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Journal articles on the topic 'Bureaucratic politics'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 18 February 2022

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1

Ricks, Jacob I. "AGENTS, PRINCIPALS, OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN? BUREAUCRATS AND POLICY CONTROL IN THAILAND." Journal of East Asian Studies 18, no. 3 (July 18, 2018): 321–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jea.2018.17.

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AbstractIn the aftermath of the 2006 and 2014 Thai coups, observers declared the resurrection of the bureaucratic polity. Bureaucrats, though, remained influential even during the period of 1992–2006, when elected politicians were thought to command the Thai state. Bureaucratic involvement in politics poses a challenge for dominant political science theories of politician–bureaucrat relationships, which draw heavily from principal–agent frameworks. I apply agency theory to Thailand, testing three different hypotheses derived from the theory. Examining legislative productivity and control over bureaucratic career trajectories, I find that elected politicians increasingly acted as principals of the Thai state from 1992 through 2006, and to a lesser degree from 2008 to 2013. Thai bureaucrats, though, have frequently engaged in the political sphere, blunting political oversight and expanding their independence vis-à-vis politicians. This suggests that the principal–agent model overlooks the range of resources that bureaucracies can bring to bear in developing countries, granting them greater autonomy than anticipated. As such, theories of the politician–bureaucrat relationship in developing states need to better account for the mechanisms through which bureaucrats exercise policy discretion and political influence.

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2

Clifford, J. Garry. "Bureaucratic Politics." Journal of American History 77, no. 1 (June 1990): 161. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2078648.

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3

Tambulasi, Richard I. C. "Policy Transfer and Bureaucratic Politics." International Journal of Public and Private Healthcare Management and Economics 2, no. 1 (January 2012): 22–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijpphme.2012010103.

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The paper argues that the implementation of health sector reforms modelled on private sector based modularity approaches is mediated by country specific contextual factors. One of such factors is bureaucratic politics. To this end, paper advances that bureaucratic politics have a role to play in the effective implementation of reforms advocated within the international transfer of private sector-based health sector management models. Although, politicians are ultimately the decision makers in terms of which reforms are politically viable, bureaucrats have an input in the process and their behaviours can affect reform implementation. This is true even in the context of coercive transfer to developing countries. Using the case of Malawi’s hospital autonomy reforms, the paper demonstrates that although the failure of hospital autonomy in Malawi has been attributed to political undesirability, bureaucratic politics has also played a pivotal role which cannot be ignored.

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4

Hart, Paul 'T, and Uriel Rosenthal. "Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics." Mershon International Studies Review 42, no. 2 (November 1998): 233. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/254415.

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5

Hogan, Joseph John. "Bureaucratic Politics and Reaganomics." Public Policy and Administration 2, no. 2 (April 1987): 12–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/095207678700200202.

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6

Kasza, Gregory J. "Bureaucratic Politics in Radical Military Regimes." American Political Science Review 81, no. 3 (September 1987): 851–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962680.

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Most theories of bureaucratic politics depict state bureaucracies as a conservative force in the political system. Their resistance to radical politics and innovative programs is attributed to certain typical traits of bureaucratic structures and career patterns. I summarize the arguments for bureaucratic conservatism, and then describe how civilian bureaucracies serving military regimes in Japan (1937–45), Peru (1968–75), and Egypt (1952–70) invalidated those arguments by promoting radical policy programs through the three devices of supraministerial bodies, low-ranking ministries, and new specialized agencies. I conclude that middle theories of bureaucratic politics may prove more fruitful than grand theoretical attempts to encompass all bureaucracies in a single set of propositions, and that structural and occupational explanations of bureaucratic behavior need to be modified by a greater appreciation for the role of individual bureaucratic leaders.

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7

Schnose, Viktoryia. "Who is in charge here? Legislators, bureaucrats and the policy making process." Party Politics 23, no. 4 (August 13, 2015): 342–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068815597896.

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Scholars in comparative politics often assume that political parties are the primary instruments for translating citizens’ preferences into specific policy outcomes. However, the crucial but often forgotten link between preferences, parties, and outcomes is the bureaucracy. Are bureaucrats able to affect policy outside of parties’ control? And, if so, how does this bureaucratic policy drift differ across institutional contexts? I argue that institutions that regulate the nomination process by which parties in government select bureaucrats (meritocratic versus partisan recruitment) determine the levels of bureaucratic influence on the policy making process, specifically in terms of policy change. I test my theoretical argument using two large cross-national datasets on budget allocations and policy stability. I find that bureaucratic professionalism partially explains changes in allocation to the “ideological” budgetary categories and is positively correlated with policy stability around the world.

