Academic literature on the topic 'Berkeley, George, Kant, Immanuel'

The need to prove the existence of the external world has been a subject that has concerned the rationalist philosophers, particularly Descartes and the empiricist philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Taking the epoché as the key mark of the phenomenologist—the suspension of the question of the existence of the external world—the issue of the external world should not come under the domain of the phenomenologist. Ironically, however, I would like to suggest that it could be argued that the founder of the phenomenological school of thought, Edmund Husserl, also did not avoid the question of the existence of the external world. What I would like to suggest further is that Immanuel Kant grants himself illicit access to the external world and thus illustrates that the question of the external world is vital to the argument structure of the first Critique.

No seu livro “Wie Metaphern Wissen schaffen” (“Como metáforas criam conhecimento”), o lingüista Olaf Jäkel dedica-se a uma sistematização e reformulação da teoria cognitiva das metáforas, fundada pelos norte-americanos George Lakoff e Mark Johnson. Neste contexto, ele também remete-se a algumas teorias precursoras de outras áreas, dentre elas, ao pensamento de Immanuel Kant, que implica muitas semelhanças principalmente quanto aos elementos básicos da lingüística cognitiva em geral, embora Lakoff e Johnson recusem a teoria kantiana globalmente, por suspeitá-la objetivista. O presente artigo tem como objetivo, depois de ter resumido as caraterísticas essenciais da teoria cognitiva das metáforas, sintetizada por Jäkel, a apresentação de três linhas filosóficas nas quais encontram-se observações sobre metáforas que antecipam a teoria de Lakoff e Johnson: a filosofia da língua/a crítica da língua, a filosofia kantiana e a filosofia fenomenológica de Hans Blumenberg.

The scientific reports on the successful use of Human Embryonic Stem cells to cure many sicknesses as provoked a long-standing controversy about the ethics of research involving human embryos. This controversy arises from sharply differing moral views regarding the use of embryos for research purposes. Indeed, an earnest international scholarly debate continues till today over the ethical, legal, and medical issues that arise in this arena. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) had given a moral guideline that ethical decisions should be made by considering the nature of the act itself, not its consequences. Furthermore, Kant has warned that persons (autonomous agents) have a special moral worth or dignity, which is the basis for the respect that is owed to them. Thus, respect for persons, means never using persons merely as means to our ends, but always treating them also as ends in themselves. Some philosophers like Richard Doerflinger, Michael Novak, Gilbert Meilaender, and Robert P. George have used the Kantian formula of humanity to criticize the argument that spare IVF embryos can be used for stem cell research given their inevitable death and thus lack of properties for future life. However, the purpose of this paper is to take a critical look at the Human Embryonic Stem cells subject matter to investigate the concept of “personhood’, with the maxim of ‘never treating a person as a means’. This paper argues that if we accepts the definition of a person to possess capacities such as ‘rational’ ‘will’ and ‘self-determination’, then IVF embryos is not a person and can therefore be researched upon, used to derive human embryonic stem cells. Hence, Human Embryonic Stem cells research can be carried out within the ambiance of Kant Categorical Imperative without moral conflict.

Resumen: El presente artículo pretende realizar una aproximación entre los pensamientos éticos de Kant y Kierkegaard concentrándonos en los conceptos de educación y libertad. Para ello pondremos foco en el pensamiento práctico desarrollado por el filósofo alemán en el año 1790, al cual denominamos la segunda ética kantiana, y en la primera autoría kierkegaardiana, es decir, O lo uno o lo otro (1843) y El concepto de angustia (1844). Consideramos que estos dos periodos, en ambos autores, nos brindan la posibilidad de encontrar puntos de contactos que nos permiten sostener que la ética que Kierkegaard tiene en mente para estas obras es el pensamiento moral desarrollado por Kant en este periodo.Palabras claves: Kant. Kierkegaard. Libertad. Educación. ÉticaAbstract: The present article intends to make an approximation between the ethical thoughts of Kant and Kierkegaard concentrating on the concepts of education and freedom. For this we will focus on the practical thought developed by the German philosopher in the year 1790, which we call the second