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Journal articles on the topic 'Brain – Philosophy'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Smith, Aaron. "Brain‐mind philosophy." Inquiry 29, no. 1-4 (January 1986): 203–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201748608602087.

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2

Jacobson, Anne Jaap. "Philosophy on the brain." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 66 (2014): 121–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20146698.

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3

Rose, David. "Philosophy and the brain." Trends in Neurosciences 10, no. 9 (January 1987): 384–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-2236(87)90078-6.

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4

FORREST, DAVID V. "Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem." American Journal of Psychiatry 162, no. 2 (February 2005): 408–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.162.2.408.

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5

Berrios, GE. "‘Brain Disorders’, by Henry Calderwood (1879)." History of Psychiatry 29, no. 2 (May 18, 2018): 232–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957154x17745435.

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Henry Calderwood, a nineteenth-century Scottish philosopher interested in madness, published in 1879 an important work on the interaction between philosophy of mind, the nascent neurosciences and mental disease. Holding a spiritual view of the mind, he considered the phrase ‘mental disease’ (as Feuchtersleben had in 1845) to be but a misleading metaphor. His analysis of the research work of Ferrier, Clouston, Crichton-Browne, Maudsley, Tuke, Sankey, etc., is detailed, and his views are correct on the very limited explanatory power that their findings had for the understanding of madness. Calderwood’s conceptual contribution deserves to be added to the growing list of nineteenth-century writers who started the construction of a veritable ‘philosophy of alienism’ (now called ‘philosophy of psychiatry’).
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6

Schönher, Mathias. "Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Nature: System and Method in What is Philosophy?" Theory, Culture & Society 36, no. 7-8 (February 14, 2019): 89–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276418820954.

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For its elliptical style, What is Philosophy? appears to be fragmentary and inscrutable, and its reception has been correspondingly contentious. Following an intimation by Gilles Deleuze himself, this article proposes that his final book, written in collaboration with Félix Guattari, contains a philosophy of nature. To address this proposition, the article begins by outlining the comprehensive system of nature set out in What is Philosophy?, defining it as an open system in motion that conjoins philosophy with the historical preconditions and intersects it with science and art. The article then addresses the precise method whereby the philosopher as an individual subject, emerging from nature, can succeed in becoming creative – that is, in creating concepts to bring forth new events. Finally, the brain turns out to be the pivot between the system and this method. What is Philosophy? thus presents an account of the brain based on a theory of the three specific planes of philosophy, science and art, and uses it to expand upon the idea of assemblage for a philosophy of nature.
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7

Hustvedt, Siri. "Philosophy matters in brain matters." Seizure 22, no. 3 (April 2013): 169–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.seizure.2013.01.002.

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8

KIM, JeongTak. "Communication Philosophy in Taoism : Beyond “Brain-to-Brain” Communication." Asian Communication Research 14, no. 2 (December 31, 2017): 122–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.20879/acr.2017.14.2.122.

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9

Fox, Claire. "A brain-based philosophy of life." Lancet Neurology 5, no. 3 (March 2006): 212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1474-4422(06)70372-6.

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10

Jacyna, L. S. "Process and progress: John Hughlings Jackson's philosophy of science." Brain 134, no. 10 (October 1, 2011): 3121–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/brain/awr236.

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11

Vogeley, Kai Thorsten, and Rüdiger Jürgen Seitz. "Representation and identity ‐ convergence of brain research and mind‐brain philosophy." Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 4, no. 3-4 (September 1995): 183–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09647049509525638.

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12

Smythies, John. "Philosophy, Perception, and Neuroscience." Perception 38, no. 5 (January 1, 2009): 638–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/p6025.

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This paper presents the results of some recent experiments in neuroscience and perceptual science that reveal the role of virtual reality in normal visual perception, and the use of television technology by the visual brain. This involves particularly the cholinergic system in the forebrain. This research throws new light on the nature of perception and the relation of phenomenal consciousness and its brain. It is directly relevant to criticisms by certain analytical philosophers of aspects of neuroscience relating to these matters. Particular attention is paid to their support for Naive Realism.
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13

Gillett, Grant. "Philosophy and the Brain. J. Z. Young." Philosophy of Science 57, no. 1 (March 1990): 172–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289541.

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14

Churchland, Patricia Smith. "Is Neuroscience Relevant to Philosophy?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 16 (1990): 323–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1990.10717230.