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8

TING, MICHAEL M. "Legislatures, Bureaucracies, and Distributive Spending." American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (May 2012): 367–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000081.

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This article develops a theory of bureaucratic influence on distributive politics. Although there exists a rich literature on the effects of institutions such as presidents, electoral systems, and bicameralism on government spending, the role of professional bureaucrats has yet to receive formal scrutiny. In the model, legislators bargain over the allocation of distributive benefits across districts. The legislature may either “politicize” a program by bargaining directly over pork and bypassing bureaucratic scrutiny, or “professionalize” it by letting a bureaucrat approve or reject project funding in each district according to an underlying quality standard. The model predicts that the legislature will professionalize when the expected program quality is high. However, politicization becomes more likely as the number of high-quality projects increases and under divided government. Further, more competent bureaucrats can encourage politicization if the expected program quality is low. Finally, politicized programs are larger than professionalized programs.

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9

Muh. Najib Husain, Muh. Nasir, and Suryani B.B. "Bureaucracy Involvement In Local Election In Konawe Selatan District." Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS) 1, no. 1 (February 25, 2021): 52–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.47540/ijias.v1i1.157.

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Local Election often makes the bureaucratic apparatus face a dilemma, between being neutral or being involved in politics. Ideally and based on the rules of law, bureaucracy requeired to behave professional and neutral from politics. Despite that in reality it is difficult fot the bureaucratic aparatur to be neutral, moreover when they faced with the temptations and pressures of power. This article highlights the involvement of bureaucracy on local election in Konawe Selatan District, by outlining the modes of bureaucratic involvement, and identifying factors of bureaucratic involvement. This study found that the bureaucrats involved in the Lokal Election were state civil servants and village government officials. Factors that encourage bureaucratic involvement are: the status of incumbent regional head candidates who remain active during the implementation of the elections, the lure of promotion for the bureaucratic apparatus, weak sanctions by the State civil apparatus commission and regional head candidates, and weak supervision and enforcement of election supervisory agencies (Bawaslu and ranks).

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10

Carpenter, D., and G. A. Krause. "Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 25, no. 1 (June 20, 2014): 5–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muu012.

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11

Sullivan, Denis J. "Bureaucratic Politics in Development Assistance." Administration & Society 23, no. 1 (May 1991): 29–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009539979102300102.

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12

Ellison, Brian A. "New Thinking about Bureaucratic Politics." Public Administration Review 71, no. 6 (November 2011): 945–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02445.x.

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13

Montgomery, John D. "Bureaucratic Politics in Southern Africa." Public Administration Review 46, no. 5 (September 1986): 407. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/975779.

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14

Bowornwathana, Bidhya, and Ora-orn Poocharoen. "Bureaucratic Politics and Administrative Reform: Why Politics Matters." Public Organization Review 10, no. 4 (August 4, 2010): 303–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11115-010-0129-0.

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15

Andersen, David Delfs Erbo. "Does Meritocracy Lead to Bureaucratic Quality? Revisiting the Experience of Prussia and Imperial and Weimar Germany." Social Science History 42, no. 2 (2018): 245–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2017.48.

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How do state bureaucracies become high-quality organizations? Leading comparative politics studies assume that bureaucratic quality is forged by the introduction of meritocratic personnel systems because meritocracies, in contrast to politicized bureaucracies, select the most competent applicants for the jobs at hand. However, in line with principal-agent theory I propose that without a certain level of responsiveness of bureaucrats to the government in place and its policies, the positive consequences of meritocracy for bureaucratic quality are drastically reduced. Meritocracy is likewise essential to bureaucratic quality but, given that it demands some bureaucratic autonomy, meritocracy also creates a control problem. To study the consequences of meritocracy for bureaucratic quality, I revisit bureaucratic developments in the paradigmatically important historical cases of Prussia as well as Imperial and Weimar Germany. Based on extant scholarship of Prussian and German bureaucratic history, the analysis shows that bureaucratic quality varies over time with responsiveness even when meritocraticness is constant at high and low levels, and that governments knowing this hesitate to adopt meritocratic systems despite their advantages if they believe the bureaucracy will be unresponsive. Studying Prussia and Germany historically helps distinguish between the consequences for bureaucratic quality of meritocracy from those of responsiveness. On this basis, I identify where comparative politics studies may benefit from adding, in a comparative historical perspective, responsiveness to the explanation of bureaucratic quality.