Kantian ethic, and in the first Kierkegaardian authorship, that is, Either/Or (1843) and The Concept of Anxiety (1844). We consider that these two periods, in both authors, give us the possibility of finding points of contact that allow us to maintain that the ethics that Kierkegaard has in mind for these works is the moral thought developed by Kant in this period.Keywords: Kant. Kierkegaard. Freedom. Education. Ethics Resumo: O presente artigo pretende fazer uma aproximação entre os pensamentos éticos de Kant e Kierkegaard concentrando-se nos conceitos de educação e liberdade. Para isso, vamos nos concentrar no pensamento prático desenvolvido pelo filósofo alemão no ano de 1790, que chamamos a segunda ética kantiana, e na primeira autoria de kierkegaardiana, ou seja, Ou/Ou (1843) e O conceito de Angústia (1844). Consideramos que esses dois períodos, em ambos os autores, nos darão a possibilidade de encontrar pontos de contato que nos permitam sustentar que a ética que Kierkegaard tem em mente para essas obras é o pensamento moral desenvolvido por Kant nesse período.Palavras-chave: Kant. Kierkegaard. Liberdade. Educação. Ética REFERENCIASALLISON, Henry. Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.ASSISTER, Alison. Kant and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil. In: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 72 (April 1996), pp 275-296.DI GIOVANNI, George. Freedom and religion in Kant and his immediate successors: The vocation of mankind, 1774–1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.DIP, Patricia. Judge William: the Limits of the ethical. In: Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, Volume 17, Katalin Nun,Jon Stewart (Eds.), London-New York, Routledge, 2016.FOUCAULT, Michel. Una lectura de Kant: Introducción a la antropología en sentido pragmático. Traducción Ariel Dilon. Buenos Aires: Siglo veintiuno, 2013.FREMSTEDAL, Roe. Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest Good. Virtue, Happiness, and the kingdom of God, New York: Palgrave Macmillan , 2014._______. The concept of the highest good in Kierkegaard and Kant. Int J Philos Relig (2011) 69:155–171._______. The moral argument for the existence of God and immorality. Kierkegaard and Kant. Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc, JRE 41. (2013), pp. 50–78._______. The Moral Makeup of the World: Kierkegaard and Kant on the Relation between Virtue and Happiness in this World. Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook. N° 1 (2012), pp. 25-47.FRIEDMAN, R. Kant and Kierkegaard: the limits of the Reason and the cunning of faith. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 19:3-22, pp. 3-22. _______. Kierkegaard: First Existentialist or last Kantian?. Religious Studies, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 18, Nº 2 (1982), pp. 159-170.FRIERSON, Patrick. R. Freedom and anthropology in Kant’s moral philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.GOUWENS, David. Kierkegaard as religious thinker. Cambridge: University Press, USA, 1996.GREEN, Ronald. Kant und Kierkegaard.The Hidden Debt. New York: State University New York Press, 1992.HELLER, Ágnes. Crítica a la Ilustración. Traducción Gustau Muñoz y José Ignacio López Soria. Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 1999.HEIDEGGER, Martin. Kant y el problema de la metafísica. Traducción Gred Ibscher Roth. México: Fondo de cultura económica, 2013.KANT, Immanuel. Antropología en sentido pragmático. Traducción José Gaos. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2014._______. La metafísica de las Costumbres. Traducción Adela Cortina Orts y Jesús Cornill Sancho. Madrid: Tecnos, 1994._______. Pedagogía. Traducción Lorenzo Luzuriaga y José Luis Pascal, Madrid: Akal, 2003.KIERKEGAARD, Soren. O lo uno o lo otro I. Traducción Bogonya Saez Tajafuerce y Darío González. Madrid: Trotta, 2006._______. O lo uno o lo otro II. Traducción Darío González. Madrid: Trotta, 2007._______. El concepto de angustia. Traducción Darío González y Óscar Parcero. Madrid: Trotta, 2013._______. En la espera de la fe, Traducción Luis Guerrero Martínez y Leticia Valadez. México: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2005.KNAPPE, Ulrich. Theory and practice in Kant and Kierkegaard. (Kierkegaard studies. Monograph serie; 9), Copenhagen: Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, 2004.KOSCH, Michelle. Freedom And Reason in Kant, Schelling and Kierkegaard. