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1

Kurki, Milja. Causation in international relations: Reclaiming causal analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

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Kurki, Milja. Causation in international relations: Reclaiming causal analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

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Kurki, Milja. Causation in international relations: Reclaiming causal analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

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4

American international oil policy: Causal factors and effect. London: F. Pinter, 1987.

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5

American international oil policy: Causal factors and effect. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.

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6

Spadolini, Giovanni. Laurea "honoris causa" dell'Universita' (sic) di Coimbra al Professor Giovanni Spadolini =: Doutoramento "honoris causa" do Professor Giovanni Spadolini pela Universidade de Coimbra. Lisbona: Istituto italiano di cultura in Portogallo, 1992.

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Horiner-Levi, Eveline. Effects of group membership and intergroup stereotypes on causal attribution. [Israel: s.n., 1988.

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8

El subdesarrollo social de España: Causas y consecuencias. Barcelona: Diario Público, 2009.

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9

Rey, Alina López de. Un lider y su causa: Quintín Lame. [Colombia]: Academia de Historia del Cauca, 1990.

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10

González, Arturo Huerta. La globalización, causa de la crisis asiática y mexicana. México: Editorial Diana, 1998.

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11

Sulla, Olga. Analysis of causal relations and long- and short-term correspondence between share indices in Israel and the United States. Jerusalem: Bank of Israel, Monetary Dept., 2000.

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12

Levi, Moisés Orfali. Talmud y cristianismo: Historia y causas de un conflicto. Barcelona: Riopiedras, 1998.

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13

Lecturer, Rashid Abdul, and Pakistan Institute of Development Economics., eds. A significant shift in causal relations of money, income, and prices in Pakistan: The price hikes in the early 1970s. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2006.

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14

Husain, Fazal. A significant shift in causal relations of money, income, and prices in Pakistan: The price hikes in the early 1970s. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2006.

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15

Husain, Fazal. A significant shift in causal relations of money, income, and prices in Pakistan: The price hikes in the early 1970s. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2006.

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16

Chʻoe, Myŏng-sang. Hanʼguk chŏnjaeng kwa kukche kwanʼgye =: Korean War and international relation. [Korea]: Konggun Taehak, 1996.

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Las relaciones entre Panamá y Estados Unidos: Causas de conflicto en la era de la globalización. Panamá: J.H. Santos Aguilera, 2006.

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18

Morínigo, Ubaldo Centurión. El Paraguay en el Parlamento Latinoamericano: Triunfo de una causa nacionalista y democrática. [Asunción, Paraguay]: U. Centurión Morínigo, 1988.

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19

Suárez, Omar Jaén. Panamá soberana: El 9 de enero de 1964 : sus causas, los eventos y sus consecuencias. Panamá: Expedición al Istmo, Raúl Arango Chiari/Rolando Domoingo, 2013.

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20

Rautcher, Sergio Rodríguez. El ejército entre las causas del regionalismo de Valdivia, (1800-1830). Stgo. [i.e. Santiago], Chile: Estado Mayor General del Ejército, 1985.

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21

Bernstein, Sara. Causal Idealism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198746973.003.0013.

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This chapter argues that causal idealism, the view that causation is a product of mental activity, is at least as attractive as several contemporary views of causation that incorporate human thought and agency into the causal relation. The chapter discusses three such views: contextualism, which holds that truth conditions for causal judgments are contextual; contrastivism, which holds that the causal relation is a quaternary relation between a cause, an effect, and contextually specified contrast classes for the cause and the effect; and pragmatism, which holds that causal claims are sensitive to pragmatic factors. This chapter suggests that causal idealism has at least as much explanatory strength as these three theories, and is more parsimonious and internally stable.
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22

Dowe, Phil. Causal Process Theories. Edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies. Oxford University Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0011.

