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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Causation'
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Poellinger, Roland. "Concrete causation." Diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-171789.
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Concrete Causation beschäftigt sich mit Theorien der Verursachung, ihrer Interpretation und ihrer Einbettung in metaphysisch-ontologische Fragestellungen sowie der Anwendung solcher Theorien in naturwissenschaftlichem und entscheidungstheoretischem Kontext. Die Arbeit gliedert sich in vier Kapitel, die eine historisch-systematische Verortung der zentralen Probleme vornehmen (Kapitel 1), um dann eine begriffliche und technische Darstellung der Theorien von David Lewis und Judea Pearl zu liefern (Kapitel 2). Der mathematisch-technische Rahmen von Pearl (in Bayes'schen Netzen) wird nach philosophisch motivierten begrifflichen Überlegungen für eine epistemische Interpretation von Kausalität und in einer Erweiterung des interventionistischen Ansatzes für die Betonung des wissensordnenden Aspekts von Kausalrelationen herangezogen (Kapitel 3). Die Integration von kausalem und nicht-kausalem Wissen in einheitlichen Strukturen stellt einen Ansatz zur Lösung von Problemen der (kausalen) Entscheidungstheorie dar und ermöglicht gleichzeitig die Abbildung von logisch-mathematischen, synonymischen sowie reduktiven Zusammenhängen in operationalisierbaren Netzen der Belief Propagation (Kapitel 4).<br>Concrete Causation centers about theories of causation, their interpretation, and their embedding in metaphysical-ontological questions, as well as the application of such theories in the context of science and decision theory. The dissertation is divided into four chapters, that firstly undertake the historical-systematic localization of central problems (chapter 1) to then give a rendition of the concepts and the formalisms underlying David Lewis' and Judea Pearl's theories (chapter 2). After philosophically motivated conceptual deliberations Pearl’s mathematical-technical framework is drawn on for an epistemic interpretation and for emphasizing the knowledge-organizing aspect of causality in an extension of the interventionist Bayes net account of causation (chapter 3). Integrating causal and non-causal knowledge in unified structures ultimately leads to an approach towards solving problems of (causal) decision theory and at the same time facilitates the representation of logical-mathematical, synonymical, as well as reductive relationships in efficiently structured, operational nets of belief propagation (chapter 4).
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Morgan, Jennifer Margaret. "Analysing causation." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2017. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/7205/.
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This thesis will survey several prominent approaches to analysing causation, discuss their differences and similarities, and look at a number of problems which are common to all of them. I will be arguing for the following claims about how we should approach the process of analysing causation. Firstly, I will be arguing that a reductive analysis is desirable, since if we can reductively analyse causation in terms of something empirically accessible, we can explain how it is possible to know anything about causation. I will argue that to reductively analyse causation is to find out what kind of facts ground causal facts. Secondly, I will argue, following Hall and Strevens, that there are two kinds of causation, causal difference making and causal influence. This two-tiered approach explains the cases where we are tempted to ascribe conflicting characteristics to our concept of causation. Thirdly, I will argue that causal influence grounds causal difference making and that it does so necessarily. That the grounding relation holds necessarily is important for defending the two-tiered approach against the objection that it would yield a disjunctive account.
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McKay, Phyllis Kirsten. "Causation and agency." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.417234.
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Schumacher, Melissa Renée. "Causation and evidence." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/101525.
