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Journal articles on the topic 'Bilateral monopoly'

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Published: 4 June 2025

Last updated: 6 July 2025

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1

Angerhofer, Tirza J., and Roger D. Blair. "Successive Monopoly, Bilateral Monopoly and Vertical Mergers." Review of Industrial Organization 59, no. 2 (2021): 343–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-021-09825-y.

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2

Shastitko, A., and N. Pavlova. "Antitrust in bilateral monopoly." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 8 (August 20, 2017): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-8-75-91.

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The existing practice of implementing antitrust law to bilateral monopolies in Russia shows signs of inconsistency. Traditional theoretical approaches differ in their estimations of the characteristics and attainability of equilibrium on such markets, but overall more or less converge on the idea of antitrust regulation of such markets to be unjustified. But approaching the problem in the context of transaction cost economics, taking into account the externalities appearing both upstream and downstream from the bilateral monopoly market in case of a suboptimal result, leads to viewing the antitrust authority as a discrete institutional alternative of internalizing such externalities by creating the incentives to develop a hybrid governance mechanism for transactions between the sides of contractual relationship characterized by sufficiently high switching costs. Taking into account the wide occurrence of bilateral monopolies in the Russian economy, the choice of a uniform approach to regulation is critical in terms of creating transparent legal environment and adjusting companies’ incentives.

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3

Cheng, Doris, and Yeung-Nan Shieh. "Bilateral monopoly and industrial location." Regional Science and Urban Economics 22, no. 2 (1992): 187–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-0462(92)90010-x.

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4

Bose, Arup, and Barnali Gupta. "Mixed markets in bilateral monopoly." Journal of Economics 110, no. 2 (2012): 141–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0310-8.

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5

Rochet, Jean-Charles. "Bilateral monopoly with imperfect information." Journal of Economic Theory 36, no. 2 (1985): 214–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90103-6.

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6

Imai, Haruo. "Bilateral price-setting in a bilateral monopoly model." Mathematical Social Sciences 12, no. 3 (1986): 279–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(86)90017-x.

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7

Blair, Roger D., David L. Kaserman, and Richard E. Romano. "A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly." Southern Economic Journal 55, no. 4 (1989): 831. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1059465.

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8

BEGHIN, JOHN C., and DANIEL A. SUMNER. "DOMESTIC CONTENT REQUIREMENTS WITH BILATERAL MONOPOLY *." Oxford Economic Papers 44, no. 2 (1992): 306–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042048.

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9

Pita, Cristina, and Ramón J. Torregrosa. "The concavity axiom in bilateral monopoly." Economics Letters 80, no. 2 (2003): 211–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00079-x.

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10

Irmen, Andreas. "Mark-up pricing and bilateral monopoly." Economics Letters 54, no. 2 (1997): 179–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00001-3.

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11

Pavlou, Apostolis. "Asymmetric information in a bilateral monopoly." Journal of Dynamics and Games 3, no. 2 (2016): 169–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2016009.

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12

Leslie, Derek. "A DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY." Bulletin of Economic Research 42, no. 3 (1990): 155–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.1990.tb00668.x.

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13

Brand, Björn, and Michael Grothe. "Social responsibility in a bilateral monopoly." Journal of Economics 115, no. 3 (2014): 275–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-014-0412-6.

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14

Meta, Mehmed. "The trasformation of bilateral monopoly into a market condition of monemporium." Tehnika 77, no. 3 (2022): 373–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/tehnika2203373m.

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Pure monopoly (supply side monopoly), where against one seller of particular products which doesn't have close substitutes stand many buyers, as well as the market state of a pure monopsony (demand side monopoly) are theoretical models. In practice such market conditions is hard to find. The aim of this paper is to point out the problem of the equilibrium of an enterprise in the conditions when one company with a monopsonic position on a market of inputs sells its product only to one firm which has a monopoly position in the market of its output, which actually means solving the problem of equilibrium of the enterprise in the conditions of bilateral monopoly. By integrating these enterprises, the market condition of the bilateral monopoly is going to be transformed into a new structure, well-known as the market state of the monemporium. The integrated enterprise has an extremely strong market power manifested through both on the side of selling its output and on the procurement of production inputs. The problem of the equilibrium of such an enterprise and the economic implications, especially those that have a reflection on the level of profit, are a particular area of interests in this paper.

