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Jena, Jan-Ole [Verfasser]. "Die Business Judgment Rule im Prozess : Eine prozessrechtliche Betrachtung der Business Judgment Rule und Beweislastverteilung im Organhaftungsrecht / Jan-Ole Jena." Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2020. http://d-nb.info/1212397061/34.
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Resch, Sarah-Maria [Verfasser]. "Business Judgment Rule und Insolvenzverwalterhaftung / Sarah-Maria Resch." Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2019. http://d-nb.info/1195857543/34.
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Lindström, Moa. "The Business Judgment Rule : Tillämpningen i svensk rätt." Thesis, Karlstads universitet, Handelshögskolan (from 2013), 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-74699.
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Det har under en tid diskuterats huruvida den princip som i amerikansk rätt kallas the business judgment rule även förekommer i svensk rätt. Frågan har varit föremål för diskussion i flertalet artiklar och det är därför relevant att utreda huruvida principen förekommer i svensk rätt samt om en sådan princip kan anses vara förenlig med det skadeståndsansvar som styrelseledamöter har enligt 29 kap. 1 § ABL. Denna framställning syftar därför till att ge ett svar på om en princip likt the business judgment rule som förkommer i amerikansk rätt även förekommer i det svenska rättssystemet och om en sådan princip kan anses vara förenlig med 29 kap. 1 § ABL. För att utreda rättsläget har två metoder använts, den rättsdogmatiska metoden och den komparativa metoden, och den juridiska argumentationen i framställningen bygger på lagstiftning, förarbeten, rättspraxis och doktrin. The business judgment rule förekommer i den amerikanska aktiebolagsrätten och principen är en presumtion om att bolagsledningen vid beslutsfattande agerat utifrån en väl informerade grund, i god tro samt i övertygelsen om att beslutet fattats för aktiebolagets bästa. Principen har kommit att ta sin form genom the Supreme Courts i USA och inte direkt genom skriven lag vilket beror på att USA är ett s.k. common law land där rättstillämparen även är skaparen av rättsreglerna. För att principen ska vara tillämplig krävs att fyra rekvisit uppfylls, dessa är att det ska röra sig om ett beslut som fattats av en styrelseledamot och the triads of fiduciary duties. I svensk rätt regleras styrelseledamöters skadeståndsansvar i 29 kap. 1 § ABL och av paragrafen framkommer att en styrelseledamot som inom sitt uppdrag bringar skada till aktiebolaget, aktieägare eller tredje man genom uppsåt eller av oaktsamhet ska ersätta denna skada. Inom ramen för styrelseledamöters skadeståndsansvar enligt 29 kap. 1 § ABL finns såväl ett externt som ett internt skadeståndsansvar. För att en styrelseledamot ska kunna ställas ansvarig för en skada krävs att styrelseledamoten agerat oaktsamt, eller genom uppsåt, samt att det föreligger adekvat kausalitet mellan handlandet och den uppkomna skadan. Efter en genomgång av lagstiftning, förarbeten, prejudikat och doktrin på såväl det amerikanska som det svenska området kan konstateras att the business judgment rule som presumtion inte förekommer i de svenska regleringarna på området, varken i den allmänna skadeståndsrätten eller i ABL. Vissa rekvisit som förekommer i the business judgment rule kan däremot anses förekomma i såväl 29 kap. 1 § ABL som i rättstillämparens bedömningar. Rekvisitet för duty of care kan liknas med den culpabedömning som sker vid utredningen av om en person varit oaktsam i sitt handlande. Högsta domstolen har även i några rättsfall framfört att om en person fattar ett beslut som varit väl motiverat och med en informerad basis bör inte beslutet ifrågasättas, vilket även detta kan liknas med rekvisitet för duty of care samt det tankesätt som finns gällande the business judgment rule. Det kan även konstateras att om en princip likt the business judgment rule skulle komma att bli allmänt vedertagen i svensk rätt torde detta inte stå i strid med 29 kap. 1 § ABL.
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Fischer, Stephan [Verfasser]. "Die Business Judgment Rule als typübergreifendes Institut. / Stephan Fischer." Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2018. http://d-nb.info/123844458X/34.
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Sobczyk, Justyna Angelika. "La Business Judgment Rule : l'essai sur les sources de la règle." Thesis, Paris 1, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA010270/document.
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La première source de la business judgment rule a été la jurisprudence. Celle-ci a été la source des codifications incitatives et contraignantes. Nos recherches ont mis en évidence deux types de formulations de la business judgment rule. Le premier type est la formulation prétorienne lato sensu et stricto sensu. Le second type est la formulation codifiée (Model Business Corporation Act, Corporate Director's Guidebook, Principles of Corporate Governance, lois limitant la responsabilité personnelle des dirigeants). De plus, nos recherches ont dégagé 9 types de termes qui se retrouvent dans tous les types des formulations. Les 4 premiers types de termes correspondent respectivement (1) aux pouvoirs des dirigeants et à leur discrétion, (2) au statut des dirigeants, (3) aux devoirs des dirigeants, (4) aux degrés de devoirs requis et à la gravité de la transgression de ces devoirs sanctionnée (standard of conduct). Les cinq types de termes suivants correspondent respectivement (1) au droit à l'erreur, (2) à la présomption de comportement/conduite, (3) au refus d'un contrôle judiciaire, (4) à la charge de la preuve, (5) à la justification de la business judgment rule (standard of revision). Les deux différences fondamentales entre les formulations de la business judgment rule sont les suivantes. La première différence se situe au niveau des conditions d'application de la règle et concerne la relation entre le standard de conduite, c'est-à-dire le type des devoirs, le degré des devoirs et la gravité de la transgression des devoirs, et le standard de responsabilité, c'est-à-dire les devoirs examinés quand la business judgment rule s'applique. La seconde différence fondamentale entre les formulations se situe au niveau des effets de la règle et concerne l'étendue d'un contrôle judiciaire sur le résultat de l'action ou de l'omission des dirigeants, c'est-à-dire le prix grossièrement inadéquat, l'abus de discrétion, le dépassement grossier, etcThe first source of the « business judgment rule » is the jurisprudence. The jurisprudence was the source of the « soft law » and « hard law » codifications. The research showed two types of formulations of the « business judgment rule ». The first type is the jurisprudence formulation lato sensu_and stricto sensu. The second type is the codification formulation (Mode) Business Corporation Act, Corporate Director's Guidebook, Principles of Corporate Governance, lois limitant la responsabilité personnelle des dirigeants). The research showed nine types of terms which may be found in the formulations of the « business judgment rule». The first four terms correspond respectively to (1) the powers of the governors of the corporation and their discretion ; (2) their status ; (3) their duties, and (4) the degree of their duties. This first type of terms constitutes the standard of conduct. The next five types of terms correspond respectively to (1) the right to the error; (2) the presumption of the conduct; (3) the refusal of judicial review; (4) the burden of proof; (5) the justification of the « business judgment rule ». This second type of terms constitutes the standard of revision. There are two fundamental differences between the formulations of the « business judgment rule ». The first difference is situated at the level of the conditions of application of the « business judgment rule », and concerns the relations between the standard of conduct and the standard of revision. The second difference is situated at the level of the effects of the « business judgment rule » and concerns the scope of judicial review
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Gollan, Anna Katharina. "Vorstandshaftung in der Stiftung eine Untersuchung zur Anwendbarkeit der Business Judgment Rule." Köln München Heymann, 2008. http://d-nb.info/993614892/04.
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Taube, Carl-Tessen [Verfasser]. "Die Anwendung der Business Judgment Rule auf den GmbH-Geschäftsführer. / Carl-Tessen Taube." Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2018. http://d-nb.info/1238443117/34.
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Göppert, Jan. "Die Reichweite der Business Judgment Rule bei unternehmerischen Entscheidungen des Aufsichtsrats der Aktiengesellschaft." Berlin Duncker & Humblot, 2009. http://d-nb.info/998768928/04.
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Nagy, Sandra. "Hostile takeovers in the face of the Business Judgment Rule : A comparative analysis between Sweden and the United States of America in regard to the Business Judgment Rule and the Unocal test." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-306969.