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Many questions concerning the nature of the mind have remained intractable since their first systematic discussion by the ancient Greeks. What is the nature of knowledge, and how is it possible to represent the world? What are consciousness and free will? What is the self and how is it that some organisms are more intelligent than others? Since it is now overwhelmingly evident that these are phenomena of the physical brain, it is not surprising that an established empirical and theoretical foundation in this domain has eluded us for so long. For in order to understand what we are and how we work, we must understand the brain and how it works. Yet the brain is exceedingly difficult to study, and research on any significant scale is critically dependent on advanced technology.
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15

Young, Michael J. "Brain-Computer Interfaces and the Philosophy of Action." AJOB Neuroscience 11, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 4–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2019.1704309.

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16

Davies, David. "Putnam's Brain-Teaser." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 2 (June 1995): 203–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717413.

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1. Metaphysical Realists have traditionally relied upon the skeptic to give substance to the idea that truth is, in the words of Hilary Putnam, 'radically non-episternic,’ forever outstripping, in principle at least, the reach of justification. What better model of truth so conceived, after all, than the skeptic's contention that even our firmest convictions might be mistaken in that we might be the victims of demonic deception or the machinations of an evil scientist? But the availability of this favorite model of Realist truth, encapsulated in the claim that we might be ‘brains in a vat,’ has been called into question by Putnam in the opening chapter of Reason, Truth, and History. Putnam contends that, if we grant the Realist notion of truth, as referentially mediated correspondence to THE WORLD, then, given certain plausible constraints on reference, we can know that we are not brains in a vat (or, more accurately, ‘brains in a vat' of a particular kind, as we shall see).
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17

Schnelle, Helmut. "Grammar and brain." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26, no. 6 (December 2003): 689–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x03450152.

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Jackendoff's account of relating linguistic structure and brain structure is too restricted in concentrating on formal features of computational requirements, neglecting the achievements of various types of neuroscientific modelling. My own approaches to neuronal models of syntactic organization show how these requirements could be met. The book's lack of discussion of a sound philosophy of the relation is briefly mentioned.
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18

Tretter, F. "Towards an interdisciplinary neurophilosophy." European Psychiatry 26, S2 (March 2011): 1059. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0924-9338(11)72764-x.

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IntroductionScience (e.g. neuroscience) aims to “explain” phenomena (e.g. consciousness). Philosophy of science analyses the structure, consistency, range etc. of the respective scientific “theories” (e.g. philosophy of physics).ObjectivesA philosophy of neuroscience could be established (Neurophilosophy) as neurobiology claims to “explain” mental states and processes. Some (analytical) philosophers (e.g. Hacker) criticize brain theories because of mereological fallacies (e.g. not the brain/neurons can “decide”, but a person), misconceptions (e.g. “information”), implicit Cartesianism etc. But also some neuroscientists devaluate philosophy (e.g. Crick, Edelman, Zeki). Obviously, a deep gap in communication between neuroscience and philosophy exists.Aims and methodsWe propose an integrated systematic programme of “interdisciplinary neurophilosophy” that could help by integrating findings of philosophy, psychology, neurobiology and systems science.ResultsFor instance, it is useful to talk about the “brain” as an extremely heterogeneous interconnected system that encompasses the problem of “dynamic complexity” and to use views of “systems science” and/or “computational science” in order to understand the phenomenology of network-based neural processing and coding. Also more detailed medical/neurobiological definitions of the “conscious brain” (e.g. probably excluding the cerebellum) are important for the brain-mind debate. Additionally, psychological and psychiatric categories have to be reviewed with the aim of a functional language.ConclusionsAn institutionalized multidisciplinary neurophilosophy will help to proceed in brain-mind debate.
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19

Ren, Fang. "Influence of cognitive neuroscience on contemporary philosophy of science." Translational Neuroscience 10, no. 1 (April 23, 2019): 37–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/tnsci-2019-0007.

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Abstract The study of contemporary philosophy of science based on cognitive neuroscience has strongly promoted the philosophy study of brain cognitive problems. It has pointed out the research direction for human to explore the relationship between the traditional mind and brain while systematically reflecting and investigating the theoretical basis and research method of cognitive neuroscience. Therefore, this study explores the influence and the significance of cognitive neuroscience on contemporary philosophy of science.
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20

Peters, Michael A. "Human Brain Project; Blue Brain; Virtual Brain." Educational Philosophy and Theory 45, no. 8 (April 5, 2013): 817–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2013.781295.