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15

Fazio, Gioacchino. "Bilateral monopoly: a contribution by Francesco Ferrara." European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 16, no. 2 (2009): 251–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672560902891002.

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16

Fanti, Luciano, and Domenico Buccella. "Bargaining Agenda in a Unionized Bilateral Monopoly." LABOUR 33, no. 4 (2019): 450–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/labr.12166.

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17

Oczkowski, Edward. "An econometric analysis of the bilateral monopoly model." Economic Modelling 16, no. 1 (1999): 53–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0264-9993(98)00024-8.

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18

Jiang, Li, and Zhongyuan Hao. "Rationalizing vertical information flow in a bilateral monopoly." Operations Research Letters 44, no. 3 (2016): 419–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.04.002.

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19

Dubey, Pradeep, and Dieter Sondermann. "Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)." Games and Economic Behavior 65, no. 1 (2009): 124–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.009.

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20

Fanti, Luciano, and Domenico Buccella. "Social Responsibility in a Bilateral Monopoly with Downstream Convex Technology." Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 20, no. 4 (2020): 761–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10842-020-00343-3.

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Abstract This paper shows that, in a bilateral monopoly with consumer-friendly social concerns, only the downstream firm is always incentivized to adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR) if it has decreasing returns to the input, leading to a Pareto-superior outcome in equilibrium. This occurrence differs from a standard linear bilateral monopoly in which, if the upstream (downstream) firm commits itself to CSR before the downstream (upstream) does, then both firms improve profits, while they do not deviate from pure profit-maximization if CSR levels are simultaneously chosen. Straightforward policy and empirical implications are offered, and this paper argues that the presence of CSR-type firms crucially depends on technology.

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21

Xing, Ziyi. "Research on Market Definition of Digital Economy and Case Analysis: Based on the Perspective of Bilateral Market." Frontiers in Business, Economics and Management 12, no. 1 (2023): 87–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/fbem.v12i1.13764.

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In recent years, with the continuous development of digital economy, regulating the healthy development of platform economy has become an important issue. China's relevant government departments call for a clear adherence to the principles of “fair competition”, and for the strengthening of anti-monopoly and the establishment and improvement of market supervision to adapt to the development of the digital economy. In the process of anti-monopoly law enforcement, the relevant market definition is usually regarded as the logical starting point of analyzing the competitive behavior. Compared with traditional enterprises, platform enterprises have bilateral market characteristics such as “cross network externality” and “asymmetric price structure”, which face challenges in defining their relevant markets. This article first clear the bilateral market meaning, then discusses the platform enterprise bilateral market characteristics, and sort out the scholars in recent years about “define a single or multiple market” “assumed monopolist test is applicable”point of view, finally analyzed the “Sherpa's Abused Market Dominance” “Tangshan Renren Company v.Baidu Case” “Qihoo360 v.Tencent Case” three Chinese anti-monopoly law enforcement cases. The aim is to further discuss how to better combine the theoretical investigation and case analysis of qualitative and quantitative analysis to define the relevant market more accurately.

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22

Dobbs, Ian M., and Martyn B. Hill. "Pricing Solutions to the Bilateral Monopoly Problem under Uncertainty." Southern Economic Journal 60, no. 2 (1993): 479. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1060093.

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23

Wang, Judith Y. T., Hai Yang, and Erik T. Verhoef. "Strategic Interactions of Bilateral Monopoly on a Private Highway." Networks and Spatial Economics 4, no. 2 (2004): 203–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:nets.0000027773.75570.5f.

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24

Chatterjee, Ishita, and Bibhas Saha. "Bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly." Economics Letters 120, no. 2 (2013): 280–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009.

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25

Busetto, Francesca, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, and Damiano Turchet. "On three welfare properties of monopoly in bilateral exchange." Journal of Mathematical Economics 119 (August 2025): 103147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103147.

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26

Shastitko, Andrey, Claude Ménard, and Natalia Pavlova. "The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless?" Russian Journal of Economics 4, no. 2 (2018): 175–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3897/j.ruje.4.27031.