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If the core idea of process theories of causation is that causation can be understood in terms of causal processes and interactions, then the approach should be attributed primarily to Wesley Salmon (1925–2001). Salmon takes causal processes and interactions as more fundamental than causal relations between events. To express this Salmon liked to quote John Venn: ‘Substitute for the time honoured “chain of causation”, so often introduced into discussions upon this subject, the phrase a “rope of causation”, and see what a very different aspect the question will wear’. According to the process theory, any facts about causation as a relation between events obtain only on account of more basic facts about causal processes and interactions. Causal processes are the world-lines of objects, exhibiting some characteristic essential for causation.
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23

Ehring, Douglas. Causal Relata. Edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies. Oxford University Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0020.

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This article argues that the intrinsicness of the causal relation undermines the main case for facts as the causal relata, which is based on causation by and of absences. Furthermore, it argues that since causes and effects are generally temporally and spatially related to each other, facts could not be causes and effects. It also argues that the transitivity of causation rules out at least one major candidate for causal relata, coarse-grained events. And, finally, it argues that since the best theory of causation employs the notion of qualitative or property persistence, the best candidate for causal relata must be based around tropes or particularized properties.
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24

Godfrey‐Smith, Peter. Causal Pluralism. Edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies. Oxford University Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0017.

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Causal pluralism is the view that causation is not a single kind of relation or connection between things in the world. Instead, the apparently simple and univocal term ‘cause’ is seen as masking an underlying diversity. Assessing such a claim requires making sense of a difficult counting operation. How do we tell whether a theory of causation is identifying causation with a ‘single’ kind of connection? In practice, there tends not to be much disagreement about how to do the counting, because most philosophical work on causation has sought a view with an obvious kind of unity. The literature often works with a standard range of candidate connections that seem to have an important link to the idea of causation.
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25

Bernstein, Sara. Causal Proportions and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805601.003.0009.

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Both causation and moral responsibility seem to come in degrees, but explaining the metaphysical relationship between them is more complex than theorists have realized. This paper poses an original puzzle about this relationship and uses it to reach three important conclusions. First, certain natural resolutions of the puzzle reveal the existence of a new sort of moral luck called proportionality luck. Second, there is indeterminacy in the type of causal relation deployed in assessments of moral responsibility. Finally—and most importantly—leading theories of causation do not have the ability to capture the sorts of causal differences that matter for moral evaluation of agents’ causal contributions to outcomes.
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26

Over, David E. Causation and the Probability of Causal Conditionals. Edited by Michael R. Waldmann. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199399550.013.3.

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Indicative and counterfactual conditionals are central to reasoning in general and causal reasoning in particular. Normative theorists and psychologists have held a range of views on how natural language indicative and counterfactual conditionals, and probability judgments about them, are related to causation. There is the question of whether “causal” conditionals, referring to possible causes and effects, can be used to explain causation, or whether causation can be used to explain the conditionals. There are questions about how causation, conditionals, Bayesian inferences, conditional probability, and imaging are related to each other. Psychological results are relevant to these questions, including findings on how people make conditional inferences and judgments about possibilities, conditionals, and conditional probability. Deeper understanding of the relation between causation and conditionals will come in further research on people’s reasoning from counterfactuals as premises, and to counterfactuals as conclusions.
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Bennett, Karen. Causing. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199682683.003.0004.

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It is common to sharply distinguish between causal and noncausal determination, and to assume that building or grounding only involves the latter. That is a mistake; the line between causal and noncausal determination is not nearly as clear as it is usually taken to be. This chapter defends the claim that building is causally tainted in two quite distinct senses. First, it is useful to count causation itself as a building relation. That is, the class that includes both causation and other putatively noncausal building relations is reasonably natural and philosophically important. Second, some particular building relations other than causation hold in virtue of causal facts.
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28

Buehner, Marc J. Space, Time, and Causality. Edited by Michael R. Waldmann. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199399550.013.29.

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This chapter explores how the understanding of causality relates to the understanding of space and time. Traditionally, spatiotemporal contiguity is regarded as a cue toward causality. While concurring with this view, this chapter also reviews some boundary conditions of this approach. Moreover, temporal information goes beyond merely helping to identify causal relations; it also shapes the types of causal inferences that reasoners draw. Recent developments further show that the relation between time and causality is bi-directional: not only does temporal information shape and guide causal inferences, but once one holds a causal belief, one’s perception of time and space is distorted such that cause and effect appear closer in space-time. Spatiotemporal contiguity thus supports causal beliefs, which in turn foster impressions of contiguity.
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29

Lewis, Clayton. Causal Relations. Edited by Susan E. F. Chipman. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199842193.013.9.

