Academic literature on the topic 'Bruce Ackerman'

Liberal theory traditionally neglects the citizenship problems of mentally handicapped persons, preferring to concentrate upon those with unequivocal claims to the status of citizenship. Bruce Ackerman has recently resurrected the usage of dialogic methods in establishing the content of liberal theory. This paper uses different versions of such methods to stress the powerful claims which may, despite Ackerman's denial, be used to extend this status to this group. Three such methods are suggested—representative dialogue, Ackerman's own form of dialogue, and action as dialogue. It is subsequently argued that Ackerman considerably underestimates the interaction between political and biological definitions of incapacity; he, therefore, fails to consider that a lack of citizenship simply reinforces dialogic inability.

Is statesmanship still compatible with democracy? Democratic theorists once viewed democracy as a partnership between citizens and statesmen, to which each brought complementary virtues. Statesmanship has come to be condemned by many contemporary democratic theorists, however, as inimical to democracy. By turning statesmen into “facilitators,” they seek to displace statesmanship with an expanded concept of citizenship. In response, and stung by charges of elitism, embattled liberal defenders of statesmanship have begun to recast it in light of this line of attack. Most notably, the liberal Bruce Ackerman has sought to advance a new concept of nonelitist, “neutral” liberal statesmanship that is compatible with democracy. This study examines both the criticisms that led to this rethinking of statesmanship—especially in the thought of Benjamin R. Barber, liberal statesmanship's leading critic—and Ackerman's success in meeting them. Our study tries to demonstrate that Ackerman actually reconstructs liberal statesmanship on the basis of Barber's arguments and thereby further undermines the statesmanship he purports to defend. I conclude with an effort to rehabilitatean older understanding of liberal statesmanship.

Após os ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001, promovidospela Al-Qaeda, o debate no constitucionalismo norte-americano tem comofoco central a segurança nacional e os limites às liberdades civis. A doutrinada “Constituição de Emergência” de Bruce Ackerman é analisada nestetexto sob a ótica das críticas formuladas pelo constitucionalista norte-americano David Cole. Nas conclusões, acrescentamos nosso ponto de vista.