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In cases concerning a hostile takeover occurring in the United States, the board of directors must fulfill the duties set forward by the Unocal test. If the board of directors succeed, it implies that the decision, regardless if it is a bad decision, is protected by the Business Judgment Rule. The Business Judgment Rule presumes that the board of directors in good faith made an informed decision in the line of the corporations’ interests. The Business Judgment Rule is inherently unique for American companies. In Sweden liability for directors is based on a culpa evaluation which in turn is based on principles deriving from tort law. This is the result from the corporate law only providing for a very limited part concerning liability. In this thesis, the different judicial systems are explained with focus on differences and similarities based on duties of the board. Moreover, the different liabilities from a Swedish and an American perspective will be discussed. Concluding, it is hard to distinguish a Swedish version of the Business Judgment Rule, however, the creation of one would most likely be beneficial since it, to a large extent, provides for a better business world.Vid ett fientligt företagsförvärv i USA måste styrelseledamöterna visa att de uppfyller de krav som framställts genom Unocal-testet. Lyckas styreledamöterna uppfylla kraven så blir de skyddade från skadeståndsrättsligt ansvar i enlighet med the Business Judgment Rule, oavsett om beslutet ledde till en dålig affär. The Business Judgment Rule presumerar att styrelseledamöterna i god tro fattat ett välgrundat affärsbeslut som ligger i bolagets intresse. The Business Judgment Rule är unikt för amerikanska bolag. I Sverige utgår skadeståndsansvar för styrelseledamöter från en culpabedömning, vilket baseras på allmänna skadeståndsrättsliga principer då den aktiebolagsrättsliga skadeståndsdelen är begränsad. I denna uppsats redogörs de olika rättssystemen med fokus på likheter och skillnader i styrelseuppdraget. Vidare diskuteras styrelseledamöternas skadeståndsansvar utifrån ett amerikanskt och ett svenskt perspektiv. Slutligen visas det att det är svårt att se en svensk version till the Business Judgment Rule, men att en sådan troligen skulle vara att föredra då regeln ger effekter som bidrar till en bättre affärsvärld.
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Wallisch, Kai [Verfasser]. "Unternehmerische Entscheidungen der Hauptversammlung : Die Anwendung der Business Judgment Rule auf Hauptversammlungsbeschlüsse / Kai Wallisch." Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1107604591/34.
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Göppert, Jan [Verfasser]. "Die Reichweite der Business Judgment Rule bei unternehmerischen Entscheidungen des Aufsichtsrats der Aktiengesellschaft. / Jan Göppert." Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2010. http://d-nb.info/1238363865/34.
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Ashraf, Zeeshan. "The position of the business judgment rule in different corporate cultures and structures : a study and analysis." Thesis, McGill University, 2001. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=32795.
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The American courts developed business law by devising principles for resolving the rift between shareholders and the management. An important principle in this respect is the Business Judgment Rule (BJR). The BJR has attained an important position in the American corporate law. However, it has failed to find such position in the laws of other jurisdictions.In the current era, when different economies are integrating into a global market, corporations are forming global alliances. This thesis will study the role of the BJR in global alliances by examining the case of the Star Alliance as an example. It will focus in particular on the position of the BJR in the interplay of different corporate structures and cultures. The thesis will review corporate cultures of Germany and Japan. It will conclude that the BJR's importance is growing and finding place in jurisdictions other than America.
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Nadalin, Guilherme Frazão. "A responsabilidade civil dos administradores de companhias abertas: artigo 159, § 6°, LSA e a Business Judgment Rule." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-20052016-104823/.
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O estudo da responsabilidade civil dos administradores de companhias abertas na doutrina nacional trata usualmente dos deveres fiduciários, do ato regular de gestão e da teoria ultra vires, da culpa ou dolo do administrador, das ações ut universi e ut singuli e da solidariedade entre a responsabilidade do administrador e a da companhia. Poucos abordam as causas extintivas dessa responsabilidade, e raro são os que tratam da hipótese de exclusão de responsabilidade do artigo 159, § 6º, da Lei nº 6.404/76. Como a disciplina dos deveres fiduciários prevista na lei societária brasileira tem forte influência do Direito norte-americano, buscou-se na legislação, doutrina e jurisprudência daquele país os fundamentos necessários à melhor interpretação e aplicação da regra de exclusão e, em especial, na business judgment rule, doutrina que protege os administradores contra responsabilização por prejuízos à companhia decorrentes de decisões por eles adotadas, proteção esta também conferida pela hipótese do artigo 159, § 6º, da Lei nº 6.404/76, ao administrador leal e de boa-fé.The study of corporate directors civil liability in national doctrine usually deals with fiduciaries duties, regular management act and the ultra vires theory, directors malpractice or deceit, ut universi and ut singuli actions and solidarity between directors and companies responsibility. Few address the extinctive causes of such liability, and rare are those who address the liability exclusion hypothesis of the Article 159, § 6º, of the Law n. 6.404/76. Whereas that the fiduciary duties discipline provided for in Brazilian corporate law has strong influence of American law, was sought in the legislation, doctrine and jurisprudence of that country the fundamentals for a better understanding and application of the exclusion rule and, particularly, in the business judgment rule, a doctrine that protects directors against liability for damages to the company arising from their acts, protection also afforded by the Article 159, § 6º, of the Law n. 6.404/76, to the loyal and good faith director.
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Geiser, Martina. "Leitungspflichten des Vorstandes in der AG Grenzziehung zwischen der business judgment rule und den notwendigen Anforderungen an eine Compliance-Organisation." Hamburg Kovač, 2009. http://d-nb.info/999016989/04.
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Geiser, Martina. "Leitungspflichten des Vorstandes in der AG : Grenzziehung zwischen der business judgment rule und den notwendigen Anforderungen an eine Compliance-Organisation /." Hamburg : Kovač, 2010. http://www.verlagdrkovac.de/978-3-8300-4826-8.htm.
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Joubert, Deon Ernst. "The business judgment rule and the liability of directors for the environmental damage caused by the South African mining industry." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/62540.
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The South African mining industry is viewed as the locomotive of the economic
development in South Africa and has been a leading contributor to the economy for
more than a century. However, the price paid for economic growth has left South
Africa with a "mining legacy" and mining companies now face an upsurge of politically
and regulatory induced challenges. Directors of mining companies have to act with a
certain level of duty of care, skill and diligence in order for them to navigate through
these various challenges. The heightened awareness of environmental degradation
caused by mining has seen a rise in stricter mining liability legislation in South Africa,
with a specific focus on company and director liability. The result is that directors are
now faced with the possibility of personal liability when performing their executive
function. According to the business judgment rule, directors will be shielded from
liability if they acted with the necessary duty of care.
The objective of this dissertation is to examine to what extent the business judgment
rule will offer protection to a director of a mining company where the director caused
environmental damage. The analysis of this study will be conducted in the context of
the environmental damage caused by a mining company due to the decision making
and 'governance' of the mining company's director or directors.Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2017.
Public Law
LLM
Unrestricted
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Smit, Imogan. "The application of the business judgment rule in fundamental transactions and insolvent trading in South Africa : foreign precedents and local choices." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/5523.
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Eisele, Stefan. "Codification of the Business Judgment Rule in Section 76 (4) Companies Act 2008: comparing the South African with the German approach." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/25021.
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The Business Judgement Rule stems from the US common law and relates to the directors duty of care and skill. Currently, the Business Judgment Rule is in operation in many countries all over the world. It is a judicial device used to limit the scope of personal liability for directors and officers. The rule consists of a rebuttable presumption that a director or officer, when making a business decision, has acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. It should thus form a safe harbour for rational and informed managerial actions. Courts applied the Business Judgment Rule in numerous courts decisions and established certain standards of a proper decision making process. From the experiences of the massive corruption scandals of ENRON and Worldcom and in the light of the experiences of the global financial crisis, there is a rising public interest in good corporate governance and diligent and reasonable management. Therefore, the rule has been codified in numerous countries all over the world. Among these countries are South Africa and Germany. In South Africa, the rule has been incorporated with the Companies Act, 71 of 2008. Germany has adopted the Business Judgment Rule specifically in the German Stock Corporation Act 1965 (Aktiengesetz). These codifications in modern company law are problematic and the scope of their respective application and the meaning of their prerequisites are somewhat unclear. Therefore, opinions about the rule, its application and its concrete effect diverge and the idea of a codified rule in modern corporation acts in contrast to the historical application by courts has been massively criticized. Despite all differences it is generally acknowledged that the rule and its application are intricate and a deep insight in its complex application is required to avoid a misunderstanding and a misapplication of the rule by the competent courts. The author intended to identify potential problems pertaining to the application of the rule and its prerequisites. By comparing the German and the South African approach, several similarities and differences were found. Based on these findings, five potential problems for the application of the rule in South Africa and its interpretation by the competent courts were presented in more detail. These problems relate to the scope of application in general, the blurred lines between the terms of rationality and reasonableness, the determination of the concrete judicial review, the avoidance of hindsight biases and the unjustified extension of judicial review by over interpreting the term proper purpose. Although it is hardly possible to present practical solutions for all these problems in a minor thesis, reviewing the rule, its prerequisites, and its rationale by considering additional experiences from other countries enhances the awareness of potential problems and risks. The primary guideline for the application of the rule has to be - in any case - the avoidance of the hindsight bias.
