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Journal articles on the topic 'Bid-rigging (collusion)'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 4 February 2022

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Imhof, David. "DETECTING BID-RIGGING CARTELS WITH DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS." Journal of Competition Law & Economics 15, no. 4 (December 2019): 427–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhz019.

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Abstract The paper shows that descriptive statistics, used as screens, capture the effect of bid rigging in the distribution of the bids. The bid-rigging cartel studied in this paper negatively affected the variance of the bids as illustrated by the coefficient of variance and the kurtosis statistic. Furthermore, it cleverly manipulated the differences between bids to secure that the designated bidder from the cartel won the contract. Such cover-bidding mechanism produced asymmetry in the distribution of the bids illustrated by the relative distance, the skewness statistic, and the percentage difference between the first and second lowest bids. The descriptive statistics capture the change in the statistical pattern of the distribution of the bids between periods of collusion and competition. Moreover, the bid rotation screen shows that the behavior of firms changed radically between the cartel and post-cartel periods. Finally, the paper discusses policy implications for competition agencies wishing to set up a detection method for screening procurement markets.

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Tanaka, Satoru, and Shuya Hayashi. "Collusion between public procurers and suppliers in the context of japan’s public procurement: The role of the risks of “unsuccessful procurement”." Journal of Public Procurement 16, no. 3 (March 1, 2016): 291–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jopp-16-03-2016-b003.

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This paper examines the economic forces which may lead to government-assisted or -facilitated bid-rigging (kansei-dango) in public procurement in Japan, and considers their implications. A public official may often worry about situations where his/her procurement project will not be successfully implemented. Based on a simplified theoretical treatment and on case studies of kansei-dango, it is argued that the desire to avert the risk of unsuccessful procurement resulting from the "experience goods" status of procured goods and/or services may be one reason for bid-rigging. Based on this understanding of kansei-dango, we discuss some implications for policies to restrain this type of corruption.

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Lanzillotti, Robert F. "Collusion/Competition." Antitrust Bulletin 62, no. 3 (August 16, 2017): 591–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003603x17719765.

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Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Matsushita, various U.S. district courts have issued a series of rulings that appear to constitute a new learning on the economics of collusive behavior and to elevate the economic evidentiary bar for successful proof of price-fixing and bid-rigging. The rulings use game theory constructs expressed as pure, interdependent behavior that theoretically can result in supracompetitive prices in the absence of any agreement. The most recent explanation of this learning is contained in the 2016 titanium dioxide (TiO2) opinion Valspar v. E. I. DuPont, which raises the bar for proving a Sherman Act Sec. 1 violation. This and earlier rulings appear counterintuitive when their reasoning is tested against the context of Judge Richard Posner’s opinion on the value of circumstantial evidence in High Fructose Corn Syrup and In re Text Messaging. This article identifies market structure and behavioral features typically found in cartel arrangements, and tests the efficacy of what is perceived as a new learning on collusion/competition with empirical data from twelve alleged price-fixing conspiracies successfully litigated over the past two decades.

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Molchanova, Glafira O., Alexey I. Rey, and Dmitry Yu Shagarov. "Detecting Indicators of Horizontal Collusion in Public Procurement with Machine Learning Methods." Economics of Contemporary Russia, no. 1 (April 6, 2020): 109–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.33293/1609-1442-2020-1(88)-109-127.

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Improvement of procurement procedures and their digitization help prevent and identify cartels, but at the same time lead to the emergence of new anticompetitive schemes. In this paper we focus on electronic auctions, which have become the main method of public procurement in Russia in recent years. As e-auctions provide access to many big government orders; the incentives for bidders to join anti-competitive agreements are increased. Therefore, the development of methods to detect bid rigging at electronic auctions is of high practical importance. The aim of this work was to develop a method for detecting signs of horizontal collusion at an auction. We use machine learning methods to train classifiers that predict the presence or absence of cartel in electronic auctions, depending on the distribution of bidders, the time of submission of applications, the duration of the auction and the number of participants. Variables for the model were selected on the basis of distribution plots built for sample of cartels and random sample. The study is based on data from public procurement Web portal and the information about bid rigging from cases of the Federal Antimonopoly Service. The results showed that the Random forest model most accurately predicts the detection of the cartels on electronic auctions. The accuracy of the prediction is 84%, and the recall and precision of the model are 83 and 87%, respectively. The most significant variables for the classification are the level of price reduction, the difference in the time of application filing of participants and the value of the maximum starting price of contract.