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21

Hohwy, Jakob. "The Self-Evidencing Brain." Noûs 50, no. 2 (March 24, 2014): 259–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12062.

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22

McDonald, Hugh P. "The Problem with “Brain”." Contemporary Pragmatism 2, no. 2 (April 21, 2005): 93–126. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-90000021.

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23

Green, Karen. "Brain writing and Derrida." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71, no. 3 (September 1993): 238–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409312345272.

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24

Ball, Brian, Fintan Nagle, and Ioannis Votsis. "Introduction: Mind and Brain." Topoi 39, no. 1 (October 31, 2019): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09681-2.

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25

Pessoa Jr., Osvaldo. "The colored-brain thesis." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 84–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.10.

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The “colored-brain thesis”, or strong qualitative physicalism, is discussed from historical and philosophical perspectives. This thesis was proposed by Thomas Case (1888), in a non-materialistic context, and is close to views explored by H. H. Price (1932) and E. Boring (1933). Using Mary’s room thought experiment, one can argue that physicalism implies qualitative physicalism. Qualitative physicalism involves three basic statements: (i) perceptual internalism, and realism of qualia; (ii) ontic physicalism, charaterized as a description in space, time, and scale; and (iii) mind-brain identity thesis. In addition, (iv) structuralism in physics, and distinguishing the present version from that suggested by H. Feigl and S. Pepper, (v) realism of the physical description. The “neurosurgeon argument” is presented, as to why the greenness of a visually perceived avocado, which (according to this view) is present in the brain as a physical-chemical attribute, would not be seen as green by a neurosurgeon who opens the observer’s skull. This conception is compared with two close views, Russellian (and Schlickian) monisms and panprotopsychism (including panqualityism). According to the strong qualitative physicalism presented here, the phenomenal experience of a quale q is identical to a physico-chemical quality q, which arises from a combination of (1) the materiality wassociated with the brain, and (2) the causal organization or structure of the relevant elements of the brain S, including in this organization the structure of the self: (Sw)q. The “explanatory gap” between mental and physical states is shifted to a gap between the physico-chemical qualities q and the organized materiality of a specific brain region (Sw)q, and is seen as being bridged only by a set of non-explanatory postulates. Keywords: Colored-brain thesis, qualitative physicalism, mind-brain identity thesis, qualia, panprotopsychism, sensorium.
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26

Ventegodt, Søren, Niels Jørgen Andersen, and Joav Merrick. "Quality of Life Philosophy IV. The Brain and Consciousness." Scientific World JOURNAL 3 (2003): 1199–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1100/tsw.2003.104.

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In this article we look at the brain’s structure and function from a philosophical perspective. Although the brain at micro-level, with its trillions of ultra-thin nerve fibers, is one of the most complicated structures in the known universe, you can still grasp its composition if you go up to the level of the cell. How this structure functions is not quite clear. You can understand its function at fiber level, because it is fairly simple, and you can understand it at cell level, but it is already vague. Roughly speaking, you can envision a single nerve cell as a tiny, independent computer whose behavior is dependent on continuous calculations of all input. At organ level, the function can be understood as an extremely complex pattern machine. Finally, the brain’s function can be understood at the cognitive level as what provides consciousness through its ability to keep order in our complicated reality. The superior function of the brain is to connect the real us, our higher self, to the surrounding world.The brain has been developed so that it can create all possible complex patterns. The connectivity seems to imply that the patterns of the human brain are 1000-dimensional. It is our vision that these complicated patterns arise from basic patterns in the quantum matter of which everything is created. In our opinion, our consciousness’ special utilization of a patterned aspect of nature is what lies behind inscrutable statements like “Man is created in God’s image”. We suggest that these patterns in matter are the basic, creative force that influences all living organisms. Unfortunately, science has only just begun to understand these patterns.The Bible’s description of the origin of man is two people eating from the Tree of Knowledge and as punishment they are expelled from the Garden of Eden. What does that mean? It means that, as conscious creatures, we no longer were an unproblematic, harmonious part of the world around us. The great question is why this consciousness about the world, provided by the brain, is not a gift that makes life better instead of getting us expelled from the Garden of Eden. We think that our real problem is the fact that we are still not in control of our consciousness. Instead of it serving us, we have become its slaves. If we come to understand brain and consciousness in order to solve this basic problem of our existence, we shall again be able to become a coherent part of the world, both as individuals and as a species. We share the vision that such an understanding of the problems of consciousness will make medical science holistic and will bring quality of life, health, and the ability to function to its patients.
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27

Northoff, Georg. "Why do we need a philosophy of the brain?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8, no. 11 (November 2004): 484–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.09.003.