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Schlimm, Katrin. "Das Geschäftsleiterermessen des Vorstands einer Aktiengesellschaft : die Kodifikation einer "Business Judgment Rule" deutscher Prägung in [section] 93 Abs. 1 S. 2 AktG /." Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2009. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=017163215&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Eckervogt, Yannick [Verfasser]. "Die Innenhaftung des hauptamtlichen Leitorgans einer Krankenkasse im Sinne des § 35a SGB IV : Die Business Judgment Rule und ihre Übertragbarkeit / Yannick Eckervogt." Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2017. http://d-nb.info/1160479976/34.
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Svanidze, Teona. "Evaluating Introduction of the Business Judgment Rule in Sweden : A Comparative Study of Accountability of the Board of Directors in Sweden and Delaware." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-417211.
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The Swedish corporate law scholars have long debated whether there is something similar to the American business judgment rule (BJR) in the Swedish Companies Act (SCA). Recently, the discourse shifted to claim that the BJR exists in Swedish case law and should be introduced in the SCA in the form of a statute. However, the Swedish corporate law scholars have not investigated in much detail whether the BJR should be introduced in the SCA. An eagerness to introduce the BJR might seem bewildering due to the corporate scandals at the beginning of this century and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. These events left corporate law scholars and those in the business community with the pressing question of whether the board of directors is sufficiently accountable, and the BJR appears to do the very opposite. In view of the foregoing, this thesis examines whether the BJR should be introduced in the SCA. This examination enables a comparative analysis of the liability rules of the board of directors in Sweden and Delaware, which is the dominant source of state corporate law in the United States. This thesis also steps outside traditional legal sources and considers other disciplines such as moral and political philosophy, sociology, and the methodology of law and economics. This thesis finds that the BJR does not balance the values of the authority of the board of directors and the need to hold it accountable for its decisions and actions in an appropriate manner because it allows the value of authority to completely dominate. An appropriate balance between these values of authority and accountability requires that none of the values be so preeminent that any of them completely dominate. The BJR is made more critical because the Delaware courts apply it generously in favor of the board of directors and adopt an inveterate attitude in cases raising duty of care, thus, weakening the duty of care as a viable and meaningful accountability mechanism. Given these findings, this thesis concludes that the Swedish legislator should only consider introducing the BJR in the SCA if it is articulated in a different way. Alternatively, if it is given a dual function to protect both the authority of the board of directors and the need to hold it accountable for its decisions and actions. The justifications behind the BJR do not change the conclusion because they do not fully defend the existence of the BJR and the dominance of the value of authority. This thesis also considers the benefits of introducing the BJR in the SCA, but they also do not change the overall conclusion. Instead, the conclusion is strengthened by the fact that a no liability rule can emerge when the BJR is combined with other protective devices in the SCA in the same way as it does in Delaware if the BJR is not modified or given a dual function. The no liability rule appears to deter the threat of legal liability as an effective accountability mechanism, which cannot be defended by either social norms or market forces.
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Leach, James. "The correct understanding of the Business Judgment Rule in Section 76(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: avoiding the American mistakes." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9615.
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Includes bibliographical references.The South African law concerning directors' duties is intricate under both the common law and the Companies Act. This is an area of corporate law which allows for a wealth of practical and theoretical difficulty. I aim to deconstruct the intricacy of the American experience of the business judgment rule, with particular reference to the rule in Delaware, so as to present what I perceive to be the correct practical application of the rule in South African corporate law. This dissertation does not address the wisdom of the decision to transplant and codify the American business judgment rule within the Companies Act.
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Mupangavanhu, Brighton Murisa. "Standards of care, skill, diligence, and the business judgment rule in view of South Africa's Companies Act 71 of 2008: future implications for corporate governance." Doctoral thesis, University of Cape Town, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/25428.
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Decision-making is the most critical role that company directors have to play in the life of a company that they are appointed to manage. South African law (in s66 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the Act) has now followed the global trend of recognising that directors have original authority/mandate to manage or direct company affairs or business. A director is accorded (by law) powers to exercise to enable him or her to fulfil the functions of that office. Decision-making, which is not an easy task, is critical to enterprise efficiency and advancement of the national economy. Directors have to make business decisions, at times under imperfect circumstances and while confronting tensions inherent in the corporate form. Not least of these tensions is the pressure to balance the profit maximisation drive from shareholders and accountability for how the directors exercise the powers at their disposal. Despite pressures involved in decision-making, the law requires that directors should exercise their powers in the best interests of the corporation. Thus the Act has attempted to put mechanisms in place to ensure that directors' freedom to manage corporations has to be necessarily constrained and balanced by the need for them to be accountable. The thesis focuses on the duty of care, skill and diligence on one hand (standard of conduct), and the business judgment rule (BJR- standard of review) on the other. These are two mechanisms put in place by the Act to ensure a balance between directors' freedom to manage and accountability. The thesis seeks to answer the key question whether the Act has made standards of care, skill and diligence clearer, more accessible and enforceable than before in light of the Act's adoption of BJR. The thesis analyses the duty of care, skill under s76(3)(c) and BJR under s76(4) in light of the context of law reform (that is the purposes of law reform) and international experiences. In this thesis, an appraisal of the positives brought about by the codification of the duty of care and the adoption of BJR into statute for the first time in SA is given. It is argued that while some purposes of law reform have been achieved, the Act has not achieved the purpose of clarity of standards. For example, the analysis reveals unfortunate omissions and worrying ambiguities in the formulation of standards of care, skill and diligence in s76(3)(c). While giving in-depth analysis of the scope and policy rationale of BJR under the Act, the thesis further notes that the characterisation of BJR in s76(4)(a) as a standard of conduct as opposed to standard of review is problematic. It has also been argued that the BJR is not properly aligned to international standards. Clear amendments to the Act have been suggested to improve clarity of standards and the law in s76(3)(c) and s76(4)(a).
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Kalweit, Christian. "Fehlerhaftes Vorstands-und Aufsichtsratshandeln und dessen Sanktionierung durch Aktionärsklagen in Deutschland und Frankreich : Ökonomische, rechtsvergleichende und rechtspolitische überlegungen vor dem Hintergrund der US-amerikanischen Business Judgment Rule." Toulouse 1, 2004. http://www.theses.fr/2004TOU10049.
