Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'British Telecom. Northern Ireland'

This thesis sets out to explain the attitude of the British Labour Party towards the conflict in Northern Ireland both before and after the deployment of British troops on the streets of Northern Ireland in August 1969. The first chapter discusses themes in the Labour Party's political thought on nationalism. These themes and others are developed and explored in the second chapter on 'The British Labour Party, Empire and Northern Ireland'. The Labour Party's experience of ethnic conflict in the process of decolonisation is used to set the context for understanding the reaction of the party to `the troubles'. Chapters three to seven consist of a chronological account of the Labour Party's reaction to the Northern Ireland conflict. An attempt is made to suggest what the consequences of Labour's attitude was on the ground in Northern Ireland. This is done through an examination of the Party's relationship with the unionist Northern Ireland Labour Party and the predominantly nationalist-inclined civil rights movement. The importance of British nationalism is emphasised to explain the development of the Party's policy. It is argued that initially the conflict in Northern Ireland was viewed predominantly as a problem of `alienation' but it came increasingly to be regarded as a `colonial' issue.

Using the methods of strategic analysis, this work evaluates the British government's approach towards the conflict in Northern Ireland, starting with London's first intervention in 1969, and ending with the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998. The British government's aim throughout the period was to achieve the containment of the conflict. In the years 1969-71, it was believed that this aim could be realised by maintaining the existing constitutional structures of Home Rule and Unionist majority rule. The outcomes of this strategy, however, were wholly negative. From 1972, the government's aim translated into the objective of creating political stability through a system of government to which both sides would consent, thus establishing a mutual veto on what was seen as the 'political solution'. It followed that the most important factor to determine London's strategy was the imperative of facilitating political agreement. However, traditional ideas continued to interfere with the conditioning of the strategic instruments, so that London's effectiveness as a political facilitator turned out to be limited. As a consequence, there were two attempts to circumvent the logic of the mutual veto: the notion of producing stability by making Direct Rule from London semi-permanent (1976-79), and the idea of easing the operation of Direct Rule through an inter-governmental framework, resulting in the Anglo- Irish Agreement of 1985. Although both attempts were failures in that they could not achieve what the British government had intended, they nevertheless conditioned the form of agreement that was reached in 1998. The Belfast Agreement made it possible for the British government to realise its objective, yet in allowing some parties to maintain the threat of violence as a means with which to obtain concessions, it suffers from an asymmetry that furthers instability and might well turn out to make the achievement of containment impossible

This thesis considers British government policy in Northern Ireland during the Labour administration of 1974 to 1979. Utilising a distinctively historical methodology which draws from a wide range of archival sources, it challenges a number dominant narratives about the British government policy and the Northern Ireland conflict more generally. It incorporates political, security and economic affairs. During these crucial years the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed following a loyalist general strike, the Labour government considered a wide range of constitutional options for Northern Ireland, dialogue was held with militant republicans during the Provisional IRA's 1975 ceasefire and security policy was transformed with the end of detention without trial and the advent of police primacy. Violence levels declined significantly as both the British government and the Provisional IRA came to see the conflict as a lasting one, adjusting their strategies. This thesis also considers relations between the British government political parties in Great Britain and Ireland, both North and South. Existing accounts are found to be over-reliant on contemporary perceptions in all these areas and a more nuanced analysis is offered in place of this, taking into account the parameters within which ministers and officials operated.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, September 1998.
"September 1998." Thesis advisor(s): Maria Rasmussen, Terry Johnson. Includes bibliographical references (p. 161-164). Also available online.

