Relevant bibliographies by topics / Bilateral investment treaty (BIT)

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Academic literature on the topic 'Bilateral investment treaty (BIT)'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 11 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Bilateral investment treaty (BIT)"

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Zugliani, Niccolò. "HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE 2016 MOROCCO–NIGERIA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 68, no. 3 (May 23, 2019): 761–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589319000174.

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AbstractThe 2016 Morocco–Nigeria bilateral investment treaty (BIT) stands out from other such treaties because of its innovative human rights approach to the protection and promotion of foreign direct investment. Human rights permeate its approach to the regulation of investment in a manner which is most unusual in international investment agreements (IIAs). As a result, this is the most socially-responsible BIT currently concluded. Although it remains exceptional within the investment-treaty framework, the treaty reflects African initiatives to ensure that the next generation of BITs encourages more responsible investments. As such, it shows that human rights-compliant investment treaties can find fertile ground in developing African countries and it sets an example for current and future negotiations aimed at fostering respect for human rights in investment activities.
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Tegarmas G., Adinda Balqis. "Perlindungan Kepentingan Nasional Melalui Klausula Dalam Bilateral Investment Treaty." Jurist-Diction 2, no. 6 (November 4, 2019): 1909. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/jd.v2i6.15919.

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Kepentingan nasional merupakan hal yang abstrak dan dinamis namun dianggap penting dalam pelaksanaan kegiatan penanaman modal. Landasan yang mendasari argumentasi tersebut yaitu parameter dan definisi yang beragam atau tidak menentu. Setiap negara berusaha melindungi dan mempertahankan kepentingan nasional dalam hal penanaman modal asing sehingga dapat memacu pembangunan perekonomian nasional, khususnya pada bilateral investment treaty (BIT). BIT menjadi instrumen perlindungan kepentingan nasional yang menjamin kepastian hukum dan membatasi intrepretasi hakim pada suatu sengketa. Kepentingan nasional dapat ditemukan dalam klasula utama BIT yaitu Most Favored Nation, National Treatment, Fair and Equitable Treatment. Tiga klausula tersebut dinilai belum memberikan perlindungan yang seimbang antara investor asing dan investor dalam negeri, berakibat buruk pada kepentingan nasional host country dan membatasi regulatory space atau policy space suatu negara untuk mengatur sendiri kegiatan penanaman modal. Hal tersebut bersesuaian dengan dependency theory yang memandang penanaman modal asing sebagai suatu ancaman bagi host country. Sejalan dengan hal tersebut, BIT dapat diberhentikan berdasarkan fundamental changes of circumtances secara legal apabila tidak melakukan tindakan breach of treaty dan dapat digantikan dengan model BIT yang baru. Tulisan ini mengkaji bentuk perlindungan kepentingan nasional dalam penanaman modal asing dan pilihan penyesuaian klasula utama BIT sehingga dapat memberikan perlindungan terhadap kepentingan nasional.
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Pratama, Pandu Rizky Putra, and Prita Amalia. "The ISDS Mechanism and Standards of Protection in the Investment Treaty." Lentera Hukum 7, no. 2 (July 27, 2020): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.19184/ejlh.v7i2.17348.

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International investment activities require legal certainty for investors. While the host country also needs legal certainty related to state sovereignty, legal protection is needed for investors and the host country to realize legal certainty in investment activities. Countries in the world entered into investment agreements to provide legal protection for investment activities. In investment agreements, generally, there are requirements to comply with the national law of the host country to get protection from investment agreements. This study aims to review the implications of not fulfilling the obligations in the investment agreement to apply the benefits contained therein, specifically regarding ISDS mechanism and protection standards. This study finds that the impact of the non-fulfillment of these obligations on the ISDS mechanism depends on the admission clause specified in the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). On standards of protection, it refers to general principles of international law and arbitration decisions, investments that violate these obligations do not receive international legal protection. This research suggests the Indonesian Government tighten the admission clause in the BIT to prevent investors from using the ISDS mechanism in the BIT and to specify the impact of violating obligations to comply with the national laws of the host country. KEYWORDS: International Investment Law, Standards of Protection, Bilateral Investment Treaty
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Roshana Putri, Resha. "INDONESIA’S NEW MODEL OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: COMPARISON WITH BRAZIL." Padjadjaran Journal of International Law 3, no. 2 (June 28, 2019): 235–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.23920/pjil.v3i2.314.