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16

Konkipudi, Kiran, and Suraj Jacob. "Political Pressures and Bureaucratic Consequences: Vignettes of Janmabhoomi Implementation in Andhra Pradesh." Studies in Indian Politics 5, no. 1 (April 20, 2017): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321023017698254.

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Drawing on vignettes from fieldwork in Andhra Pradesh, the article explores how political pressures shape bureaucratic practices around the government’s flagship Janmabhoomi programme. It argues that competitive state politics manifests in clientelist–populist voter mobilization leading to two-level political pressures—state politicians pressure higher bureaucracy which in turn pressures the lower bureaucracy tasked with implementation, and local politicians allied with the governing party put direct pressures on lower bureaucracy for favouritism. Lower level bureaucrats cope with these impossible pressures by subverting official procedures, so that actual practices hardly match the rational Weberian construction in official documents. The article’s contribution lies in linking the ‘political game’ and the ‘bureaucratic game’ in a grounded empirical context.

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17

Flynn, Rob. "The Mediation of Bureaucratic-Professional Influence: Decentralization in Dutch Housing Policy." Political Studies 34, no. 4 (December 1986): 607–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1986.tb01616.x.

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The influence of state bureaucrats and professionals on public policy is empirically and theoretically problematic. Recent work concerning the ‘dual politics thesis' has suggested that bureaucratic autonomy will flourish particularly at the regional level of the state. Evidence about decentralization in the Dutch housing system is reviewed which generally supports this thesis. However, it is argued that regional bureaucratic and professional power in housing policy, and the specific institutional arrangements for decentralization, must also be explained in terms of the distinctive nature of Dutch pillarized society and politics.

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18

Miller, Chris. "The Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie." History of Political Economy 51, S1 (December 1, 2019): 231–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-7903312.

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This article examines shifts in Soviet ideas about the economic and political role of the state. Drawing on documents from Russian archives as well as published debates, the article traces Soviet ideas about how states operate. Examining the role of writers such as Fedor Burlatsky and Karen Brutents, the article suggests that by the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet analysts increasingly believed that state structures could be self-interested, functioning as a type of class. Soviet scholars concluded that such self-interested state structures explained some of what they perceived as the failures of third-world economic development—as well as some of the pathologies of the USSR’s own politics.

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19

Welch, David A. "A Positive Science of Bureaucratic Politics?" Mershon International Studies Review 42, no. 2 (November 1998): 210. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/254412.

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20

Weldes, Jutta. "Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment." Mershon International Studies Review 42, no. 2 (November 1998): 216. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/254413.

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21

Bendor, Jonathan, and Terry M. Moe. "An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics." American Political Science Review 79, no. 3 (September 1985): 755–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1956842.

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In this article we outline a new framework for the formal analysis of bureaucratic politics. It departs from standard neoclassical approaches, notably those of Niskanen (1971) and Peltzman (1976), in several important respects. First our approach explicitly models a system of three-way interaction among bureaus, politicians, and interest groups. Second, it allows for institutional features of each type of participant. Third, it is a model of dynamic process. Fourth, participants make choices adoptively rather than optimizing. Fifth, participants are only minimally informed.The result is a dynamic model of adaptive behavior, very much in the spirit of Simon's (1947) behavioral tradition, that offers a new perspective on political control, bureaucratic power, and the “intelligence of democracy.”

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22

Williams, Michael C. "Vietnam: the politics of bureaucratic socialism." International Affairs 70, no. 2 (April 1994): 385. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2625344.

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23

Brower, R. S., and M. Y. Abolafia. "Bureaucratic Politics: The View from Below." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 7, no. 2 (April 1, 1997): 305–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024350.

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24

Thai, Nguyen Huu, and Gareth Porter. "Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism." Pacific Affairs 67, no. 2 (1994): 310. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2759451.

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25

McAllister, Brian J. "Narrative Disorientation and Beckett's Bureaucratic Space." Journal of Beckett Studies 29, no. 2 (September 2020): 161–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jobs.2020.0309.