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La thèse présentée est consacrée à un ensemble de questions difficiles et diverses concernant l'action des conseil de surveillance, conseil d'administration et directoire et leur sanction dans le droit français et allemand des sociétés par actions. Les formes les plus significatives des actions en justice des actionnaires destinées à contrôler les managers dans le droit français et allemand sont étudiées et analysées. Pour le droit allemand il s'agit des plaintes et des plaintes en dédommagement, pour le droit français l'action individuelle ainsi que l'action sociale exercée ut universi et ut singuli. Ces possibilités d'action jouent un rôle important dans le gouvernement d'entreprise des grandes sociétés par actions. Moyens de fortunes issus du droit privé, elles peuvent remplir une fonction essentielle dans le contrôle des organes de direction et de surveillance. L'analyse de ces expédients en France et en Allemagne est conduite avec en arrière plan la règle américaine du jugement des affaires (business judgment rule). La thèse est divisée en trois parties. La première partie de la thèse présente les fautes de gestion et leur sanction dans le droit allemand - ainsi qu'une comparaison avec le droit américain et l'action dérivée de l'actionnaire qui y figure. La seconde partie est consacrée au droit français et ses régulations. Enfin, dans la troisième partie une analyse économique des actions disponibles permet d'en rendre compte et d'évaluer d'un point de vue normatif leurs développements. Les résultats obtenus sont rassemblés sous formes de thèses à la fin du travailThe subject of the present study is as multi-faceted as it is complex : the deficient or incorrect actions of the executive board, board of directors and the supervisory board and the sanctioning thereof in German and French corporations. The thesis examines and analyses the most important forms of shareholders' suits regarding management control in German and French law. For German law, the work focuses mainly on averting lawsuits and claims for damages, while for French law the work concentrates on the "action individuelle" as well as on the "action sociale exercée ut universi" and "ut singuli". These rights to sue play an important role in the Corporate Governance of big stock companies. As a remedy under private law they may play a central part in the control of the management and supervisory bodies. The analysis of these rights to sue in Germany and France was undertaken also with a view to the US-American business judgment rule. The study is divided in three parts. In the first part it describes deficient or incorrect actions of the board of directors and the supervisory board and the sanctioning thereof in Germany. Furthermore, it compares German practice with US-American law and its shareholders' derivative suit. In the second part, it focuses on the French law and its regulations. Finally, in the third part, the thesis looks at the subject from an economic point of view and attempt to (positively) explain such rights to sue and to determine (normatively) how such rights should be formulated. The study closes with a summary of the most important insights gained
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Sabat, Martyna. "Die Innenhaftung des Vorstands in einer Aktiengesellschaft - eine rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung zum deutschen und polnischen Recht : Zugleich ein Vorschlag zur Kodifizierung der Business Judgment Rule in Polen / Martyna Sabat." Berlin : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2018.
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Sabat, Martyna [Verfasser]. "Die Innenhaftung des Vorstands in einer Aktiengesellschaft - eine rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung zum deutschen und polnischen Recht : Zugleich ein Vorschlag zur Kodifizierung der Business Judgment Rule in Polen / Martyna Sabat." Frankfurt a.M. : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2018. http://d-nb.info/118021501X/34.
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Matažinskaitė, Agnė. "Verslo sprendimo vertinimo taisyklės taikymo Lietuvos teisinėje sistemoje galimybės." Master's thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2013. http://vddb.laba.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2013~D_20130626_185326-62941.
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Šio darbo tikslas – ištirti verslo sprendimo vertinimo taisyklės galimybes Lietuvos teisinėje sistemoje. Šiam tikslui pasiekti pasitelkiami ryškiausi bendrosios ir kontinentinės teisės sistemų atskirų valstybių verslo sprendimo vertinimo taisyklės taikymo pavyzdžiai. Darbe analizuojama šios taisyklės samprata pasirinktose valstybėse bei Lietuvos teisinėje sistemoje. Taip pat darbe keliamas klausimas ar Lietuvos teisinėje sistemoje apskritai egzistuoja verslo sprendimo vertinimo taisyklė. Pažymima, jog šiuo metu Lietuvoje egzistuoja nuomonių dėl verslo sprendimo vertinimo taisyklės egzistavimo dualumas tarp Lietuvos mokslininkų.
Analizuojant verslo sprendimo sampratą, pastebimas ir užsienio valstybių mokslininkų nuomonių dėl verslo sprendimo vertinimo taisyklės taikymo daugiareikšmiškumas. Ši taisyklė gali būti suprantama kaip atsakomybės standartas, numatanti kaip įmonės valdymo organų nariai turi vykdyti jiems nustatytas pareigas, kaip teisminio susilaikymo doktrina, užkertanti kelią teismams vertinti priimamų verslo sprendimų esmę bei ją keisti, bei netgi kaip neliečiamybės doktrina. Taip pat verslo sprendimo vertinimo taisyklė turi procesinę bei materialią dalis. Pažymima, jog pagal tai, kaip konkrečios valstybės teisinėje sistemoje ši taisyklė įtvirtinama, skiriami skirtingi jos taikymo modeliai. Toks verslo sprendimo vertinimo taisyklės daugiareikšmiškumas sąlygoja šios taisyklės taikymo galimybių ribas, kurios darbe vertinamos Lietuvos teisinės sistemos atžvilgiu.
... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]The aim of this paper is to examine the possibilities of application of the business judgement rule in Lithuanian legal system. In order to achieve this aim, the most prominent cases of application of the business judgement rule in different common and continental law countries are analysed. The paper also compares the conception of this rule in selected countries and in Lithuanian legal system. The analysis of the descriptions, although short, of the business judgement rule found in the works of Lithuanian scholars, has shown a dual approach to the application of the business judgement rule. The paper also raises the question of the existence of this rule in Lithuanian legal system. The analysis of the conception of business judgement rule has also demonstrated various attitudes to the application of this rule among foreign scholars. This rule can be regarded as standard of liability, indicating the way in which the members of the company’s management bodies have to perform their duties; as judicial abstention doctrine, preventing courts from evaluating and changing the essence of business decisions; even as doctrine of immunity. In addition, the business judgement rule consists of two components, including procedural and material ones. It is noted that the rule has different models of application depending on the way it is established in the legal system of a country. Such variation of attitudes to the business judgement rule determines the boundaries of its application... [to full text]
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Kaminskaitė, Birutė. "Bendrovių valdymo organų civilinės atsakomybės ypatumai." Master's thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2007. http://vddb.laba.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2007~D_20070102_203353-42867.
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This paper deals with principal issues of the civil liability of the corporates governance bodies. The question of ,,corporate governance” are not enough analyzed in the law doctrine of Lithuania. The term ,,corporate governance” related with the corporate governance systems, governance bodies, shareholders and other stakeholders. This definition depend on every country legal framework, rules, procedures and traditions. The status problems of corporate governance bodies are shortly discussed in this study. There are made conclusion, that they are liable under Civil law rules. This means that director is subject of full liability principle, which require that he/she would have to cover all damages, which are result of his/her illegal action. The member of corporate governance body becomes civilly liable when four conditions are present: damage, illegal action, causality and fault. The general obligations of the corporate governance bodies provided in the Lithuanian Civil Code, Corporation Act, the local acts of corporation and they rise from specifical (fiduciary) theirs position. Fiduciary duty means an obligation to act in the best interest of another party. The corporate governance bodies duties falled into three broad categories: the duty of care, duty of loyalty and duty to act in good faith. This work discuss about the limitation of the directors civil liability, the directors liability insurance.-.
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SEMEGHINI, DANILO. "La diligenza degli amministratori di società per azioni nella gestione dell'impresa." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Brescia, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10281/26555.
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The business judgment rule is the pivot of the law governing directors' liability, which in turn is one of the fundamental regulatory strategy by which the law addresses the agency problems involved in the shareholder-manager relationship. Yet, despite its centrality, it is a doctrine not understood as much as it is employed. This work contends that the business judgment rule does play a specific role, which is, however, narrower than the role it is usually and ambiguously attributed. Its proper understanding and use may promote a more balanced legal scenario, where business judgment rule, duty of care, and charter exemption option can be better exploited according to their peculiar function, thereby offering a more linear, diversified and efficient setting. To the contrary, confusion about the respective roles of each component and consequent overlapping among their spheres of action make the present one a suboptimal legal setting.
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Damken, Nico. "Corporate Governance in mittelständischen Kapitalgesellschaften : Bedeutung der Business judgment rule und der D & O-Versicherung für Manager im Mittelstand nach der Novellierung des [section] 93 AktG durch das UMAG /." Edewecht : OlWIR, Oldenburger Verl. für Wirtschaft, Informatik und Recht, 2007. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=015428535&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Toman, Antonín. "Odpovědnost členů dozorčí rady." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2010. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-136214.
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This thesis deals with civil liability of the Supervisory Board and its members for breaching his duties. Emphasis is placed on responsibility and legal relationship, whose content is obligation to pay damages, between Supervisory Board and its member and business companies (in the new terminology "business corporation"). This thesis is dealing at first with the legal anchoring of the Supervisory Board as such, the creation and termination of the Supervisory Board and the definition of its living space not only in the relation to corporation, but also to individual shareholders, General Assembly and of course to the Board - including their mutual rights and responsibilities. Thesis is crossed by author's intention to evaluate the active legislation, whose legislative life is coming to an end, and on the basis of that to comment upcoming legislation that at least brings a fresh wind to the corporate life. Shortly is discussed upon by the factual impossibility to prosecute members of the Supervisory Board for crimes associated with their performance.
