Academic literature on the topic 'Blotto Game'

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Journal articles on the topic "Blotto Game"

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Hu, Senhao. "The colonel blotto game based on probability and statistics." Theoretical and Natural Science 11, no. 1 (2023): 206–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-8818/11/20230409.

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The Colonel Blotto Game is famous as zero-sum game. The game asked players to get more passes(objects) than their opponents to win the game with limited regiments(resources). The one who put more regiments on the pass would get it, and player who has more passes would win the game. The Colonel Blotto Game could be used in athletics, business and competition in other forms: how the player uses specific amount of resource with strategies to gain more benefits than competitors. In this case, the Colonel Blotto Game could be seen transfer to a linear program problem, with constraints about limited resources to maximize what players get in the game. This article would analyze the strategy for the Colonel Blotto game in probability of winning and build the model by extending the Colonel Blotto Game with more regiments, more passes and weighted some passes to look for how these variables impact each other and find the general solution for this game. Then using linear program to check the final results. This article would focus on the resources, benefits and weighted of the benefits for the Colonel Blotto game to find out the directly relationship among these variables of the model with the strategy to win the game.
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Roberson, Brian. "The Colonel Blotto game." Economic Theory 29, no. 1 (2006): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0071-5.

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Osorio, Antonio. "The lottery Blotto game." Economics Letters 120, no. 2 (2013): 164–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.012.

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Wu, Hongjian. "Mixed nash equilibrium and its application in two-player zero-Sum games." Theoretical and Natural Science 26, no. 1 (2023): 158–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-8818/26/20241052.

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The Colonel Blotto game represents a classic case in game theory, embodying the essence of two-player zero-sum games. A vital game theory theorem has demonstrated a mixed Nash equilibrium in all zero-sum games. In this paper, the author will start with this classic game to expound the principles of mixed Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the paper will explore the practical applications of mixed Nash equilibrium in the context of two-player zero-sum games, illustrating its significance in addressing real-world issues and decision-making. By delving into the Colonel Blotto game and its associated theories, the paper will reveal the importance and broad applicability of mixed Nash equilibrium, showcasing its role in various real-world applications, including competitive strategies, resource allocation, risk management, and more. This research will assist readers in gaining a better understanding of the concept of mixed Nash equilibrium and how to apply it to the resolution of practical problems.
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Ganzfried, Sam. "Algorithm for Computing Approximate Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Application to Continuous Blotto." Games 12, no. 2 (2021): 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12020047.

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Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games—in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite—is far more challenging. Nonetheless, many real-world domains have continuous action spaces, e.g., where actions refer to an amount of time, money, or other resource that is naturally modeled as being real-valued as opposed to integral. We present a new algorithm for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies in continuous games. In addition to two-player zero-sum games, our algorithm also applies to multiplayer games and games with imperfect information. We experiment with our algorithm on a continuous imperfect-information Blotto game, in which two players distribute resources over multiple battlefields. Blotto games have frequently been used to model national security scenarios and have also been applied to electoral competition and auction theory. Experiments show that our algorithm is able to quickly compute close approximations of Nash equilibrium strategies for this game.
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Boix-Adserà, Enric, Benjamin L. Edelman, and Siddhartha Jayanti. "The multiplayer Colonel Blotto game." Games and Economic Behavior 129 (September 2021): 15–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.002.

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Rinott, Yosef, Marco Scarsini, and Yaming Yu. "A Colonel Blotto Gladiator Game." Mathematics of Operations Research 37, no. 4 (2012): 574–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0550.

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O.G., Podlipskaia. "BLOTTO GAME IN A PROPAGANDA BATTLE." Computational Mathematics and Information Technologies 1, no. 3 (2022): 114–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.23947/2587-8999-2022-1-3-114-120.

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The model describes the following process. Two parties, called Left and Right, are involved in information warfare on two topics that play the role of battlefields. Each party has limited broadcasting resources for propaganda, which each allocates between these two topics. Each member of the population backs one of the parties for each topic. A situation is possible in which an individual backs different parties on different topics. In this case, the individual is considered a supporter of the party supported on a more salient topic. Party supporters participate in participatory propaganda, campaigning on the topic or two topics they support for their party. The saliency of a topic depends on the amount of media broadcasting and communication on it. The number of party supporters’ changes over time under the influence of media and party propaganda. The problem is to determine the parties' best strategies. Each party apportion its broadcasting resource between two topics, thereby choosing its strategy
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Adamo, Tim, and Alexander Matros. "A Blotto game with Incomplete Information." Economics Letters 105, no. 1 (2009): 100–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.025.