La present tesi doctoral no pretén ser una comparació entre la teoria de Habermas i la teoria d'Ackerman per tal de triar quina d'ambdues propostes ens sembla més adient, sinó que partint de l'anàlisi filosòfica de la teoria habermasiana en el seu conjunt, hi apliquem aspectes que considerem compatibles de la teoria d'Ackerman als elements que considerem necessaris millorar. Entenem que els aspectes que destacarem de la teoria d'Ackerman suposen una millora en el conjunt del projecte filosòfic normatiu de Habermas.<br/><br/>El primer capítol del treball està dedicat als antecedents del concepte de dret a Jürgen Habermas. En aquest primer capítol pretenem treballar amb la influència de Max Weber sobre Habermas i, en especial, sobre la seua concepció del dret i sobre les formes de legitimació de les normes jurídiques. Un cop definida la racionalització i com aquest procés afecta al dret i a la llibertat, analitzem el concepte de dret a l'obra de Max Weber i com Habermas l'analitza a la seua obra la Teoria de L'Acció Comunicativa. Aprofitant les similituds entre ambdós autors, també introduïm una primera definició del concepte de dret legítim a l'obra de Habermas Teoria de L'Acció Comunicativa. Un altre punt del primer capítol l'hem dedicat a esmentar l'enorme transcendència que ha tingut la teoria de la racionalització weberiana en altres autors, i les similituds amb teories com la normalització a Foucault, la cosificació a Lukács, la juridificació a Kolhberg o la decomodificació de Polanyi. A aquest mateix capítol introduïm l'eterna discussió entre els autors relativistes i els universalistes, entre el positivisme i el iusnaturalisme.<br/><br/>El segon capítol de la tesi doctoral l'hem dedicat a les influències sobre el primer concepte de dret de Habermas de les diferents teories de control social dels autors de la primera generació de l'escola de Frankfurt, de György Lukács i de Kohlberg. En aquest apartat de la tesi doctoral, hem volgut desenvolupar les influències més importants que les teories dels autors de l'escola de Frankfurt varen produir al projecte de filosofia normativa de Habermas.<br/><br/>El tercer capítol d'aquesta tesi tracta del primer concepte de dret legítim a la primera obra de Habermas. Afirmem que és el primer concepte de dret perquè entenem que Habermas canvia la seua teoria ètica i la forma de legitimar el dret amb l'aparició de l'obra Faktizität und Geltung. El present treball analitza el concepte de dret i la seua forma de legitimació fins a l'any de publicació d'aquesta obra 1992. Aquest capítol es basa fonamentalment en tres obres de Habermas, exposades de manera cronològica, la Teoria de l'Acció Comunicativa, Teoria i Praxis, i Die nachholdende Revolution.<br/><br/>Els dos següents capítols de la tesi doctoral els dediquem al concepte de dret legítim i les formes de legitimació del dret que apareix a l'obra Faktizität und Geltung. El conjunt d'ambdós capítols pretenen exposar de manera completa el concepte de dret legítim, els elements, principis i característiques que formen la teoria jurídica democràtica a Habermas al Faktizität und Geltung. Amb aquesta exposició, a més destaquem les diferents variacions que el concepte ha sofert al llarg de l'obra de Habermas. <br/><br/>Un cop hem analitzat el concepte de dret legítim a l'obra de Habermas, els mitjans de legitimació del dret i les diferents variacions que ha sofert al llarg de la seua obra, dediquem el darrer capítol del cos del treball doctoral a fer una complementació entre la teoria de Bruce Ackerman i l'obra de Habermas.<br><i>"The Jus-philosophical theory of Jürgen Habermas. Complementation with the work of Bruce Ackerman"<br/><br/>TEXT:<br/><br/>The present doctoral thesis does not intend to be a comparison among the Habermas's theory and the theory of Ackerman in order to choose which of both proposals it seems us more suitable, but following the philosophical analysis of the Habermas's theory, I apply aspects which I consider compatibles of the Ackerman's work that I understand that should to be improved. I understand that the aspects that I highlight of the theory of Ackerman suppose an improvement of the normative philosophical project of Habermas.<br/><br/>The first chapter of the work is dedicated to the antecedents of the concept of law in the Jürgen Habermas's work. In this first chapter we intend to work with the influence of Max Weber to Habermas and, especially, about his law's conception and legitimation forms of the juridical rules. Once the rationalization is defined and how this process affects to the law and freedom, I analyze Max Weber's concept of law and how Habermas analyzes this concept at his Theory of The Communicative Action. Using the similarities among both authors, we also introduce a first definition of the concept of legitimate law at the Habermas's work.. the Weberian theory of rationalization in other authors, and the similarities with theories like the normalization in Foucault, the reification in Lukács, the juridification in Kolhberg or the decomodification of Polanyi. I also introduce in the first chapter the eternal discussion between the relativist and the universalists authors, between the positivism and the jus- naturalism.<br/><br/>The second chapter of the doctoral thesis is dedicated to the influences of the authors of the first generation of the school of Frankfurt , György Lukács and Kohlberg to the first Habermas's concept of law. In this section of the doctoral thesis, I wanted to develop the most important influences that the theories of the authors of the Frankfurt School produced to the Habermas's project of normative philosophy The third chapter of this thesis is related to the first concept of legitimate law at the first Habermas's. work I state that it is the first concept of law because I understand that Habermas with the appearance of the Faktizität und Geltung changes his ethical theory and the procedure of law legitimating. The present work analyzes the concept of law and his legitimation form until 1992 the year of the Faktizität und Geltung publication. This chapter is ground fundamentally on three works of Habermas, exposed in a chronological way, the Theory of the Communicative Action, Theory and Praxis, and Die nachholdende Revolution The two following chapters of the doctoral thesis are dedicate to the concept of legitimate law and the legitimation procedure that appears in the work the Faktizität und Geltung. The set of both chapters intend to expose the concept of legitimate law in a complete way; the elements; Principles and characteristics that form the democratic juridical theory in Habermas in the Faktizität und Geltung. With this exposure, we highlight the different variations that the concept has suffered along the Habermas's work.<br/><br/>Once we have analyzed the concept of legitimate law at the Habermas's work, the legitimation procedures and the different variations that it has suffered along his work, we dedicate the last chapter of the doctoral work making a complementation among the theory of Bruce Ackerman and the work of Habermas. </i>