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Andreisová, Lucie. "Péče řádného hospodáře členů statutárních orgánů kapitálových obchodních společností a její vazba na interní compliance programy." Doctoral thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2017. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-264712.
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The purpose of this dissertation is to provide its readers with a detailed and comprehensive look at the institute of duty of care, business judgment rule and related civil and partly also criminal liability of members of (not only) statutory bodies of capital business companies, and in this respect also to introduce an internal compliance program as one of the main instruments of good and effective corporate governance. The main objective of this dissertation is therefore to verify or refute the hypothesis whether, and if so in what particular form, can an internal compliance program be seen as an institute helping members of statutory bodies of capital business companies in fulfilling specific requirements and obligations of their duty to carry out the statutory function with due (managerial) care. The existence (implementation) of an internal compliance program is quite commonly connected with so called regulated markets and also with individual business corporations whose ownership structure extends the boundaries of the Czech Republic (typically British or American business corporations seated in the Czech Republic). But what about a wide neutral zone of Czech business corporations, i.e. especially small and medium-sized capital business companies? Shall these implement an internal compliance program as well? And, if so, on what grounds and with what benefits?
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Ponczek, Daniel Kalansky. "O instituto da incorporação de ações." Universidade de São Paulo, 2011. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-03082012-162117/.
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O presente trabalho tem por objeto o estudo do instituto da incorporação de ações. Para tanto, será analisado, (i) no primeiro capítulo, o regime legal vigente e sua natureza jurídica, apresentando-se as diferenças em relação à operação de incorporação de sociedade, fazendo inclusive um contraste com o direito norte-americano; (ii) no segundo capítulo, a proteção dos acionistas minoritários em operações de incorporação de controlada e eventual impedimento de voto do acionista controlador, analisando-se os recentes pareceres de orientação emitidos pela CVM; (iii) no terceiro capítulo, o estudo do instituto do tag along e do fechamento de capital e necessidade de realização de oferta pública em operações de incorporação de ações que impliquem transferência de controle ou cancelamento de registro de companhia aberta, à luz das últimas operações realizadas no mercado; (iv) no quarto capítulo, a discussão dos principais precedentes nos quais a CVM decidiu impor restrições ou impedir a realização de operações de incorporação de ações por entender ter havido um tratamento não equitativo entre os acionistas minoritários e controladores, com o objetivo de demonstrar a alteração do comportamento do órgão regulador no decorrer dos anosThe present work aims the study of the stock-for-stock exchange transactions (incorporação de ações). For this purpose, it will be examined (i) in the first part, the current legal regime and legal nature, contemplating differences with the statutory merger (incorporação de sociedade), including a comparison with the US law, (ii) in the second part, the protection of minority shareholders in the context of parent-subsidiary mergers and possible exclusion from voting of the controlling shareholder, taking into account the recent opinions issued by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), (iii) in the third part, the study of the tag along rights and the regulation for delisting companies and the need to conduct a tender offer in stock-for-stock exchange transactions involving transfer of control or delisting of a publicly-held company in light of recent transactions, and (iv) in the fourth part, the discussion of the key precedents on which CVM has decided to impose restrictions or prevent the conduct of stock-for-stock transaction under the understanding that there was inequitable treatment of minority shareholders and controlling shareholders, in order to demonstrate the change of the CVMs understanding over the years.
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Yi-Chan, Lee, and 李儀嬋. "The Business Judgment Rule In Taiwnan." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/37327254528625447840.
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碩士南台科技大學
財經法律研究所
98
Abstract U.S. courts are reluctant to second guess directors' business judgment and strategy successful or not, then develop the "Business Judgment Rule" which is to encourage directors to be brave enough to assume the post of director. Don't to fear the directors' responsibility to reject be the directors of the company. Because the business decision usually with uncertainty of risk, it encourages the directors made the decision even if accompanied by risks, have the potential of major interests in decision-making. The company's decision makers are allowed to complete decisive manner the decision-making and the court does not second guess them. This is a purpose of the Business Judgment Rule. But the Business Judgment Rule shall also comply with the duty of care and duty of loyalty as a precondition. However, the Article 1 No. 23 of Corporate Law, amended on 2001, introduction the Duty of Care and Duty of loyalty in the Corporate Law that only the introduction of the concept but did not introduce its detailed specification of the concept. It did not introduce the Business Judgment Rule at the same time. So the practitioners to use the article in laws, and the source of law is different, even cause misunderstanding of its. The authors would like provide recommendations on these topics and for future research. Key word: Directors, Business Judgment Rule, Fiduciary Duty, Duty of Care, Duty of Loyalty, the Article 1 No. 23 of Corporate Law.
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Lin, Hsia-Sheng, and 林夏陞. "The Economic Analysis of Business Judgment Rule– Also on the Application of Business Judgment Rule in Close Corporation." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/hntttr.
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碩士國立臺北大學
法律學系一般生組
104
The development of Business Judgment Rule in our country, in contrast to common law, started late, and the concept of this rule is not accepted by all civil judgments. There were a doctrinal dispute of this rule in American law, one considered the rule as the standard of liability, which established a requirement of judicial review and distribution principles of the burden of proof; another seem the rule as an abstention doctrine, which claim that Courts should abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of the directors' conduct unless the plaintiff can carry the very heavy burden of rebutting that presumption. On the other hand, legislations of close company’s chapter in the Taiwan Company Act was adopted last year. It provided a new option to someone who want to set up a Venture Capital or small-capital businesses. But it is a issue that the Business Judgment Rule can apply in the directors’ fiduciary duty cases of close company or not. The minority shareholder in close companies, different from public companies, are vulnerable and could be oppressed by controlling shareholders. It would be unfair that director can protect by Business Judgment Rule when the court review director’s oppression. In this way, this article synthesized the doctrinal dispute and guiding principle of this rule, also discussed the function of this rule in the method of economic analysis. Beside, this article synthesized the Judicial Opinions in Taiwan and commented on its disadvantage. Finally, this article discussed the application of Business Judgment Rule in Close Corporation
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WU, SIN-PEI, and 吳信霈. "Setting the Medical Judgment Rule--Observations from the Business Judgment Rule and Avoiding the Hindsight Bias Perspective." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7y429v.
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碩士國立高雄大學
政治法律學系碩士班
107
The problem of defensive medicine not only harms the relationship between medical relationship and social trust, but also affects the health of the whole people.The cause of defensive medicine is believed to stem from the adverse effects of judicial proceedings. Through economic analysis, it can be known that a rational physician will inevitably adopt a risk avoidance strategy when the risk of damage compensation is too high, leading to a conservative and retreating medical behavior, and even medical personnel are reluctant to join a higher-risk department. This kind of professional withdrawal effect can also be found in the commercial field. The American law trial practice develops the "business judgment rules" to solve this problem. The purpose of the business judgment rule is to avoid the influence of "hindsight bias", which leads to the wrong result of the substantive examination of the court, and misjudges the non- negligent behavior as negligent. Therefore, the business judgment rules will recognize that commercial behavior has a "professional discretionary space", and derive the five elements from the principle of good faith. Those who can pass the five elements can think that no fault is established. The function of the business judgment rules do not widen negligence liability. On the contrary, the discussion of hindsight bias must be based on the determination of negligence liability. Therefore, the application of the business judgment rules will not cause the change of negligence responsibility. In our country also has a referee that is based on the business judgment rules. Our medical law clearly stipulates that the establishment of medical negligence in the "professional discretionary space" is considered as a key-point in introducing business judgment rules into medical litigation. I try to construct the "medical judgment rules" by referring the construction of business judgment rules. If the result between medical judgment rules and that court had even make are different. It shows that hindsight bias is already do something bad in medical litigation, and it is necessary to introduce business judgment rules into medical ligation to solve hindsight bias problem.