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Thesis: Ph. D. in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2015.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>This work addresses questions about causation and evidence: How can we learn what causes what? Can we get evidence for objects that don't cause anything? And what is the evidential relationship between events in a causal loop? Structural equations accounts of causation seem to provide a good basis for discovering causal relationships through observation. But these accounts can sometimes give the wrong verdict in cases that are structurally similar to cases that they do get right. Distinctions between default and deviant states, and between more and less normal worlds, have been introduced to solve this problem. In "Defaults, Normality, and Control" I argue that both of these kinds of solution introduce new problems without solving the old one. I propose a different theory of causation based on the structural equations account, designed to capture the intuition that the causes of an event are whatever could have, by not occurring, most easily prevented that event. In the philosophical literature, Occam's Razor is standardly taken to be a constraint on the amount of (types of) objects a theory can be justifiably committed to. In "Occam's Razor and Philosophical Objects" I introduce an interpretation of Occam's Razor that doesn't fit that standard mold, but gives plausible answers to the questions "What is theoretical simplicity?" and "Why should we believe the simpler theory?". I then apply it to abstract and non-fundamental objects, and show that theories that include such objects need be no more complex than theories that don't. We can therefore be justified in believing such theories, even though they make the same predictions about observables as alternative theories. In "Playing Dice With a Time Machine: A New Puzzle About Causal Loops", I use an original puzzle case to bring out the problem of calculating the probabilities of events in a causal loop, and I propose a solution. I also point to some difficulties involved in reaching that solution.<br>by Melissa Renée Schumacher.<br>Ph. D. in Linguistics
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Loewenstein, Yael Rebecca, and Yael Rebecca Loewenstein. "Counterfactuals Without Causation, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/625614.
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It is near-consensus among those currently working on the semantics of counterfactuals that the correct treatment of counterfactuals (whatever it is) must invoke causal independence in order to rule a particular set of seemingly true counterfactuals – including a famous one called Morgenbesser's Coin (MC) – true. But if we must analyze counterfactuals in terms of causation, this rules out giving a reductive account of causation in terms of counterfactuals, and is, as such, a serious blow to the Humean hope of reducing causation to counterfactual dependence.
This dissertation is composed of three self-standing articles. In the first article I argue that counterfactuals like MC are false contrary to appearances; as is the thesis that the correct semantics of counterfactuals must appeal to causal independence.
In the second article I argue that there are important, widely-held assumptions about difference-making and its relationship to causation which are false, and which may underlie some of the remaining, most threatening objections to the counterfactual analysis of causation.
In the final article I discuss the puzzle of reverse Sobel sequences – an alleged problem for the classic Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals. I argue that none of the extant approaches to the problem are right, and defend a novel solution to the puzzle. If I am correct, reverse Sobel sequences do not threaten the classic analysis. They do, however, give additional evidence for the thesis, forcefully defended by Alan Hájek, that most non-probabilistic 'would'-counterfactuals are false. This motivates placing a stronger emphasis on trying to understand probabilistic counterfactuals first and foremost.
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Roberts, Mark. "Essays in cumulative causation." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.620441.
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Ignatenko, D. "Mental causation problem solutions." Thesis, Sumy State University, 2017. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/66273.
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Mental causation is the cause and effect relationship of consciousness and the physical world, in particular, the influence of human consciousness on his/her behavior. In everyday life and scientific practice, the interaction between consciousness and the physical world is taken for granted. The influence of mental states and processes on human behavior is recognized as an established fact in everyday psychology, in scientific psychology, and in the philosophy of psychology. At the same time, in the modern philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the problem of mental causation is the subject of extensive discussions.
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Ignatenko, D. "Mental causation problem solutions." Thesis, Sumy State University, 2017. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/65312.
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Mental causation is the cause and effect relationship of consciousness and the physical world, in particular, the influence of human consciousness on his/her behavior. In everyday life and scientific practice, the interaction between consciousness and the physical world is taken for granted. The influence of mental states and processes on human behavior is recognized as an established fact in everyday psychology, in scientific psychology, and in the philosophy of psychology. At the same time, in the modern philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the problem of mental causation is the subject of extensive discussions.
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Pearlberg, Daniel. "Causation, Mechanism and Mind." The Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1430829433.
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Fischer, Enno [Verfasser]. "Actual Causation / Enno Fischer." Hannover : Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität, 2021. http://d-nb.info/1238222315/34.
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Smith, Sheldon Russell. "Laws and causation : a defense of a modified covering-law conception of causation /." The Ohio State University, 1998. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487949508369487.