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30

Hitchcock, Christopher. Probabilistic Causation. Edited by Alan Hájek and Christopher Hitchcock. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.013.41.

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This chapter will explore a variety of projects that aim to characterize causal concepts using probability. These are, somewhat arbitrarily, divided into four categories. First, a tradition within philosophy that has aimed to define, or at least constrain, causation in terms of conditional probability is discussed. Secondly, the use of causal Bayes nets to represent causal relations, to facilitate inferences from probabilities to causal relations, and to ‘identify’ causal quantities in probabilistic terms is discussed. Thirdly, efforts to measure causal strength in probabilistic terms are reviewed, with particular attention to the significance of these measures in the context of epidemiology. Finally, attempts are discussed to analyze the relation of ‘actual causation’ (sometimes called ‘singular causation’) using probability.
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31

Holyoak, Keith J., and Hee Seung Lee. Inferring Causal Relations by Analogy. Edited by Michael R. Waldmann. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199399550.013.25.

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When two situations share a common pattern of relationships among their constituent elements, people often draw an analogy between a familiar source analog and a novel target analog. This chapter reviews major subprocesses of analogical reasoning and discusses how analogical inference is guided by causal relations. Psychological evidence suggests that analogical inference often involves constructing and then running a causal model. It also provides some examples of analogies and models that have been used as tools in science education to foster understanding of critical causal relations. A Bayesian theory of causal inference by analogy illuminates how causal knowledge, represented as causal models, can be integrated with analogical reasoning to yield inductive inferences.
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32

Skow, Brad. Scientific Explanation. Edited by Paul Humphreys. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.15.

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This chapter argues that the notion of explanation relevant to the philosophy of science is that of an answer to a why-question. From this point of view it surveys most of the historically important theories of explanation. Hempel’s deductive-nomological, and inductive-statistical, models of explanation required explanations to cite laws. Familiar counterexamples to these models suggested that laws are not needed, and instead that explanations should cite causes. One theory of causal explanation, David Lewis’s, is discussed in some detail. Many philosophers now reject causal theories of explanation because they think that there are non-causal explanations; some examples are reviewed. The role of probabilities and statistics in explanation, and their relation to causation, is also discussed. Another strategy for dealing with counterexamples to Hempel’s theory leads to unificationist theories of explanation. Kitcher's unificationist theory is presented, and a new argument against unificationist theories is offered. Also discussed in some detail are Van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory, and Streven’s and Woodward’s recent theories of causal explanation.
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33

Pruss, Alexander R. Refinement, Alternatives, and Extensions. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198810339.003.0007.

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A number of questions concerning the precise formulation of causal finitism—mainly, the question of what causal relation counts for generating causal histories—are raised, and solutions are surveyed. It turns out that the Grim Reaper paradox is more subtle than we saw in Chapter 3, and requires careful consideration. Alternatives to causal finitism are considered. The three main ones are: finitism simpliciter, the no-room theory on which space and time lack the room for paradoxical infinities, and Huemer’s rejection of infinite intensive magnitudes. Finitism was already rejected in Chapter 1 on grounds of conflict with mathematics. The no-room solution only works if it implies causal finitism. And Huemer’s solution has some serious difficulties. Finally, extensions of causal finitism to rule out causal loops and infinite explanatory chains are considered.
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34

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Henry E. Brady, and David Collier. Political Science Methodology. Edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199286546.003.0001.