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This paper is about the challenges that antitrust authorities face when dealing with bilateral monopolies. The curse of antitrust refers to traps threatening the efficient applicability of antitrust policies in these situations. Standard theories diverge about the attainability of equilibrium under bilateral monopolies but share skepticism about its efficiency if it ever exists. We suggest a different approach, based on transaction cost theory. First, since bilateral monopolies often develop in the upper segment of value chains, misalignment between parties may generate negative externalities. Second, if parties reach an agreement, the impact of the governance mechanism implemented must be assessed beyond the usual parameters of prices and quantities. Indeed, the risk of negative externalities in the absence of appropriate governance increases dramatically when “critical transactions” are at stake. With vertical integration prohibited, second-best alternatives in which antitrust authorities leave room for innovative hybrid governance may allow internalizing externalities while avoiding high switching costs.

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27

Shastitko, Andrey, Claude Ménard, and Natalia Pavlova. "The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless?" Russian Journal of Economics 4, no. (2) (2018): 175–96. https://doi.org/10.3897/j.ruje.4.27031.

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This paper is about the challenges that antitrust authorities face when dealing with bilateral monopolies. The curse of antitrust refers to traps threatening the efficient applicability of antitrust policies in these situations. Standard theories diverge about the attainability of equilibrium under bilateral monopolies but share skepticism about its efficiency if it ever exists. We suggest a different approach, based on transaction cost theory. First, since bilateral monopolies often develop in the upper segment of value chains, misalignment between parties may generate negative externalities. Second, if parties reach an agreement, the impact of the governance mechanism implemented must be assessed beyond the usual parameters of prices and quantities. Indeed, the risk of negative externalities in the absence of appropriate governance increases dramatically when "critical transactions" are at stake. With vertical integration prohibited, second-best alternatives in which antitrust authorities leave room for innovative hybrid governance may allow internalizing externalities while avoiding high switching costs.

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28

Roesler, Anne-Katrin, and Balázs Szentes. "Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing." American Economic Review 107, no. 7 (2017): 2072–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160145.

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This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she observes only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's expected payoff. We identify a buyer-optimal signal structure which generates (i) efficient trade and (ii) a unit-elastic demand. Furthermore, we show that every other buyer-optimal signal structure yields the same outcome as the one we identify: in particular, the same price. (JEL D11, D42, D82, D83, L12)

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29

Soldatos, Gerasimos. "A discussion of joint bank and industry concentration." Business and Economic Horizons 14, no. 2 (2018): 207–16. https://doi.org/10.15208/beh.2018.16.

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This article examines bank and industry concentration jointly within the static framework of Cournot competition. The general equilibrium is one in which banks form a multiplant monopoly and firm profit is zero. This is an unstable equilibrium because: (A) Firms have an incentive to (i) collude to “fight banks back” in the context of bilateral monopoly bargaining, and/or (ii) modernize their business towards financial independence; (B) Banks’ best response is (i) innovation too, combined with (ii) disciplinary credit rationing.  

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30

Lewis, Tracy, Robin Lindsey, and Roger Ware. "Long-Term Bilateral Monopoly: The Case of an Exhaustible Resource." RAND Journal of Economics 17, no. 1 (1986): 89. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555630.

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31

Siddhartha, Dasgupta, and Devadoss Stephen. "Equilibrium Contracts In a Bilateral Monopoly with Unequal Bargaining Powers." International Economic Journal 16, no. 1 (2002): 43–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10168730200000003.

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32

DASGUPTA, SIDDHARTHA, and STEPHEN DEVADOSS. "EQUILIBRIUM CONTRACTS IN A BILATERAL MONOPOLY WITH UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWERS." International Economic Journal 16, no. 1 (2002): 43–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10168730200080003.

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33

Lekakis, Joseph N. "FORUM: Bilateral Monopoly: A Market for Intercountry River Water Allocation." Environmental Management 22, no. 1 (1998): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s002679900079.

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34

Assayag, Abraham, and Yves Rabeau. "Un modèle de la détermination des salaires dans l’industrie de la construction au Québec." Articles 54, no. 3 (2009): 355–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/800780ar.