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AbstractIn the past few years, there has been a surge in lawsuits against the mechanism for resolving international investment disputes through the Investors State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) forum proposed by foreign investors who are host states, including Indonesia. Most of the claims are caused by the policies of the host country which are intended to protect the basic rights of the people such as the right to health, the right to a healthy environment, taxes, as well as the minimum standard of wages for workers. This policy provides a loss for foreign investors and is considered a violation of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). BIT is often recognized to be detrimental to Indonesia, because it can disrupt the sovereignty of the country, especially when dealing with international disputes with foreign investors. This study uses a comparative juridical approach, comparing the BIT model in Indonesia with Brazil, namely Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement (CIFA). Brazil was chosen because it succeeds to reform its investment regime, specifically on its BITs. The results obtained were that Indonesia had to change several provisions in its BITs, which has been regulated CIFA provisions in Brazil, which is not member of the ICSID Convention.Keywords: BIT, CIFA, Investor State Dispute Settlement. AbstrakBeberapa tahun terakhir, ada lonjakan tuntutan hukum terhadap mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa investasi internasional melalui Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) forum yang diusulkan oleh investor asing yang menjadi host states, termasuk Indonesia. Sebagian besar klaim disebabkan oleh kebijakan negara tuan rumah yang dimaksudkan untuk melindungi hak-hak dasar masyarakatnya seperti hak atas kesehatan, hak atas lingkungan yang sehat, pajak, juga standar minimum upah pekerja. Kebijakan ini memberikan kerugian bagi investor asing dan dianggap sebagai pelanggaran Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). BIT seringkali dianggap merugikan bagi Indonesia, karena dapat mengganggu kedaulatan negara, khususnya ketika berhadapan dengan sengketa internasional dengan investor asing. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan yuridis normatif dengan metode perbandingan, yaitu dengan membandingkan model BIT di Indonesia dengan Brazilia, yaitu Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement (CIFA). Brazil dipilih karena merupakan negara yang berhasil melakukan reformasi terhadap rezim investasinya, khususnya pada BIT. Hasil yang diperoleh adalah bahwa Indonesia harus merubah beberapa ketentuan dalam BITs nya, seperti yang terkadung dalam CIFA di Brazil, yang bukan merupakan negara anggota dari Konvensi ICSID. Kata Kunci: BIT, CIFA, Penyelesaian Sengketa Investor-Negara
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Nasution, Nabilla Zelda. "Klausula Counter-claim dalam Bilateral Investment Treaty Indonesia." Jurist-Diction 2, no. 6 (November 4, 2019): 2219. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/jd.v2i6.15950.

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Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) merupakan suatu mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa antara investor dan negara penerima investasi (host state) karena suatu pelanggaran terhadap Hukum Investasi Internasional. Berdasarkan data UNCTAD, alasan yang sering diajukan dalam gugatan ISDS umumnya meliputi empat hal permasalahan yakni Most Favoured Nations, National Treatment, Non Exproriation, dan Fair and Equitable Treatment. Namun pengaturan penyelesaian sengketa investasi dengan mekanisme ISDS dianggap lebih berpihak kepada pihak investor dibandingkan kepada host state karena sebagian besar IIA mengijinkan ISDS diajukan oleh investor, dan dalam prakteknya investor merupakan satu-satunya penggugat yang diizinkan. Ketidakseimbangan kedudukan para pihak dalam mekanisme ISDS memberikan pemikiran counter-claim sebagai upaya menyeimbangkan kedudukan investor dan host state dalam mekanisme ISDS. Selain itu pentingnya counter-claiim dalam mekanisme ISDS antara lain karena belum ada aturan yang seragam mengenai counter-claim, counter-claim memungkinkan responden untuk mencari keadilan di forum yang sama sehingga lebih efisien. Serta bagi host state, counter-claim dapat digunakan untuk membersihkan reputasi host state atas gugatan yang diajukan oleh investor. Penelitian ini mengkaji klausula counterclaim yang dapat diadopsi dalam BIT Indonesia sehingga dapat menyeimbangkan kedudukan para pihak dalam mekanisme ISDS, khususnya Indonesia sebagai host state. Penelitian hukum yang digunakan adalah pendekatan konseptual (conseptual approach), pendekatan perundang-udangan (statute approach), dan pendekatan kasus (case approach) dalam membahas counterclaim dalam mekanisme ISDS serta dalam menganalisa rumusan klausula counterclaim yang dapat di adopsi dalam Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Indonesia.
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Oh, Chang Hoon, and Michele Fratianni. "On the optimal size of bilateral investment treaty network in foreign direct investment flows." Multinational Business Review 25, no. 2 (July 17, 2017): 150–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mbr-04-2017-0024.