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This essay investigates political implications of narrative space in Samuel Beckett's closed-space narratives, arguing for a narratological understanding of these spatial politics. It focuses on Imagination Dead Imagine, a text that radically disorients reader engagement with narrative space. In this text, Beckett collides bureaucratic narrative logic, which compartmentalises and accounts for all details of narrative space, against trenchantly anti-bureaucratic grammar, in which sentence structure disrupts and undermines spatial ordering. This dialectical relationship between bureaucratic narrative voice and unstable grammar critiques the logic that, in Giorgio Agamben's biopolitical sense, defines the bureaucratic nation-state. By associating narrative space and its inhabiting characters with the bureaucratic logic of modernity, Imagination Dead Imagine enacts and examines what Agamben calls the state of exception, inscribing politics onto the bare life of characters. While the text avoids direct reference to these historical conditions, its structure performs and resists the politics implicit in those conditions.

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26

Indiahono, Dwiyanto, Erwan Purwanto, and Agus Pramusinto. "Compliance and Conflict of Value in Public Policy Implementation: Comparison between the New Order and the Reformation Era." Policy & Governance Review 2, no. 2 (November 27, 2018): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.30589/pgr.v2i2.97.

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This research aims to examine diﬀerences in the relationship of bureaucratic and political oﬃcials during the New Order (Soeharto’s era) and the Reformation (post-Soeharto) era within the arena of public policy implementation. This is a matter of importance given that there is a change in relations between the two from integration in the New Order to bureaucratic impartiality in the Reformation Era. This study attempts to answer the question: How were the relations of bureaucratic and political oﬃcials in the implementation of local level public policy during the New Order and the Reformation Era? A qualitative research has been conducted in Tegal Municipality using the following data collection techniques: interview, focus group discussion, documentation, and observation. Tegal Municipality was selected as the study location because of the unique relationship shown between the mayor and the bureaucracy. Its uniqueness lies in the emergence of bureaucratic oﬃcials who dare to oppose political oﬃcials, based on their convictions that bureaucratic/public values should be maintained even if it means having to be in direct conflict with political oﬃcials. This research indicates that the relationship between bureaucratic and political oﬃcials in the arena of local level policy implementation during the New Order was characterized as being full of pressure and compliance, whereas during the Reformation Era bureaucrats have the audacity to hinder policy implementation. Such audacity to thwart policies is considered to have developed from a stance that aims to protect public budget and values in policies. The occurring conflict of values here demonstrates a dichotomy of political and bureaucratic oﬃcials that is diﬀerent from the prevailing definition of politics-administration dichotomy introduced at the onset of Public Administration studies.

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27

Eckhard, Steffen, and Vytautas Jankauskas. "The politics of evaluation in international organizations: A comparative study of stakeholder influence potential." Evaluation 25, no. 1 (November 1, 2018): 62–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1356389018803967.

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While the political nature of evaluation is widely recognized, few attempts exist to conceptualize and compare these politics. This article develops the concept of evaluation stakeholder influence potential, which builds on four political resources for influence (agenda-setting powers, staff and budgetary resources, access to evaluation results, and access to evaluators). These resources are measured for both member states and international public administrations in 24 United Nations organizations. We find that the administration—and not member states—have the largest influence potential in almost two-thirds of the international organizations. Our findings allow classifying them into three groups for which we expect differences in political contestation about evaluation use: two extreme-case groups (either member state or administrative dominance) and a group of contested middle cases. This finding of bureaucratic dominance reinforces literature on bureaucrats as powerful evaluation stakeholders in domestic settings and speaks to nascent research on bureaucratic influence in international organizations.

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28

Pérez, Federico. "Excavating Legal Landscapes: Juridical Archaeology and the Politics of Bureaucratic Materiality in Bogotá, Colombia." Cultural Anthropology 31, no. 2 (May 4, 2016): 215–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.14506/ca31.2.04.

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In Bogotá, urban planners employ the notion of juridical archaeology to describe the difficulties associated with the implementation of the city’s profuse and contradictory building regulations. They evoke a stratified and recalcitrant topography of decrees whose unpredictable effects are tied to the juxtapositions and gaps between sedimented legal artifacts. In practice, however, juridical archaeology holds great strategic value to bureaucratic operators, as it enables them to configure frameworks for urban development in a field of regulatory contingency. By representing the city’s legal system as an opaque and intricately layered terrain, bureaucrats and lawyers deflect accountability, arguing that incoherence is to blame. Furthermore, they occlude their interpretative agency by claiming that they do not shape the meaning of the law, but merely excavate it from the city’s legal depths. I argue that juridical archaeology expands understandings of state reification, showing that bureaucratic disorder itself can be reified as a concrete amalgamation of incompatible parts and pieces. Furthermore, I qualify scholarly claims about the agency of bureaucratic artifacts through a more interactive approach to materiality that highlights the crucial roles of social meaning and practice. From this perspective, I focus on the ways in which actors materialize legal infrastructures in their everyday performances of bureaucratic expertise and authority.

