Academic literature on the topic 'Bid-rigging (collusion)'

Abstract The paper shows that descriptive statistics, used as screens, capture the effect of bid rigging in the distribution of the bids. The bid-rigging cartel studied in this paper negatively affected the variance of the bids as illustrated by the coefficient of variance and the kurtosis statistic. Furthermore, it cleverly manipulated the differences between bids to secure that the designated bidder from the cartel won the contract. Such cover-bidding mechanism produced asymmetry in the distribution of the bids illustrated by the relative distance, the skewness statistic, and the percentage difference between the first and second lowest bids. The descriptive statistics capture the change in the statistical pattern of the distribution of the bids between periods of collusion and competition. Moreover, the bid rotation screen shows that the behavior of firms changed radically between the cartel and post-cartel periods. Finally, the paper discusses policy implications for competition agencies wishing to set up a detection method for screening procurement markets.

This paper examines the economic forces which may lead to government-assisted or -facilitated bid-rigging (kansei-dango) in public procurement in Japan, and considers their implications. A public official may often worry about situations where his/her procurement project will not be successfully implemented. Based on a simplified theoretical treatment and on case studies of kansei-dango, it is argued that the desire to avert the risk of unsuccessful procurement resulting from the "experience goods" status of procured goods and/or services may be one reason for bid-rigging. Based on this understanding of kansei-dango, we discuss some implications for policies to restrain this type of corruption.

Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Matsushita, various U.S. district courts have issued a series of rulings that appear to constitute a new learning on the economics of collusive behavior and to elevate the economic evidentiary bar for successful proof of price-fixing and bid-rigging. The rulings use game theory constructs expressed as pure, interdependent behavior that theoretically can result in supracompetitive prices in the absence of any agreement. The most recent explanation of this learning is contained in the 2016 titanium dioxide (TiO2) opinion Valspar v. E. I. DuPont, which raises the bar for proving a Sherman Act Sec. 1 violation. This and earlier rulings appear counterintuitive when their reasoning is tested against the context of Judge Richard Posner’s opinion on the value of circumstantial evidence in High Fructose Corn Syrup and In re Text Messaging. This article identifies market structure and behavioral features typically found in cartel arrangements, and tests the efficacy of what is perceived as a new learning on collusion/competition with empirical data from twelve alleged price-fixing conspiracies successfully litigated over the past two decades.

Improvement of procurement procedures and their digitization help prevent and identify cartels, but at the same time lead to the emergence of new anticompetitive schemes. In this paper we focus on electronic auctions, which have become the main method of public procurement in Russia in recent years. As e-auctions provide access to many big government orders; the incentives for bidders to join anti-competitive agreements are increased. Therefore, the development of methods to detect bid rigging at electronic auctions is of high practical importance. The aim of this work was to develop a method for detecting signs of horizontal collusion at an auction. We use machine learning methods to train classifiers that predict the presence or absence of cartel in electronic auctions, depending on the distribution of bidders, the time of submission of applications, the duration of the auction and the number of participants. Variables for the model were selected on the basis of distribution plots built for sample of cartels and random sample. The study is based on data from public procurement Web portal and the information about bid rigging from cases of the Federal Antimonopoly Service. The results showed that the Random forest model most accurately predicts the detection of the cartels on electronic auctions. The accuracy of the prediction is 84%, and the recall and precision of the model are 83 and 87%, respectively. The most significant variables for the classification are the level of price reduction, the difference in the time of application filing of participants and the value of the maximum starting price of contract.

This paper undertakes a critical case analysis of the process and outcomes of the Competition Commission (CCSA) Fast Track Construction Settlement Project relative to the mandates of the CCSA and the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB). The study reviews the information from the CCSA’s settlements, analysing the breakdown by private and public projects, type of project and the nature of bid-rigging. It provides an assessment of the practices involved and considers the cooperation that is required for the successful implementation of large infrastructure projects and how these can be organized in a way that ensures rivalry while enabling co-operation. The paper further reviews the barriers to entry, and the complementary measures that can be taken to ensure greater effective rivalry and participation. Interventions that could be necessary at the regulatory, procurement and firm level to ensure that the construction sector charts a new sustainable competitive path are highlighted.