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Purpose The aim of this paper first is to go beyond the static effects of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and empirically estimate the marginal effects of the stock of BITs on foreign direct investment flows. Design/methodology/approach These statistical models use a gravity equation. Findings This paper finds that BITs is subject to diminishing returns measured in terms of FDI flows. Diminishing returns are more pronounced among country-pairs that have not signed BITs but have their own BIT network than among country-pairs with their own BITs. Research limitations/implications The subsidiary finding is that a measure of a country’s BIT network characteristic, capturing conditions favorable for a mix of horizontally and vertically integrated activities, may be the limiting force underlying the diminishing returns of the stock of BITs. Originality/value For a given country’s BIT network, a multinational enterprise finds more value in investing where a bilateral treaty is in place. This suggests either stronger property-rights protection or greater latitude to use the host country as an export platform.
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Ejims, Okechukwu. "The 2016 Morocco–Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty: More Practical Reality in Providing a Balanced Investment Treaty?" ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 34, no. 1 (2019): 62–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/siz001.

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Abstract The law governing international investment comprises primarily treaties between individual States and regional arrangements focusing on investment provisions that protect and promote foreign investment and the principles of customary international law that govern it. Recently, there has been rapid growth in such agreements, and growing criticism of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) due to their unbalanced content and the vague and broad investment protection standards that can be interpreted in ways that prioritise investment protection over the right of host States to regulate. In this context, the Morocco–Nigeria BIT has been applauded as a balanced and innovative example of the genre and a response to the global backlash against BITs. This article shows how this BIT has taken a bold step towards such reconciliation, by attempting to balance investor protection with series of obligations placed on the investor on human rights, and environmental and social impact assessment, effectively safeguarding the host State’s regulatory space in relation to social and environmental matters. Whether this step has resolved the issue of balancing the interests of investment protection and the preservation of the regulatory interest of the host State is unlikely, given that some substantive provisions are drafted so as not to strike a proper balance between private and public interests. The discussion also shows that many provisions remain vague and, hence, continue to grant discretion to investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) tribunals to determine the meaning of these provisions.
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Sefriani, Sefriani. "The Urgency of Non-Precluded Measures Clause in Indonesian Bilateral Investment Treaty." PADJADJARAN Jurnal Ilmu Hukum (Journal of Law) 06, no. 02 (August 2019): 233–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v6n2.a2.

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The legitimacy crisis of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) within the international community was caused by the increasing regulatory disputes before the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) forum. It encourages Indonesia to discontinue several BITs, to review and to make new BIT models for Indonesia. This article aims to analyze the urgency of the non-precluding measures (NPM) clause in the new BIT Model of Indonesia to balance the interests of investors and the interests of Indonesia as the host state, considering that to date the existing BIT content is not balanced. The BIT provides so much protection to investors and, vice versa, weighty obligations to the host country. This study employed descriptive analytical method. The study concludes that the NPM Clause is very important in the new Indonesian BIT Model. At least, can be based on five arguments. First, the NPM clause will transfer risk from the country to foreign investors in situations of extraordinary threats. Second, the NPM clause will limit investor protection in certain situations. Third, the NPM clause will provide greater flexibility to Indonesia as the host to regulate its investment policy to achieve sustainable development to realize the people’s welfare, labor rights, public health, safety environment, public morals, and order. Fourth, the NPM clause is important for self-recovery during international financial crisis. Fifth, lastly, the NPM clause will balance the protection of both investors and Indonesia as the host state.
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Sefriani, Sefriani. "The Urgency of Non-Precluded Measures Clause in Indonesian Bilateral Investment Treaty." PADJADJARAN Jurnal Ilmu Hukum (Journal of Law) 06, no. 02 (August 2019): 233–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v6n2.a2.

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The legitimacy crisis of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) within the international community was caused by the increasing regulatory disputes before the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) forum. It encourages Indonesia to discontinue several BITs, to review and to make new BIT models for Indonesia. This article aims to analyze the urgency of the non-precluding measures (NPM) clause in the new BIT Model of Indonesia to balance the interests of investors and the interests of Indonesia as the host state, considering that to date the existing BIT content is not balanced. The BIT provides so much protection to investors and, vice versa, weighty obligations to the host country. This study employed descriptive analytical method. The study concludes that the NPM Clause is very important in the new Indonesian BIT Model. At least, can be based on five arguments. First, the NPM clause will transfer risk from the country to foreign investors in situations of extraordinary threats. Second, the NPM clause will limit investor protection in certain situations. Third, the NPM clause will provide greater flexibility to Indonesia as the host to regulate its investment policy to achieve sustainable development to realize the people’s welfare, labor rights, public health, safety environment, public morals, and order. Fourth, the NPM clause is important for self-recovery during international financial crisis. Fifth, lastly, the NPM clause will balance the protection of both investors and Indonesia as the host state.
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Tzanakopoulos, Antonios. "National Treatment and MFN in the (Invisible) EU Model BIT." Journal of World Investment & Trade 15, no. 3-4 (July 28, 2014): 484–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22119000-01504007.