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Liu, Yang-Min, and 劉陽明. "The Application of Business Judgment Rule in Law and Business Decision." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/33833956451725334020.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
商學組
101
In recent years rulings of criminal cases referring to Business Judgment Rule is increasing, which also draws attention among the academic circle. During the trial of the HJTC case at Hsinchu District Court, Mr. Cao Xing-cheng defended himself with Business Judgment Rule and argued that Business Judgment Rule encourages people with talent to take aggressive initiatives and save the judge from making complicate business decision, and the competency of a member of the board should be left to the discretion of the board of directors and should not be a concern of the court. His argument is ensued with intensive discussion among the public. The issue of permissibility of Business Judgment Rule as the criterion for the ruling of guilty or not guilty on criminal charge of breach of trust receives controversial and diversified comments from the academic and practitioners’ circles. This Study summarizes and analyzes available criminal case rulings, scholar dissertations published on periodicals, and two cases of Rechi and BenQ. The conclusion drawn favors Business Judgment Rule that it should be permissible on criminal charge of breach of trust and it allows legal professionals to think outside the box. It is recommended that prosecutors and judges alike should not only think from the aspect of business owners and take into consideration that enterprises must make businesses judgment in favor of competitiveness, but also give them positive approval instead of placing criminal charge of breach of trust on them. Regarding to practice of Business Judgment Rule, on the system side, it is recommended that judicial authorities should self-restrain on the ultima ratio of penalty and the principle of difference, and judges should favor the permissibility of Business Judgment Rule. On the legality side, it is recommended to improve civil indemnification legislation and revise and augment the Guidelines for Prosecutor Offices Processing Breach of Trust Cases. On the implementation side, it is recommended that a prosecutors’ performance appraisal system and a Business Judgment Rule checklist should be established. On the other hand, an enterprise makes decisions of various importances on a daily basis but shows little respect for legal professionals in its organization and neglects legal risks in its decision-making. When a decision fails, it causes not only economic loss, but also litigation. To reduce legal risk and improve decision-making quality, Business Judgment Rule not only serve as a criterion for the ruling on charge of breach of trust, but also an important standard for enterprise decision-making as a required process of enterprise decision-making. On the legal side, it is recommended that an enterprise should evaluate legal risk when making decisions. On the system side, it is recommended that an enterprise should consult with legal professionals when making decisions. On implementation side, it is recommended that an enterprise should take into account the impact of possible criminal charges.
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Chu, Chin-chin, and 褚親親. "The Feasibility of "The Business Judgment Rule" in Taiwan." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/hv9cjn.
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Dyke, Michael John. "The business judgment rule : its application in South Africa." Diss., 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/16728.
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The business judgment rule is used by American courts to establish whether a director has
fulfilled his duty of care. It is based on the concept that the directors are legally empowered
to manage a corporation's affairs, and the courts accordingly do not interfere with the exercise
of those powers unless a board's action is tainted by fraud or self-interest. The courts will not
review a business decision where, acting in good faith, the board has truly applied itself to
making an informed decision. In certain circumstances, where self-interest on the part of
directors is more likely to be a factor, a stricter test is applied. The business judgment rule
is implicit in the judgments of English and South African courts and the King Committee has
recommended its formal recognition in South Africa. The need for such formal recognition
and stricter interpretation of the duty of care and skill discussed.Private Law
LL.M.
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Rocha, Liliana Barcelos. "A responsabilidade dos administradores e a business judgment rule." Master's thesis, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/10173.
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A responsabilidade civil dos administradores assume especial relevância na atualidade, face à presente crise mundial e à crescente profissionalização dos administradores. Aos administradores são atribuídos cada vez mais poderes, para o exercício das suas funções tornando cada vez mais relevante o regime da responsabilidade civil dos administradores, de modo a responsabilizar os administradores pelos danos acusados à sociedade.
Com origem norte-americana, o surgimento da business judgment rule teve como objectivo criar um princípio que conseguisse avaliar a responsabilidade dos administradores no âmbito das decisões tomadas durante o exercício das suas funções, intrinsecamente ligada ao dever de cuidado do administrador, às decisões de gestão e ao cuidado que deve ser exercido pelo administrador na tomada destas decisões.
Neste trabalho procura-se analisar a transposição da business judgment rule para o ordenamento jurídico português e as questões de classificação e aplicação desta. Assentando a responsabilidade dos administradores na violação dos deveres inerentes às suas funções, iremos iniciar esta análise com uma breve referência aos deveres gerais dos administradores. Nesta análise não deixaremos de ter em conta a origem desta norma e a sua aplicação em outros regimes jurídicos.The civil liability of directors is particularly relevant today, given the current global crisis and the increasing professionalization of administrators. Administrators are increasingly empowered to be able to perform their functions and responsibilities, thus increasing the importance of having a relevant civil liability regime to hold them accountable for damages their decisions cause to their companies. The business judgment rule emerged in the United States as a principle to correctly assess the liability of directors in exercising their duties towards their companies. The rule is intrinsically linked to the administrator's duty of care in making management decisions. This paper analyzes the implementation of the business judgment rule to the Portuguese legal system and the issues of classification and enforcement that arise from it. Settling the liability of directors in breach of their duties, we will begin this analysis with a brief reference to the general duties of directors. We shall also take into account the origin of the rule and its application in other legal systems.
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Domingos, Paulino Jacinto. "A business judgment rule e a responsabilidade dos administradores." Master's thesis, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/22170.
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Os administradores das sociedades comerciais são diariamente colocados
perante a necessidade de tomar decisões relativas à gestão das sociedades – na senda,
aliás, da concentração de poderes de gestão no órgão de administração – que vem sendo
acolhida no moderno Direito das Sociedades anônimas. Tais decisões, devido a sua
extensão significativa, reclama uma análise aprofundada sobre os seus contornos.
Claro e evidente é, da complexidade da relação jurídica existente entre
administradores e sociedades comerciais, compreendendo direitos e deveres para
ambos. Quanto aos administradores, a falta de cumprimento de tais deveres, pode o
mesmo ficar sujeito à responsabilidade civil de acordo com o art. 72º do Código das
Sociedades Comerciais (doravante CSC).
O presente trabalho, em termos gerais, visa essencialmente analisar a introdução
dos deveres fiduciários de lealdade e cuidado nos sistemas de civil law, com especial
atenção ao ordenamento jurídico português fruto da reforma do Código das Sociedades
Comerciais ocorrida em 2006. Uma das principais alterações introduzidas pela reforma
em que incidirá o nosso estudo é a regra do juízo empresarial, também conhecida como
business jugdment rule1
. A regra, para efeitos de responsabilidade, estabelece os
pressupostos e critérios que visam excluir a responsabilidade dos administradores por
danos causados a sociedade.
Da origem a introdução da regra no regime português, queremos com o presente
trabalho analisar o sentido dado pelo legislador, a sua aplicação em matéria de
responsabilidade dos administradores e os limites à discricionariedade empresarial para
efeitos de sindicabilidade.Directors' of commercial companies are placed daily before the need to take decisions regarding the management of companies – in the way, moreover, of the concentration of management powers in the executive body – which has been welcomed in the modern Company Law. Such decisions, due to their significant extent, call for an in-depth analysis of their contours. Clear and evident is the complexity of the legal relationship between directors' and commercial companies, comprising rights and duties for both. As for the directors, the lack of fulfillment of such duties may be subject to civil liability in accordance with art. 72.º of the Portuguese Companies Code. In general terms, the present study aims to analyze the introduction of fiduciary duties of loyalty and care in the civil law systems, with special attention to the Portuguese legal system and the amendments introduced to the regime of Directors' liability as a result of the Companies Code reform that took place back in 2006. One of the key aspects brought by the reform that our research will be focusing in, is the business judgment rule. This rule consists in exempting officers and directors from liability that could arise as a result of the decisions they make causing losses for the company. From the origin of the rule and the introduction in the Portuguese Company Code, with the present study we want to analyze the meaning given by the Portuguese law maker, its interpretation, application in matters of directors' liability and the limits to business discretion for the purposes of syndicability.
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Yeh, Feng-Kang, and 葉峰剛. "The Research On Independent Director And Business Judgment Rule." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29262029758986628372.