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29

O’Brien, Kevin J., Lianjiang Li, and Mingxing Liu. "BUREAUCRAT-ASSISTED CONTENTION IN CHINA*." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 25, SI (September 1, 2020): 661–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.17813/1086-671x-25-5-661.

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Bureaucrat-assisted contention in China is a type of collective action in which native-born local officials help socioeconomic elites launch or sustain popular action against outsider party secretaries by leaking information and sabotaging repression. Bureaucrats who assist local influentials are neither elite allies nor institutional activists. Instead, they unleash or support collective action as a weapon in a power struggle against ambitious, heavy-handed or corrupt superiors. Unlike mass demonstrations that are mobilized as a bargaining chip, bureaucrat-assisted contention hinges on a partnership with local elites who have their own grievances and pursue their own goals. Because it combines bureaucratic politics and popular action, this type of contention can help us understand underexplored aspects of political opportunities, framing, and mobilizing structures. In particular, it shows how participants in contention sometimes span the state-society divide, and how collective action can influence (and be influenced by) power struggles within a government.

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Jagannath, Harish P. "Street-level collaboration: perception, power, and politics on the frontlines of collaboration." International Journal of Public Sector Management 33, no. 4 (April 6, 2020): 461–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijpsm-07-2019-0194.

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PurposeTo examine the implementation processes and outcomes of collaborative governance initiatives through the lens of bureaucratic politics.Design/methodology/approachAn in-depth single case study research design with 28 embedded cases to study the implementation of a collaborative governance initiative. This paper uses the analytical technique of process tracing to explicate necessary and sufficient conditions to uncover causal mechanisms and confirm descriptive and causal inferences.FindingsThis study finds that when street-level bureaucrats perceived the collaborative initiative as a health intervention (and not as a collaborative initiative), it resulted in low levels of stakeholder participation and made the collaborative initiative unsuccessful. This paper finds that bureaucratic politics is the causal mechanism that further legitimized this perception resulting in each stakeholder group avoiding participation and sticking to their departmental siloes.Research limitations/implicationsThis is a single case study about a revelatory case of collaborative governance implementation in India, and findings are analytically generalizable to similar administrative contexts. Further research is needed through a multiple case study design in a comparative context to examine bureaucratic politics in implementing collaborative initiatives.Practical implicationsPolicymakers and managers need to carefully consider the implications of engaging organizations with competing institutional histories when formulating and implementing collaborative governance initiatives.Originality/valueThis study's uniqueness is that it examines implementation of collaborative governance through a bureaucratic politics lens. Specifically, the study applies Western-centric scholarship on collaborative governance and street-level bureaucracy to a non-Western developing country context to push the theoretical and empirical boundaries of key concepts in public administration.

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Keucheyan, Razmig, and Cédric Durand. "Bureaucratic Caesarism." Historical Materialism 23, no. 2 (June 10, 2015): 23–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1569206x-12341406.

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In 2010, the Eurozone became the epicentre of the world crisis. The vulnerability of Europe appears to be linked to the specific institutional arrangement which organises monetary, financial and budgetary policies within the Eurozone. This article tries to understand the evolution of theeuduring a short but decisive historical sequence (2007–12) in a theoretical framework that puts elements of Gramsci’s reflections on the theme of crisis, and especially his notion of ‘Caesarism’, at its centre. It addresses the current debate concerning the relationships between democratic politics and neoliberalism, while focusing on how the radicalisation of the crisis put at stake the co-construction of capitalism and representative democracy in the Western world sincewwii.

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Hammond, Thomas H. "Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics." American Journal of Political Science 30, no. 2 (May 1986): 379. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111102.

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PAGE, EDWARD C., and LINDA WOUTERS. "BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN BRUSSELS." Public Administration 72, no. 3 (August 1994): 445–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1994.tb01022.x.

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Lai, Hongyi, and Su-Jeong Kang. "Domestic Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy." Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (October 4, 2013): 294–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.832531.