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:35:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Karina Bonetti Badawi.pdf: 800033 bytes, checksum: 7c3ff84ba02fd0bd99cf4281153b6989 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-06<br>This study proposes a new structure of separation of powers in Brazil. The structure that develops finds support in the work "The New Separation of Powers" Bruce Ackerman, which develops a framework of separation of powers called 'limited parliamentarism'. The model presented in this work is the breakdown of the classical structure of the tripartite powers, inspired by Montesquieu, and opening for numerous other instances of control, beyond redistribution of existing functions. The work presents a proposal to amend the Federal Constitution to insert the new model of separation of powers. Finally, we analyze the validation of this new model in Brazil, through a constitutional amendment. The goal that we seek with this new model is the democratic legitimacy as an exercise in democracy, the efficiency of state action and the protection and expansion of Fundamental Rights.<br>Este presente estudo propõe uma nova estrutura da separação dos poderes no Brasil. A estrutura que se desenvolve encontra apoio na obra A Nova Separação dos Poderes de Bruce Ackerman, o qual desenvolve uma estrutura de separação dos poderes denominada de parlamentarismo limitado . O modelo apresentado neste trabalho faz a quebra da estrutura clássica da tripartição dos poderes, inspirada em Montesquieu, e a abertura para inúmeras outras instâncias de controle, além da redistribuição das funções já existentes. O trabalho apresenta uma proposta de alteração da Constituição Federal para inserção do novo modelo de separação dos poderes. E, por fim, analisa-se a validação deste novo modelo no Brasil, por meio de emenda constitucional. O objetivo que se busca com esse novo modelo é a legitimidade democrática como exercício de democracia, a eficiência da atuação do Estado e a proteção e a ampliação dos Direitos Fundamentais.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, 2005.<br>Submitted by Diogo Trindade Fóis (diogo_fois@hotmail.com) on 2009-11-06T19:46:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2006_Daniel Barcelos Vargas.pdf: 816248 bytes, checksum: 6b4576b537f1cf86cae365c1db678cb9 (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by Gomes Neide(nagomes2005@gmail.com) on 2010-06-29T19:09:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2006_Daniel Barcelos Vargas.pdf: 816248 bytes, checksum: 6b4576b537f1cf86cae365c1db678cb9 (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2010-06-29T19:09:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2006_Daniel Barcelos Vargas.pdf: 816248 bytes, checksum: 6b4576b537f1cf86cae365c1db678cb9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005<br>Ao longo das últimas décadas, foram apresentadas diversas tentativas de reconsideração do constitucionalismo a partir da perspectiva do republicanismo cívico. A primeira parte da dissertação examina como o "renascimento republicano" na historiografia da experiência política norte-americana influenciou o desenvolvimento de novas teorias constitucionais. Para cumprir esse objetivo, a pesquisa confere especial atenção ao trabalho de John Pocock, para quem a Revolução Americana representou um novo capítulo das respostas apresentadas pelo humanismo cívico italiano aos desafios políticos enfrentados pela consciência da comunidade política existente em seu tempo. A segunda parte da dissertação examina as teorias constitucionais de três dos mais renomados representantes do constitucionalismo republicano contemporâneo: Bruce Ackerman, Frank Michelman e Cass Sunstein. Cada um desses autores tenta adotar os princípios do republicanismo no sistema de governo constitucional contemporâneo, incorporando um modelo conceitual de ordem chamado "comunidade". Após apresentar as principais características desse conceito e descrever como ele é utilizado por Ackerman, Michelman e Sunstein, a dissertação explora os limites das abordagens teóricas de cada um desses autores. A investigação demonstra que o recurso à tradição republicana, na teoria constitucional contemporânea, é uma atitude promissora, mas ainda carente de uma formulação que solucione, de maneira consistente, a tensão entre democracia e constitucionalismo. Por fim, novas possibilidades de desenvolvimento dos estudos em direito constitucional são apresentadas. __________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT<br>During the last decades, constitutional debate has witnessed different attempts to reconsider constitutionalism and to recast it under the perspective of civic republicanism. The first part of the dissertation examines how the “republican revival” in the historiography of American political experience influenced the development of new constitutional theories. To accomplish this goal, special attention was given to the work of John Pocock, according to whom the American Revolution is best understood as the reenactment of responses previously given by Italian civic humanism to the political challenges posed by the consciousness of the existence of the political community in time. The second part of the dissertation focuses on the constitutional theories of three among the most important representatives of contemporary republican constitutionalism: Bruce Ackerman, Frank Michelman e Cass Sunstein. Each of these authors tries to adopt the principles of republicanism in contemporary constitutional government by advancing a new conceptual model for constitutional order which they call “community”. After presenting the main features of this concept and describing how it is used by Ackerman, Michelman and Sunstein, the dissertation explores the limits of the theoretical approach upheld by each of these authors. The dissertation intends to demonstrate that resort to the republican tradition in contemporary constitutional theory is promising, but still lacks a consistent conceptual formulation that could aid more effectively in overcoming the unresolved tensions between democracy and constitutionalism. The dissertation concludes by suggesting new possibilities for the development of contemporary constitutional law.