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This article discusses the potential provisions on national treatment and most-favoured-nation (mfn) treatment to be included in a future model bilateral investment treaty (bit) of the European Union (eu) against the background of the leaked draft text of the Canada-eu Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (ceta) investment chapter. It concludes that the relevant eu treaty practice seems to be closer to investment protection models influenced by the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta), such as those prevalent in the Canada and us Model bits, and that a future eu Model bit along these lines will depart significantly from the investment treaty practice of eu Member States.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Bilateral investment treaty (BIT)"

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Bellak, Christian. "Economic Impact of Investment Agreements." WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2015. http://epub.wu.ac.at/4625/1/wp200.pdf.

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Based on a thorough analysis of theoretical arguments, this meta-analysis does not find a genuine empirical effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment after correcting for publication selection bias.
Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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Genest, Alexandre. "Performance Requirement Prohibitions in International Investment Law." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/37013.

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Performance requirements act as policy instruments for achieving broadly-defined economic and developmental objectives of States, especially industrial and technological development objectives. Many States consider that performance requirements distort trade and investment flows, negatively impact global and national welfare and disrupt investment decisions compared to business-as-usual scenarios. As a result, a number of States have committed to prohibiting performance requirements in international investment agreements (“IIAs.”). Performance requirement prohibitions (“PRPs”) are meant to eliminate trade-distorting performance requirements and performance requirements which replace investor decision-making by State decision-making. This thesis focuses on providing answers to two research questions: first, how do States prohibit performance requirements in IIAs? And second, how should PRPs in IIAs be interpreted and applied? For the first time, this thesis: proposes a comprehensive understanding of PRPs in IIAs by drawing notably on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) Uruguay Round of negotiations and on the United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) Programme; develops a detailed typology and analysis of PRPs in IIAs through the identification of systematically reproduced drafting patterns; conducts the first critical and in-depth analysis of all arbitral awards which have decided claims based on PRPs in IIAs; analyses interpretation and application issues related to provisions that exempt government procurement from PRPs and to reservations that shield sensitive non-conforming measures or strategically important sectors from PRPs; and anticipates the application of most-favoured nation (“MFN”) treatment clauses to PRPs in the future. Finally, this thesis formulates proposals that can help interpret and apply existing PRPs and draft future PRPs in a more deliberate and informed way.
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Steenkamp, Tania. "South Africa's new bilateral investment treaty policy : a reasonable response to a flawed regime?" Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/49945.

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In 2010 South Africa officially adopted a new Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy. The new policy brought to an end a policy review process that was initiated following an investor-State arbitration concerning legislation introduced in the South African mining sector, aimed at promoting equality in South African society, which allegedly breached South Africa’s international obligations in terms of the country’s Bilateral Investment Treaties with Italy and the Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union respectively. South Africa’s new policy was introduced in the wake of various concerns that have been raised against the investment law regime, specifically with regard to the way in which earlier Bilateral Investment Treaties limited a State’s right to regulate, which could, in turn, negatively impact on a State’s right to development. One of the main limitations on a State’s right to regulate is the overly expansive application of the provision prohibiting expropriation of investments of foreign investors. If applied to any form of taking, including takings resulting from proportional and non-discriminatory regulatory measures that are in the public interest, States face the risk of their actions being challenged in investor-State arbitration. If such an arbitration tribunal finds the disputed regulatory measures to violate a State’s international obligations, States who have not drafted their Bilateral Investment Treaties carefully, will be forced to pay compensation to the investor based solely on the market value of the investment in terms of the standard of paying prompt, adequate and effective compensation. This thesis considers South Africa’s new policy against the background of these concerns. It focuses specifically on the standard for expropriation, the standard of compensation for expropriation and the role of investor-State arbitration in investment law. South Africa’s policy is placed in context through consideration of the Bilateral Investment Treaty policies of Canada and Brazil. Finally, through a study of various treaty models, the thesis considers ways in which these potentially problematic provisions could be drafted to address the concerns raised by South Africa. The thesis concludes that, despite legitimate concerns about the implementation of South Africa’s new policy, the policy itself is reasonable and appropriate in light of the country’s domestic priorities.
Law, Faculty of
Graduate
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Eichler, Stefan, and Jannik A. Nauerth. "Bilateral investment treaties and sovereign default risk." Technische Universität Dresden, 2021. https://tud.qucosa.de/id/qucosa%3A75267.

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This paper analyzes the impact of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on sovereign bond returns of 25 emerging markets from 1993 to 2016. Under a BIT, foreign investors can use an international arbitration scheme to enforce compensation claims against the domestic government in case of direct or indirect expropriation. We focus on the so far unexplored effects of legal risk associated with BITs on sovereign creditworthiness. We find small unconditional effects of BITs on sovereign bond returns. Taking the heterogeneity of BITs and political regimes into account, we find robust and strong negative effects. In countries with high political risk of expropriation (measured by low executive constraints), we find that the implementation of investor-friendly BITs is associated with a significantly negative impact on sovereign bond returns, accounting for roughly 15% of bond returns’ standard deviation.
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Mutsau, Sharon Chido. "Revisiting Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in the 21st Century : a Kenyan and South African experience." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/4770.