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The provincial decree applying to the construction industry in Quebec has created a situation of bilateral monopoly in that segment of the labor market (unions on the supply side and entrepreneurs on the demand side). If negotiations are undertaken at a time where business conditions are booming, then the unions have a very powerful negotiating power. Since contracts are signed for a three year period, wage increases do not afterwards reflect market conditions. Since wages are fixed by the provincial decree, there is then a quantity adjustment in the construction sector. In this paper, we have specified and estimated a model that allows us to measure the bilateral monopoly impact of wage increases and to compute quantity adjustments in the construction market. It is shown then that the provincial decree adversily affects the competition position of the construction industry in Quebec and that restauring this position involves a severe recession in the construction industry.

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35

Ayoub, Antoine. "Technologie, matières premières et pétrole : vers un monopole bilatéral?" Articles 53, no. 4 (2009): 666–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/800752ar.

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Abstract What is the appropriate economic policy for primary commodity producing developing countries given that industrialized countries are specialized in the production of technological progress? Integrating the concept of product life cycle to the static theory of comparative advantage, Harry Johnson has argued that free trade will, by spreading the technology, dissolve the monopoly in technology, and thus constitutes the only policy capable of transmitting growth from one country to another. This article criticizes this thesis on the following points: 1) A rigorous interpretation of the concept of product life cycle and of the underlying assumptions suggests that only industrialized countries present the necessary conditions for the location of the production of exportable technological progress. 2) It follows that the monopoly of the industrialized countries is not temporary but dynamic and self renewing. 3) Free trade, in this case, will only reinforce the negative effects of this monopoly on international specialization and, therefore, reinforce the disparities between industrialized and developing countries. Given the absence of a supranational authority which could intervene against this monopoly, it is appropriate to consider the limits of the bilateral monopoly policy which the developing countries will apply, based on their primary commodities, and the role that OPEC can play in this context.

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36

Sari, Destia Anjelina, and Rusnilawati Rusnilawati. "THE EFFECT OF TEACHING GAMES FOR UNDESTANDING (TGFU) MODEL WITH MATHEMATICS MONOPOLY MEDIA ON LEARNING MOTIVATION AND MATHEMATICS LEARNING OUTCOMES OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CLASS I STUDENTS." Prima: Jurnal Pendidikan Matematika 8, no. 1 (2024): 115. http://dx.doi.org/10.31000/prima.v8i1.9408.

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The purpose of this study is to describe the motivation and learning outcomes of mathematics using the Teaching Games for Undestanding (TGfU) model with a monopoly on mathematics. The experimental method with the design used in this research is a one-group pretest-posttest research design. In this design it combines pre-test and post-test by conducting tests on subjects before being given treatment and after being given treatment. The results of the hypothesis test show that the value of Sig. (bilateral) is 0.001, meaning that the value of Sig. (bilateral) < less than 0.05, it can be concluded that H0 is rejected and Ha is accepted, namely the learning motivation of the Teaching Games for Understanding (TGfU) model with monopoly mathematics is better than before applying it. the results of the t-test obtained a tcount of 2,773 with a degree of freedom (df) of 32 and a significance value of 5% ttable was 2.01. So it can be concluded that tcount (2.773) > greater than ttable (2.02) which can be interpreted as a Teaching Games for Understanding (TGfU) model with a math monopoly if H0 is rejected and Ha is accepted, which means the model is better than before applying. F count 45.025 thus we can know that the f table is 4.07. Based on the decision above, Fcount (45.025) > greater than Ftable (4.07). So it can be concluded that H0 is rejected and Ha is accepted, which means that the Teaching Games for Understanding (TGfU) model with monopoly media is better than the Problem Based Learning model assisted by image media.

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37

Chen, Shih-Shen, Chien-Shu Tsai, and Chen Chen. "Quid Pro Quo CSR and Trade Liberalization in a Bilateral Monopoly." Games 13, no. 3 (2022): 38. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13030038.