Anglo-Free State relations between the wars still awaits a comprehensive study ... This is in par a reflection of the larger failure of British historians to work on Anglo-Irish history '" the Right has been ill at ease dealing with Britan's greatest failure, whilst the Left has found tropical climes more suited for the cultivation of its moral superiority. When R.F.Holland made this apposite comment, just over a decade ago, he may have been adding to the very problems he identified. Writing within the context of the 'Commonweath Alliance', he was joining a distinguished list of British and Irish historians who have sought to fiter inter-war Anglo-Free State relations through the mesh of Empire-Commonweath development. Beginning with A. Berredale Keith in the 1920s, this usage continued in either direct or indirect form (by way of particular institutions of Commonweath) from the 1930s to the 1970s through the works of W.K. Hancock, Nicholas Mansergh and D.W. Harkness, and was still finding favour with Brendan Sexton's study of the Irish Governor-Generalship system in the late 1980s.2 But herein a contradiction has developed: cumulative study of the unnatural origins and performance of the Free State as a Dominion has moved beyond questions of function to ask whether the Free State was in fact ever a Dominion at alL. 3 As such, there seems ever more need to step back from inter-Commonwealth study and refocus on the precise nature of the Free State's central relationship with Britan in this period. It is of course acknowledged that outwith the established zones of internal Irish and Empire-Imperial study there is no home or forum for one of the most enduring quandares of modern Europea history. Even if it is accepted that 'pure' Anglo-Irish history did not end in 1922, the weight of research based on the ten yeas prior, as against the ten yeas subsequent, suggests an easy acceptance, on both sides of the Irish Sea, and Atlantic, of the absolute value changes in that relationship. Studies covering the transition to independence, such as those of Joseph M. CUITan and Sheila Lawlot, have taen only tentative steps beyond 1922, and may indeed have epitomised an approach that subsequent Irish studies have done little to dispel; in the 1980s, major overviews by RF. Foster and J.J. Le have been notably reluctant to evaluate the quality of that new found freedom with continuing reference to Ireland's giant neighbour. Though Foster, and others, have noted that the main aim of the Free State in the 1920s was 'self-definition against Britan', the point is the extent to which Britan was wiling to allow the same. There has then been little impetus for direct Anglo-Free State inter-war study, and although the tide has begun to turn since the mid-1980's, notably through the achievements of Paul Canning, Deidre McMahon and, shortly before his death, Nicholas Mansergh6, it is probable that we are stil a long way short of being able to produce a comprehensive and coherent review of the period. Apar from the crucial Anglo/Irish-Anglo/Commonwealth dichotomy,there remains the political chasm dividing the Cosgrave years of the 1920s from those of de Valera's 1930s; indeed the overwhelming preoccupation with post-1931 confrontations has often, as in the case of McMahon's fine study, taen as its contrasting staing point the supposedly compliant 'pro-Treaty' years of 1922-31. It is hard to bridge this gulf when the little direct work on these earlier years, mostly concentrating on the two fundamenta issues of Boundar and financial settlement, has tended not to question this divide. Although Irish historians have turned an increasingly sympathetic eye on the internal politics and problems of these early yeas, the apathetic external image, in contrast to the later period, has been persistent. Nowhere has this negativity been more apparent than on the, also vita, topic of defence relations. For a subject that has been given more than adequate attention in terms of the 1921 Treaty negotiations and the Treaty Ports issue of the 1930s, the period in between has had little intensive coverage. In this regard the negative response of W.K.Hancock in 1937, stating that Cosgrave did not bother to question British defence imperatives, was stil being held some fifty yeas later by Paul Canning.7 Thus an enduring and importt image has emerged of defence relations re-enforcing the above divide, an image that has had to stand for the lack of new reseach. This does not mea that the image is necessarly an entirely false one, but it does mean that many of the supposed novelties of the de Valera yeas have been built on largely unknown foundations. The Treaty Ports issue is also vita to this thesis, but then so are other defence related matters which had an impact specific to the 1920s. In other words, the human and political context of how both countries, but the Irish government in paricular, coped with the immediate legacy of centuries of armed occupation, with the recent 1916-21 conflct, and with the smaller scale continuity of British occupation, was bound to cast old shadows over a new relationship. But how big were these shadows? It was on the basis of placing some detaled flesh on the skeleton of known (and unknown) policies and events that this thesis took shape. Frustrations and resentments could tae necessarily quieter forms than those which characterised the 1930s, and in the end be no less significant. If the first objective is then to make solid the continuity of defence affairs, it is appropriate to begin with a brief evaluation of the Treaty defence negotiations before tang a close look at British operations in the South in 1922 - the year when a reluctant Cosgrave was to inherit a situation where British forces were close to the development of civil war. Despite our growing knowledge of Britan's part in the progress of that war, there is stil a general perception that its forces became peripheral to events after the Truce of July 1921, and that its Army was, and had been, the only British Service involved in the struggle against armed republicanism.This is simply not the case, and it is to be wondered whether the proper absorption of Irish historians with the internal dynamics of the period, together with the authoritative quality of Charles Townshend's history of the 1919-21 British campaign, have not produced inhibitions to wider inquiry. 8 In any event, as the Admiralty was to play a central par in later defence relations it seems right to introduce, for the first time, the Royal Navy's importt role in the events of 1922. The point here is to establish that the actions and perceptions of both Services were to have repercussions for later attitudes. After these chapters, the following two aim to look at the cumulative legacy of British involvement and how both countries adjusted to the many unresolved questions thrown up by the Treaty and the unplanned contingencies of 1922. Retaining the theme that neither country could escape the past, nor trust to the future, chapter six returns to the physical and political impact made by the continuing presence of British forces in and around the three Treaty Ports, and along and across the Border. The final two chapters explore how all these factors helped determine the conditions for, and consequences of, one of the most damaging episodes of the later 1920s - the complete failure of the joint coasta defence review scheduled for December 1926.In all, the cumulative emphasis on the politics of defence may ilustrate what it was to be a small aspiring country that had little choice but to accept Britan's version of what was an inevitably close relationship, and to endure what Britan claimed as the benign strategic necessity of continued occupation.