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Jung, Eunhoo, Seungyun Cho, Junhyeok Choi, Sanghoon Park, and Sanghun Song. "Mathematical Analysis and Visualization of Optimal Strategies in the Expanded Colonel Blotto Game." Korean Science Education Society for the Gifted 15, no. 3 (2023): 504–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.29306/jseg.2023.15.3.504.

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The Colonel Blotto Game is a game theory that can be applied to various social phenomena in reality, and prior research on various variations is also being conducted. This study attempted to build a strategy selection model using the concept of Quantal Response Equilibrium, an extension of the Nash Equilibrium, in the Colonel Blotto Game that assigned weights to each battlefield arrangement, identify the effectiveness of different strategies, and visualize the results. For this purpose, the rules and progression of the Colonel Blotto Game were mathematically defined and the optimal probabilistic strategy was analyzed. The results obtained using C++ were visualized and presented in two ways (a method based on troop deployment characteristic indicators and a method applying the PCA algorithm for dimensionality reduction). It was found that the smaller the model’s strategy selection volatility, the more dominant the equal distribution strategy is, and as the volatility increases, several characteristic strategies, including the equal distribution strategy, form a cyclical relationship.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Blotto Game"

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Lee, Moon Gul. "New fictitious play procedure for solving Blotto games." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2004. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/04Dec%5FLee%5Moon.pdf.

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Thesis (M.S. in Operations Research)--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004.<br>Thesis Advisor(s): James N. Eagle, W. Matthew Carlyle. Includes bibliographical references (p. 35). Also available online.
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Vu, Dong Quan. "Models and solutions of strategic resource allocation problems : approximate equilibrium and online learning in Blotto games." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Sorbonne université, 2020. https://accesdistant.sorbonne-universite.fr/login?url=https://theses-intra.sorbonne-universite.fr/2020SORUS120.pdf.

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Les problèmes d'allocation des ressources sont définis comme les situations concernant les décisions sur la distribution d’un budget limité afin d’optimiser un objectif. Beaucoup d'entre eux impliquent des interactions entre des décideurs compétitifs ; ils peuvent être bien capturés par des modèles de théorie des jeux. Dans cette thèse, nous choisissons d'étudier les jeux d'allocation de ressources. Nous nous concentrons principalement sur le jeu de Colonel Blotto (CB). Dans le jeu CB, deux joueurs compétitifs, chacun ayant un budget fixe, distribuent simultanément leurs ressources vers n champs de bataille. Chaque joueur évalue chaque champ de bataille avec une certaine valeur. Dans chaque champ de bataille, le joueur qui a l'allocation la plus élevée gagne la valeur correspondante tandis que l'autre obtient zéro. Le gain de chaque joueur est à ses gains cumulés sur tous les champs de bataille. Tout d'abord, nous modélisons plusieurs variantes et extensions du jeu CB comme jeux d'informations complètes à un coup. Notre première contribution est une classe d'équilibres approximatifs dans ces jeux et nous prouvons que l'erreur d'approximation est bien contrôlée. Deuxièmement, nous modélisons les jeux d'allocation de ressources avec des structures combinatoires comme des problèmes d'apprentissage en ligne pour étudier des situations impliquant des jeux séquentiels et des informations incomplètes. Nous établissons une connexion entre ces jeux et les problèmes de chemin le plus court en ligne (OSP). Notre deuxième contribution est un ensemble de nouveaux algorithmes d’OSP sous plusieurs paramètres de feedback qui améliorent des garanties de regret et du temps d'exécution<br>Resource allocation problems are broadly defined as situations involving decisions on distributing a limited budget of resources in order to optimize an objective. In particular, many of them involve interactions between competitive decision-makers which can be well captured by game-theoretic models. In this thesis, we choose to investigate resource allocation games. We primarily focus on the Colonel Blotto game (CB game). In the CB game, two competitive players, each having a fixed budget of resources, simultaneously distribute their resources toward n battlefields. Each player evaluates each battlefield with a certain value. In each battlefield, the player who has the higher allocation wins and gains the corresponding value while the other loses and gains zero. Each player's payoff is her aggregate gains from all the battlefields. First, we model several prominent variants of the CB game and their extensions as one-shot complete-information games and analyze players' strategic behaviors. Our first main contribution is a class of approximate (Nash) equilibria in these games for which we prove that the approximation error can be well-controlled. Second, we model resource allocation games with combinatorial structures as online learning problems to study situations involving sequential plays and incomplete information. We make a connection between these games and online shortest path problems (OSP). Our second main contribution is a set of novel regret-minimization algorithms for generic instances of OSP under several restricted feedback settings that provide significant improvements in regret guarantees and running time in comparison with existing solutions
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Thomas, C. D. "Bandit models and Blotto games." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2011. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1325637/.