A presente dissertação se ocupa em analisar a relevância da melhor técnica legislativa, para a formulação e efetivação de políticas públicas, dentro de nossa contemporaneidade democrática. Nesse aspecto, um instrumento recente aparece no cenário político e jurídico: a Legística. Em linhas gerais, a Legística sintetiza o estudo dos aspectos formal e material do texto legal, além de perquirir, à luz da ciência jurídica, se seria possível que a lei, com todas as suas características e com as garantias que visa promover, fosse instrumento apto à determinada dinâmica que permitisse adaptações de conteúdo, em face de sua aplicação no curso do tempo. E, ainda, antes mesmo da vigência do texto normativo, qual o trâmite que viabilizasse participação e técnica. Ao discorrer sobre o tema, pareceu-me mais adequado definir um foco e cercá-lo das informações relevantes, visando consolidá-lo como síntese de inúmeros processos. A lei é esse foco. O mandamento legal, na Ordem Constitucional, que fundamenta o poder estatal, e todas as influências que correm como pano de fundo, inclusive as históricas, porém, sem longas digressões. O tempo presente parece-me sintetizar, em si próprio, toda experiência acumulada e variantes decorrentes do local, da política e das ambições econômicas e, com igual relevância, dos anseios por um mundo melhor, de homens e mulheres. Penso que a presente dissertação terá cumprido seu papel, se permanecer coerente com as fontes de pesquisa, seus próprios termos, e se instigar ao leitor chegar ao seu final.<br>The present essay is concerned with analyzing the relevance of the best legislative technique for the enforcement and execution of public policies within our contemporary democracy. According to this, a recent instrument appears in the political and legal scene:Legistics. In general Legistica summarizes the study of both formal and material aspects of the legal text besides questioning with scientism - whether it was possible to the law, with all its features and with the assurances that promotes would be a capable instrument to a specific dynamic that would allow content to be adapted due to the concreteness of time. And yet, even before its term, which could be the procedure which would enable participation and technique? Discussing the topic, it seemed more appropriate to define a focus and surround it with relevant information in order to consolidate it as a synthesis of many processes. The law is this focus. The legal command in Constitutional order that underlies state power. And all the influences that run in the background, including the historical, but without long digressions. It seems to me that the present time summarizes the whole experience and variants arising from local, politics, and economic ambitions and, with equal relevance, the yearnings for a better world of men and women. I think that the present work will have fulfilled its role, if it remains consistent with its research sources, its own terms that urges the reader to get to its end.

Ideas matter. Constitutional jurisprudence decisions reflect overarching intellectual trends in society. The Buckley Constitution reflects the influence of modern individualistic libertarianism in contemporary American society. Some prominent authors have glimpsed more inclusive approaches to free speech. For example, renowned First Amendment theorist Alexander Meiklejohn sought to illustrate an inclusive approach to freedom of speech in his timeless metaphor of a town meeting. This chapter begins by outlining several wrong turns that the campaign finance cases have taken which render an inclusive approach impossible. One involves equating spending money with speaking. Spending money to speak is at most a combination of speech and action. Moreover, monetary limitations on political campaigning are similar to content neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. Some authors concerned with the distribution of speech rights have overtly offered a more egalitarian free speech approach. They include Jürgen Habermas, Bruce Ackerman, and Ronald Dworkin.

This introductory chapter discusses how judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation has usually emerged historically for a combination of four reasons. First, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is a response to a nation’s need for an umpire to resolve federalism or separation of powers boundary line disputes. The second main cause of the origins and growth of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is what can be called the rights from wrongs hypothesis; judicial review very often emerges as a response to an abominable deprivation of human rights. The third major cause is the out-and-out borrowing of the institution of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation from either the United States’ model; the German Civil Law model; and, most recently, from the Canadian Second Look judicial review constitutional model. The fourth major cause is the existence of a system of checks and balances, which gives Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts political space to grow in. Revolutionary charismatic constitutionalism can also lead to the growth of judicial review as Professor Bruce Ackerman has explained in an important new book, REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW (2019).

What is an amendment? This chapter shows why this question is central to the study of constitutional change. Some constitutional changes are identified as amendments but in reality may be more. Whether a constitutional change is an amendment entails implications for how the change must be made, whether a court can and should evaluate its constitutionality, and what the change requires for legitimation. This chapter returns to the origins of formal amendment—to the Articles of Confederation, America’s first constitution, which codified the very first amendment rule in a national constitution—to uncover the foundations of amendment practice and what makes an amendment different from other constitutional changes. This chapter moreover raises a question about an increasingly common phenomenon that straddles the border of legality and legitimacy: the violation of amendment rules. This chapter explains that the Indian basic structure doctrine and Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments are, at bottom, variations on the same theme we see all over the world: changes to amendment rules that occur in defiance of the rules of formal amendment. Many examples follow to illustrate this point. The chapter closes by describing and situating the importance of the chapters to follow in this book. This chapter considers constitutions from around the globe.