The study presented here focuses on the treatment accorded to Northern Ireland by the British press since 1969. It argues that the press has failed to provide the public with an impartial or meaningful account of the conflict in the North, and explores some of the factors that have contributed to this failure. Chapter One outlines the primary functions that have been ascribed to journalists and the press in democratic society, and provides a standard against which press performance may be judged. Chapter Two evaluates a range of commentaries on the British media's reporting of Northern Ireland from Partition to the present day. The study moves on to examine the debate over the media's representation of "terrorism" and assesses the consequences of this debate for the British media's reporting of Northern Ireland. Chapter Four provides an account of the research methods employed in the study and reflects on some of the practical problems encountered during the course of the fieldwork. Chapter Five presents the findings of a content analysis of the coverage accorded to civilian assassinations by seven British and two Northern Irish newspapers during a five week period in 1972. Chapter Six outlines the development of the information services operated by the army and the police, and describes how these forces have used their strategic position as a news source to gain the edge in the propaganda war. Picking up on some of the themes and issues raised in previous chapters, Chapter Seven focuses on those involved in the production of news and presents the findings of a series of interviews undertaken with journalists in Belfast and London. The final chapter summarises the principal findings of the study and reflects on the prospects of a reversal in the present approach to the reporting of Northern Ireland by the British press.

This thesis investigates the impact of informers and agents upon Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) military strategy, and British counter-insurgency strategy in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1998. The importance of this topic was highlighted by revelations in 2003 and 2005 concerning two senior republicans who had both been working for British intelligence for decades. The uncovering of these two senior spies created intense debate within the media and Irish republican community as to whether the IRA ended its military campaign largely because of significant infiltration. Yet, surprisingly, there has been no dedicated academic study of the impact of informers and agents upon the IRA. A few academics have briefly considered this topic in recent monographs and journal articles. Whilst acknowledging other important factors, they argue that intelligence successes against the IRA played a crucial role in influencing that organization to end its military campaign in 1998. This first in-depth study of the influence of informers and agents on IRA and British strategies during the Troubles cross-references new extensive interview material alongside memoirs from various Troubles participants. Its central argument is that the elusive nature of many rural IRA units, its cellular structure in Belfast, and the isolation of the IRA leadership prevented the organization from being damaged to any considerable extent by spies. In fact, the IRA’s resilience was a key factor encouraging the British government to try to include republicans in political settlements in 1972, 1975 and the 1990s. The IRA’s military strength also points towards the prominence of political factors in persuading republicans to call a ceasefire by 1994. The role of spies in Northern Ireland and the circumstances in which the state permitted negotiations with the IRA are key considerations for those interested in other small-scale conflicts.

This study sets out to analyse the policies of the Labour Party and the attitude of the movement to the Northern Ireland problem. The main focus will be the Labour movement during the years of opposition between 1979 and 1997 with a brief overview of the years preceding the 1979 election. The policies, ideas and arguments on the question of Northern Ireland need to be analysed against the backdrop of the enormous changes which the Labour Party itself went through in its eighteen years of opposition. These included various policy changes as well as ideological and structural changes, beginning with a sharp move to the left in 1981, followed by a steady reform process initiated by Neil Kinnock and ultimately resulting in Tony Blair's 'New Labour Party': a party almost unrecognisable compared to that led by James Callaghan. This thesis sets out to look at the broad Labour movement with all its various pressure groups.

Thesis advisor: James Cronin
The Northern Ireland conflict has often been viewed as parochial, closed off from the currents of international opinion and foreign influence. Yet nationalists, unionists, and pacifists consistently recruited supporters and confronted their adversaries on an international stage. The relative success or failure of these groups within the Northern Ireland political system was based in large part on their ability to navigate the changing global context. This dissertation demonstrates that to understand the development of the conflict and that of the peace process, it is necessary to take a comprehensive look at the role of the international community. The conflict in Northern Ireland was fundamentally international from its inception in the late 1960s and grew increasingly so over the next thirty years. Many of the ideas that motivated the groups involved in the Northern Ireland conflict were global in nature and origin, as were the institutions and organizations that became important players in the conflict and its resolution. Given that international ideas, institutions, and organizations were so central in forming the contours of the conflict, the conflict must be analyzed within a framework of international history
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: History