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Stanford, Preston Kyle. "A pragmatic theory of causation /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC IP addresses, 1997. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p9804038.
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Adams, Danielle Helen. "The metaphysics of divine causation." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2016. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/15561/.
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It is something of an orthodoxy that the nature of causation can be characterised by the following metaphysical theses: that causes do not necessitate their effects, that causes must temporally precede their effects, that causation is governed by laws of nature, that causation entails counterfactual dependence, and that causation is not systematically overdetermined. Two further commonly accepted metaphysical claims are that causal notions give us the correct tools to properly understand agency, and that the causes of actions are mental events. Classical theism, however, is comprised by certain commitments which seem to be in direct tension with each of these metaphysical theses. God is understood to be causally efficacious – a divine being who creates, sustains, and intervenes in worldly affairs – and so who is, indeed the, paradigmatic causal agent. Further, God is said to be atemporal, non-physical, and such that he exists independently of all else. The God of classical theism is also characterised as being omnipotent, at least in the sense that whatever he wills to be the case cannot fail to be the case. The apparent tension between these metaphysical theses which concern causation and those which concern God thus threaten the very coherence of the notion of divine causality. The goal of this thesis is therefore to examine these prima facie theistically problematic theses concerning causation, and to consider ways of making room for a coherent notion of divine causality. In some cases, it will argue that certain causal theses ought to be rejected, in others, it will find ways of resolving the tension.
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Khoury, Lara. "Uncertain causation in medical liability." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.251465.
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Laird, Kirstie. "Free will and mental causation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.365538.
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Lock, Suzanne M. "Content, Causation and Relational Properties." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.489725.
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If mental properties are relational properties, their causal relevance can be called into question on the grounds that only intrinsic properties are causally efficacious. I argue that this problem has wider scope than is generally recognised by demonstrating that a number of the most attractive theories of mind posit relational content properties. This is contrary to the popular view that the problem of relational properties only ~rises for extemalist and computational theories of mind. I argue that the best attempts to provide an account ofproperty efficacy fail to account for the efficacy of relational properties, and consider whether any of the strategies can be used to develop an account which can be satisfied by relational properties. I identify the use of supervenient causation as a prima Jacie promising strategy.· However, the forms of supervenience offered do not seem to be ones which enable relational properties to supervene. I discuss the notion of supervenience and draw attention to the failure of relational properties to supervene under standard varieties of supervenience. I develop a new version of supervenience, which enables some relational properties to be considered supervenient. This enables me to give an account of property efficacy which can be satisfied by some relational properties. A number of theories of content do not satisfy the account of property efficacy which I develop, but I remain optimistic that the path of reconciliation is the right one to follow to resolve the problem of relational properties.
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Glynn, Luke. "A Probabilistic Analysis of Causation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.523098.
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Ma, Cynthia Kwai Wah. "Process causation and quantum physics." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2001. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1609/.
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Philosophical analyses of causation take many forms but one major difficulty they all aim to address is that of the spatiotemporal continuity between causes and their effects. Bertrand Russell in 1913 brought the problem to its most transparent form and made it a case against the notion of causation in physics. The issue highlighted in Russell's argument is that of temporal contiguity between cause and effect. This tension arises from the imposition of a spectrum of discrete events occupying spacetime points upon a background of spacetime continuum. An immediate and natural solution is to superpose instead spatiotemporally continuous entities, or processes, on the spacetime continuum. This is indeed the process view of physical causation advocated by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe. This view takes the continuous trajectories of physical objects (worldlines) as the causal connection whereby causal influences in the form of conserved quantities are transported amongst events. Because of their reliance on spatiotemporal continuity, these theories have difficulty when confronted with the discontinuous processes in the quantum domain. This thesis is concerned with process theories. It has two parts. The first part introduces and criticizes these theories, which leads to my proposal of the History Conserved Quantity Theory with Transmission. The second part considers the extension of the idea of causal processes to quantum physics. I show how a probability distribution generated by the Schrodinger wavefunction can be regarded as a conserved quantity that makes the spacetime evolution of the wavefunction a quantum causal process. However, there are conceptual problems in the interpretation of the wavefunction, chiefly to do, as I shall argue, with the difference in the behaviours of probabilistic potentials between quantum and classical physics. I propose in the final chapter, the Feynman Path Integral formulation of quantum mechanics (with the Feynman histories) as an alternative approach to incorporating the probabilistic potentials in quantum physics. This account of how to introduce causal processes in quantum mechanics fares better, I claim, than the previous one in dealing with the situational aspect of quantum phenomena that requires the consideration of events at more than one time.