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Political methodology offers techniques for clarifying the theoretical meaning of concepts such as revolution and for developing definitions of revolutions. It also provides descriptive indicators for comparing the scope of revolutionary change, and sample surveys for gauging the support for revolutions. It then presents an array of methods for making causal inferences that provide insights into the causes and consequences of revolutions. An overview of the book is given. Topics addressed include social theory and approaches to social science methodology; concepts and development measurement; causality and explanation in social research; experiments, quasi-experiments, and natural experiments; general methods of quantitative tools for causal and descriptive inference; quantitative tools for causal and descriptive inference; qualitative tools for causal inference; and organizations, institutions, and movements in the field of methodology. In general, the Handbook provides overviews of specific methodologies, but it also emphasizes three things: utility for understanding politics, pluralism of approaches, and cutting across boundaries. This volume discusses interpretive and constructivist methods, along with broader issues of situating alternative analytic tools in relation to an understanding of culture.
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35

Marmodoro, Anna. Aristotelian Powers at Work. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198796572.003.0005.

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This paper puts powers to work by developing a broadly Aristotelian account of causation, built on the fundamental idea (which Aristotle found in Plato, attributed by him to Heraclitus) that causation is a mutual interaction between powers. On this Aristotelian view, causal powers manifest them-selves in dependence on the manifestation of their mutual partners. (See also Heil, this volume; Mumford, this volume; and Martin 2008.) The manifestations of two causal power partners are co-determined, co-varying, and co-extensive in time. (See Marmodoro 2006.) Yet, causation has a direction and is thus asymmetric. This asymmetry is what underpins metaphysically the distinction between causal agent and patient. The proposed Aristotelian analysis of the interaction between mutually manifesting causal powers is distinctive, in that it pays justice to the intuition that there is agency in causation. That is, agency is not a metaphorical way of describing what causal powers do. For some powers, it is a way of being that instantiates the non-anthropomorphic sense in which powers are causal agents. This point is brought out in the paper in relation to the explanation of the concept of change. In an Aristotelian fashion, the paper argues that the distinction be-tween agent and patient in causation is pivotal to offering a realist account of causation that does not reify the interaction of the reciprocal causal partners into a relation. On the proposed view, the interaction between mutually manifesting causal partners consists in the power of one substance being realized in another substance. Specifically, the agent’s causal powers metaphysically belong to the agent, but come to be realized in the patient. The significance of this is that the interaction of the agent’s and the patient’s powers is not a relation; rather, it is an ex-tension of the constitution of the agent onto the patient, which occurs when agent and patient interact and their powers are mutually manifested. Thus the proposed Aristotelian account of causation explains the mutual interaction between manifestation partners—potentiality, agency, and change—as irreducible to one another, but interconnected.
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36

Pearce, Kenneth L. Foundational Grounding and the Argument from Contingency. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198806967.003.0011.

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The argument from contingency for the existence of God is best understood as a request for an explanation of the total sequence of causes and effects in the universe (‘History’ for short). Many puzzles about how there could be such an explanation arise from the assumption that God is being introduced as one more cause prepended to the sequence of causes that (allegedly) needed explaining. In response to this difficulty, this chapter defends three theses. First, it argues that, if the argument from contingency is to succeed, the explanation of History in terms of God must not be a causal explanation; second, that a particular hypothesis about God’s relation to History—that God is what I call the foundational ground of History—is intelligible and explanatory; third and finally, that the explanatory advantages of this hypothesis cannot be had within the confines of naturalism.
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37

Jansson, Lina. When are Structural Equation Models Apt? Causation versus Grounding. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198777946.003.0013.

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While much about the notion of ground in contemporary metaphysics is contested, there is large agreement that ground is closely connected to a certain kind of explanation. Recently, Jonathan Schaffer and Alastair Wilson have argued that ground is a relation that is very closely related to causation and that grounding explanations should be given an account in broadly interventionist terms through the use of structural equations and directed graphs. Such an approach offers the potential benefit of a largely unified framework for explanations with different relations, or different species of the same relation, backing different types of explanation. However, this chapter argues that this benefit cannot be realized since there are crucial differences between causal explanations and grounding explanations in how we can evaluate the aptness of the models in question.
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38

Noordhof, Paul. A Variety of Causes. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199251469.001.0001.