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Magister Legum - LLM
BITs signed prior to the 21st century are problematic. Some countries with BITs signed during this period have since reviewed those BITs and taken action to address the disadvantages the BITs held for the host nation or have either resorted to eradicating some of their BITs. In particular, developing countries that signed BITs with developed nations seem to be disproportionately disadvantaged in these agreements. This thesis highlights Kenya‟s current BIT situation and compares it in light of another developing country, South Africa, with regards to its BIT experience. Given that South Africa has undergone an extensive BIT review process and moves to change some of these BITs, this thesis compares and contrasts the Kenyan and South African experience. The study highlights the possible lessons that could be learnt from the South African BIT review experience and provides recommendations for the Kenyan government regarding its outdated BITs. The lessons and recommendations benefit not only Kenya but also other countries that are still to review their BITs as it adds to the literature on why it is important for countries with such BITs to revisit them and how best they can go about the review mechanism. In addition, the study is also significant in that it raises awareness of the use and effects of BITs, thereby enabling countries that enter into such agreements to make informed decisions.
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Söderman, Martin. "India's 2016 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty : A backlash to the Calvo doctrine and legal nationalism?" Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-183512.

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Cosmas, Julius. "A critical assessment of the legitimacy of the international investment arbitration system: a call for reform." University of the Western Cape, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/4389.

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Doctor Legum - LLD
Currently most international investment disputes are settled through arbitration. The origin of this dispute settlement system can be associated with the recent proliferation of over 3000 Bilateral Investment Treaties. Through this system disputes are settled by autonomous and differently constituted tribunals which have powers to render final and binding awards. The dissatisfied party has very limited opportunity to challenge the rendered award as there are no higher bodies in the hierarchy where a dissatisfied party can lodge an appeal, save for limited procedural challenges which are allowed under the system. These differently constituted tribunals at times reach diametrically opposed decisions on similar facts and those decisions stand side by side and all are considered valid. These inconsistent decisions are leading to lack of consistency and uniformity which in turn affects the legitimacy of the system as a whole. The rules of these institutions do not allow the proceedings to be held in public despite the fact that at times these tribunals question the regulatory powers of the state and state measures on service provision to its citizens. Another issue under the current system is that due to lack of coordination, arbitrators play dual roles: as counsels and arbitrators. This practice compromises the cherished principle of the rule of law. In the effort to address these concerns, stakeholders have suggested a number of possible solutions. The suggested solutions include: invoking res judicata and lis pendens principles; adopting the doctrine of precedent; applying the ‘fork in the road’ principle; adopting the margin of appreciation standard in interpretation of BITs; creating an appellate structure at ICSID and creating a treaty to treaty appellate body. This research submits that, the suggested solutions singularly and cumulatively don not address the legitimacy issues adequately. The research therefore calls for the establishment of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in order to address the legitimacy issues cumulatively. It is submitted that establishing a Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI) which provides for creating a standing international investment court with an appellate court is the only solution which addresses all the issues haunting the international investment dispute settlement system. In addition, the research suggests interim solutions which will help to increase the legitimacy of the current system pending the establishment of the MAI and the courts. The interim solutions include: establishment of the investor – state dispute adjudication Centre; effective utilisation of host state courts; mandatory publication of all awards; enhancing the effective use of member states interpretative statement; and forming a working commission to provide basic interpretation and the scope of the basic international investment law principles. These measures are only meant to improve the current system pending the establishment of the MAI and the courts. The research concludes that for the betterment of international investment law, the reform is inevitable and that the benefits would outweigh any demerits.
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Chidede, Talkmore. "Entrenching the right to regulate in the international investment legal framework: The African experience." University of Western Cape, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/7582.

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Doctor Legum - LLD
The existing traditional international investment law regime which is largely based on the conventional European and North American Model Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) has come under intense criticism. The argument is that this regime, among other things, prioritises the protection of foreign investors and investments while sidelining significant public interest issues of the host countries. The inability to adequately accommodate public interest issues in the international investment law has unduly constrained the host countries’ sovereign right to regulate investments in public interests and pursue their public policy objectives.
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Jantjies, Dumisani Joseph. "Can a multilateral agreement on investment reduce double tax treaty abuse in developing countries?" University of the Western Cape, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/5680.

