Academic literature on the topic 'Belgium – Foreign relations – Cameroon'

During 2002, countries from all regions, especially Africa, resorted to the International Court of Justice; only one of the Court's 2002 judgments involved an OECD countiy. The Court's work during the year also shows the continued importance of boundary issues for states and for the Court.The Court again completed a substantial program of work, resolving three cases with final judgments. In February, it triggered substantial controversy by finding that a Belgian court's warrant for the arrest of the then foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Congo”) violated international law. In October, it resolved a complex of boundary disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria, although by year-end Nigeria had not yet implemented the Court's key requirement—withdrawal from the Bakassi Peninsula. In December, comparing sparse effectivités, it concluded that Malaysia, and not Indonesia, had sovereignty over two small disputed islands.

Abstract:Based on primary sources, including documents obtained from Cameroon’s Ministry of External Relations, oral interviews conducted in Cameroon, and local newspapers, and a variety of secondary sources, this article examines Cameroon’s foreign policy and economic relations with China. It argues that Cameroon’s engagement with China has resulted in short-term benefits for consumers but undermined long-term, sustainable economic development. The article concludes that unless China genuinely pursues its promised policies of “mutual respect” and “win–win gain,” voices of protest will only grow louder in Cameroon and other African nations.

AbstractExisting literature argues that the tactics of Cameroon foreign policy have been conservative, weak and timid. This study refutes that perspective. Based on extensive and previously unused primary sources obtained from Cameroon's Ministry of External Relations and from the nation's archives in Buea and Yaoundé, this study argues that Cameroon's foreign policy was neither timid nor makeshift. Its strategy was one of pragmatism. By examining the nation's policy toward Nigeria in the reunification of Cameroon, the Nigerian civil war, the Bakassi Peninsula crisis and Boko Haram, the study maintains that, while the nation's policy was cautious, its leaders focused on the objectives and as a result scored major victories. The study concludes by suggesting that President Paul Biya invokes the same skills he used in foreign policy to address the ongoing Anglophone problem, a problem that threatens to unravel much of what the country has accomplished.

This study tested a causal relationship between international public relations (PR) expenditure and its economic outcome at the country level by using a time-series analysis. International PR expenditures of four client countries (Japan, Colombia, Belgium, and the Philippines) were collected from the semi-annual reports of the Foreign Agency Registration Act (FARA) from 1996 to 2009. Economic outcome was measured by U.S. imports from the client countries and U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) toward them. This study found that the past PR expenditure holds power in forecasting future economic outcomes for Japan, Belgium, and the Philippines except Colombia.

AbstractCameroon's autocrat, Paul Biya, declared war on Boko Haram in 2014. Using a variety of ethnographic materials, this article examines the politics of rumours and conspiracy theories that have defined the popular response to this war in Cameroon. It underlines the mobilising force of these rumours on intra-elite struggles within the national context as well as on international relations, particularly on French–Cameroon relations. I argue that rumour-mongering is a central mode of production of suspicion in times of war and social crisis. Yet, the current rumours in the wake of the war against Boko Haram in Cameroon are inscribed within a historical framework of a state-directed politics of paranoia that seeks to define ‘enemies of destabilisation’. In the end, this politics of suspicion also works to bring otherwise disaffected Cameroonians to support the autocratic Paul Biya as a victim of foreign plots for regime change in Cameroon.

During the seventies, the Belgian-Zairese relations are characterized by a series of crises and reconciliations.Many facts had an important effect on those relations : the « Zairianisation » of foreign, especially Belgian, companies; President Mobutu's request for economic aid; the Shaba-invasion of 1977; the presence of Zaïrese opponents in Belgium and the hostility against Kinshasa and especially against President Mobutu from the part of particular Belgian circles.All these facts make it very difficult to Belgium to draw a coherent policy in this case.

AbstractThe European integration process has altered the conditions under which national foreign policies in Europe are made. Departing from this assumption, this article explores whether and under what conditions a small EU member state can influence European foreign policy. To this end, the role that Belgium has played in the construction of European foreign policy towards the African Great Lakes is examined. This article argues that a small EU member state can significantly influence European foreign policy, resulting in reinforcement of its national foreign policy. Yet this influence is conditioned by two intertwined factors: the nature of EU involvement; and the characteristics of the Union's foreign policy system. Depending on these elements, a small member state can supersede the quantifiable notion of 'smallness' and actively shape the construction of European foreign policy.