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Metaphysicians often focus on what is vertically fundamental, appealing to grounding or truth-making, rather than what is horizontally fundamental: what must be common to any metaphysical picture of the universe. There is a case for causation being one such feature. But how should it be characterized? A revised semantics for counterfactuals provides the basis for a new counterfactual analysis of causation that is compatible with Humean supervenience but also appropriate for a non-Humean metaphysical framework. Causes (independently of their competitors) both make the chance of an effect very much greater than its mean background chance in the circumstances and actually influences the probability of the effect in this way at the time at which the effect occurred via a complete causal chain. Causation understood in this way is a non-transitive relation. It is neutral over the metaphysics of causes and effects but allows a natural way for events to be understood as one fundamental type of causation, the other being property causation. Although negative causal statements are true, there are no cases of negative causation. The analysis explains how causation involving substantial processes is only one variety of causation, others include double prevention. It allows for a variety of micro- and macro-properties to be the basis of the difference between cause and effect. Laws are patterns of causation realized in different ways in different metaphysical pictures. The analysis of causation characterizes a horizontally fundamental property whose modal character depends upon its different realizations.
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39

Rehder, Bob. Concepts as Causal Models. Edited by Michael R. Waldmann. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199399550.013.39.

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This chapter evaluates the case for treating concepts as causal models, the view that people conceive of a categories as consisting of not only features but also the causal relations that link those features. In particular, it reviews the role of causal models in categorization, the process of inferring an object’s category membership by observing its features. Reviewed studies include those testing categories that are either real world or artificial (made up of the experimenters) and subjects that are either adults or children. The chapter concludes that causal models provide accounts of causal-based categorization judgments that are superior to alternative accounts.
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40

Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Sangeet S. Khemlani. Mental Models and Causation. Edited by Michael R. Waldmann. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199399550.013.4.

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The theory of mental models accounts for the meanings of causal relations in daily life. They refer to seven temporally-ordered deterministic relations between possibilities, which include causes, prevents, and enables. Various factors—forces, mechanisms, interventions—can enter into the interpretation of causal assertions, but they are not part of their core meanings. Mental models represent only salient possibilities, and so they are identical for causes and enables, which may explain failures to distinguish between their meanings. Yet, reasoners deduce different conclusions from them, and distinguish between them in scenarios, such as those in which one event enables a cause to have its effect. Neither causation itself nor the distinction between causes and enables can be captured in the pure probability calculus. Statistical regularities, however, often underlie the induction of causal relations. The chapter shows how models help to resolve inconsistent causal scenarios and to reverse engineer electrical circuits.
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41

Levine, Joseph. Conscious Awareness and (Self-)Representation. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198800088.003.0007.

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Another kind of representational theory of phenomenal character is higher-order theory, which identifies our awareness of our conscious states with a higher-order representation of them. One version of such a theory is the “self-representational” theory, according to which phenomenally conscious states are those that include a representation of themselves, along with whatever perceptual content they possess. I criticize this approach for not properly capturing conscious subjectivity, which is its alleged principal virtue. In particular, I argue that the kind of cognitive relation that obtains between ourselves and the contents of our conscious experience cannot be appropriately modeled on the causal relations that underlie any materialist theory of representation.
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42

Menzies, Peter. Platitudes and Counterexamples. Edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies. Oxford University Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0018.

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This article explains the conception of causation as a natural relation in more detail. It outlines some of the features of our use of the causal concept that do not fit with the idea of causation as a natural relation between events. It then outlines the correct explanation of these features, replacing the metaphysical conception of causation with a conception of causation in terms of a contrastive difference-making relation, where the contrasts are determined contextually on the basis of what are often normative considerations.
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43

Rehder, Bob. Concepts as Causal Models. Edited by Michael R. Waldmann. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199399550.013.21.

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This chapter evaluates the case for treating concepts as causal models, the view that people conceive of a categories as consisting of not only features but also the causal relations that link those features. In particular, it reviews the role of causal models in category-based induction. Category-based induction consists of drawing inferences about either objects or categories; in the latter case one generalizes a feature to a category (and thus its members). How causal knowledge influences how categories are formed in the first place—causal-based category discovery—is also examined. Whereas the causal model approach provides a generally compelling account of a large variety of inductive inferences, certain key discrepancies between the theory and empirical findings are highlighted. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the new sorts of representations, tasks, and tests that should be applied to the causal model approach to concepts.
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44

Glennan, Stuart. Production and Relevance. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779711.003.0007.