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Magister Philosophiae - MPhil
Over the years, the world economy has experienced growth in foreign direct investments (FDI), with the role of developing countries becoming more evident as both recipients and investors alike. The proliferation of international investment has also led to more bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with their complex and often duplicated rules. The increase in BITs of this complex nature has thus resuscitated a less publicly debated course, although recently discussed within the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), is there need for multilateral agreement on investment (MAI), hosted within the multilateral institution(s)? Since the late 1990s, the discussion as to whether international investments require the MAI has been characterised by diverging interests of developed and developing countries, with neither willing to concede. Even in the immediate post-War II period, this standoff between developed and developing countries has dominated a discourse on whether there is a need for an international agreement on international investment. Yet developing countries, or African countries classified as least developing, continue to be left out of MAI discussions. For example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 1990's proposed plurilateral agreement excluded African countries.
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Lhoumeau-Aizpuru, Sébastien. "Le déséquilibre entre les droits et les obligations des entreprises pétrolières opérant dans les pays à faible gouvernance." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019AIXM0599.

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Cette thèse se propose d’effectuer une analyse sectorielle de l’état des droits et des obligations des entreprises multinationales pétrolières en dehors des réglementations des pays d’investissement. Le choix de l’industrie pétrolière se fonde sur la place de ce secteur dans l’économie mondiale et ses caractéristiques particulières. Dans une première partie, nous constaterons que la protection des investissements est particulièrement efficace et que son effet négatif sur le développement des réglementations des États d’accueil des investissements est accentué. Le mouvement actuel de prise en compte de ce problème dans les TBI est insuffisant compte tenu du peu d’intérêt du Traité sur la Charte de l’énergie sur cette problématique et de la difficile évolution rédactionnelle des clauses de stabilisation. Dans un deuxième temps, cette thèse constatera que les obligations transnationales à la charge des entreprises pétrolières multinationales, en dehors du droit des investissements, semblent parfois moins enclines à jouer un rôle d’équilibre dans le secteur pétrolier. Les initiatives de soft law sont adaptées mais adoptées partiellement et les possibles sanctions semblent incertaines. Les mécanismes fondés sur l’extraterritorialité sont limités et la mise en place d’un devoir de vigilance peu adapté à l’organisation pétrolière. La prise en compte des spécificités pétrolières reste cantonnée au cadre du reporting et les outils juridiques propres à l’industrie ne prennent généralement en compte que la lutte contre la corruption. Enfin, les pressions politiques, des ONG et des médias sont centrées sur les entreprises dont le siège est situé dans un État occidental
This thesis carry out a sectorial analysis of the state of the rights and the obligations of the multinational oil companies outside the regulations of the countries of investment. The choice of the oil industry is based on the place of this sector in the global economy and its characteristics. In the first part, we will note that the protection of investments is particularly effective and the potential negative effect on the development of the regulations of the host countries of investments is accentuated in the oil sector. Similarly, the current movement to take this problem into account in the bilateral investment treaties is insufficient given the lack of interest of the Energy Charter Treaty on this issue and the difficult evolution of the stabilization clauses. Secondly, this thesis will find that the transnational obligations borne by multinational oil companies, apart from investment law, sometimes seem less inclined to play a balancing role in the oil sector. The soft law initiatives are adapted but partially adopted and the possible sanctions seem uncertain. Mechanisms based on extraterritoriality are limited and the establishment of a duty of care do not really suit to the oil organization. The consideration of oil specificities is confined to the reporting framework and the legal tools specific to the industry generally only take into account the fight against corruption. Finally, the political pressures, the intervention of non-governmental organizations and the media are focused on companies whose head office is located in a Western State and transfer of oil interests are usual in the sector
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Books on the topic "Bilateral investment treaty (BIT)"

1

Hallward-Driemeier, Mary. Do bilateral investment treaties attract foreign direct investment?: Only a bit ... and they could bite. Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2003.

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United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Bilateral Investment Treaty with Panama and Business and Economic Relations Treaty with Poland: Report (to accompany Treaty doc. 99-14 and Treaty doc. 101-18). [Washington, D.C.?: U.S. G.P.O., 1990.

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3

State liability in investment treaty arbitration: Global constitutional and administrative law in the BIT generation. Oxford: Hart, 2012.

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State liability in investment treaty arbitration: Global constitutional and administrative law in the BIT generation. Oxford: Hart Pub., 2009.

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Shuang bian tou zi tiao yue yu Zhongguo neng yuan tou zi an quan: Bilateral investment treaty and protection on energy investment of China. Shanghai Shi: Fu dan da xue chu ban she, 2012.

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Bilateral investment treaties with Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Croatia, El Salvador, Honduras, Jordan, Lithuania, Mozambique, Uzbekistan, and a protocol amending the bilateral investment treaty with Panama: Report (to accompany treaty docs. 106-47; 106-25; 106-26; 106-29; 106-28; 106- 27; 106-30; 106-42; 106-31; 104-25; and 106-46). [Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O., 2000.