There are very few publications concerning the history of the foreign policy of Belgium. Those concerning the relation between public opinion and international relations are even less frequent. Based on publications of the results of public opinion polls organized by the Universitary lnstitute for Economic and Social Information (INSOC), and a limitedchoice of other written sources, it is possible to prove that the call on the public opinion concerning the history of international relations, and even more for the decision making, must be treated very carefully. In fact, there doesn't exist just one but several public opinions. The reactions in Belgium on the resolution of the United Nation concerningthe division of Palestine may be a clear example of the latter.

Federal states like Belgium operate under conflicting pressures in the conduct of their international relations: centralizing pressures, on the one hand, imposed by the necessity of speaking with a single voice in order to forge a coherent international policy and decentralizing pressures, on the other, because globalization stimulates a qualitative and quantitative extension of the internal and international roles of substate players, mainly through the international deployment of substate paradiplomacy. This centralization of external affairs and the centrifugal forces introduced by globalization cause problems in this type of system, in which substate entities have numerous fields of jurisdiction. This new phenomenon is not without its risks because it leads to disorder and conflict. In many countries, the development of paradiplomacy by the substate actors creates conflict with the central government. The impression is created that the federal and the substate authorities are condemned to fight a zero-sum struggle for access to the international system, the former seeking to prevent the latter from playing a role in the development of foreign policy and to limit all international action by them. The case of Belgium is of particular interest since its substate entities are the most dynamic regions in the world in international relations. The objective of this article is to evaluate the impact of the Flemish identity paradiplomacy on the foreign policy of the federal state.

A first comment on the contribution of Professor Franck concerns the fact that the coordination of European alfairs is entrusted to the political section of the Foreign Ministry. This should not be attributed mainly to historical consideration but to the fact that the « paradigma » of that section does not come into conflict with the « paradigma » of other ministries implicated in European affairs. A second comment concerns the difficult relationship in external relations between the Foreign Ministry and the administration of the Communities and Regions in Belgium. The law is open to varying interpretation and a solution can only be found on a pragmatic basis, accepting that problems in international relationsare not always purely cultural or purely political.