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Gibb, Sophie Catherine. "The metaphysics of mental causation." Thesis, Durham University, 2002. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3863/.
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This thesis argues that the fundamental issues within the mental causation debate are metaphysical ones. Consequently, it is only with metaphysical clarity, that any clarity can be gained in the mental causation debate. In order to provide a successful theory of mental causation one cannot divorce oneself from metaphysics. Neither can one hope to provide a theory of mental causation that is somehow neutral between the various metaphysical systems. Rather, to be plausible, a theory of mental causation must be based within an independently plausible metaphysical framework. I divide the metaphysical issues that are of importance to the mental causation debate into three broad groups. Firstly, what causation is a relation between. Secondly, what the existence and identity conditions for properties are. Thirdly, what the causal relation is. Part One of this thesis is concerned with the first of these issues. The interpretation of the argument from causal over determination, and the possible responses to it, depend upon what causation is a relation between. A belief to the contrary, has led to implausible theories of mental causation and the misrepresentation of those positions within the mental causation debate that are ontologically serious. Part Two is concerned with property analysis. It is suggested that a plausible analysis of properties reveals that the true contenders within the mental causation debate are psychophysical reductionism on the one hand, and interactive mentalism on the other. Part Three is concerned with the causal relation. It is argued that the mental causation debate is affected by what one understands causation to be. In particular, whether a causal closure principle that is strong enough to allow one to advance physicalism can plausibly be advanced, depends upon the theory of causation in which one is embedding psychophysical causation.
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Brown, M. C. "Causation, colour and secondary qualities." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2012. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1377108/.
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This thesis examines Price and Menzies’ defence of an agential theory of causation by analogy with the dispositional theory of colour, and their claim that causation should be treated as a secondary quality. Exploration of the objections to their theory that Price and Menzies discuss shows that causation should not be treated as a secondary quality. These objections are that the agential theory of causation confuses metaphysics with epistemology, that it is unavoidably circular, that it cannot account for causation in cases where agential manipulation is impossible, and that it is unacceptably anthropocentric. It is argued that although understanding causation as a secondary quality is supposed by Price and Menzies to solve these problems, this understanding does not in fact provide adequate responses to the four objections, and hence that treating causation as a secondary quality is under-motivated. It is argued, however, that the analogy made between causation and colour is nevertheless useful, because an idea from a different theory of colour presents a better option for understanding causation. This alternative idea uses agency, but does not bring the disadvantage of making causation metaphysically dependent on agency. The alternative idea is built on the argument for selectionism about colour. It is ultimately argued that although causation is not a secondary quality, it may yet be a tertiary quality.
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Musyimi, Syano. "Making room for absence causation." Thesis, University of Bristol, 2016. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.701813.
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This thesis will focus on two accounts of causation - Lewis' and Armstrong's, and their approach to absence causation. Lewis accepts absence causation but suffers from what I call the Multiplicity Problem (MP), where too many absence causes are admitted I show that this problem is solved, by enlarge, by his latest theory of causation - Causation as Influence. This solution is set against competing alternatives to avoid MP by accounting for causation with context, contrast, or by reversing Lewis' counterfactual dependence · relation. I show that my proposed Lewisian solution is still preferable to these alternatives. I then turn to Armstrong, showing that his rejection of absence causation is inconsistent with scientific realism. Treating causation as pseudo causation fails because the genuinepseudo causation distinction is justified by intuition, and absence causation is intuitively genuine. Accounting for absence causation via the principles of truth making for negative truth is also inadequate because it leaves us with an excessive causal relatum - the entire universe. I conclude that Armstrong should accept absence causation.