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Jing wai tou zi fa gui jie du ji shuang bian tou zi bao hu xie ding ying yong: ANALYSIS OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON OUTBOUND INVESTMENT AND APPLICATION OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY. Beijing Shi: Fa lü chu ban she, 2013.

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United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Bilateral investment treaties, Treaty docs. 99-14 and 101-18: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, second session, September 18, 1990. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1990.

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United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Bilateral investment treaties with Argentina, Treat doc. 103-2, Armenia, Treaty doc. 103-11, Bulgaria, Treaty doc. 103-3, Ecuador, Treat doc. 103-15, Kazakhstan, Treaty doc. 103-12, Kyrgyzstan, Treaty doc. 103-13, Moldova, Treaty doc. 103-14, and Romania, Treaty doc. 102-36: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, September 10, 1993. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1993.

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United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Bilateral investment treaties with Argentina, Treat doc. 103-2; Armenia, Treaty doc. 103-11; Bulgaria, Treaty doc. 103-3; Ecuador, Treat doc. 103-15; Kazakhstan, Treaty doc. 103-12; Kyrgyzstan, Treaty doc. 103-13; Moldova, Treaty doc. 103-14; and Romania, Treaty doc. 102-36: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, September 10, 1993. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1993.

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Book chapters on the topic "Bilateral investment treaty (BIT)"

1

Ranjan, Prabhash. "Investment Protection and Host State’s Right to Regulate in the Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Lessons for Asian Countries." In Asia's Changing International Investment Regime, 47–65. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5882-0_5.

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Sadowski, Wojciech. "The Rule of Law and the Roll of the Dice. The Uncertain Future of Investor-State Arbitration in the EU." In Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States, 333–59. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62317-6_13.

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AbstractInvestment treaty law and EU law began to develop in the same era and share some important philosophical and axiological foundations. The pressure on the CEE countries to enter into numerous bilateral investment treaties in late 80s and early 90s, in the context of the EU accession aspirations of the former communist countries, was likely to result, eventually, in a conflict between EU law and investment treaty law. The conflict could have been managed in three different ways, yet the CJEU decided in Achmea to declare an undefined volume of intra-EU arbitrations to be incompatible with EU law. This important judgment, which delivered an outcome desired by the European Commission and a number of Member States, is based on questionable legal reasoning that creates high uncertainty in this area of law. The doubts include the scope of application of Achmea, which is now a highly debatable issue. The CJEU itself saw it necessary to limit the scope of Achmea by declaring in Opinion 1/17 (CETA) that the legal reasoning of Achmea did not apply to investment protection treaties with third countries. The Member States of the EU remain politically divided in their views as to whether Achmea applies to the Energy Charter Treaty. And while the problems with the rule of law and independence of the judiciary in certain Member States continue to grow, Achmea has left an important gap for which there is no substitute in the current architecture of the EU legal system.
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Reinisch, August. "Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation Hart Publishing, 2009 ISBN 978-1-84113-856-5." In European Yearbook of International Economic Law (EYIEL), Vol. 3 (2012), 709–12. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23309-8_24.

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Ranjan, Prabhash. "Conclusion." In India and Bilateral Investment Treaties, 351–62. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199493746.003.0009.

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The concluding chapter shows that India’s approach towards BITs post 2010 has become protectionist. This protectionist approach towards BITs is divergent from India’s liberal foreign investment policy. India’s BIT practice needs to evolve in a manner that balances investment protection with the host state’s right to regulate. This is important as it would help India safeguard its regulatory power as a host nation and also to protect Indian investment abroad. India needs to evolve its investment treaty practice by developing BITs as tools that advance international rule of law and are modelled using the normativity of embedded liberalism. Embedded liberalism will represent a compromise between free markets and regulation, thus increasing the acceptability of BITs for all stakeholders such as foreign investors, the civil society and the sovereign state.
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"How Are Chinese BITs Interpreted? Jurisprudential Review of Treaty Interpretative Tools in Chinese BIT-based Arbitration Cases." In Decoding Chinese Bilateral Investment Treaties, 144–81. Cambridge University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108867146.006.

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Ranjan, Prabhash. "India’s BITs." In India and Bilateral Investment Treaties, 172–216. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199493746.003.0005.

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Continuing on the discussion on the key features of Indian BITs from the previous chapter, this chapter studies the following provisions in India’s BITs and FTA investment chapters: expropriation; monetary transfer provisions; general exception clauses; and the investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions. Like chapter 4, this chapter will also discuss these provisions against the background of ISDS jurisprudence that has emerged on these four issues. The chapter demonstrates that these provisions in many treaties are worded broadly and the determination of the content is subject to arbitral discretion. These broadly worded treaty provisions, subject to arbitral discretion, fail to balance investment protection and host state’s right to regulate. India was primarily a ‘rule taker’ in international investment law because most of these provisions in Indian BITs are borrowed from the BITs of ‘capital exporting’ countries that followed the laissez faire liberalism model.
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Ranjan, Prabhash. "India’s BITs." In India and Bilateral Investment Treaties, 142–71. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199493746.003.0004.