Abstract In this article, we present findings from the Brazilian Federal Police’s ongoing investigation referred to as ‘Operation Car Wash’, which led to an accusation of collusive bidding being presented to a cartel that comprised 16 construction contractors. While plea bargains from several contractors within the cartel have materialized, additional evidence needs to be provided by the investigations officials to ensure the adequate application of justice. In this article, we provide scientific evidence that can be used by the Brazilian criminal courts to demonstrate the presence of collusive bidding. The contributions of this article are two-fold: (i) a robust and reliable econometric model to prove the presence of collusive bidding is implemented, which meets the basic criteria defined by the judicial system for scientific evidence; and (ii) the negative economic impact of collusive bid rigging is quantified, which was much higher than the percentage admitted by those involved in their leniency agreements.

This article examines the manifestations and causes of corrupt practices in the civil service of developing countries based on review of theoretical and empirical literature regarding corruption and development. Among the corrupt practices identified are: bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, abuse of power, conflict of interest, insider trading/abuse of privileged information, favoritism, collusion with business interests, procurement contract/bid rigging and influence peddling This article also has identified the main underlying causes of corruption in the civil service of developing countries to be politicization of the civil service, poor pay, lack of accountability/transparency in public organizations, weak enforcements mechanisms, lack of merit-based career advancement, and excessive/ opaque regulations. The findings reported this article reveal that ethical violations in the civil service and overall corruption levels in politics, economy, and society are very high, with the negative outcome of hampering economic growth, sabotaging social justice and contributing to political instability in the context of developing countries. Keywords: accountability, civil service, corruption, corruption perception index, developing countries, development, ethics, transparency

碩士
東吳大學
法律學系
106
The most important goal of the Government Procurement Actis that to establish a fair, open, fair, and transparent competitive procurement environment, using the limited budget to maximize the benefits. There are lots of crimes in Government Procurement Act, including the crimes between tenderers and between tenderers and entities, especially when Public officials involve in Government Procurement Act, it usually turns to complicated situations by applying in Criminal law and Anti-Corruption Act. This article analyzes the criminal liability under Article 87 of the Government Procurement Act, analyzing bid rigging, procurement fraud, accompanying-bidding, finding out if there is a problem, to fix it up, so that it can achieve the purpose of Government Procurement Act.

碩士
逢甲大學
經營管理碩士在職專班
96
According to WTO ‘s estimation upon its members, the expense of public construction and procurement of Taiwan government amounts to 6-8 billion USD every year. In the past, except Audit Law, Audit Regulation and Regulations for Auditing Government’s Procurement, Order and Realization, in which government procurement was only mentioned and regulated roughly, there has been no clear-out regulation for procurement actions. The evidences of bid collusion and bid rigging were hard to be collected; furthermore, the unclear regulations have caused the confusions of service providers, procurer and law enforcement agency and the controversies consequently occurred. The Fair Trade Law enforced in 1992 preliminarily set up regulations upon concerted action (bid collusion) and discrimination action (bid rigging); however, the government procurement system has not been established as a sound and effective one at that time. With the rapid social and economic development and under the pressure of being as a WTO member, the Government Procurement Law was finally promulgated on May 27, 1998 and effective on May 27, 1999. Since then the government procurement was finally formally regulated and the crimes involved with bid collusion or rigging are clearly defined and disciplined. Although the procurement regulation has been set up, the bid collusion and rigging behaviors still constantly occur and get subtler and trickier. Therefore, there is more to be reviewed and improved in law or system of government procurement. This thesis will review the regulations related bid collusion and rigging behaviors of German, USA, Japan and EU, refer to domestic and foreign publications including papers, journals, books and government publications and analyze the practical cases investigated by Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice or the cases handled by Public Construction Commission. Finally, some suggestions and the objects (respectively of short-term, mid-term and long-term) will be proposed from the aspect of law and system for further improvement and reformation in the future. There are six chapters in this thesis: Chapter 1 -- Motivation, object, methodology, scope and research limitations. Chapter 2 – Theoretical reviews of bid collusion and rigging, typology and definition. Chapter 3 – Review of system, regulation and discipline of German, USA, Japan and EU. Chapter 4 – Review of the historical development of the law enactment, the background, process, content, principle and objects of Government Procurement; Discussion upon the content and characteristics of WTO GPA (Government Procurement Agreement); Comparison of the government procurement systems and the regulations of bid collusion and rigging between Taiwan and other developed countries. Chapter 5 – Analysis of practical cases of crimes involved with bid collusion and rigging; Analysis of the criminal motivations and manners. Chapter 6 – Summary and suggestions for prevention and reformation in the future.