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006._______. Choosing Evil: Schelling, Kierkegaard, and the legacy of Kant's conception of Freedom. (Dissertation Philosophy). New York: Columbia University, 1999.LÖWITH, Karl. De Hegel a Nietzsche: La quiebra revolucionaria del pensamiento en el siglo XIX. Trad. Emilio Estiú. Buenos Aires: Katz, 2012.MOONEY, Edward. On Soren Kierkegaard, Dialogue, polemics, Lost Intimacy, and Time. Syracusa, Ashgate, 2007.MUENCH, Paul. Kierkegaard’s Socratic Task. (Dissertation). University of Pittsburgh, 2006.MUÑOZ FONNEGRA, Sergio. La elección ética. Sobre la crítica de Kierkegaard a la filosofía moral de Kant. Estudios filosóficos, Universidad de Antioquia, n. 41, pp. 81-109, 2010.NAES, Arnes. Kierkegaard and the values of education: Contribution to the Kierkegaard Conference of the International Institute of Philosophy, Copenhagen, 1966.NEGT, Oskar. Kant y Marx. Un diálogo entre épocas. Traducción Alejandro del Río. Madrid: Trotta, 2004.OLIVARES-BØGESKOV, Benjamín. El concepto de felicidad en las obras de Søren Kierkegaard: principios psicológicos en los estadios estéticos, ético y religioso. México: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2015._______. El concepto de felicidad en el estadio ético. La integración de la estética en la vida ética. La Mirada Kierkegaardiana. Nº 0, pp. 43-64, 2008.PECK, William. On Autonomy: The Primacy of the Subject in Kant and Kierkegaard. (Ph. D. Dissertation). Connecticut: Yale University, 1974.RODRÍGUEZ, Pablo. El descubrimiento de la libertad infinita. Kierkegaard y el pecado. El títere y el enano. Revista de Teología Crítica, Vol. 1, ISSN N°: 1853 – 0702, pp. 207-216, 2010.RODRÍGUEZ, Yésica; RODRÍGUEZ, Pablo; PEÑA ARROYAVE, Alejandro. El concepto de aburrimiento en Kierkegaard. Revista de Filosofía. Universidad Iberoamericana. Año 49, N° 142, ISSN: 0185-3481, pp. 97-118, 2017.RODRÍGUEZ, Yésica. Kierkegaard y Kant. Una interpretación del sí mismo a partir de la segunda ética kantiana. In: DIP, Patricia., RODRÍGUEZ, Pablo (Coord.) Orígenes y significado de la filosofía Poshegeliana. Buenos Aires, Gorla, 2017, pp. 113-139.STACK, George. Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics. Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1977.TORRALBA, Francesc. Poética de la libertad: Lectura de Kierkegaard. Madrid, Caparrós Editores, 1998.

Editors' Preface When Ulf Wilhelmsson first contacted us about including his "Dialogue on Film and Philosophy" in the M/C 'chat' issue, we were initially taken aback. True, the notion of chat surely must include that of 'dialogue', but Wilhelmsson's idea, as he put it to us, was that of a Socratic dialogue about film. The dialogue "Film och Filosofi" already existed in Swedish, but he had done an initial rough translation of the dialogue on his Website. Since Wilhelmsson put this to us in the very early days of the submission period, we decided to have a look. Wilhelmsson had omitted to mention the fact that his dialogue was amusing as well as informative. Playing Socrates was ... Quentin Tarantino. Tarantino was not just discussing film, but he was moderating a hefty grab-bag of influential philosphers, film-makers, film-scholars and the odd Beatle (John Lennon). Furthermore, creeping in to many of the utterances in the discussion was Wilhelmsson's take on Tarantino's vernacular -- keep an eye out for "Bada boom bada boom, get it?" and "Oh Sartre. Dude, I would also like to provide a similar example". The philosphers sometimes also get a chance to break out of their linguistic bonds, such as Herakleit, who tells us that "War is the primogenitor of the whole shebang". Occasionally, Wilhelmsson lets his conversants get rowdy (St Thomas of Aquinas and Aristotle yell "Tabula Rasa!" in unison), put on accents (Michel Chion with French accent: "Merci merci. Je vous en pris that you are recognising tse sound"), be "dead sure of themselves" (George Lakoff and Mark Johnson; Noam Chomsky thanks us for our attention) and wander in and out of the dialogue's virtual space (at the end, Immanuel Kant returns to us after his daily walk around town). Unfortunately, due to its length, the dialogue can not be supplied in regular M/C 'bits', and so we have made it available as a downloadable Rich Text Format file. Felicity Meakins & E. Sean Rintel -- M/C 'chat' co-editors Download "Dialogue on Film and Philosophy" in Rich Text Format: Citation reference for this article MLA style: Ulf Wilhelmsson. "Dialogue on Film and Philosophy." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3.4 (2000). [your date of access] <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0008/dialogue.php>. Chicago style: Ulf Wilhelmsson, "Dialogue on Film and Philosophy," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3, no. 4 (2000), <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0008/dialogue.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: Ulf Wilhelmsson. (2000) Dialogue on Film and Philosophy. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3(4). <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0008/dialogue.php> ([your date of access]).

