaining psychological processing. Second, even if there is such a framework, game theory is too limited, because it focuses selectively on decision making to the exclusion of other crucial cognitive processes.

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McGlothlin, Joel W., Erol Akçay, Edmund D. Brodie, Allen J. Moore, and Jeremy Van Cleve. "A Synthesis of Game Theory and Quantitative Genetic Models of Social Evolution." Journal of Heredity 113, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 109–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jhered/esab064.

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Abstract Two popular approaches for modeling social evolution, evolutionary game theory and quantitative genetics, ask complementary questions but are rarely integrated. Game theory focuses on evolutionary outcomes, with models solving for evolutionarily stable equilibria, whereas quantitative genetics provides insight into evolutionary processes, with models predicting short-term responses to selection. Here we draw parallels between evolutionary game theory and interacting phenotypes theory, which is a quantitative genetic framework for understanding social evolution. First, we show how any evolutionary game may be translated into two quantitative genetic selection gradients, nonsocial and social selection, which may be used to predict evolutionary change from a single round of the game. We show that synergistic fitness effects may alter predicted selection gradients, causing changes in magnitude and sign as the population mean evolves. Second, we show how evolutionary games involving plastic behavioral responses to partners can be modeled using indirect genetic effects, which describe how trait expression changes in response to genes in the social environment. We demonstrate that repeated social interactions in models of reciprocity generate indirect effects and conversely, that estimates of parameters from indirect genetic effect models may be used to predict the evolution of reciprocity. We argue that a pluralistic view incorporating both theoretical approaches will benefit empiricists and theorists studying social evolution. We advocate the measurement of social selection and indirect genetic effects in natural populations to test the predictions from game theory and, in turn, the use of game theory models to aid in the interpretation of quantitative genetic estimates.

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Zhou, Zhe, Scott J. Moura, Hongcai Zhang, Xuan Zhang, Qinglai Guo, and Hongbin Sun. "Power-traffic network equilibrium incorporating behavioral theory: A potential game perspective." Applied Energy 289 (May 2021): 116703. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.116703.

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Foss, Jeffrey. "Game theory for reformation of behavioral science based on a mistake." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 24–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07000672.

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Gintis assumes the behavioral (=social) sciences are in disarray, and so proposes a theory for their unification. Examination of the unity of the physical sciences reveals he misunderstands the unity of science in general, and so fails to see that the social sciences are already unified with the physical sciences. Another explanation of the differences between them is outlined.

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Silverman, Barry G., Gnana Bharathy, Benjamin Nye, and Tony Smith. "Modeling factions for ‘effects based operations’, part II: behavioral game theory." Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 14, no. 2 (February 29, 2008): 120–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10588-008-9023-5.

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Li, Dayin, and Yubiao Wang. "Online Learning Management for Primary and Secondary Students during the COVID-19 Epidemic: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach." Sustainability 14, no. 19 (September 29, 2022): 12416. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su141912416.

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The purpose of this study is to explore the management of primary and secondary school students’ online learning during the COVID-19 pandemic and to analyze the impact of stakeholders’ behavioral choices on students’ online learning management. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs two-game models of "schools-students" and “schools-students-parents”, analyzes the influence of the behavioral interaction of game subjects on the game equilibrium in the two scenarios, and uses MATLAB 2018 software to carry out the numerical simulation. The results show significant differences in different game players’ strategy choices on students’ online learning management. Among them, the benefits brought by learning are the main factors affecting students’ strategic choices. Although the participation of parents has a positive effect on promoting students’ game strategy selection towards cooperation, there is a participation boundary to the involvement of parents. The school’s choice of punishment or reward has no significant effect on students’ online learning management. Compared with schools, punishments and rewards from parents have a substantial impact on promoting students’ strategic choices towards cooperation.

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Ross, Don. "Evolutionary game theory and the normative theory of institutional design: Binmore and behavioral economics." Politics, Philosophy & Economics 5, no. 1 (February 2006): 51–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594x06060619.

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Nax, Heinrich H. "The “Black Box” Method for Experimental Economics." Games 14, no. 2 (March 1, 2023): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g14020023.

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How humans behave in repeated strategic interactions, how they learn, how their decisions adapt, and how their decision-making evolves is a topic of fundamental interest in behavioral economics and behavioral game theory [...]