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28

Koch, C. "PHILOSOPHY AND BRAIN SCIENCE: Thinking About the Conscious Mind." Science 306, no. 5698 (November 5, 2004): 979–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1102777.

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29

Churchland, Paul M. "Into the brain: where philosophy should go from here." Topoi 25, no. 1-2 (September 2006): 29–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-006-0024-z.

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30

Bonanno, Giacomo, Christian List, Bertil Tungodden, and Peter Vallentyne. "INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY ON NEUROECONOMICS." Economics and Philosophy 24, no. 3 (November 2008): 301–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267108001995.

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The past fifteen years or so have witnessed considerable progress in our understanding of how the human brain works. One of the objectives of the fast-growing field of neuroscience is to deepen our knowledge of how the brain perceives and interacts with the external world. Advances in this direction have been made possible by progress in brain imaging techniques and by clinical data obtained from patients with localized brain lesions. A relatively new field within neuroscience is neuroeconomics, which focuses on individual decision making and aims to systematically classify and map the brain activity that correlates with decision-making that pertains to economic choices. Neuroeconomic studies rely heavily on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which measures the haemodynamic response (that is, changes in the blood flow) related to neural activity in the brain.
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31

Trigg, Jonathan. "The Philosophy of Ordinary Language Is a Naturalistic Philosophy." Essays in Philosophy 11, no. 2 (2010): 197–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip20101126.

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It is argued that the only response to the mereological objections of the ordinary language philosopher available to the scientistic philosopher of mind requires the adoption of the view that ordinary psychological talk is theoretical and falsified by the findings of brain science. The availability of this sort of response produces a kind of stalemate between these opposed views and viewpoints: the claim that attribution of psychological predicates to parts of organisms is nonsense is met with the claim that it is only nonsensical if our ordinary ways of talking are – naively – taken to be sacrosanct. The aim of the paper is to show that the ordinary language philosopher has a reply here that the scientistic philosopher is not in a position to ignore. Namely, that the only way to resist mereological objections is to adopt conceptions of personhood that are inimical to naturalistic accounts of mentality.
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32

Ananth, Mahesh. "Social Brain Matters." Teaching Philosophy 32, no. 3 (2009): 305–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil200932331.

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33

Jernigan, Terry L. "Photons to Philosophy." Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society 6, no. 4 (May 2000): 512–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355617700244081.

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In less than 150 pages, the author has written a lucid and broad-ranging primer on functional imaging with much to offer the neuropsychologist. The book consists of three sections: “Basic Concepts,” “Three Methods of Imaging Brain Activation,” and “Establishing the Correspondence of Activation Patterns to Behavioral Functions,” with brief Preface and Postscript (“Imaging Consciousness”). The level of description is more conceptual than technical, relying more heavily on beautifully illustrated visual models of the techniques than on more mathematical accounts, and thus the material is likely to be easily accessible to clinical and basic neuroscientists alike. The text should serve well as required reading for upper division and graduate courses introducing the topic, and will be a painless and thought-provoking introduction for scientists in other areas of specialization as well.
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34

Hickson, Matthew. "The Necessity of Philosophy in the Exercise Sciences." Philosophies 4, no. 3 (August 7, 2019): 45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4030045.