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Connolly, Patrick J. Nelson Alan Jean. "Locke's Ideational Account of Causation." Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009. http://dc.lib.unc.edu/u?/etd,2317.
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Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009.<br>Title from electronic title page (viewed Jun. 26, 2009). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy." Discipline: Philosophy; Department/School: Philosophy.
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Kerry, Roger. "Causation in evidence based medicine." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2017. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/40494/.
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Evidence based medicine (EBM) offers an established framework for the generation, interpretation, and utilisation of information in medicine and the health sciences. Central to the practice of EBM is, I argue, the notion of causation. This thesis makes an original contribution to the philosophy of EBM through a unique identification of a causal theory in EBM, and then by demonstrating a reconceptualised theory of causation better suited to evidence based person centred care. PART 1 of this thesis demonstrates that a very specific idea of causation can be witnessed within the structure of EBM. This idea is typically Humean. Through a consideration of the structure and textual narrative of EBM, it is proposed that the framework substantiates central and canonical claims. These claims relate to the core activity of EBM being the informing of clinical decision-making through the transference of causal claims from prioritised research methods. I argue that a Humean notion of causation is problematic for the central and canonical claims, thereby presenting a paradox – EBM is structured to inform clinical decision-making about causation but is inhibited from doing so by the way this very structure conceptualises causation. In PART 2 I argue for a reconceptualisation of causation that offers some solutions to the problems identified in PART 1. This theory relates to a dispositionalist ontology and takes causes to be derived from properties of an individual and as being things that merely tend towards an effect. Causes are seen as complex and context-sensitive, and whereby a traditional Humean account sees these factors as challenges to its epistemological reading, causal dispositionalism takes them as its starting point. To present this theory, desiderata are developed from existing narratives on EBM and elements of the theory set against these. In conclusion, I argue that if medicine and health care desire a framework of practice that is both evidence based and person centred, its causal theory must be reconceptualised. Causal dispositionalism offers an encouraging reconceptualisation.
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Chatti, Sami. "Sémantique de la causation analytique." Thesis, Paris 3, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA030075.
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Cette thèse porte sur la question de la sémantique causative. Elle propose une typologie sémantique pour les verbes causatifs analytiques CAUSE, MAKE, HAVE, GET et LET, fondée sur le modèle de la dynamique des forces. Le premier chapitre est une étude épistémologique de l’essence de la notion de causation et de son expression linguistique en anglais. Le second chapitre situe le cadre théorique de notre analyse, à savoir la sémantique cognitive. Le troisième chapitre est un tour d’horizon des idées les plus récurrentes dans la littérature au sujet de la sémantique des verbes causatifs analytiques. Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous proposons une étude de corpus portant sur les propriétés lexico-sémantiques des verbes CAUSE, MAKE, HAVE, GET et LET. Sur la base des donnés empiriques de notre étude de corpus, nous présentons, dans le dernier chapitre, une nouvelle typologie sémantique pour les verbes causatifs analytiques anglais<br>This thesis deals with the semantics of causative constructions. It develops a semantic typology for English periphrastic causative verbs CAUSE, MAKE, HAVE, GET, and LET, based on the force-dynamics model. The first chapter aims to capture the essence of the notion of causation from an epistemic as well as a linguistic viewpoints. The second chapter sets the theoretical framework, which is cognitive semantics. The third chapter offers a discussion of some of the most commonly shared hypotheses about the semantics of English periphrastic causative verbs in literature. In the fourth chapter, we propose a corpus study of the lexico-semantic features of the verbs CAUSE, MAKE, HAVE, GET and LET. The last chapter presents a newly semantic typology for English periphrastic causative verbs, drawn upon the data we collected from our corpus study
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Pechlivanidi, Elina. "Causation as the manifestation of dispositions : a study on the possibility of dispositional accounts of causation." Thesis, University of Bristol, 2012. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.601182.