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Güth, Werner. "(Non)Behavioral Economics." Zeitschrift für Psychologie / Journal of Psychology 216, no. 4 (January 2008): 244–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/0044-3409.216.4.244.

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Economic theory has evolved without paying proper attention to behavioral approaches, especially to social, economic, and cognitive psychology. This has recently been addressed by including behavioral economics courses in many doctoral study programs. Although this new development is most welcome, the typical topics of the behavioral economics courses like aversion theories and simple adaptive (learning or evolutionary) dynamics are not truly behavioral. More specifically, we question whether neoclassical repairs or game-fitting exercises as well as more or less mechanical adaptation processes qualify as behavioral approaches. To avoid criticizing without offering alternatives, we suggest some truly behavioral concepts, especially the satisficing approach.

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Ainslie, George. "Game theory can build higher mental processes from lower ones1." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 16–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07000593.

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The question of reductionism is an obstacle to unification. Many behavioral scientists who study the more complex or higher mental functions avoid regarding them as selected by motivation. Game-theoretic models in which complex processes grow from the strategic interaction of elementary reward-seeking processes can overcome the mechanical feel of earlier reward-based models. Three examples are briefly described.

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Giaccherini, Matilde, and Giovanni Ponti. "Preference Based Subjective Beliefs." Games 9, no. 3 (July 16, 2018): 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9030050.

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We test the empirical content of the assumption of preference dependent beliefs using a behavioral model of strategic decision making in which the rankings of individuals over final outcomes in simple games influence their beliefs over the opponent’s behavior. This approach— by analogy with Psychological Game Theory—allows for interdependence between preferences and beliefs but reverses the order of causality. We use existing evidence from a multi-stage experiment in which we first elicit distributional preferences in a Random Dictator Game, then estimate beliefs in a related 2×2 effort game conditional on these preferences. Our structural estimations confirm our working hypothesis on how social preferences shape beliefs: subjects with higher guilt (envy) expect others to put less (more) effort, which reduces the expected difference in payoffs.

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Sit, Cindy H. P., Jessica W. K. Lam, and Thomas L. McKenzie. "Children's Use of Electronic Games: Choices of Game Mode and Challenge Levels." International Journal of Pediatrics 2010 (2010): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2010/218586.

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Introduction. Interactive electronic games are popular and are believed to contribute to physical activity accrual. The purpose of this study was to examine children's electronic game use during conditions in which they had free access to selecting interactive and seated screen-based versions of electronic games and during the interactive versions had free choice in making adjustments to the activity intensity.Methods. We systematically observed 60 Hong Kong primary school children during two 60-minute game sessions while simultaneously recording their game mode choices and physical activity levels using SOFIT (System for Observing Fitness Instruction Time).Results. When given free choice, children spent more than half of their available time participating in interactive versions of games. These versions of games provided significantly more moderate-to-vigorous physical activity and greater energy expenditure than the computer screen versions. Children with the opportunity to modify intensity levels spent more time playing the interactive versions and accrued more physical activity.Conclusions. The tenets of behavioral choice theory were supported. Access to new-generation interactive games, particularly those with modifiable intensity levels, may facilitate children's participation in physical activity.

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Gold, Natalie, Andrew M. Colman, and Briony D. Pulford. "Normative theory in decision making and moral reasoning." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34, no. 5 (October 2011): 256–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11000495.

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AbstractNormative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.

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Marin-Lopez, Blas A., David Jimenez-Gomez, and José-María Abellán-Perpiñán. "Behavioral Economics in the Epidemiology of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Theory and Simulations." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 15 (August 3, 2022): 9557. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19159557.

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We provide a game-theoretical epidemiological model for the COVID-19 pandemic that takes into account that: (1) asymptomatic individuals can be contagious, (2) contagion is behavior-dependent, (3) behavior is determined by a game that depends on beliefs and social interactions, (4) there can be systematic biases in the perceptions and beliefs about the pandemic. We incorporate lockdown decisions by the government into the model. The citizens’ and government’s beliefs can exhibit several biases that we discuss from the point of view of behavioral economics. We provide simulations to understand the effect of lockdown decisions and the possibility of “nudging” citizens in the right direction by improving the accuracy of their beliefs.