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Ratshisusu, Hardin. "Limiting collusion in the construction industry: A review of the bid-rigging settlement in South Africa." Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 7, no. 4 (September 30, 2014): 587–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/jef.v7i4.386.

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This paper undertakes a critical case analysis of the process and outcomes of the Competition Commission (CCSA) Fast Track Construction Settlement Project relative to the mandates of the CCSA and the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB). The study reviews the information from the CCSA’s settlements, analysing the breakdown by private and public projects, type of project and the nature of bid-rigging. It provides an assessment of the practices involved and considers the cooperation that is required for the successful implementation of large infrastructure projects and how these can be organized in a way that ensures rivalry while enabling co-operation. The paper further reviews the barriers to entry, and the complementary measures that can be taken to ensure greater effective rivalry and participation. Interventions that could be necessary at the regulatory, procurement and firm level to ensure that the construction sector charts a new sustainable competitive path are highlighted.

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Signor, Regis, Peter E. D. Love, João José C. B. Vallim, Alexandre B. Raupp, and Oluwole Olatunji. "It is not collusion unless you get caught: the case of ‘Operation Car Wash’ and unearthing of a Cartel." Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 7, no. 2 (April 26, 2019): 177–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnz009.

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Abstract In this article, we present findings from the Brazilian Federal Police’s ongoing investigation referred to as ‘Operation Car Wash’, which led to an accusation of collusive bidding being presented to a cartel that comprised 16 construction contractors. While plea bargains from several contractors within the cartel have materialized, additional evidence needs to be provided by the investigations officials to ensure the adequate application of justice. In this article, we provide scientific evidence that can be used by the Brazilian criminal courts to demonstrate the presence of collusive bidding. The contributions of this article are two-fold: (i) a robust and reliable econometric model to prove the presence of collusive bidding is implemented, which meets the basic criteria defined by the judicial system for scientific evidence; and (ii) the negative economic impact of collusive bid rigging is quantified, which was much higher than the percentage admitted by those involved in their leniency agreements.

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Clark, Robert, Decio Coviello, Jean-Franï¿½ois Gauthier, and Art Shneyerov. "Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 34, no. 3 (July 20, 2018): 301–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewy011.

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Desta, Yemane. "Manifestations and Causes of Civil Service Corruption in the of Developing Countries." Journal of Public Administration and Governance 9, no. 3 (July 29, 2019): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/jpag.v9i3.14930.

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This article examines the manifestations and causes of corrupt practices in the civil service of developing countries based on review of theoretical and empirical literature regarding corruption and development. Among the corrupt practices identified are: bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, abuse of power, conflict of interest, insider trading/abuse of privileged information, favoritism, collusion with business interests, procurement contract/bid rigging and influence peddling This article also has identified the main underlying causes of corruption in the civil service of developing countries to be politicization of the civil service, poor pay, lack of accountability/transparency in public organizations, weak enforcements mechanisms, lack of merit-based career advancement, and excessive/ opaque regulations. The findings reported this article reveal that ethical violations in the civil service and overall corruption levels in politics, economy, and society are very high, with the negative outcome of hampering economic growth, sabotaging social justice and contributing to political instability in the context of developing countries. Keywords: accountability, civil service, corruption, corruption perception index, developing countries, development, ethics, transparency

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Howlader, Jaydeep, and Ashis Kumar Mal. "Sealed-bid auction: a cryptographic solution to bid-rigging attack in the collusive environment." Security and Communication Networks 8, no. 18 (May 25, 2015): 3415–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sec.1268.

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Shin, Do Wook. "The issues of the damage lawsuit by the collusive bid-rigging." Korean Lawyers Association Journal 59, no. 9 (September 2010): 230–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.17007/klaj.2010.59.9.006.

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"Book Reviews." Journal of Economic Literature 52, no. 2 (June 1, 2014): 548–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.2.535.r7.