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Independently of whether dispositions are understood as essential potencies, powers or mere capacities, it has been acknowledged that there is a direct connection between them and causation. Thus, the attention of metaphysicians has recently turned 10 an explanation DJ causal relations based on dispositions. This thesis is a study on the possibility of formulating a dispositional account of causation and about the way such an account can be articulated. I examine two main issues: first, how exactly do dispositional properties participate in causal processes? Second, how exactly is the relation between dispositional properties and their manifestations to be understood? I argue that in order to understand the nature of the participation of dispositional properties in causal processes, we need a distinction between two kinds of dispositional properties, that I will call capacities and dispositions: only by distinguishing between the two can we understand how a dispositional cause is formed. Moreover, I defend the thesis that dispositions necessitate their manifestations .
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Son, Minjeong. "Causation and syntactic decomposition of events." Access to citation, abstract and download form provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company; downloadable PDF file 1.05 Mb., 255 p, 2006. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3205430.
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Broadbent, Alex. "A reverse counterfactual analysis of causation." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2007. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/226170.
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Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causation starts with the claim that c causes e if ~ C > ~ E, where c and e are events, C and E are the propositions that c and e respectively occur, ~ is negation and > is the counterfactual conditional. The purpose of my project is to provide a counterfactual analysis of causation which departs signigicantly from Lewis's starting point, and thus can hope to solve several stubborn problems for that approach. Whereas Lewis starts with a sufficiency claim, my analysis claims that a certain counterfactual is necessary for causation. I say that, if c causes e, then ~ E > ~ C - I call the latter the Reverse Counterfactual. This will often, perhaps always, be a backtracking counterfactual, so two chapters are devoted to defending a conception of counterfactuals which allows backtracking. Thus prepared, I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual is true of causes, but not of mere conditions for an effect. This provides a neat analysis of the principles governing causal selection, which is extended in a discussion of causal transitivity. Standard counterfactual accounts suffer counterexamples from preemption, but I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual has resources to deal neatly with those too. Finally I argue that the Reverse counterfactual, as a necessary condition oncausation, is the most we can hope for: in principle, there can be no counterfactual sufficient condition for causation.
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Sneddon, Andrew George. "Agents and actions, causation and responsibility." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0004/NQ42980.pdf.
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Maiese, Michelle Lynn. "Mental causation, trying, and the emotions." Diss., Connect to online resource, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3178334.
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Green, Celia. "Causation and the mind-body problem." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.321533.
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Emsley, Richard. "Statistical models of selection and causation." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.570460.
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Crane, Timothy Martin. "The content and causation of thought." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.306351.
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McGrath, Sarah 1972. "Causation in metaphysics and moral theory." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8148.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2002.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>Chapter 1: The causal relata. Ordinary talk suggests that entities from different ontological categories can cause and be caused: Kathy's throw, the fact that Kathy threw, and Kathy herself can all cause the window to break. But according to the majority view, causation exclusively relates events. This chapter defends the contrary view that the causal relata are as miscellaneous as ordinary talk suggests. A question remains: is there an ontological kind K such that causal relations on entities of that kind are somehow more fundamental than causal relations on the non-Ks? I argue that there is such a kind: facts. I defend this claim against objections. Chapter 2. Causation by omission. Ordinary talk also suggests that omissions can be causes. For example, if Barry promised to water Alice's plant, didn't water it, and the plant then dried up and died, then Barry's not watering the plant-his omitting to water the plant-is a cause of its death. But there are reasons to think that either there is no causation by omission, or there is far more of it than common sense allows. I argue that neither disjunct is acceptable, and propose that we avoid the dilemma by embracing the view that causation has a normative component. The proposal faces the objection that causation is a paradigmatic example of a natural, and so entirelynon-normative, relation.<br>(cont.) I argue that the objection can be defused once we are clear about the kind of normativity that plays a role in causation by omission. Chapter 3. Causation and the Making/Allowing Distinction. Common sense morality suggests that it can matter morally whether an agent makes an outcome occur or merely allows it to occur. For example, it is far worse to pinch your little brother than to allow him to be pinched. I argue against the assumption that the making/allowing distinction is exclusive: in fact, the categories of making and allowing overlap. I go on to offer a positive account of makings, and a positive account of allowings.<br>by Sarah McGrath.<br>Ph.D.