Carty, R. Kenneth, William Cross and Lisa Young. Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics. By Miriam Lapp 631Broadbent, Edward, ed. Democratic Equality: What Went Wrong? By Rodney Haddow 633Boyd, Susan S., Dorothy E. Chunn and Robert Menzies, eds. (Ab)Using Power: The Canadian Experience. By Audrey Doerr 635Pal, Leslie A., ed.. How Ottawa Spends 2000-2001: Past Imperfect, Future Tense. By Nelson Wiseman 636Chennells, David. The Politics of Nationalism in Canada: Cultural Conflict since 1760. By Richard Vengroff 638Helly, Denise et Nicolas Van Schendel. Appartenir au Québec. Citoyenneté, nation et société civile. Enquête à Montréal, 1995. Par Guy Chiasson 639Rose, Alex. Spirit Dance at Meziadin: Chief Joseph Gosnell and the Nisga'a Treaty. By Michael J. Prince 640Cardinal, Linda, en collaboration avec Caroline Andrew et Michèle Kérisit. Chroniques d'une vie politique mouvementée. L'Ontario francophone de 1986 à 1996. Par Simon Langlois 642Kreinin, Mordechai, ed. Building a Partnership: The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. By Stephen Clarkson 643Clingermayer, James C. and Richard C. Feiock. Institutional Constraints and Policy Choice: An Exploration of Local Governance. By John J. Kirlin 645Muxel, Anne. L'expérience politique des jeunes. Par Marc Molgat 647Sowerwine, Charles. France since 1870: Culture, Politics and Society. By Robert Elgie 650Sniderman, Paul M., Pierangelo Peri, Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Thomas Piazza. The Outsider: Prejudice and Politics in Italy. By Stephen Hellman 651Gardet, Claudie, avec une préface de Marie-Claire Bergère. Les relations de la République populaire de Chine et de la République démocratique allemande (1949-1989). Par André Laliberté 653Katsiaficas, George, ed. After the Fall: 1989 and the Future of Freedom. By Barbara J. Falk 655Quesney, Chantale. Kosovo, les mémoires qui tuent. La guerre vue sur Internet. Par Dany Deschênes 657Moser, Robert G. Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia. By Jody Baumgartner 660Powers, Nancy R. Grassroots Expectations of Democracy and Economy: Argentina in Comparative Perspective. By Jeffery R. Webber 661Kymlicka, Will. La citoyenneté multiculturelle. Une théorie libérale du droit des minorités. Par France Gagnon 663Kymlicka, Will. Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. By Ciaran Cronin 665Schmid, Carol L. The Politics of Language: Conflict, Identity, and Cultural Pluralism in Comparative Perspective. By Ines Molinaro 667Merad, Ali. La tradition musulmane. Par Chedly Belkhodja 668Kaufman, Stuart J. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. By Crawford Young 671Baum, Gregory. Le nationalisme: perspectives éthiques et religieuses. Par Frédérick Boily 672Keating, Michael and John McGarry, eds. Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order. By Stefan Wolff 674Gurr, Ted Robert. Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. By John A. Hall 676Biggar, Nigel, ed. Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict. By Steven M. Delue 677Kruks, Sonia. Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics. By Lorraine Code 679Kinzer, Bruce L. England's Disgrace? J. S. Mill and the Irish Question. By Samuel V. Laselva 681Kahan, Alan S. Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burkhardt, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville. By Brian Richardson 682Passet, René. L'illusion néo-libérale. Par Marcel Filion 684Andrew, Edward G. Conscience and Its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason, and Modern Subjectivity. By Jason Neidleman 687Villa, Dana, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt. By Robert Pirro 689Pirro, Robert C. Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Tragedy. By Pamela S. Leach 691Davis, Arthur and Peter C. Emberley, eds. Collected Works of George Grant:Vol. 1: 1933-1950. By Ron Dart 692Owen, J. Judd. Religion and the Demise of Liberal Rationalism: The Foundational Crisis of the Separation of Church and State. By Emily R. Gill 694Gray, John. Two Faces of Liberalism. By Brian Donohue 695Lom, Petr. The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism. By Craig Beam 696Parekh, Bhikhu. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. By Jonathan Quong 698Heath, Joseph. Communicative Action and Rational Choice. By Bryce Weber 699Franke, Mark F. N. Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics. By Brian Orend 702Philpott, Daniel. Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations. By Chris Brown 703Aleinikoff, T. Alexander and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds. Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices. By Patrizia Longo 705Sommier, Isabelle. Les nouveaux mouvements contestataires à l'heure de la mondialisation. Par Christian Poirier 706Harris, Paul G., ed.. The Environment, International Relations, and U.S. Foreign Policy. By Robert Boardman 709Burgerman, Susan. Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action. By Phil Degruchy 711