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碩士嶺東科技大學
財經法律研究所
100
Taiwan adopted the dual-track frame in Modern Corporate Governance. Because the Supervisor system was inefficiency, Taiwan has introduced the Independent Director and Audit Commission rules from American, which also has been made legislation in the Securities and Exchange Ac in 2006. But the position of Taiwan director board was partial different from American, which has an orientation towards executing the business decision, not supervise. Under this conflicted situation of rules, the authorities and duties of Independent Director in Taiwan was inconsistent with translation. Hence, the point of this article will focus on this problem, and make advices form the viewpoint of rules, authority, and eliminating personal liability. In the aspect of systems, there was a situation of lacking Independent Director of talent, which cause the incumbents had to hold two or more posts concurrently. Therefore, they had no time and vitality to bring their professional knowledge into full play. In order to solve this problem, this article recommended that the Financial Supervisory Commission can invite the professional retired public servant to sever as the candidates of Independent Director. At the same time, the official authorities also have to establish complete talent bank. Besides, the new rules of Remuneration Commission must be amended which should be established or not by the demand of listed Company. In the aspect of authority, when the Independent Director was in the character of the member of director board, must treat their authorities as two aspects: when the board make a business decision, they would offer their professional advice on the basis of the objective standpoint, and when the other directors execute the decision, the Independent Director must supervise them, who might violate the laws. In view of this, this article recommended that the Company Act should amend section 193-II to the percentage of responsibility of the Independent Director. Besides, we could assay the due care of Independent Director with two viewpoints: business decision and Supervision. The duty of supervision could be treat as the most central authority. Hence, the standard of “good administrator” would be an appropriate one for them. Contrary, the Independent Director did not have enough time to realize every single business decision and acquire consistent information due to their outside and objective stance. Therefore, it must have to provide the Business Judgment Rule (BJR) for them to reduce their risk of litigation. The ideal BJR supplementary measure should renew as follows: Amended the Company act section 23-I, establish the complete fiduciary duty of Independent Director; and the court also have to generalize the concrete and definite standard of the Independent Director`s duty of care from various cases; Moreover, when the court had applied the BJR, they must clearly expound the burden of proof between the plaintiff and defendant. Concluding from the above-mentioned, only the complete and definite Independent Director rules can really elaborate it`s effect, and to achieve preferable Corporate Governance.
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Hu, Yi-Hua, and 胡怡嬅. "The Application of Business Judgment Rule in Judicial Practice." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/14181217809110904202.
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碩士國立臺北大學
法律學系法律專業組
100
Although few civil judgments of our court adopted the Business Judgment Rule which stemmed from civil practices of common laws, it may not fully compatible with our civil law system. Despite the controversial situation in civil cases, it has quietly spread out in criminal cases as defenses arguing that some acts of company directors do not subject to criminal punishments. In criminal cases, however, we cannot be more prudent about the question whether it is applicable or not, because the outcome concerns the conviction of defendants. In the thesis I hold that, the Business Judgment Rule may be applicable and appropriate in civil cases on the distribution of burden of proof, namely, charging the plaintiffs/shareholders with initial burden of proof, so as to ward off unnecessary lawsuits from few shareholders. Thus, introducing the rule into the civil law system of Taiwan may not produce great conflicts. However, its standards of review, whether positive or negative, are not necessarily fully compatible to the requirements of the Offenses of Breach of Trust as regulated in the Criminal Code and other special criminal Acts. That is to say, even though the prosecutor should bear the burden of proof on the parts of it which are consistent with the offenses, when it comes to the parts which are not consistent, the prosecutor may bear inappropriate burden of proving facts which are not covered by the requirements of the alleged offenses as well as beyond the contested issues. Besides, in criminal cases, the adoption of evidence and review of requirements of offenses are under more strict scrutiny, the defendants are presumed innocent if the prosecutors cannot prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus the function of standing criminal law is consistent to the function of Business Judgment Rule which presumes the acts of directors, if fitting its standards of review, not liable. Furthermore, regarding mens rea, the Offenses of Breach of Trust require an intention of obtaining illegal profits for offenders themselves or other parties and to do relevant acts on purpose, not including negligent acts. Thus, those intentional offenses are more severe than the gross negligence required by the Business Judgment Rule, not to mention that in special criminal Acts, mens rea includes knowledge of actus reus as regulated in those Acts. As regards the criminal procedure against directors who committed illegal acts, the Business Judgment Rule, which is easily used as an instrument to manipulate judicial authorities, if admissible in the procedure, may result in “Empty-Chair Defense” and shadow the fairness and justice when a judge accepts only superficial evidences without proper evaluation. Therefore, this thesis holds that it is not appropriate introducing the Business Judgment Rule into our criminal proceedings.
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LI, CHIEN-YU, and 李建裕. "The application of Business Judgment Rule of US Corporation Law in Medical Malpractice Disputes - the feasibility of Medical Judgment Rule." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/978a6z.
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碩士銘傳大學
法律學系碩士在職專班
104
Medical malpractice disputes have become topics of news recently. Young doctors change their favorite subspecialty into low risky ones due to Taiwan unfriendly medical circumstance. The mental stress of medical lawsuit bring defensive medicine more popular. The reasons why medical malpractice disputes become ubiquitous are raising awareness of medical issues and having courage to fight for rights. The opposition of doctor-patient relationship make medical circumstance worse. Besides criminal law, with the support of public power and civil law, medical caregivers become more vulnerable and helpless. Our health care environment will collapse if medical caregivers keep focus on defensive medicine other than patient’s maximal benefit. US Corporation Law exists similar consideration on business management. The application of“ Business Judgment Rule”on medical malpractice disputes could be useful for Taiwan's legislation to solve this complicated situation.
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LIN, YI-SHEN, and 林怡伸. "THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: A SAFE HARBOR FOR DIRECTORS' LIABILITY?" Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73445489873264821883.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺北大學
法學系
95
The amendment of corporation law in November, 2001 added Article 23rd Sec. 1, provides that “Directors and officers shall exercise their discretion with duty of loyalty and duty of care, directors and officers will be responsible for damages if they violate the duties and cause injury to the corporation.” The rationale interprets that “ By referring to common law, this amendment added the concepts of duty of loyalty and duty of care …..”. However, it is unclear if the Business Judgment Rule (thereinafter“BJR”) was led in our corporation law along with the concepts of duty of care and duty of loyalty contemporaneously. In other word, our corporation law does not clearly indicate if a director or officer who is not interested in the subject of the business decision makes the business decision and is fully informed with respect to the subject of the business decision to the extent that the director or officer reasonably and honestly believes is in the best interests of the corporation, should be responsible for the damage caused thereby to the corporation. Whether directors are allowed to assert BJR for being free from duty when they are sued for damages due to their violation of duty of care? Can the court apply the BJR as merit to prevent the directors from duty while dealing with suits which are involved with violation of duty of care by directors? Are there relevant precedents in common law? The issues like these are all disputes both in practice and in theory, thus are worthy of being discussed further. Another issue included in this essay is if it is necessary to introduce the BJR into our legal system in case that the court is not allowed to apply the BJR to let the directors be free from duty before the BJR is in the statutes literally. Furthermore, international mergers and acquisitions (thereinafter“M&A”) have happened very frequently in the recent years, and this kind of transactions also appear in Taiwan occasionally. When an acquiring company is trying to engage in a hostile acquisition to the target company, it is also a business decision for the directors to determine if they want to take a defense and what kinds of defenses is best for the company. If such a business decision results in injury to the company or its shareholders, the directors would claim the BJR to prevent themselves for duties. Thus, if there is a similar case raised in Taiwan, could the directors be free from duties by the BJR? The issues that have been mentioned led to my research motives. The concept of the BJR is borrowed from the common law, so firstly, in the chapter II I am gonna introduce the basic concepts of the BJR. Secondly, the chapter III encompasses the application and development of the BJR. Finally, from the perspectives of comparative law, the chapter IV analyzes the application of the BJR in domestic legal system and the necessity of leading it to our corporation law. The essay concluded that before our corporation law clearly regulates the BJR, court should not be allowed to apply the rule as merit to let directors free from duties. In order to encourage business operators to run the business with good faith and assume the commercial risk, plus, courts lack the ability to review the business decision of a corporation, it is necessary to introduce the BJR into our legal system. Though the issues of applicable subjects, requirements and M&A need to be taken into consideration while introducing the rule into domestic law.
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Lee, Hua-Lan, and 李華蘭. "A Study of Business Judgment Rule with Taiwan Corporate Governance." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/79565350761241869473.