Le travail de recherche intitulé :«La Belgique et l’Afrique centrale, diversification ou néocolonialisme ?Dynamique de la coopération belge au Cameroun et dans ses anciennes colonies (1960-1990) » s’interroge sur la mise en œuvre et le déploiement de la coopération belge en Afrique centrale principalement au Cameroun. Il développe cette politique au Cameroun sous un regard global des intérêts belges dans son pré carré c'est-à- dire dans ses anciennes colonies dans le contexte de guerre froide et de construction européenne. C’est également le contexte de la mise en place du marché commun, de la signature des accords de Yaoundé entre la CEE et EAMA (Etats Africains et Malgaches Associés). Les aspects analysés prennent aussi en compte la France autre ancienne métropole de la région.<p>Cette thèse insiste sur les éléments de mise en place et les fondements de la politique étrangère de la Belgique en Afrique centrale. Elle analyse sa présence depuis la colonisation du Congo, du Ruanda-Urundi et développe le processus de mutation de la Belgique dans la sous-région à la faveur des indépendances. Cette accession à la souveraineté des territoires leur attribuait le statut d’acteur de la communauté internationale. L’adaptation de la Belgique à cette nouvelle donne l’oblige à étendre son espace de captation d’intérêts par l’établissement des relations diplomatiques avec de nombreux pays de la région parmi lesquels le Cameroun. Le choix du Cameroun comme pays d'appui à la politique belge dans la région en dehors de ses colonies est le fait de nombreuses justifications que cette thèse démontre. <p>Ce travail insiste sur les rapports politiques entre le Cameroun et la Belgique notamment les éléments expliquant la coopération diplomatique et politique entre le Cameroun et la Belgique. Celle-ci était basée sur un soutien mutuel dans la lutte contre les mouvements rebelles procommunistes au Cameroun et au Congo dans les années 60. Cet ouvrage développe l'organisation de l’action conjointe de la Belgique et du Cameroun dans la lutte contre le communisme en Afrique centrale principalement au Congo en période de guerre froide, les éléments prouvant le soutien de la Belgique au Cameroun dans sa lutte contre les activistes nationalistes de l’UPC et réciproquement, les actions montrant la collaboration et la compréhension du Cameroun envers la Belgique dans la gestion des conflits d’après indépendance au Congo, au Rwanda et au Burundi. <p>De plus, cette thèse évoque la dynamique de la politique étrangère de la Belgique à partir de 1965 dans la région. Dans cette section marquée par l’arrivée de Mobutu au pouvoir et le coup d’Etat de Micombero au Burundi, ce travail détaille les éléments qui justifient le renforcement des relations politiques entre le Cameroun et la Belgique après 1965 par l’analyse du contexte national et international de mise en place de cette politique après 1967. Un contexte marqué par la réélection d’Ahmadou Ahidjo et le renforcement de son pouvoir et le départ du socialiste Paul-Henri Spaak, remplacé par le démocrate-chrétien Pierre Harmel. Ce dernier instaure une nouvelle politique dite de diversification et de distanciation envers le régime de Mobutu. Le constat est que cette diversification a profité au Cameroun, devenu progressivement un partenaire privilégié de la Belgique dans la région après la visite officielle d’Ahidjo de 1967 à Bruxelles. <p>Ce travail analyse les rapports qu’entretenaient la Belgique et le Cameroun dans les organisations internationales en rapport avec la situation interne de son pré-carré d’Afrique centrale, notamment les circonstances du soutien de la candidature du Zaïre à l’entrée dans l’Union Douanière et Economique d’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) et plus tard dans la création de l’Union Economique d’Afrique Centrale (UEAC) en 1969. Le soutien mutuel des candidatures belges et camerounaises dans les instances internationales à partir des années septante, les incidences de l’entrée du Royaume-Uni de Grande Bretagne et l’Irlande du Nord au sein de la Communauté Economique Européenne (la convention de Lomé I) sur la politique étrangère belge menée par Renaat Van Elslande, les implications de la zaïrianisation sur les relations belgo-zaïroises, l’arrivée au pouvoir de Juvénal Habyarimana au Rwanda et la renégociation des accords d’indépendance entre le Cameroun et la France. La Belgique et ces pays souhaitaient une approche plus consensuelle des grandes questions internationales, notamment le nouvel ordre économique international, le conflit du proche orient, la question de la décolonisation des territoires portugais d’Afrique centrale, la généralisation des conflits armés et des assassinats politiques.<p>La présence militaire belge en Afrique centrale est un fait colonial. Un rappel nécessaire de cette présence militaire depuis la période coloniale nous a permis de nous interroger sur la gestion difficile du devenir de ces soldats après les indépendances du Congo, du Rwanda et du Burundi, notamment pendant la crise Katangaise. Ces difficultés rencontrées au Congo poussent la Belgique à trouver des dérivatifs pour se désengager militairement au Ruanda-Urundi après l’indépendance en 1962. La visite officielle de juin 1967 d’Ahmadou Ahidjo en Belgique marque le début d’une intense coopération militaire entre la Belgique et le Cameroun. Les deux pays coopèrent pour la livraison du matériel de guerre par la Fabrique d’Herstal à Liège, et dans la formation les officiers camerounais en Belgique. Plusieurs facteurs justifiant cette coopération avec le Cameroun sont énumérés dans cette thèse. De plus, ce travail retrace l’implication de la Belgique dans les guerres du Shaba et ses initiatives en faveur d’une paix globale dans la région autour les années 80. <p>Le troisième grand axe de cette thèse développe la présence de la Belgique en Afrique centrale dans le cadre de la Communauté Economique Européenne. Après avoir expliqué l'historique et l'évolution du FED, nous avons exploré le poids de la présence belge au sein du Fond Européen de Développement par rapport à la France et les autres Etats de la CEE pour constater sa faiblesse dans cette institution contrôlée par la France l’Allemagne. Ce qui justifie son choix de renforcer la coopération bilatérale dans la région. Enfin, ce thèse insiste sur ces relations économiques bilatérales de la Belgique en Afrique centrale, principalement au Cameroun en comparaison avec les anciennes colonies pour voir l'influence de la Belgique au Cameroun, au Congo, au Rwanda et au Burundi depuis les indépendances jusqu'aux années nonante. <p><p><br>Doctorat en Histoire, art et archéologie<br>info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Thesis (M.A.)--Indiana University, 2009.<br>Title from screen (viewed on November 5, 2009). Department of History, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). Advisor(s): Kevin Cramer, William H. Schneider, Monroe H. Little. Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-126).