Image 1: “Oklahoma State Highway Re-imagined.” CC BY-SA 4.0 2015 by author, using Wikimedia image by Ks0stm (CC BY-SA 3 2013). Introduction This article is divided in three major parts. First a scenario, second its context, and third, an analysis. The text draws on ethnographic research on security practices in the United States among police and parts of the intelligence community from 2006 through to the beginning of 2014. Real names are used when the material is drawn from archival sources, while individuals who were interviewed during fieldwork are referred to by their position rank or title. For matters of fact not otherwise referenced, see the sources compiled on “The Complete 911 Timeline” at History Commons. First, a scenario. Oklahoma, 2001 It is 1 April 2001, in far western Oklahoma, warm beneath the late afternoon sun. Highway Patrol Trooper C.L. Parkins is about 80 kilometres from the border of Texas, watching trucks and cars speed along Interstate 40. The speed limit is around 110 kilometres per hour, and just then, his radar clocks a blue Toyota Corolla going 135 kph. The driver is not wearing a seatbelt. Trooper Parkins swung in behind the vehicle, and after a while signalled that the car should pull over. The driver was dark-haired and short; in Parkins’s memory, he spoke English without any problem. He asked the man to come sit in the patrol car while he did a series of routine checks—to see if the vehicle was stolen, if there were warrants out for his arrest, if his license was valid. Parkins said, “I visited with him a little bit but I just barely remember even having him in my car. You stop so many people that if […] you don't arrest them or anything […] you don't remember too much after a couple months” (Clay and Ellis). Nawaf Al Hazmi had a valid California driver’s license, with an address in San Diego, and the car’s registration had been legally transferred to him by his former roommate. Parkins’s inquiries to the National Crime Information Center returned no warnings, nor did anything seem odd in their interaction. So the officer wrote Al Hazmi two tickets totalling $138, one for speeding and one for failure to use a seat belt, and told him to be on his way. Al Hazmi, for his part, was crossing the country to a new apartment in a Virginia suburb of Washington, DC, and upon arrival he mailed the payment for his tickets to the county court clerk in Oklahoma. Over the next five months, he lived several places on the East Coast: going to the gym, making routine purchases, and taking a few trips that included Las Vegas and Florida. He had a couple more encounters with local law enforcement and these too were unremarkable. On 1 May 2001 he was mugged, and promptly notified the police, who documented the incident with his name and local address (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 139). At the end of June, having moved to New Jersey, he was involved in a minor traffic accident on the George Washington Bridge, and officers again recorded his real name and details of the incident. In July, Khalid Al Mihdhar, the previous owner of the car, returned from abroad, and joined Al Hazmi in New Jersey. The two were boyhood friends, and they went together to a library several times to look up travel information, and then, with Al Hazmi’s younger brother Selem, to book their final flight. On 11 September, the three boarded American Airlines flight 77 as part of the Al Qaeda team that flew the mid-sized jet into the west façade of the Pentagon. They died along with the piloting hijacker, all the passengers, and 125 people on the ground. Theirs was one of four airplanes hijacked that day, one of which was crashed by passengers, the others into significant sites of American power, by men who had been living for varying lengths of time all but unnoticed in the United States. No one thought that Trooper Parkins, or the other officers with whom the 9/11 hijackers crossed paths, should have acted differently. The Commissioner of the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety himself commented that the trooper “did the right thing” at that April traffic stop. And yet, interviewed by a local newspaper in January of 2002, Parkins mused to the reporter “it's difficult sometimes to think back and go: 'What if you had known something else?'" (Clay and Ellis). Missed Opportunities Image 2: “Hijackers Timeline (Redacted).” CC BY-SA 4.0 2015 by author, using the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s “Working Draft Chronology of Events for Hijackers and Associates”. In fact, several of the men who would become the 9/11 hijackers were stopped for minor traffic violations. Mohamed Atta, usually pointed to as the ringleader, was given a citation in Florida that spring of 2001 for driving without a license. When he missed his court date, a bench warrant was issued (Wall Street Journal). Perhaps the warrant was not flagged properly, however, since nothing happened when he was pulled over again, for speeding. In the government inquiries that followed attack, and in the press, these brushes with the law were “missed opportunities” to thwart the 9/11 plot (Kean and Hamilton, Report 353). Among a certain set of career law enforcement personnel, particularly those active in management and police associations, these missed opportunities were fraught with a sense of personal failure. Yet, in short order, they were to become a source of professional revelation. The scenarios—Trooper Parkins and Al Hazmi, other encounters in other states, the general fact that there had been chance meetings between police officers and the hijackers—were re-imagined in the aftermath of 9/11. Those moments were returned to and reversed, so that multiple potentialities could be seen, beyond or in addition to what had taken place. The deputy director of an intelligence fusion centre told me in an interview, “it is always a local cop who saw something” and he replayed how the incidents of contact had unfolded with the men. These scenarios offered a way to recapture the past. In the uncertainty of every encounter, whether