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35

Brummer, Klaus. "The Bureaucratic Politics of Security Institution Reform." German Politics 18, no. 4 (December 2009): 501–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644000903349440.

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36

Qingmin, Zhang. "Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy-making." Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 4 (July 6, 2016): 435–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow007.

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37

Lapuente, Victor. "Above politics: Bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment." Public Administration 95, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 549–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/padm.12317.

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38

Satkunanandan, Shalini. "Bureaucratic Passions." Law, Culture and the Humanities 15, no. 1 (November 29, 2015): 14–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1743872115614801.

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In order to have a more nuanced conversation about the role and size of government, we should attend to our diverse passional experiences of bureaucracy. We overlook our affective experience of bureaucracy in our usual focus on bureaucracy’s impersonality and passionless rule and on cost-benefit analyses of individual regulations. To the extent that we consider bureaucracy’s passional effects, bureaucracy is cast as something that saps passion – understood as energy and vigor – from our lives. Attention to the variety of passional experiences of bureaucracy reveals neglected and salutary aspects of life within and under the shadow of bureaucracy. For example, particular bureaucratic affects are arguably a pedagogy in the realities, compromises and burdens of politics, and may enhance – in desirable ways – our solidarity with those who share our polity.

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Junge, Dirk, Thomas König, and Bernd Luig. "Legislative Gridlock and Bureaucratic Politics in the European Union." British Journal of Political Science 45, no. 4 (June 9, 2014): 777–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123414000027.

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How does the risk of gridlock affect the type of legislative output? Do bureaucratic agents expand their activities when they can expect that the principals are unable to overrule them? This article introduces a novel approach for calculating the risk of gridlock in bicameral legislatures in order to estimate its impact on bureaucratic activities, combining data on all secondary and tertiary acts of the European Union (EU) from 1983 to 2009. The findings reveal that bureaucratic activities expand when the risk of gridlock increases and an overruling of tertiary acts becomes less likely. This may sustain the EU's overall decision-making productivity, but its bureaucratic nature may raise further questions about democratic legitimacy and principal-agent problems in the representation of interests.

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Rhodes, Edward. "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U.S. Navy." World Politics 47, no. 1 (October 1994): 1–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2950678.

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Allison's Model III (governmental or bureaucratic politics) suggests that state policies reflect the parochial concerns of intragovernmental “players in positions” and the relative power of these players. This article offers a critical test. It examines a policy area—U.S. decisions on the composition of naval forces—in which we would, a priori, expect bureaucratic politics to have a maximum effect and which participants, observers, and scholars have routinely described as critically influenced by bureaucratic politics. This article employs statistical methods to assess whether outcomes have indeed been affected by the parochial priorities and perceptions of individuals who, because of their relative power and the rules of the game, have dominated the relevant bureaucratic action-channels. Contrary to the expectations of the bureaucratic politics literature—indeed, contrary to the reports of firsthand observers and the actors involved—bureaucratic politics do not seem to have mattered: knowledge of bureaucratic interests and power does not permit us to predict outcomes. The article then proceeds to suggest an alternative model of state behavior thatdoesprovide significant explanatory power: the article demonstrates that shifts in force posture can be modeled as a function ofideasandimagesrather than ofinterests. This gives rise to speculation that in explaining American foreign and security policy the name of the game is not, as Allison suggests, politics, but the competition of ideas for intellectual hegemony.

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Marsh, Kevin P. "The Intersection of War and Politics." Armed Forces & Society 38, no. 3 (August 4, 2011): 413–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x11415492.

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This study examines the decision-making process of the George W. Bush administration which led to the decision in late 2006 to order the Iraq troop surge. The study analyzes whether the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making can accurately explain the events of the case. The study seeks to further test the explanatory power and descriptive accuracy of the bureaucratic politics model, while also attaining a more textured, academic understanding of the decision-making process leading to the Iraq troop surge. The decision to order the troop surge in Iraq is one of the more important decisions in post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy and continues to impact U.S. strategy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and overall military doctrine. Finally, the author endeavors to contribute to the further development and refinement of the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making.

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Dahlström, Carl, and Mikael Holmgren. "The Political Dynamics of Bureaucratic Turnover." British Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (September 4, 2017): 823–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000230.