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We construct a dynamic bilateral monopoly game to analyze the bargaining between a foreign manufacturer and a domestic retailer regarding the wholesale price and explain the foreign upstream firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative and its economic impacts on the domestic market. Under free trade, the foreign upstream firm’s CSR initiative realizes improvements in consumer surplus and social welfare in the home country. A “win–win–win” strategy exists, as the foreign manufacturer has more of an incentive to implement CSR when the government implements a strategic trade policy. The consumer-friendly action implemented by the foreign upstream firm leads to adequate consumer welfare and social welfare, which mitigates the government’s political hostility. With the high bargaining power of the foreign upstream firm and the low weight of the consumer-friendly upstream firm, the government should set a higher tariff rate for the foreign upstream firm to extract rent and enhance social welfare.

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38

Ouchida, Yasunori. "Cooperative choice of corporate social responsibility in a bilateral monopoly model." Applied Economics Letters 26, no. 10 (2018): 799–806. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1497843.

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39

Fujiwara, Kenji, and Ngo Van Long. "Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly." Dynamic Games and Applications 1, no. 4 (2011): 479–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0036-1.

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40

Ingene, Charles A., and Mark E. Parry. "Bilateral monopoly, identical distributors, and game-theoretic analyses of distribution channels." Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 35, no. 4 (2007): 586–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11747-006-0006-0.

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41

Kant, Shashi, and J. C. Nautiyal. "Sustainable joint forest management through bargaining: a bilateral monopoly gaming approach." Forest Ecology and Management 65, no. 2-3 (1994): 251–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-1127(94)90174-0.

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42

Rapoport, Amnon, and Mark A. Fuller. "Bidding Strategies in a Bilateral Monopoly with Two-Sided Incomplete Information." Journal of Mathematical Psychology 39, no. 2 (1995): 179–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jmps.1995.1019.

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43

Yu, Man, and Tuo Li. "Information Sharing in a Supply Chain under Cap-and-Trade Regulation." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2018 (October 24, 2018): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/4573919.

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Under cap-and-trade regulation, this paper investigates information sharing issues in supply chains with different structures. Adopting a game-theoretic method, we start the analysis from a simple bilateral monopoly supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The model is then extended to a scenario with two competing retailers. The manufacturer provides the wholesale price and invests in carbon emission abatement level. The retailers order products to meet consumers' demand in an uncertain market. One retailer has the power to obtain private information. The results show that the wholesale price and the carbon emission abatement level respond positively to the demand signal. We find that the well-informed retailer is better off with low-demand information sharing and worse off with high-demand information sharing in a bilateral monopoly supply chain. However, the well-informed retailer can benefit from high-demand information sharing in a competitive environment. We also find that the uninformed retailer may get hurt from information sharing under certain conditions. Moreover, the manufacturer's expected profit is related to the capability of abating carbon emissions, the information accuracy, and the demand uncertainty.

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44

Truett, Dale B., and Lila J. Truett. "Joint Profit Maximization, Negotiation, and the Determinacy of Price in Bilateral Monopoly." Journal of Economic Education 24, no. 3 (1993): 260–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220485.1993.10844798.

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45

Fanti, Luciano, and Domenico Buccella. "Publisher Correction: Social Responsibility in a Bilateral Monopoly with Downstream Convex Technology." Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 20, no. 4 (2020): 777. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10842-020-00345-1.

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46

Truett, Dale B., and Lila J. Truett. "Joint Profit Maximization, Negotiation, and the Determinacy of Price in Bilateral Monopoly." Journal of Economic Education 24, no. 3 (1993): 260. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1183126.

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47

Broman, Elizabeth M. "The bilateral monopoly model: Approaching certainty under the split-the-difference mechanism." Journal of Economic Theory 48, no. 1 (1989): 134–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90122-1.

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48

Goering, Gregory E. "The Profit-Maximizing Case for Corporate Social Responsibility in a Bilateral Monopoly." Managerial and Decision Economics 35, no. 7 (2013): 493–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.2643.

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49

Kalinowski, Sławomir. "Price Discount for the Increased Order as a Cooperative Game in Bilateral Monopoly." Economics & Sociology 8, no. 3 (2015): 108–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.14254/2071-789x.2015/8-3/8.

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50

Avenel, Eric. "Upstream Capacity Constraint and the Preservation of Monopoly Power in Private Bilateral Contracting." Journal of Industrial Economics 60, no. 4 (2012): 578–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12001.

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