a traffic stop or questioning someone taking photos of a landmark (and potential terrorist target), was also potential. Through a process of re-imagining, police encounters with the public became part of the government’s “national intelligence” strategy. Previously a division had been marked between foreign and domestic intelligence. While the phrase “national intelligence” had long been used, notably in National Intelligence Estimates, after 9/11 it became more significant. The overall director of the US intelligence community became the Director National Intelligence, for instance, and the cohesive term marked the way that increasingly diverse institutional components, types of data and forms of action were evolving to address the collection of data and intelligence production (McConnell). In a series of working groups mobilised by members of major police professional organisations, and funded by the US Department of Justice, career officers and representatives from federal agencies produced detailed recommendations and plans for involving police in the new Information Sharing Environment. Among the plans drawn up during this period was what would eventually come to be the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, built principally around the idea of encounters such as the one between Parkins and Al Hazmi. Map 1: Map of pilot sites in the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Evaluation Environment in 2010 (courtesy of the author; no longer available online). Map 2: Map of participating sites in the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, as of 2014. In an interview, a fusion centre director who participated in this planning as well as its implementation, told me that his thought had been, “if we train state and local cops to understand pre-terrorism indicators, if we train them to be more curious, and to question more what they see,” this could feed into “a system where they could actually get that information to somebody where it matters.” In devising the reporting initiative, the working groups counter-actualised the scenarios of those encounters, and the kinds of larger plots to which they were understood to belong, in order to extract a set of concepts: categories of suspicious “activities” or “patterns of behaviour” corresponding to the phases of a terrorism event in the process of becoming (Deleuze, Negotiations). This conceptualisation of terrorism was standardised, so that it could be taught, and applied, in discerning and documenting the incidents comprising an event’s phases. In police officer training, the various suspicious behaviours were called “terrorism precursor activities” and were divided between criminal and non-criminal. “Functional Standards,” developed by the Los Angeles Police Department and then tested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), served to code the observed behaviours for sharing (via compatible communication protocols) up the federal hierarchy and also horizontally between states and regions. In the popular parlance of videos made for the public by local police departments and DHS, which would come to populate the internet within a few years, these categories were “signs of terrorism,” more specifically: surveillance, eliciting information, testing security, and so on. Image 3: “The Seven Signs of Terrorism (sometimes eight).” CC BY-SA 4.0 2015 by author, using materials in the public domain. If the problem of 9/11 had been that the men who would become hijackers had gone unnoticed, the basic idea of the Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative was to create a mechanism through which the eyes and ears of everyone could contribute to their detection. In this vein, “If You See Something, Say Something™” was a campaign that originated with the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and was then licensed for use to DHS. The tips and leads such campaigns generated, together with the reports from officers on suspicious incidents that might have to do with terrorism, were coordinated in the Information Sharing Environment. Drawing on reports thus generated, the Federal Government would, in theory, communicate timely information on security threats to law enforcement so that they would be better able to discern the incidents to be reported. The cycle aimed to catch events in emergence, in a distinctively anticipatory strategy of counterterrorism (Stalcup). Re-imagination A curious fact emerges from this history, and it is key to understanding how this initiative developed. That is, there was nothing suspicious in the encounters. The soon-to-be terrorists’ licenses were up-to-date, the cars were legal, they were not nervous. Even Mohamed Atta’s warrant would have resulted in nothing more than a fine. It is not self-evident, given these facts, how a governmental technology came to be designed from these scenarios. How––if nothing seemed of immediate concern, if there had been nothing suspicious to discern––did an intelligence strategy come to be assembled around such encounters? Evidently, strident demands were made after the events of 9/11 to know, “what went wrong?” Policies were crafted and implemented according to the answers given: it was too easy to obtain identification, or to enter and stay in the country, or to buy airplane tickets and fly. But the trooper’s question, the reader will recall, was somewhat different. He had said, “It’s difficult sometimes to think back and go: ‘What if you had known something else?’” To ask “what if you had known something else?” is