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碩士國立臺灣海洋大學
海洋法律研究所
102
Economic crises engulfed the entire world in the recent years. The world was being swept by economic crisis. Since East Asian financial crisis in 1997, economic crisis revealed many kinds of Corporate Governance matters. Deepening globalization exerts impacts on all countries. Following the trend of globalization, enterprises extend its business from one single country to the whole world. Board of directors is the key executive members of a company. Directors of a company should develop and execute their business strategy base on the code of corporate governance. This paper will discuss about directors’ legal duties and responsibilities which is determined on American law and business judgement rule. We will explore the business judgment rule which protects the director from being instituted actions at law when the director’s business decision had been proved not to match in shareholders’ interest. This research will approach a subject from different angles. Business judgment rule was based on the real business practice which has been introduced in US for decades. At the time of introducing the business judgment rule in Taiwan, this paper will investigate several court decisions and provide conclusions to assist in bringing light to this area.
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Paulino, Madalena Silvério. "Business judgment rule: enquadramento da figura no ordenamento jurídico português." Master's thesis, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10451/48067.
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Começou no século XVIII a ser introduzida, organicamente, no sistema judicial, um mecanismo de proteção dos gestores societários. Este instrumento encontra-se aliado à responsabilidade que provém da posição ocupada pelos gestores, trazendo cobro a situações de responsabilização indevida. A business judgment rule evita que os gestores sejam tornados responsáveis quando a sua atuação assenta nos parâmetros legalmente estabelecidos, cumprindo a sua obrigação de gestão; quando, não obstante este ato correto aos olhos do Direito, da sua conduta advieram consequências nefastas para o esquema societário. Este projeto procurará traçar as fronteiras da ampla obrigação de gestão, incluindo descobrir o leque de deveres e condutas vinculativas ética e legalmente adstritas à posição do gestor. Tudo isto é justificado pela separação dos valores controlo e propriedade, que origina uma relação vertical com problemas na conciliação de interesses. Esta relação de agência cria problemas e custos a serem suportados pelos intervenientes. Para a mitigação destes dilemas causados ao fluxo societário, entre os gestores e os sócios, entra o tema da corporate governance. Esta problemática estabelece mecanismos de controlo ou monitorização para impedir acatamento de interesse próprio em detrimento do interesse social, evitando conflitos de interesse e possibilidade de oportunismo por parte dos administradores. Um dos instrumentos relevantes para o assunto é o leque de deveres dos administradores (e consequente represália pelo incumprimento), num sistema de checks and balances. Com a responsabilidade dos administradores, – especificamente quanto à responsabilidade civil perante a sociedade - verifica-se um crescente escrutínio judicial das decisões empresariais, gerando o problema da administração defensiva e receosa, prejudicial à sociedade e economia. A business judgment rule apresenta-se como a ferramenta para o patrocínio de tranquilidade nestas tensões geradas. Ademais, por si, gerará uma forte arma para o combate dos custos de agência, os custos dos investimentos necessários para assegurar que os agentes ajustam a sua conduta à do principal.In the eighteenth century, a mechanism to protect corporate managers was introduced organically in the judicial system. This instrument finds its justification in the liability that is connected with the position occupied by the managers, and takes the burden of responsibility from them when it is not due. The business judgment rule prevents managers from being held responsible when their performance is based on the legal parameters established, fulfilling their management (or governance) obligation; when, regardless of their correct deed from the Law perspetive, their conduct had adverse consequences for the corporate scheme. This Project will seek to draw the boundaries of the broad management obligation, including discovering the range of duties and binding conducts legally and ethically attached to the manager’s position. All this is justified by the separation between control and ownership that creates a vertical relationship with problems in reconciling the interests. This agency relationship creates problems and costs for stakeholders to bear. For the mitigation of these issues caused to the corporate flow, between the managers and the partners, comes the corporate governance theme. This issue establishes control and monitoring mechanisms to prevent self-interest in negotiations in detriment of the social interest, avoiding conflicts of interest and the possibility of opportunism by the managers. One of the instruments relevant to the matter is the range of managers’ duties (and consequent reprisal for non compliance) in a checks and balances system. With the managers’ liability – specifically with regard to the civil liability towards society -, there is a growing judicial scrutiny of business decisions, generating the defensive and fearful management problem, detrimental to the society and the overall economy. The business judgment rule presents itself as an instrument that brings tranquility in these generated tensions. Moreover, by itself, it will generate a strong weapon to combat agency costs, the investment costs necessary to ensure that agents adjust their conduct to the principal’s.
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Huang, Hsiu-hui, and 黃秀惠. "A Study of Applying Forensic Accounting to Business Judgment Rule." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/90299282997825602914.
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碩士朝陽科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
101
In face of a highly competitive business world, the operational level of one organization shall be entitled to more authority to make strategic decisions in a context of drastic changes. To avoid business operators being looked into the responsibilities arising out of wrong decisions that result in operators’ adoption of risk aversion decision, the American business judgment rule has thus emerged. In terms of views in judicial practice in Taiwan, the business judgment rule has been applied to civil, criminal judgments. As the American business judgment rule is only applicable to civil cases, some scholars oppose applying the rule to criminal case. Even for civil cases, some scholars hold off their opinions of introducing the business judgment rule as there will be no opportunity for shareholders to win a lawsuit under the circumstances of asymmetric information. Most of judges have no background in business operations, and if business decisions are made with a good intention by directors and have appropriate attention, directors shall not face post-investigation, hearing nor be liable for compensatory damages despite the fact that strategic decisions result in business loss. In view of such condition, it highlights the necessity for Taiwan to introduce the Business Judgment Rule. In view of the frequent outbursts of economic scandals of complex fraudulent means in recent years, courts can hardly solve such cases simply from legal perspectives. To deal with this issue, some domestic scholars stand for the introduction of the forensic accounting system which has been practiced in the US for decades, using forensic accounting which uses the knowledge of law, audit, accounting and criminology to support judicial litigation. At the time of introducing the business judgment rule in Taiwan, if forensic accounting can be used as the tool in assisting with court judgment when judges suppose that business operators conform to the business judgment rule, judgments made by court will be more impartial, objective that conforms to fact.
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Lee, Wei-Hsing, and 李維心. "A Comparative Legal Study on the Application of Business Judgment Rule." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/c8edgm.
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碩士東吳大學
法律學系
96
The business judgment rule is developed by the American court practice. The rule shields corporate directors and officers from liability for unprofitable or harmful corporate transactions if they were made in good faith, with due care, within the directors’ or officers’ authority and no waste of corporate asset. The rule is a presumption that can protect directors from change of misconduct as long as the conduct attributed to any rational business practice. In order to plead and prove a claim, a plaintiff must allege and demonstrate the facts that can overcome this presumption. Where the presumption is overcome, directors bear the burden of proving the fairness of the challenged conduct. A presumption in favor of directors protects them, with the consequence that they can do business decisions without fearing of taking on responsibility. The rule is on the premise that directors have a fiduciary duty to act for the benefit of company. The duty includes duty of care and duty of loyalty even acting in good faith. The article23, paragraph 1 of company act of R.O.C also provides that the director of company shall have the loyalty and exercise the duty care of a good administration in conducting the business operation of the company, and if he/she acted contrary to this provision, shall be liable for the damages sustained by the company there-from. Its purpose is close to the American law’s business judgment rule. Some academics, to get rid of the possibility of liability out of court’s hindsight finding, approve of introduction business judgment rule into Taiwan. But the concept of business judgment rule involves that a shareholder plaintiff has the “heavy burden” of alleging and proving facts to the preponderance of evidence when he/she challenges the director’s decision. It differs from the Taiwan Code of civil procedure that empowers the judge to freely evaluate the fact and evidence. Therefore, if we do not bring in the rule into Taiwan, it won’t impede the director operation of the company. Furthermore, Taiwan company act, which is unlike Anglo-American law taking director’s skill and diligence as the test of duty care , adopts the integration of civil and business law that recognizes the negligence in the same way. And the director who breaches the duty of care will accord with same standard. Besides the connotation of director’s loyalty has to replenish in court practice. Consequently, that we don’t bring the Business Judgment Rule into Taiwan will not hamper directors to administer the business of corporation.
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Teixeira, Ana Cristina de Oliveira. "A business judgment rule : os critérios de racionalidade empresarial em particular." Master's thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/11981.
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