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This chapter studies in detail the international law on foreign investment that India has accepted to be bound in the embracement phase. In this regard, the chapter studies the following provisions contained in India’s BITs and FTA investment chapters: definition of investment, which is an important jurisdictional provision; fair and equitable treatment; most favoured nation treatment; and full protection and security. The aforesaid provisions are common to all Indian BITs and FTA investment chapters. The chapter shows that many of the treaty provisions are broadly worded. In order to better understand the import of the language of these provisions, they will be situated within the broader jurisprudence of the ISDS. Depending on arbitral discretion, these broad and vaguely worded provisions are capable of interpretation that gives precedence to investment protection over the host state’s sovereign regulatory power, instead of striking a balance between the two.
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Tu, Xinquan, Na Sun, and Zhen Dai. "Issues on SOEs in BITs." In China's International Investment Strategy, 194–204. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198827450.003.0011.

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The issue on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has never gone away once China began sitting around the negotiating table, especially with the United States. Sixteen years ago, when China was expecting to enter the multi-lateral trading system, there were special sections for state trading enterprises in its accession protocol in accordance with Article XVII in GATT1994. While in bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiation with the US, which was reignited in 2008 and has undergone twenty-nine rounds of talks, the issue of SOEs was brought up to the table again and seemingly became a key point blocking the negotiation. However, with uprising economy scale and front-ranking position in global trade and investment, it seems unsatisfying of China to give the same commitments concerning SOEs as it did in WTO negotiation which was sixteen years ago. To put the BIT negotiation forward on the SOE issue needs new solutions
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Jeswald W, Salacuse. "13 Other Treatment Standards." In The Law of Investment Treaties. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198850953.003.0013.

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This chapter highlights other treatment standards. In addition to the usual treaty standards of treatment discussed in previous chapters, individual investment treaties, depending on the policies of the countries concerned and the negotiation dynamics between contracting states, may impose other obligations on host states with respect to their treatment of investments and investors. Such treatment provisions do not appear in all treaties and are subject to a variety of linguistic formulations. Moreover, although they were rarely the subject of arbitration or litigation in the early years of the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) movement, investors have increasingly alleged their violation in investor–state arbitral proceedings, beginning with the second decade of the twenty-first century. These treatment standards include treatment with respect to performance requirements; entry and residence of foreign nationals and managerial personnel; compensation for losses due to war, revolution, and civil disturbance; transparency and regulatory due process; and the subrogation obligation.
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Hodgson, Matthew, and Adam Bryan. "Investment Treaty Arbitration in Asia." In China's International Investment Strategy, 430–43. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198827450.003.0024.

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This chapter seeks to explore China’s approach to bilateral investment treaties and uses this to help consider its possible future strategy. In particular, the chapter considers the interaction of the growth and nature of China’s inward- and outward-bound foreign direct investment, with the protections provided in the BITs and the identity of counterparty states. As enthusiasm for investment treaties in the West stands at a crossroads—in the face of public antipathy in Europe to the draft TTIP treaty, and hostility from the Trump administration to investment treaties in general—there is maybe an opportunity for China to demonstrate leadership and cooperation to regional and global economic partners. This chapter first maps the evolution of the protections provided in China’s investment treaties, from the rudimentary protections in the early generation investment treaties to the wider-scale coverage in the more recent investment treaties. The chapter also reflects upon the extent to which China has succeeded in protecting its outbound investment, and the counter-balance of the protections granted to inbound investment. It considers (the relatively few) cases that have been brought under Chinese investment treaties and performs a statistical analysis of the protection of Chinese foreign direct investment stocks, by reference to competitor economies. Finally, this chapter looks at where China may focus its attentions next, particularly in the context of the Trump administration in the US and China’s investment priorities.
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Conference papers on the topic "Bilateral investment treaty (BIT)"

1

Salviana, Fries Melia, and Desy Nurkristia Tejawati. "Bilateral Investment Treaty Effectiveness in Completion of Capital Investment Disposal." In Proceedings of the International Conference on Innovation in Research (ICIIR 2018) – Section: Economics and Management Science. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/iciir-18.2019.16.

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Krisharyanto, Edi, and Fries Melia Salviana. "Implementation of Bilateral Investment Treaty at Joint Enterprise Agreement." In International Conference on Law, Economics and Health (ICLEH 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200513.013.

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