also to ask what else might have been. Janet Roitman shows that identifying a crisis tends to implicate precisely the question of what went wrong. Crisis, and its critique, take up history as a series of right and wrong turns, bad choices made between existing dichotomies (90): liberty-security, security-privacy, ordinary-suspicious. It is to say, what were the possibilities and how could we have selected the correct one? Such questions seek to retrospectively uncover latencies—systemic or structural, human error or a moral lapse (71)—but they ask of those latencies what false understanding of the enemy, of threat, of priorities, allowed a terrible thing to happen. “What if…?” instead turns to the virtuality hidden in history, through which missed opportunities can be re-imagined. Image 4: “The Cholmondeley Sisters and Their Swaddled Babies.” Anonymous, c. 1600-1610 (British School, 17th century); Deleuze and Parnet (150). CC BY-SA 4.0 2015 by author, using materials in the public domain. Gilles Deleuze, speaking with Claire Parnet, says, “memory is not an actual image which forms after the object has been perceived, but a virtual image coexisting with the actual perception of the object” (150). Re-imagined scenarios take up the potential of memory, so that as the trooper’s traffic stop was revisited, it also became a way of imagining what else might have been. As Immanuel Kant, among others, points out, “the productive power of imagination is […] not exactly creative, for it is not capable of producing a sense representation that was never given to our faculty of sense; one can always furnish evidence of the material of its ideas” (61). The “memory” of these encounters provided the material for re-imagining them, and thereby re-virtualising history. This was different than other governmental responses, such as examining past events in order to assess the probable risk of their repetition, or drawing on past events to imagine future scenarios, for use in exercises that identify vulnerabilities and remedy deficiencies (Anderson). Re-imagining scenarios of police-hijacker encounters through the question of “what if?” evoked what Erin Manning calls “a certain array of recognizable elastic points” (39), through which options for other movements were invented. The Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative’s architects instrumentalised such moments as they designed new governmental entities and programs to anticipate terrorism. For each element of the encounter, an aspect of the initiative was developed: training, functional standards, a way to (hypothetically) get real-time information about threats. Suspicion was identified as a key affect, one which, if cultivated, could offer a way to effectively deal not with binary right or wrong possibilities, but with the potential which lies nestled in uncertainty. The “signs of terrorism” (that is, categories of “terrorism precursor activities”) served to maximise receptivity to encounters. Indeed, it can apparently create an oversensitivity, manifested, for example, in police surveillance of innocent people exercising their right to assemble (Madigan), or the confiscation of photographers’s equipment (Simon). “What went wrong?” and “what if?” were different interrogations of the same pre-9/11 incidents. The questions are of course intimately related. Moments where something went wrong are when one is likely to ask, what else might have been known? Moreover, what else might have been? The answers to each question informed and shaped the other, as re-imagined scenarios became the means of extracting categories of suspicious activities and patterns of behaviour that comprise the phases of an event in becoming. Conclusion The 9/11 Commission, after two years of investigation into the causes of the disastrous day, reported that “the most important failure was one of imagination” (Kean and Hamilton, Summary). The iconic images of 9/11––such as airplanes being flown into symbols of American power––already existed, in guises ranging from fictive thrillers to the infamous FBI field memo sent to headquarters on Arab men learning to fly, but not land. In 1974 there had already been an actual (failed) attempt to steal a plane and kill the president by crashing it into the White House (Kean and Hamilton, Report Ch11 n21). The threats had been imagined, as Pat O’Malley and Philip Bougen put it, but not how to govern them, and because the ways to address those threats had been not imagined, they were discounted as matters for intervention (29). O’Malley and Bougen argue that one effect of 9/11, and the general rise of incalculable insecurities, was to make it necessary for the “merely imaginable” to become governable. Images of threats from the mundane to the extreme had to be conjured, and then imagination applied again, to devise ways to render them amenable to calculation, minimisation or elimination. In the words of the 9/11 Commission, the Government must bureaucratise imagination. There is a sense in which this led to more of the same. Re-imagining the early encounters reinforced expectations for officers to do what they already do, that is, to be on the lookout for suspicious behaviours. Yet, the images of threat brought forth, in their mixing of memory and an elastic “almost,” generated their own momentum and distinctive demands. Existing capacities, such as suspicion, were re-shaped and elaborated into specific forms of security governance. The question of “what if?” and the scenarios of police-hijacker encounter were particularly potent equipment for this re-imagining of history and its re-virtualisation. References Anderson, Ben. “Preemption, Precaution, Preparedness: Anticipatory Action and Future Geographies.” Progress in Human Geography 34.6 (2010): 777-98. Clay, Nolan, and Randy Ellis. “Terrorist Ticketed Last Year on I-40.” NewsOK, 20 Jan. 2002. 