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In this thesis we present a new take on two classic problems of game theory: the "multiarmed bandit" problem of dynamic learning, and the "Colonel Blotto" game, a multidi- mensional contest. In Chapters 2-4 we treat the questions of experimentation with congestion: how do players search and learn about options when they are competing for access with other players? We consider a bandit model in which two players choose between learning about the quality of a risky option (modelled as a Poisson process with unknown arrival rate), and competing for the use of a single shared safe option that can only be used by one agent at the time. We present the equilibria of the game when switching to the safe option is irrevocable, and when it is not. We show that the equilibrium is always inefficient: it involves too little experimentation when compared to the planner solution. The striking equilibrium dynamics of the game with revocable exit are driven by a strategic option-value arising purely from competition between the players. This constitutes a new result in the bandit literature. Finally we present extensions to the model. In particular we assume that players do not observe the result of their opponent's experimentation. In Chapter 5 we turn to the n-dimensional Blotto game and allow battlefields to have different values. We describe a geometrical method for constructing equilibrium distribution in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric battlfield values. It generalises the 3-dimensional construction method first described by Gross and Wagner (1950). The proposed method does particularly well in instances of the Colonel Blotto game in which the battlefield weights satisfy some clearly defined regularity conditions. The chapter also explores the parallel between these conditions and the integer partitioning problem in combinatorial optimisation.
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Gortan, Antonio. "Otimização de algoritmos de decodificação de códigos de bloco por conjuntos de informação visando sua implementação em hardware." Universidade Tecnológica Federal do Paraná, 2011. http://repositorio.utfpr.edu.br/jspui/handle/1/196.

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Este trabalho tem como finalidade realizar uma análise teórica dos processos envolvidos na decodificação de códigos de bloco lineares por meio de conjuntos de informação visando otimizar esses procedimentos para viabilizar sua implementação em hardware de forma eficiente através do uso de FPGAs (do inglês Field Programmable Gate Array). Em especial, quatro contribuições são apresentadas com essa finalidade: uma versão modificada do algorítimo de Dorsch, um conjunto de algoritmos para determinar as candidatas mais prováveis e dimensionar sua quantidade de acordo com o ganho de codificação desejado aproximando seu desempenho ao do decodificador de máxima verossimilhança, uma versão implementável em hardware do critério de parada BGW (das iniciais dos autores: Barros, Godoy e Wille) e a obtenção de critérios para o dimensionamento da quantidade de intervalos de quantização a utilizar.<br>The purpose of this work is to undertake a theoretical analysis of the processes involved in soft-decision decoding of linear block codes using the information set approach aiming at an efficient hardware implementation in FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays). Accordingly, four contributions to this goal are presented: a modified version of the Dorsch algorithm, a set of algorithms to determine the most reliable candidates and to gauge their quantity according desired coding gain, approaching its performance to the maximum likelihood decoder, a hardware implementable version of the BGW (from the authors initials: Barros, Godoy e Wille) stop rule and the attainment of design criteria for the number of quantization intervals to apply.
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Macdonell, Scott Taplin. "Strategic political environments : gerrymandering and campaign expenditures." Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2012-05-5442.