La thèse a été évaluée par les personnes suivantes: Carlo Morselli, directeur de recherche et professeur à l'École de criminologie; Anthony Amicelle, président du jury et professeur à l'École de criminologie; Jean Bérard, membre du jury et professeur à l'École de criminologie; Carla Nagels, évaluatrice externe et professeur à l'Université libre de Bruxelles L'auteur aimerait remercier le Fonds de recherche du Québec - Société et culture (FRQSC), le Centre international de criminologie comparée (CICC) et l'École de criminologie pour le support financier octroyé à différentes étapes de la rédaction de la thèse.
La recherche trouve ses origines d’un scandale touchant l’industrie de la construction et les milieux politiques au Québec de la fin des années 2000 (à travers les allégations de corruption et de collusion soulevées par les médias) à la fin novembre 2015 (avec le dépôt du rapport final de la Commission d’enquête sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie de la construction, ci-après CEIC). L’argument principal est que les années de scandale ont permis au Québec de transiter d’une province considérée comme la terre mythique de la corruption au Canada à une entité développant une des structures anticorruptions les plus novatrices et sophistiquées dans le monde. La thèse est construite comme une étude de cas qui s’intègre aux trois grandes sphères de l’étude du phénomène criminel telles que définies par Sutherland et Cressey, à savoir le passage à l’acte, la réaction sociale et le contrôle social (1947, p.1). Dans l’étude du passage à l’acte, le concept de crime étatico-corporatif est mis à profit afin d’exposer l’aspect symbiotique des systèmes criminels alimentés à travers une interaction fondamentale entre poursuite d’intérêts publics et poursuite d’intérêts privés. De tels systèmes furent en effet identifiés dans plusieurs municipalités du Québec. Pour cette partie de la thèse, les données relatives à l’ensemble des contrats de construction octroyés par appel d’offres public par la ville de Laval dans son histoire (1965-2013) sont analysées à travers diverses mesures de réseaux sociaux. Cette portion de la thèse utilise également les témoignages issus des travaux de la CEIC, et des entretiens semi-directifs réalisés avec des acteurs provenant de diverses autorités de lutte à la collusion (truquage des appels d’offres) et à la corruption au Québec. La combinaison de ces méthodes permet d’évaluer la nature intégrée, historique et spatiale des délinquances recensées au sein de diverses municipalités, avec des indicateurs de collusion qui remontent aussi loin qu’à la création de la municipalité lavalloise dans les années 1960. Dans l’étude de la réaction sociale, un modèle d’analyse intégratif emprunté au domaine de la sociologie de l’action publique (Lascoumes et LeGalès, 2012) est utilisé pour mettre en relief les forces structurelles, organisationnelles et individuelles derrière la constitution du scandale québécois. Cette deuxième grande section de la thèse illustre comment ce scandale s’insère dans des tendances nationales et internationales d’intolérance accrue du public et d’intensification des contrôles à l’égard des actes criminels (corruption, collusion, pots-de-vin, fraude) révélés au coeur du scandale. Enfin, dans l’étude du contrôle social, l’analyse des témoignages issus des audiences de la CEIC est jumelée aux données découlant d’entretiens semi-directifs réalisés avec 22 acteurs provenant d’agences de contrôle créées à la suite du scandale : l’Unité permanente anticorruption (UPAC), le Bureau de l’inspecteur général (BIG) de la ville de Montréal, et le Bureau d’intégrité et d’éthique de Laval (BIEL). Cette dernière section illustre comment la transition d’une scène réglementaire permissive et hautement déficiente à un environnement réglementaire axée sur une mobilisation sans précédent de ressources policières, sur le partage d’information et sur la poursuite des conduites illégales au pénal s’avère très avantageuse, mais s’est accomplie – et s’accomplit toujours – à travers de nombreux défis pour les contrôleurs.
The research originated from a political scandal which spanned several years (2009-2015) in the province of Quebec. The thesis’ main argument is that the scandal years saw Quebec transformed from being considered the “historical golden land” of Canadian corruption into a province which developed one of the country’s most sophisticated systems of corruption and white-collar crime control. The thesis was constructed as a case-study, and addressed the three principal objects of criminological analysis: the breaking of laws, the making of laws, and the reaction to the breaking of laws (Sutherland and Cressey, 1947, p.1). The study applied multiple methods to achieve these goals. In the study of criminal decision-making (breaking of laws), Kramer and Michalowski’s (2006) state-corporate crime concept was applied to demonstrate the presence of multifactorial features of criminal systems fuelled by misbehaving at the intersection of private and public interests. Such conspiracies were found to be generalized across several municipalities throughout the province. For this portion of the thesis, data on all construction contracts awarded through public procurement in the entire history of what appeared to be one of Canada’s most corrupt municipalities, Laval (the 13th largest in the country), was systematically collected from 1965 to 2013. It was then analyzed using various social network measures. Testimonies from Quebec’s Commission of inquiry on the awarding and management of public contracts in the construction industry (hereafter, CEIC) were also coupled with a dozen of interviews conducted with regulators and corruption authorities in Quebec. The combination of methods helped assess the integrated, spatial and historical nature of illicit activities which undergirded many municipalities, Laval being one of the most notorious one. Traces of bid-rigging indicators in public procurement were indeed traced back to as early as the city’s founding in the 1960s. In the study of the making of laws, Lascoumes and Le Galès’ (2002) sociology of public action framework was expanded to investigate the structural, organizational, and individual forces behind the Quebec scandal. This section of the thesis unravels the sudden urge to legislate and investigate schemes that were deeply rooted in the province’s history. By making sense of the Quebec scandal, this sub-section demonstrates how larger structural and contextual factors gradually established increased incentives for elected officials to enhance legal and institutional controls on white-collar and corporate crimes which were found to be systemic across Quebec’s construction and political scenes. Finally, in the study of the reaction to the breaking of laws, testimonies from the CEIC were combined with interviews conducted with 22 actors in control agencies established as a direct result of the scandal: the Permanent Anticorruption Unit (UPAC in French), the Inspector General Bureau (BIG in French) of the city of Montreal, and the Bureau of integrity and ethics of Laval (BIEL in French). This last section shows how transitioning from a state of practical passivity to one of intense controls, monitoring, institutional rearrangements, and legislative efforts was accompanied, for regulatory and police authorities, by several benefits but substantial challenges as well.