25 Nov. 2014 ‹http://newsok.com/article/2779124›. Deleuze, Gilles. Negotiations. New York: Columbia UP, 1995. Deleuze, Gilles, and Claire Parnet. Dialogues II. New York: Columbia UP 2007 [1977]. Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Hijackers Timeline (Redacted) Part 01 of 02.” Working Draft Chronology of Events for Hijackers and Associates. 2003. 18 Apr. 2014 ‹https://vault.fbi.gov/9-11%20Commission%20Report/9-11-chronology-part-01-of-02›. Kant, Immanuel. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Trans. Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Kean, Thomas H., and Lee Hamilton. Executive Summary of the 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 25 Oct. 2015 ‹http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.htm›. Kean, Thomas H., and Lee Hamilton. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. McConnell, Mike. “Overhauling Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 2007. Madigan, Nick. “Spying Uncovered.” Baltimore Sun 18 Jul. 2008. 25 Oct. 2015 ‹http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-te.md.spy18jul18-story.html›. Manning, Erin. Relationscapes: Movement, Art, Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 2009. O’Malley, P., and P. Bougen. “Imaginable Insecurities: Imagination, Routinisation and the Government of Uncertainty post 9/11.” Imaginary Penalities. Ed. Pat Carlen. Cullompton, UK: Willan, 2008.Roitman, Janet. Anti-Crisis. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2013. Simon, Stephanie. “Suspicious Encounters: Ordinary Preemption and the Securitization of Photography.” Security Dialogue 43.2 (2012): 157-73. Stalcup, Meg. “Policing Uncertainty: On Suspicious Activity Reporting.” Modes of Uncertainty: Anthropological Cases. Eds. Limor Saminian-Darash and Paul Rabinow. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2015. 69-87. Wall Street Journal. “A Careful Sequence of Mundane Dealings Sows a Day of Bloody Terror for Hijackers.” 16 Oct. 2001.

Les idées, dans les théories de la connaissance de Descartes à Hume, sont des normes intuitives pour interpréter la nature. Quelle cosmologie en résulte? Un matérialisme (l'analyse de Berkeley le montre), débouchant chez Locke puis Hume sur l' agnosticisme, et une théorie de l'entendement qui est le modèle de l'idéalisme kantien. Mais Kant a rejoint la théorie des idées indépendamment, par le problème métaphysique de l'espace, qu'il déclare idéal en 1770, pour corriger sa théorie de l'espace absolu de 1768. De ce point, on peut tenter de suivre la construction de l'idéalisme transcendantal, et comprendre sa convergence avec la métaphysique cartésienne et l'empirisme de Locke.

Idealism is a family of metaphysical views each of which gives priority to the mental. The best-known forms of idealism in Western philosophy are the versions developed by George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant. Although idealism was once a dominant view in Western philosophy, it has suffered almost total neglect over the last several decades. The contemporary debate has focused almost exclusively on physicalism and dualism, though the alternative views of panpsychism and neutral monism are beginning to receive more attention. This book remedies the situation by bringing together seventeen new essays by leading philosophers on idealism. They explain, attack, or defend a variety of forms of idealism—not only Berkeleyan and Kantian versions, but also Buddhist and Jewish versions, and others besides. The essays are all contributions to metaphysics, but variously focus on philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and other areas of philosophy.

This chapter reflects on a long philosophical career. According to the author, what attracted him to philosophy was in part precisely the idea that it wasn’t like getting a job or following a professional career. He thought of philosophy as something you studied just for its own sake. The author also shares his life as a graduate student at Harvard University, where he was influenced by the likes of Burton Dreben and Rogers Albritton. He went to Berkeley in 1961, and cites his erstwhile colleague Thompson Clarke as the one philosopher to whom he owes the most. The author concludes by asserting that what he and his fellow philosophers have been doing is similar to the kind of investigation undertaken by greats such as Plato, Aristotle, René Descartes, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant.

In the Preface to his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) famously complained that common sense is the last refuge of the cynical and ambitious littérateur who, lacking any real aptitude for speculative thought, seeks to win over the public by consecrating their inherited prejudices. The aim of this chapter is to explain where and why Kant’s interpretation of Scottish common sense philosophy goes awry. The work of four early Scottish common-sensists is explored: Thomas Reid (1710–96), James Oswald (1703–93), James Beattie (1735–1803), and George Campbell (1719–96). As Thomas Reid is by far the best-known and most accomplished member of this group, his system is treated as the sun by whose light three less brilliant bodies of work can be seen and measured.