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My dissertation contains three chapters studying the strategic allocation of resources in political environments. Chapter 2 asks if redistricting is the result of partisan gerrymandering or apolitical considerations. I develop a statistical test for partisan gerrymandering and apply it to the U.S. Congressional districting plan chosen by the Republican legislature in Pennsylvania in 2001. First, I formally model the optimization problem faced by a strategic Republican redistricter and characterize the theoretically optimal solution. I then estimate the likelihood a district is represented by a Republican, conditional on district demographics. This estimate allows me to determine the value of the gerrymanderer's objective function under any districting plan. Next, I use a geographic representation of the state to randomly generate a sample of legally valid plans. Finally, I calculate the estimated value of a strategic Republican redistricter's objective function under each of the sample plans and under the actual plan chosen by Republicans. When controlling for incumbency the formal test shows that the Republicans' plan was a partisan gerrymander. In Chapter 3 I introduce a new and novel electoral reform that continues to allow redistricting but changes the incentives to do so. This reform ensures that parties earn seats proportional to their performance at the polls without substantially changing the electoral system in the U.S. In order to evaluate the reform's impacts, I model and solve a game that incorporates the redistricting decision, candidate choice, state legislative elections, and policy choice. Unsurprisingly, strategic redistricting biases policy in favor of the redistricting party. In the environments studied, the new reform never increases policy bias, and often reduces it. Political campaigns often require the strategic allocation of resources across multiple contests. In Chapter 4 I analyze these environments in terms of the canonical Colonel Blotto game, beginning with the most basic of Blotto games: Two officers simultaneously allocate their forces across two fields of battle. The larger force on each front wins that battle, and the payoff is the sum of the values of the battles won. I completely characterize the set of Nash equilibria to any such game and provide the unique equilibrium payoffs. This characterization comes from an intuitive graphical algorithm which I then apply to several generalizations of the game. I completely characterize the set of equilibria and provide the unique equilibrium payoffs to Blotto games with battlefield values that vary across players and games with general resource constraints. I also use my approach to solve the Blotto games on more than two battlefields with asymmetric battlefields and force endowments.<br>text
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Books on the topic "Blotto Game"

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Findings on Mosaic Warfare from a Colonel Blotto Game. RAND Corporation, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.7249/rr4397.

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Grana, Justin, Nicholas A. ODonoughue, Acquisition and Technology Policy Center Staff, Rand Corporation Staff, and Jonathan Lamb. Findings on Mosaic Warfare from a Colonel Blotto Game. RAND Corporation, The, 2021.

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gift, hobbies Lover. Just a Girl Who Loves Video Game Collecting Notebook / Journal 6x9 Ruled Lined 120 Pages School Degree Student Graduation University: Video Game Collecting Hobbie Lover for Girl Woman Beautiful Quotes Diaries Pad Blotter Birthday Gift Journal Notebook Dia. Independently Published, 2020.

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Book chapters on the topic "Blotto Game"

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Dziubiński, Marcin. "The Spectrum of Equilibria for the Colonel Blotto and the Colonel Lotto Games." In Algorithmic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_23.

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Heyman, Joseph L., and Abhishek Gupta. "Colonel Blotto Game with Coalition Formation for Sharing Resources." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01554-1_10.

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Gupta, Abhishek, Tamer Başar, and Galina A. Schwartz. "A Three-Stage Colonel Blotto Game: When to Provide More Information to an Adversary." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_12.

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Washburn, Alan. "Blotto Games." In International Series in Operations Research & Management Science. Springer US, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-9050-0_6.

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Behnezhad, Soheil, Avrim Blum, Mahsa Derakhshan, et al. "From Battlefields to Elections: Winning Strategies of Blotto and Auditing Games." In Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975031.148.

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Zieger, Susan. "Ink, Mass Culture, and the Unconscious." In The Mediated Mind. Fordham University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823279821.003.0004.

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Chapter three studies ink, an ephemeral material of mass print, because its cultural history reveals a mystified model of the unconscious as media storage that still has currency. For tens of millions of new writers, ink was a flawed technology; its blots and splashes signified the chaos of unreason. At the same time, gazing at pooled ink to see remote events or the future became a well-known pastime and cultural referent; from an older model of divination, it emerged as a psychological performance. Later in the century, deliberately spilling and spattering ink to make random forms became a social, aesthetic, and scientific practice. Inkblot games, art, and psychological tests formalized and standardized the quotidian ink accident; ink began to materialize the unconscious. Wilkie Collins, in his novel The Moonstone (1868), represented ink-gazing as a nascent figuration of the unconscious – not the deep, Freudian subjectivity of hidden, conflicting drives, but as information stored and hidden out of sight.
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Zieger, Susan. "From Paper to Pixel." In The Mediated Mind. Fordham University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823279821.003.0001.

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The introduction lays out the book’s terms, critical concerns, method, and historical and theoretical contexts. Explaining how printed ephemera transformed the texture of everyday middle- and working-class life throughout the nineteenth century, peaking in the 1860s and 1890s, it then shows how affect, itself an ephemeral human condition, registered the new social relations that mass media reorganized. The introduction explains the book’s engagement with theorists of media and mass media such as Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno and Marx Horkheimer, and Friedrich Kittler; and theorists of affect and mass culture such as Eve Sedgwick, Lauren Berlant, and Kathleen Stewart. It describes the cultural evidence the book assembles, such as temperance medals, cigarette cards, ink blot games, and novels; and describes each chapter.
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Wells, H. G. "The Trap of the White Sphinx." In The Time Machine, edited by Roger Luckhurst. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/owc/9780198707516.003.0013.