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The pervasive and often uncritical acceptance of materialistic philosophical commitments within exercise science is deeply problematic. This commitment to materialism is wrong for several reasons. Among the most important are that it ushers in fallacious metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of causation and the nature of human beings. These mistaken philosophical commitments are key because the belief that only matter is real severely impedes the exercise scientist’s ability to accurately understand or deal with human beings, whether as subjects of study or as data points to be interpreted. One example of materialist metaphysics is the assertion that all causation is physical- one lever moving another lever, one atom striking another atom, one brain state leading to another (Kretchmer, 2005). In such a world, human life is reduced to action and reaction, stimulus and response and as a result, the human being disappears. As such, a deterministic philosophy is detrimental to kinesiologists’ attempts to interpret and understand human behavior, for a materialistic philosophy, must ignore or explain away human motivation, human freedom and ultimately culture itself. In showing how mistaken these philosophic commitments are, I will focus on the sub-discipline of sport psychology for most examples, as that is the field of exercise science of which I am paradigmatically most familiar. It is also the field, when rightly understood that straddles the “two cultures” in kinesiology (i.e., the sciences and the humanities). In referencing the dangers of the materialistic conception of human beings for sport psychology, I will propose, that the materialist’s account of the natural world, causation and human beings stems from the unjustified and unnecessary rejection by the founders of modern science of the Aristotelian picture of the world (Feser, 2012). One reason that this mechanistic point of view, concerning human reality has gained ground in kinesiology is as a result of a previous philosophic commitment to quantification. As philosopher Doug Anderson (2002) has pointed out, many kinesiologists believe that shifting the discipline in the direction of mathematics and science would result in enhanced academic credibility. Moreover, given the dominance of the scientific narrative in our culture it makes it very difficult for us not to conform to it. That is, as Twietmeyer (2015) argued, kinesiologists do not just reject non-materialistic philosophic conceptions of the field, we are oblivious to their possibility. Therefore, I will propose two things; first, Aristotelian philosophy is a viable alternative to materialistic accounts of nature and causation and second, that Aristotle’s holistic anthropology is an important way to wake kinesiologists from their self-imposed philosophic slumber.
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35

Honderich, Ted. "Consciousness as Existence, and the End of Intentionality." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48 (September 2001): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100010675.

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It was only in the last century of the past millennium that the Philosophy of Mind began to flourish as a part of philosophy with some autonomy, enough for students to face examination papers in it by itself. Despite an inclination in some places to give it the name of Philosophical Psychology, it is not any science of the mind. This is not to say that the Philosophy of Mind is unempirical, but that it is like the rest of philosophy in being more taken up with good thinking about experienced facts than with establishing, elaborating or using them. Logic, if not formal logic, is the core of all philosophy, and so of the Philosophy of Mind. The discipline's first question is what it is for a thing to be conscious, whatever its capabilities. The discipline's second question is how a thing's being conscious is related to the physical world, including chairs, brains and bodily movements—the mind-brain or mind-body problem.
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36

Saler, Benson. "COMPARISON: SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE INEVITABLE." Numen 48, no. 3 (2001): 267–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852701752245569.

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AbstractSchema theory and other facets of the cognitive sciences remind us that certain of the intellectual processes of the human brain are crucially comparative. In that comparison is ineluctable in monitoring the world and in coming to understand newly encountered events, then perhaps we can consciously improve on what is cognitively inevitable. It is suggested here that if we deliberately move from what the philosopher H.H. Price calls "the Philosophy of Universals" to what he terms "the Philosophy of Resemblances," our comparisons are likely to become more realistic, both existentially and cognitively. Further, in applying the Philosophy of Resemblances in both cross-cultural and cross-species comparisons, we may better tame the ethnocentric language of the former and the anthropocentric language of the latter in their respective efforts to transcend conceptualized boundaries in order to make comparisons.
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Gill, Kathleen, and David Lamb. "Death, Brain Death and Ethics." Noûs 23, no. 4 (September 1989): 545. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215883.

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38

Dilley, Frank B. "MIND-BRAIN INTERACTION AND PSI." Southern Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 4 (December 1988): 469–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1988.tb02160.x.

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39

GILLETT, GRANT. "Brain Bisection and Personal Identity." Mind XCV, no. 378 (1986): 224–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/xcv.378.224.

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40

Schulkin, Jay. "Foraging for Coherence in Neuroscience: A Pragmatist Orientation." Contemporary Pragmatism 13, no. 1 (March 3, 2016): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01301001.

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Foraging for coherence is a pragmatist philosophy of the brain. It is a philosophy anchored to objects and instrumental in understanding the brain. Our age is dominated by neuroscience. A critical common sense underlies inquiry including that of neuroscience. Thus a pragmatist orientation to neuroscience is about foraging for coherence; not overselling neuroscience. Foraging for coherence is the search for adaptation – diverse epistemic orientation tied ideally to learning about oneself, one’s nature, and one’s history in the context of learning about the brain. Neuroscience is about us: Our desires, habits, styles of reason, human vulnerability, and abuse. The language of the neuron, or the gene, or the systems does not replace the discussion about us as the person, in the social and historical context.
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41

Asaro, Peter. "Working Models and the Synthetic Method." Science & Technology Studies 19, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 12–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.23987/sts.55200.