Horizontal anticompetitive arrangements law has been marked by major legislative turning points. The prohibition upon group boycotts was first weakened and then abolished. Having been amended on two occasions (1990 and 2001) to restrict its field of operation, the coup de grace was administered in 2017 when s 29 was repealed outright. More regulation of other horizontal anticompetitive arrangements followed Australia’s lead in the steady stream of cases involving collusive understandings that have the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening or hindering competition in terms of the key prohibition in s 27. The task of separating collusion by consensus from “conscious parallelism” has not proved easy. Cases involving joint ventures and information sharing have seldom come before the courts. In 2017 the law was remodelled so that “price-fixing” was re-cast as “cartel” activity. The substance did not change for cartels of the price-setting variety; bid rigging, market division, and output restriction arrangements had also been caught under the original 1986 wording. Very recently, cartel conduct has been criminalized.

This chapter discusses cartels in detail. A cartel is a secret agreement or arrangement between firms or individuals who would otherwise compete to increase their profits by manipulating the market. There are three general types of illegal cartels: sellers’, buyers’, and bid-rigging cartels. A suppliers’ or sellers’ cartel is where a group of firms who would have otherwise competed agree to increase the selling price of the inputs, intermediate and/or final goods, and services they sell. Meanwhile, a buyers’ cartel is where a group of buyers who would otherwise have competed agree to reduce the prices they pay for the goods and services they purchase. A bid-rigging cartel is when sellers who would otherwise compete secretly agree to raise prices and other terms to those who acquire their products or services through a tendering or bidding process. However, there are also legal cartels such as export cartels. Ultimately, the main abuse in cartels is charging a price different from that which would have been charged in the absence of the collusive arrangements.