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This Research Note explores the political dynamics of bureaucratic turnover. It argues that changes in a government’s policy objectives can shift both political screening strategies and bureaucratic selection strategies, which produces turnover of agency personnel. To buttress this conjecture, it analyzes a unique dataset tracing the careers of all agency heads in the Swedish executive bureaucracy between 1960 and 2014. It shows that, despite serving on fixed terms and with constitutionally protected decision-making powers, Swedish agency heads are considerably more likely to leave their posts following partisan shifts in government. The note concludes that, even in institutional systems seemingly designed to insulate bureaucratic expertise from political control, partisan politics can shape the composition of agency personnel.

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Indrady, Andry. "HONG KONG SAR IMMIGRATION IN THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICS, POLICY AND INSTITUTION." Jurnal Ilmiah Kajian Keimigrasian 1, no. 2 (November 24, 2018): 69–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.52617/jikk.v1i2.22.

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The Bureaucratic System of the Immigration Department of Hong Kong SAR is one of the legacies from British Colonial Government seen from legal and also immigration bureaucratic perspectives reflect the executive power domination over immigration policymaking. This is understandable since Hong Kong SAR adopts “Administrative State Model” which means Immigration Officer as a bureaucrat holds significant roles at both stages of policymaking and also its implementation. This research looks at transition period of the Immigration Department and its policies since the period of handover of Hong Kong SAR from the British Government to the Government of China especially throughout the concern from the public including academics about the future of immigration policies made by the Department that arguably from colonial to current being used as political and control tools to safeguard the interest of the Ruler. This situation ultimately will question the existence of Hong Kong SAR as one of the International Hub in the Era of Millennium.

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Wandi, Wandi, and Ahmad Rifa'i. "Reinventing Hubungan Birokrasi dan Politik dalam Mewujudkan Hubungan Industrial yang Berkeadilan di Indonesia: Suatu Kajian." J-MAS (Jurnal Manajemen dan Sains) 5, no. 1 (April 15, 2020): 106. http://dx.doi.org/10.33087/jmas.v5i1.156.

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Reinventing bureaucracy and politics must accommodate the tendency of bureaucratic political behavior. In short, public bureaucracy must be declared a political actor. As political actors, bureaucracy must not be neutral. He must increase the intensity of his involvement in the political process. However, the involvement of the public bureaucracy is not only oriented towards pursuing group profits solely. The involvement of bureaucracy in the political process and the bureaucracy's neutrality is the bureaucratic alignment of public interests such as economic progress, social justice, human rights, gender equality, and so on. Pancasila Industrial Relations as stated above can not be separated from the bureaucratic and political relations in a nation, therefore, it is important to do Reinventing Bureaucratic and Political Relations in realizing the democratization of industrial relations with justice in accordance with the values of Pancasila itself, namely by carrying out the Order Good governance.

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Meier, Kenneth J., Mallory Compton, John Polga-Hecimovich, Miyeon Song, and Cameron Wimpy. "Bureaucracy and the Failure of Politics: Challenges to Democratic Governance." Administration & Society 51, no. 10 (September 18, 2019): 1576–605. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095399719874759.

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Bureaucratic reforms worldwide seek to improve the quality of governance. In this article, we argue that the major governance failures are political, not bureaucratic, and the first step to better governance is to recognize the underlying political causes. Using illustrations from throughout the world, we contend that political institutions fail to provide clear policy goals, rarely allocate adequate resources to deal with the scope of the problems, and do not allow the bureaucracy sufficient autonomy in implementation. Rational bureaucratic responses to these problems, in turn, create additional governance problems that could have been avoided if political institutions perform their primary functions.

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Lehrer, Susan, and Kathleen Staudt. "Women, International Development, and Politics: The Bureaucratic Mire." Contemporary Sociology 21, no. 1 (January 1992): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2074776.

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Peterson, Lauri, and Jakob Skovgaard. "Bureaucratic politics and the allocation of climate finance." World Development 117 (May 2019): 72–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.12.011.

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Ellison, Brian A. "Bureaucratic Politics as Agency Competition: A Comparative Perspective." International Journal of Public Administration 29, no. 13 (November 30, 2006): 1259–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01900690600928110.

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Gilad, Sharon, Saar Alon‐Barkat, and Chagai M. Weiss. "Bureaucratic politics and the translation of movement agendas." Governance 32, no. 2 (December 25, 2018): 369–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/gove.12383.

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RIGGS, FRED W. "Bureaucratic Politics in the US: Benchmarks for Comparison." Governance 1, no. 4 (October 1988): 343–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1988.tb00071.x.

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