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‘About eight or nine in the morning I came to the same seat of yellow metal from which I had viewed the world upon the evening of my arrival. I thought of my hasty conclusions upon that evening, and could not refrain from laughing bitterly at my confidence. Here was the same beautiful scene, the same abundant foliage, the same splendid palaces and magnificent ruins, the same silver river running between its fertile banks. The gay robes of the beautiful people moved hither and thither among the trees. Some were bathing in exactly the place where I had saved Weena, and that suddenly gave me a keen stab of pain. And like blots upon the landscape rose the cupolas above the ways to the under-world. I understood now what all the beauty of the overworld people covered. Very pleasant was their day, as pleasant as the day of the cattle in the field. Like the cattle, they knew no enemies and provided against no needs. And their end was the same.
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Conference papers on the topic "Blotto Game"

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Ferdowsi, Aidin, Anibal Sanjab, Walid Saad, and Tamer Basar. "Generalized Colonel Blotto Game." In 2018 Annual American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/acc.2018.8431701.

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Shishika, Daigo, Yue Guan, Michael Dorothy, and Vijay Kumar. "Dynamic Defender-Attacker Blotto Game." In 2022 American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/acc53348.2022.9867318.

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Boix-Adserà, Enric, Benjamin L. Edelman, and Siddhartha Jayanti. "The Multiplayer Colonel Blotto Game." In EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399555.

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Gaonkar, Akash, Divya Raghunathan, and S. Matthew Weinberg. "The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game." In EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538367.

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Fuchs, Z. E., and P. P. Khargonekar. "A sequential Colonel Blotto game with a sensor network." In 2012 American Control Conference - ACC 2012. IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/acc.2012.6315589.

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Shahrivar, Ebrahim Moradi, and Shreyas Sundaram. "Multi-layer network formation via a Colonel Blotto game." In 2014 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing (GlobalSIP). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/globalsip.2014.7032237.

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Vu, Dong Quan, Patrick Loiseau, and Alonso Silva. "Efficient Computation of Approximate Equilibria in Discrete Colonel Blotto Games." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/72.

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The Colonel Blotto game is a famous game commonly used to model resource allocation problems in many domains ranging from security to advertising. Two players distribute a fixed budget of resources on multiple battlefields to maximize the aggregate value of battlefields they win, each battlefield being won by the player who allocates more resources to it. The continuous version of the game---where players can choose any fractional allocation---has been extensively studied, albeit only with partial results to date. Recently, the discrete version---where allocations can only be integers---started to gain traction and algorithms were proposed to compute the equilibrium in polynomial time; but these remain computationally impractical for large (or even moderate) numbers of battlefields. In this paper, we propose an algorithm to compute very efficiently an approximate equilibrium for the discrete Colonel Blotto game with many battlefields. We provide a theoretical bound on the approximation error as a function of the game's parameters. We also propose an efficient dynamic programming algorithm in order to compute for each game instance the actual value of the error. We perform numerical experiments that show that the proposed strategy provides a fast and good approximation to the equilibrium even for moderate numbers of battlefields
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Min, Minghui, Liang Xiao, Caixia Xie, Mohammad Hajimirsadeghi, and Narayan B. Mandayam. "Defense against advanced persistent threats: A Colonel Blotto game approach." In ICC 2017 - 2017 IEEE International Conference on Communications. IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc.2017.7997103.

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Hajimirsadeghi, Mohammad, Gokul Sridharan, Walid Saad, and Narayan B. Mandayam. "Inter-network dynamic spectrum allocation via a Colonel Blotto game." In 2016 Annual Conference on Information Science and Systems (CISS). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ciss.2016.7460510.

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Guan, Sanghai, Jingjing Wang, Chunxiao Jiang, Zhu Han, Yong Ren, and Abderrahim Benslimane. "Colonel Blotto Game Aided Attack-Defense Analysis in Real-World Networks." In GLOBECOM 2018 - 2018 IEEE Global Communications Conference. IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2018.8647886.

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Reports on the topic "Blotto Game"

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Gupta, Abhishek, Galina Schwartz, Cedric Langbort, S. S. Sastry, and Tamer Basar. A Three-Stage Colonel Blotto Game with Applications to Cyber-Physical Security. Defense Technical Information Center, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada604916.

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