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This chapter offers an account of mechanistic production, which is contrasted with Salmon and Dowe’s theory of physical production. It provides a new analysis of the nature of events, and an account of how those events can form productive causal chains. This account identifies three distinct kinds of production: constitutive, precipitating, and chained. The chapter shows how the New Mechanist account addresses a number of standard problems for theories of causation, and for mechanistic theories in particular. These include how mechanistic production could be grounded in fundamental physics, how productive theories can explain causation by omission, prevention, and disconnection, how to explain causal relevance without appeal to counterfactuals, and how to understand the relation between production and constitution in inter-level causal claims. The chapter concludes by discussing how the New Mechanist approach to causation and constitution leads to a sensible account of the nature and limits of reduction and emergence.
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45

Cheng, Patricia W., and Hongjing Lu. Causal Invariance as an Essential Constraint for Creating a Causal Representation of the World. Edited by Michael R. Waldmann. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199399550.013.9.

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This chapter illustrates the representational nature of causal understanding of the world and examines its implications for causal learning. The vastness of the search space of causal relations, given the representational aspect of the problem, implies that powerful constraints are essential for arriving at adaptive causal relations. The chapter reviews (1) why causal invariance—the sameness of how a causal mechanism operates across contexts—is an essential constraint for causal learning in intuitive reasoning, (2) a psychological causal-learning theory that assumes causal invariance as a defeasible default, (3) some ways in which the computational role of causal invariance in causal learning can become obscured, and (4) the roles of causal invariance as a general aspiration, a default assumption, a criterion for hypothesis revision, and a domain-specific description. The chapter also reviews a puzzling discrepancy in the human and non-human causal and associative learning literatures and offers a potential explanation.
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46

Jackson, Frank. Causation and Semantic Content. Edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies. Oxford University Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0029.

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How does causation enter the picture? Belief is a state shaped by the world, a state that seeks to fit the world; desire is a state that shapes the world, that seeks to make the world fit it. Both metaphors are compelling and are loaded with causality. We often use ‘reference’ for the relation between thought and world. We often use ‘content’ for how things have to be for, for example, a belief with that content to be true and a desire with that content satisfied. In these terms, the tradition of seeking to understand aboutness in causal terms is the tradition of seeking causal accounts of reference and content.
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47

Kurki, Milja. Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). Cambridge University Press, 2008.

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48

Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). Cambridge University Press, 2008.

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49

Anjum, Rani Lill, and Stephen Mumford. Dispositionalism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779636.003.0003.

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Since the advent of modern philosophy, causation has been treated as a relation between two separate events. Any worldly dynamism is then provided by the succession of essentially static events. Recent decades have seen a revival of interest in powers, but this has been hampered by an acceptance of many of the presuppositions of modern philosophy, most conspicuously those of Hume. Simply placing powers on top of the static Humean framework will not do. Causal dispositionalism offers a more dynamic notion, where an instance of causation involves a unified process rather than a relation between distinct events. This theory has a number of advantages. It can account for change as well as stability, long- and short-lived processes, genuine complexity and real emergence, non-linear interaction of causes, extreme context-sensitivity, and contrary powers. This is a more plausible framework for understanding causation in biology, ontologically and epistemically.
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50

Frye, Timothy. Economic Transformation and Comparative Politics. Edited by Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.003.0038.

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This article discusses how research on the transformation of command economies has contributed to the broader literature in comparative politics. It depicts the great variation in economic reform across countries over the last fifteen years, and examines how the European Union (EU), quality of governance, regime type, and interest groups influenced economic reform. The article attempts to identify ways in which stronger causal links between middle-range factors and economic reform can be linked. Arguments criticizing middle-range theories due to lack of causal depth are reviewed as well. The article ends by presenting an attempt to combine temporally proximate and distant factors into an explanation for reform outcomes in the region. The argument is focused on the impact of executive partisanship, democratic institutions, and the relation of the Communist Party to national sovereignty before 1989.
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