Thesis (MBA (Business Management))--Stellenbosch University, 2008.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The motive for this research was to provide clarity on the increasingly divergent opinions on the role and behaviour of South African companies in the rest of the African continent. The key question that can be asked is: “Are South African investments, saviour or villain of African Development” (Thomas, 2007)? Are they “exporting Apartheid” (Mkhabela, 2007) or are the fears raised against South African companies unfounded? The primary research objective of this study is to assess MTN-C’s contribution to the economic development of Cameroon. The specific research questions addressed in this study are: 1. What are the possible areas of economic impact? 2. How can the effects of MTN-C’s presence in Cameroon be measured—both qualitatively and quantitatively? 3. What recommendations can be made to MTN-C? To answer these questions, the researcher takes a multi-dimensional view of the economic impact across eight areas, viz., inflow of foreign direct capital, interaction with government, training and development of local staff, employment creation, local procurement, spread of local shareholding, the local mobile communications sector and corporate social investment initiatives. She assesses each of the above-mentioned eight elements and then draws some conclusions on what is perceived to be the true effect of MTN-C’s investments in Cameroon. After close to three years of in-depth research, which included several trips to Cameroon, in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, direct observation, group discussions and survey research, it can be concluded that MTN-C has indeed had a positive impact in areas like Corporate Social Investment, training and development of local staff, employment creation and the inflow of foreign capital. However, much still needs to be done. The areas that have been identified as weak include the development of local suppliers, the interaction with government and the spread of local shareholding.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die studie is gemotiveer deur die soeke na groter helderheid met betrekking tot uiteenlopende beoordelings van die rol en optrede van Suid-Afrikaanse ondernemings in die res van die Afrika-kontinent. Die kernvraag is: “Are South African investments saviour or villains of African development?” (Thomas, 2007) Is hulle besig om apartheid “uit te voer” (Mkhabela, 2007) of is dié vrese teenoor Suid-Afrikaanse ondernemings ongegrond? Die primêre navorsingsoogmerk is die beoordeling van MTN Cameroon se bydrae tot die ekonomiese ontwikkeling in Kameroen. Spesifiek drie vrae word aangespreek. 1. Watter dimensies word ingesluit in ‘n studie van die “ekonomiese impak”? 2. Hoe kan die invloed van MTN Cameroon se teenwoordigheid in dié land gemeet word – sowel kwalitatief asook kwantitatief? 3. Watter aanbevelings kan op grond van dié beoordelings aan die maatskappy gemaak word? Om hierdie vrae te beantwoord word ‘n multi-dimensionele benadering gevolg, gebaseer op agt verskillende invloed-gebiede. Hulle sluit in die invloei van buitelandse kaptiaal, interaksie met die regering, opleiding en ontwikkeling van plaaslike werknemers, werkskepping, plaaslike aankope, die verspreiding van plaaslike aandeelhouding, die mobiele kommunikasiebedryf en sosiale investerings-inisiatiewe. Elkeen van dié elemente word ontleed op grond van vraelys-reaksies en ander insigte. Dit lei tot gevolgtrekkings op elkeen van die vlakke, wat tesame die volle omvang van die betrokkenheid weerspieël. Na drie jaar se interaksie van die navorser met Kameroen, diepte-onderhoude met vername rolspelers, direkte waarnemings, groepbesprekings en 40 voltooide vraelyste kom sy tot die gevolgtrekking dat MTN Cameroon wel ‘n positiewe rol speel in gebiede soos korporatiewe sosiale investerings, opleiding, werkskepping en die invloei van kapitaal, maar dat daar nog heelwat ruimte vir verbeterings is, veral wat plaaslike aankope, interaksie met die regering en plaaslike aandeelhouding betref.