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Pavlović, Dušan, and Stevo Đurašković. "The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game." Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva 18, no. 1 (December 13, 2021): 345–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.20901/an.18.15.

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We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian Cabinet and the yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical (rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the receiver is satisfied with any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction in the receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe this behavior in the emotional behavior of frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the leaders of the yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime minister nikola Pašić who opposed any concessions to the yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces two conclusions. first, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.

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Bae, Joonheui, Sang Jin Kim, Kyung Hoon Kim, and Dong-Mo Koo. "Affective value of game items: a mood management and selective exposure approach." Internet Research 29, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 315–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/intr-12-2017-0477.

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between game items and mood management to show the affective value of game items. Specifically, the study examines the impact of interaction between two negative mood states (stress vs boredom) and types of game items (functional vs decorative) on the purchasing intention of game items.Design/methodology/approachTwo experiments were conducted to predict the outcomes of using game items.FindingsGame users effectively manage their level of arousal and mood valence using game items. The selective exposure theory provides additional understanding of different purchasing behaviors, suggesting that stressed users are more likely to purchase decorative items while bored users purchase functional items to manage their mood.Research limitations/implicationsThe study results show the affective role of game items in mood management. While previous studies focused on the cognitive and functional aspects of purchasing game items, this study extends the value of game items as augmented products.Practical implicationsWhen launching new games, companies should provide game users free game items for mood management. In addition, to increase intervention potential and behavioral affinity, marketers need to develop and launch more game item types.Originality/valueThis study extends the understanding of affective value of game items by applying mood management and selective exposure theories to explain the purchase intention of game items.

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Xie, Erhao. "Empirical properties and identification of adaptive learning models in behavioral game theory." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 191 (November 2021): 798–821. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.035.

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Dacey, Raymond, and Lisa J. Carlson. "The Normative, Behavioral, and Prescriptive Problems of Game Theory in International Relations." Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 1 (April 1996): 161. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/222661.

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Tutić, Andreas. "Decision and Game Theory as the Analytical Core of All Behavioral Sciences." Czech Sociological Review 55, no. 6 (December 1, 2019): 889–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.13060/00380288.2019.55.6.09.

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Helbing, Dirk. "A stochastic behavioral model and a ?Microscopic? foundation of evolutionary game theory." Theory and Decision 40, no. 2 (March 1996): 149–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00133171.

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Arnhart, Larry. "The behavioral sciences are historical sciences of emergent complexity." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 18–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x0700060x.

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Unlike physics and chemistry, the behavioral sciences are historical sciences that explain the fuzzy complexity of social life through historical narratives. Unifying the behavioral sciences through evolutionary game theory would require a nested hierarchy of three kinds of historical narratives: natural history, cultural history, and biographical history.

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WOON, JONATHAN. "Primaries and Candidate Polarization: Behavioral Theory and Experimental Evidence." American Political Science Review 112, no. 4 (September 10, 2018): 826–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000515.

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Do primary elections cause candidates to take extreme, polarized positions? Standard equilibrium analysis predicts full convergence to the median voter’s position with complete information, but behavioral game theory predicts divergence when players are policy-motivated and have out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Theoretically, I show that primary elections can cause greater extremism or moderation, depending on the beliefs candidates and voters have about their opponents. In a controlled incentivized experiment, I find that candidates diverge substantially and that primaries have little effect on average positions. Voters employ a strategy that weeds out candidates who are either too moderate or too extreme, which enhances ideological purity without increasing divergence. The analysis highlights the importance of behavioral assumptions in understanding the effects of electoral institutions.

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Gintis, Herbert. "A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07000581.

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The various behavioral disciplines model human behavior in distinct and incompatible ways. Yet, recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for rendering coherent the areas of overlap of the various behavioral disciplines. The analytical tools deployed in this task incorporate core principles from several behavioral disciplines. The proposed framework recognizes evolutionary theory, covering both genetic and cultural evolution, as the integrating principle of behavioral science. Moreover, if decision theory and game theory are broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, they become capable of modeling all aspects of decision making, including those normally considered “psychological,” “sociological,” or “anthropological.” The mind as a decision-making organ then becomes the organizing principle of psychology.

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