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This article examines the construction of electronic brain models in the 1940s as an instance of “working models” in science. It argues that the best way to understand the scientific role of these synthetic brains is through combining aspects of the “models as mediators” approach (Morgan and Morrison, 1999) and the “synthetic method” (Cordeschi, 2002). Taken together these approaches allow a fuller understanding of how working models functioned within the brain sciences of the time. This combined approach to understanding models is applied to an investigation of two electronic brains built in the late 1940s, the Homeostat of W. Ross Ashby, and the Tortoise of W. Grey Walter. It also examines the writings of Ashby, a psychiatrist and leading proponent of the synthetic brain models, and Walter, a brain electro-physiologist, and their ideas on the pragmatic values of such models. I conclude that rather than mere toys or publicity stunts, these electronic brains are best understood by considering the roles they played as mediators between disparate theories of brain function and animal behavior, and their combined metaphorical and material power.
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42

Buzan, Randall D., Jeff Kupfer, Dixie Eastridge, and Andres Lema-Hincapie. "Philosophy of mind: Coming to terms with traumatic brain injury." NeuroRehabilitation 34, no. 4 (June 26, 2014): 601–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/nre-141071.

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43

STONE, TONY, and ANDREW W. YOUNG. "Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief." Mind & Language 12, no. 3-4 (May 4, 2007): 327–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00077.x.

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44

Stone, Tony, and Andrew W. Young. "Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief." Mind and Language 12, no. 3&4 (September 1997): 327–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00051.

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45

Crivellato, Enrico, and Domenico Ribatti. "Soul, mind, brain: Greek philosophy and the birth of neuroscience." Brain Research Bulletin 71, no. 4 (January 2007): 327–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brainresbull.2006.09.020.

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46

Olson, Eric T. "Swinburne’s Brain Transplants." Philosophia Christi 20, no. 1 (2018): 21–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc20182014.

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47

Brenninkmeijer, Jonna. "Taking care of one’s brain: how manipulating the brain changes people’s selves." History of the Human Sciences 23, no. 1 (February 2010): 107–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0952695109352824.

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The increasing attention to the brain in science and the media, and people’s continuing quest for a better life, have resulted in a successful self-help industry for brain enhancement. Apart from brain books, foods and games, there are several devices on the market that people can use to stimulate their brains and become happier, healthier or more successful. People can, for example, switch their brain state into relaxation or concentration with a light-and-sound machine, they can train their brainwaves to cure their Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) or solve their sleeping problems with a neurofeedback device, or they can influence the firing of their neurons with electric or magnetic stimulation to overcome their depression and anxieties. Working on your self with a brain device can be seen as a contemporary form of Michel Foucault’s ‘technologies of the self’. Foucault described how since antiquity people had used techniques such as reading manuscripts, listening to teachers, or saying prayers to ‘act on their selves’ and control their own thoughts and behaviours. Different techniques, Foucault stated, are based on different precepts and constitute different selves. I follow Foucault by stating that using a brain device for self-improvement indeed constitutes a new self. Drawing on interviews with users of brain devices and observations of the practices in brain clinics, I analyse how a new self takes shape in the use of brain devices; not a monistic (neuroscientific) self, but a ‘layered’ self of all kinds of entities that exchange and control each other continuously.
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ABOITES, VICENTE. "MULTISTABLE CHAOTIC DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS AND PHILOSOPHY." International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 18, no. 06 (June 2008): 1821–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218127408021397.

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It is proposed that any dynamical system with coexisting chaotic attractors has an emergent property. This provides a nonreductive explanation of mental states and their high sensitivity to noise and initial conditions. If metaphysical terms result from the mental states and these are emergent properties of dynamical systems with coexisting attractors, such as the brain, it is suggested that this may provide a physical explanation of metaphysical concepts.
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Mole, Christopher, Corey Kubatzky, Jan Plate, Rawdon Waller, Marilee Dobbs, and Marc Nardone. "Faces and Brains: The Limitations of Brain Scanning in Cognitive Science." Philosophical Psychology 20, no. 2 (April 2007): 197–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080701209380.

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LaRock, Eric. "Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process?" International Philosophical Quarterly 48, no. 2 (2008): 201–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq20084827.

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