<p>La thèse aborde les interrogations, les positions de principe, les ambitions et les réalisations bien plus modestes de la diplomatie belge, en interaction avec les milieux politiques et une partie de la société du temps, quant à la question des nationalités en Europe centrale, orientale et balkanique (1918-1924). Les sept pays retenus sont la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie, l’Autriche, la Hongrie, la Yougoslavie, la Roumanie et la Bulgarie.<p>Par question des nationalités, il faut entendre trois aspects indissociables :la question de la modification des frontières dans cette partie du Vieux Continent (disparition des empires au profit des Etats précités), celle des territoires disputés entre lesdits Etats et enfin celle des minorités nationales.<p>Pour expliquer les différentes postures de chacun, l’étude envisage une multitude de facteurs de politique intérieure ou extérieure, principalement les peurs du socialisme et du séparatisme, mais aussi la question des rapports des individus (psychologie) et des groupes (cercles de connaissances, partis,…).<p><br>Doctorat en Histoire, art et archéologie<br>info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Die deutsche Außenpolitik zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges stellt in historischer wie politikwissenschaftlicher Hinsicht einen Gegenstand dar, der mit gutem Gewissen als wissenschaftlich erschlossen bezeichnet werden kann. Zahlreiche Aufsätze, Artikel und Bücher sind in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten erschienen, welche die deutsche Außenpolitik in Europa, Afrika, Asien, Ozeanien, Amerika, oder auch gleich der Welt als Ganzem, in den Blick genommen haben. Dies gilt sowohl für die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als auch für diejenige der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Früh – wenn nicht sogar von Beginn an – kam hierbei eine zentrale These, eine Kernthese, zum Vorschein, die, ohne auf Widerstand zu stoßen, Eingang in den historischen und politikwissenschaftlichen Forschungskanon fand und ihn bereits nach kurzer Zeit zu dominieren begann. Die Rede ist von der die deutschen Auslandsaktivitäten angeblich bestimmenden Hallstein-Doktrin und dem mit ihr in engem Zusammenhang stehenden deutsch-deutschen Gegensatz. In dieser Arbeit wird dieser Kernthese, diesem ''Mythos'' der deutschen Außenpolitik, vehement widersprochen. Weder die Hallstein-Doktrin, noch der deutsch-deutsche Gegensatz, sondern nationale ökonomische und internationale geostrategische Interessen haben die deutsche Außenpolitik – und darüber hinaus auch die gesamten deutschen Auslandsaktivitäten, der BRD wie der DDR – maßgeblich bestimmt. Zur Stützung dieser Gegenthese werden in der vorliegenden Studie die staatlichen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Aktivitäten West- und Ostdeutschlands in neun zentralafrikanischen Staaten zwischen 1945 und 1975 kritisch dargelegt, umfassend analysiert und im Hinblick auf mehrere zentrale Thesen zu den deutschen Auslandsaktivitäten ausgewertet.<br>For decades articles and books have been published on the history of German foreign policy during Cold War. Regardless of whether Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, America or the world as a whole, the foreign affairs of the Western Federal Republic of Germany and the Eastern German Democratic Republic have been researched and analysed in context of a broad variety of locations. However, even though the list of publications continues to grow, the topic''s theses–especially its main thesis–do not show much progress. Already at an early stage, a central thesis–a core thesis–came to light, met no resistance and entered history''s and political science''s research canons on German foreign policy. This thesis reads: Inner German issues and the non-solved German question were so powerful, they dominated West and East German foreign affairs nearly right from the start. German foreign policy, that was the so-called Hallstein doctrine, that was the so-called German-German contradiction. And all studies–whether of history or political science, whether designed as a case study or as a global approach–confirm this thesis, use it as an integral part of their work–until today. But be that as it may. This study contradicts this thesis, this ''myth'' of German foreign policy. Instead it argues that neither the Hallstein doctrine nor the German-German contradiction, but national economic and international geostrategic interests dominated German foreign policy and German foreign activities–regarding the FRG, the GDR, and Germany as a whole. To proof this thesis, West and East German activities–of the two states, their economies and their societies–in nine Central African states between 1945 and 1975 are observed and analysed. More than a million file pages out of more than a dozen German archives were read to tackle this task–and shed some refreshing new light on the foreign policies of the two German states during Cold War.

This chapter focuses on the European Union as a subsystem of international relations. It examines the following questions, taking into account the historical context in which EU foreign policy has developed as well as the theoretical pluralism that has characterized its study. First, how has the EU dealt with its own international relations internally? Second, what are the ideas and principles underlying EU foreign policy? Third, what is the EU's collective action capacity in relation to the rest of the world? The chapter illustrates interstate dynamics as a result of European integration by focusing on the cases of France, Germany, and Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). It also considers the EU's international identity and its role as a collective actor.

Given historically amicable relations between North Africa’s native citizens of Arab and African descent, it is counterintuitive that prejudice against foreign African migrants from sub-Saharan countries seems to be rising. Discrimination seems to be intensifying against African migrants who have recently arrived from Congo, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon, Mali, and elsewhere. Where conflict and poverty proliferate in these countries, migrants flee to North Africa seeking clandestine access to Europe by boat across the Mediterranean, or by foot through Spain’s North African enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta. In response, Spain, Italy, and North African countries have increased border and maritime security. Thus, as an alternative, many sub-Saharan African migrants have decided to resettle in North Africa. Previously, articles have appeared depicting North African states as “sender” countries of migrants. Yet, more recently, they have also become “recipient” countries of African migrants.

This chapter examines the second round of state–mosque relations that produced institutionalized Islam Councils. Interior ministries provided the first impetus to organize Islam as a “national” religion, and the government-led consultations established a variety of national councils between 1992 and 2006, from the Conseil français du culte musulman, to the Comisíon Islámica de España, to the Exécutif des musulmans de Belgique, to the Deutsche Islam Konferenz, to the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board in Britain, to the Consulta per l'Islam italiano. These national processes are not identical: many place more weight on the role of Embassy Islam and foreign government representatives (e.g., Belgium, Germany, France, Spain), while others rely more heavily on handpicked local civil society organizations (e.g., Italy, United Kingdom).