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Brijesh P. Pinto and Michael A. Williams of Competition Economics LLC review “Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement: Law and Economics Approaches to Bid Rigging”, by Stefan E. Weishaar. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the relationship between public procurement law and competition law in the area of bid rigging conspiracies from a law and economics perspective. Discusses economic theory on optimal deterrence and enforcement; industrial economics; auction theory and collusion; the effectiveness of the legal regime applicable to bid rigging in the European Union; the application of auction theory in Europe; the effectiveness of the legal regime applicable to bid rigging in China; the application of auction theory in China; the effectiveness of the legal regime applicable to bid rigging in Japan; the Japanese construction sector; and the limits of economic theories. Appendixes discuss Europe—an overview of public procurement law; China—an overview of public procurement law; and the history of Japanese antitrust legislation. Weishaar is Associate Professor of Law and Economics at the University of Groningen. Index.”

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Ingraham, Allan T. "A Test for Collusion between a Bidder and an Auctioneer in Sealed-Bid Auctions." Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy 4, no. 1 (September 20, 2005). http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1448.

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Abstract This paper derives a regression-based test to detect bidder-auctioneer cheating in sealed bid auctions. I apply this regression test to data from the New York City School Construction Authority auctions, an approximate one billion dollar per year auction market in which an auctioneer engaged in bidder-auctioneer cheating. Using the regression analysis to compare lots where bid rigging occurred with certainty to all other auctions allows one to conclude that bidder-auctioneer cheating significantly distorted the bid distribution. Comparing specific auctioneer lots before news of the cheating scandal became public with those after the scandal, I find significant differences in bidding, at the 10 percent level of significance, for two auctioneers. Therefore, bidder-auctioneer cheating may not have been limited to the one auctioneer charged with rigging bids.

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Wakui, Masako. "Bid Rigging Initiated by Government Officials: The Conjuncture of Collusion and Corruption in Japan." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743110.

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Giannino, Michele. "Collusion in Public Contracts Procurement: Suppliers of School Cleaning Services Fined for Bid Rigging (Italy)." Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, August 16, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpw061.

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"Corrigendum to: Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 35, no. 2 (August 24, 2018): 454. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewy020.

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Wijanarko, Bobby. "BID RIGGING SEBAGAI BENTUK PRAKTEK PERSAINGAN USAHA TIDAK SEHAT." Journal of Management and Business 4, no. 1 (March 1, 2005). http://dx.doi.org/10.24123/jmb.v4i1.184.

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"The Law of The Republic Indonesia Number 5 Year 1999 Concerning the Prohibition ofMonopolistics Practices and Unfair Business Competition intended for the enforcement of provisions of law and providing equal protection for every business actor in an effort to create fair business competition. Business actors shall be prohibited from entering into conspiracies with other parties in order to determine awardess of tenders which may result in unfair business competition.Bid rigging is a particular form of collusive pricefixing behaviour by which firms coordinate their bids on procurement or project contract. Bid Rigging is an agreement between parties over which competitor will win a tender -often from government agencies. This agreement may be accomplished by one or more bidders agreeing to refrain from submitting bids, or by the bidders agreeing on a low bidder and then bidding above that firm's intended (and inflated) price. The tendering process is designed to promote fairness and ensure that the lowest possible prices are received".

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Arditi, David. "PREVENTING UNETHICAL AND ILLEGAL PRACTICES IN CONSTRUCTION." Proceedings of International Structural Engineering and Construction 3, no. 1 (May 2016). http://dx.doi.org/10.14455/isec.res.2016.37.

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Despite the fact that all professional associations, including ASCE, CMAA, PMI, AACE, and NSPE have codes of ethical conduct, the majority of the stakeholders in the construction process have encountered unethical behavior at one time or another. This is a contentious issue because there is always disagreement about what is and is not ethical. This paper looks into two practices that are most common in construction contracting, namely unbalanced bidding, and pre-award bid shopping. Both practices are considered to be totally acceptable by some, and totally unethical by others. Both practices can be stopped if preventive measures are put in place. The nature of these behaviors is examined, their impact is assessed, and preventive measures are formulated. In addition, in rare instances, illegal practices come to light. Collusive behavior is one such practice that is difficult but not impossible to detect. The nature of bid rigging is examined, its impact is assessed, and recommendations are made to detect parties that are involved in collusive practices. In addition to professional associations’ efforts to publish standards for ethical conduct, the construction industry needs to be proactive in creating awareness about ethics issues, clear the confusion about what is ethical and what is not, and in promote ethical values throughout the entire spectrum of professions involved in construction.

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