This is the first such study of Operation Banner: taking three Battalions as case studies, drawing upon extensive interviews with former soldiers, primary archival sources including unpublished diaries, this thesis closely examines soldiers' behaviour at the small infantry-unit level (Battalion downwards), including the leadership, cohesion, orientation and motivation that sustained, restrained and occasionally obstructed soldiers in Northern Ireland. It contends that there are aspects of wider scholarly literatures - from sociology, anthropology, criminology, and psychology - that can throw new light on our understanding of the British Army in Northern Ireland. The thesis will also contribute fresh insights and analysis of important events during the early years of Operation Banner, including the murders of two men in County Fermanagh, Michael Naan and Andrew Murray, and that of Warrenpoint hotel owner Edmund Woolsey in South Armagh in the autumn of 1972. The central argument of this thesis is that British Army small infantry units enjoyed considerable autonomy during the early years of Operation Banner and could behave in a vengeful, highly aggressive or benign and conciliatory way as their local commanders saw fit. The strain of civil-military relations at a senior level was replicated operationally – as soldiers came to resent the limitations of waging war in the UK. The unwillingness of the Army's senior leadership to thoroughly investigate and punish serious transgressions of standard operating procedures in Northern Ireland created uncertainty among soldiers over expected behaviour and desired outcomes. Mid-ranking officers and NCOs often played important roles in restraining soldiers in Northern Ireland. The degree of violence used in Northern was much less that that seen in the colonial wars fought since the end of World War II. But overly aggressive groups of soldiers could also be mistaken for high-functioning units – with negative consequences for the Army's overall strategy in Northern Ireland.

碩士
淡江大學
歐洲研究所
89
United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland and almost all Political Parties in Northern Ireland sighed Belfast Agreement on 10 April 1998. It means that the conflict in Northern Ireland is ended. After the Partition of Northern Ireland and Southern, The conflict between Protestants and Catholics was still going on in Northern Ireland under British Rule. Violence emerged while the Civic Movement rose in 1960’s. The among of the death in disorder increased in 70’s The thesis adopts “Case Study Method”. In the other words, the first step is that this thesis takes the research subject as the whole, then describe and analysis it particularly to reflect the background and the connection and real condition of its internal units and dimensions. Secondly, it studies the conflict in Northern Ireland by social conflict theory and tries to find out the possible path to solution. This thesis stressed on Mr. Dahrendorf’s theory, especially the subject of the people who dominate and who are dominated. It also stresses on several conflict subjects in the book” The Functions of Social Conflict”, wrote by Lewis A Coser. The framework of this thesis is following: Chapter I: The Social Background of Northern Ireland and the Origin of Conflict; Chapter II: Political Conflict and Competition of Northern Ireland; Chapter III: The Structural Analysis of Conflict in Northern Ireland; Chapter IV: The Solution of Conflict in Northern Ireland. Britain and Ireland were combined after the Union Act 1800 was pass by British House of Common and Irish parliament, but Irish Nationalism was not disappeared under the Union. On the contrary, the hope for United Ireland is requested by political competition and social movements. Most Irish people satisfied with the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921, but the other in Northern Ireland went on unsucceeded revolution. They hope to be independent from United Kingdom and united with Republic of Ireland. Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 was sighed after so many disorder years, the possibility of peace emerged. The peaceful solution became probable because of the Belfast Agreement 1998.

When the army deployed to Northern Ireland in 1969 it was unprepared for the intensive bombing campaign that was to follow. Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) was conducted in much the same way as it had been since the 19th century – manually, with one or two men pitting themselves against the device, or its creator. The painful experience of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland - and in particular the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bombing campaign - led to the development of the contemporary British approach to IEDD. The army dealt with over 56000 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) incidents by 2007, rendering safe over 6300 IEDs. These successes came at a heavy price. 17 Ammunition Technical Officers (ATOs) and three other EOD team members were killed in Northern Ireland. Most of these deaths occurred during the early 1970s. It must be asked why the IEDD was more dangerous then and why did it become apparently safer in later years, despite the terrorists’ growing prowess? This thesis argues that EOD changed in the 1970s as a result of the lessons learned when casualties occurred, and that the most important changes were conceptual. Safety and success for the EOD teams came not from out-braving the bombs, but from outthinking the bombers. The lessons learnt were distilled and formalised into a set of principles, philosophies and rules that guided the conduct of IEDD operations. This thesis explains how the EOD experience in Northern Ireland shaped the contemporary British approach to IEDD operations. It begins with an introduction and a historical background. The methodology used is discussed, and the available literature on the subject is reviewed. An overview of the development of IEDs and IED tactics is offered, and the state of IEDD at the start of the Northern Ireland campaign is examined. Each of the incidents resulting in an EOD fatality is discussed and analysed in a case study, and this is followed by a further selection of case studies that scrutinise non fatal incidents that had an influence on the conduct of operations. A chapter is devoted to an analysis of successful attacks on EOD teams and from this a number of theories are offered. The official responses to incidents, in the form of regulatory documents and training publications are then discussed before the roles of equipment and personnel selection are considered.