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Stentenbach, Michael Joachim. "Structural theories of modelling token causation." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2007. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1970/.
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This thesis deals with the most prominent accounts of analyzing singular event causation by employing counterfactuals or counterfactual information. The classic counterfactual account of token event causation was proposed in 1973 by the philosopher David Lewis and ruled that an event c is a cause of event e, if and only if there is a chain of counterfactually dependent events between c and e. Apart from facing conceptual problems due to its metaphysical claim to analyze causation 'as such' and to reduce it to counterfactual dependency, this account also produced implausible results: first, it stipulated that token causation is a transitive relation, and second, it could not analyze situations in which an effect is over-determined by various causes, either symmetrically or by one cause pre-empting another one. In 2000, almost three decades later, Judea Pearl, formerly an engineer, formulated a new and highly influential theory of modeling causal dependencies using counterfactual information that, as I argue, neither faces these conceptual problems nor produces these undesired results. This formal theory analyzes causal relationships between token events in a given situation in two steps: first, a causal model describing the relevant mechanisms at work in the situation is constructed, and second, causal relationships between the events featured in the situation are determined relatively to this model. Pearl's definition of causation according to a model is technically complicated, but its underlying rationale is that the decisive property of a cause is to sustain its effect via a certain causal process against possible contingencies, this notion of sustenance embodying an aspect of production and an aspect of counterfactual dependency. This theory of Pearl's was received with great interest in the philosophical community, most importantly by Christopher Hitchcock and James Woodward, who tried to simplify this account while preserving the basic intuition that a cause is linked to its effect by a causal process, in essence a concatenation of the mechanisms at work in the situation, just defining a causal process in a formally simpler way. I describe and employ this simplified account by Hitchcock and Woodward as a graphic introduction to Pearl's theory, because the same basic notions, like the one of a causal model, are defined in a formally more accessible way and the basic problems, like the generation of a causal model, become obvious. I mainly discuss Hitchcock's account, since this is the earlier one, since it is more elaborate, and mainly since it is conceptually in need of clarification. Woodward's account is in essence equivalent to Hitchcock's, given a slightly changed terminology. The core of my thesis consists of a comparison of Pearl's theory with Hitchcock's account. I present four paradigmatic examples, three of which are judged differently by these two theories. In each of these three examples our causal intuition is in accord with the judgment delivered by Pearl's account but contradicts the verdict of Hitchcock's. I draw the conclusion that Hitchcock's project of simplifying Pearl's theory fails in the second step of causal analysis, i.e. in defining causation according to a given model. Building on the lessons learned from this comparison, I offer a slight generalization of Pearl's definition of token causation according to a model, since Pearl's original account has the shortcoming that token causes cannot be exogenous in a model.
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Schulz, Christoph. "Causation and the objectification of agency." Thesis, University of Hertfordshire, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2299/16480.
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This dissertation defends the so-called 'agency-approach' to causation, which attempts to ground the causal relation in the cause's role of being a means to bring about its effect. The defence is confined to a conceptual interpretation of this theory, pertaining to the concept of causation as it appears in a causal judgement. However, causal judgements are not seen as limited to specific domains, and they are not exclusively attributed to human agents alone. As a methodological framework to describe the different perspectives of causal judgments, a method taken from the philosophy of information is made use of - the so-called 'method of abstraction'. According to this method, levels of abstraction are devised for the subjective perspective of the acting agent, for the agent as observer during the observation of other agents' actions, and for the agent that judges efficient causation. As a further piece of propaedeutic work, a class of similar (yet not agency-centred) approaches to causation is considered, and their modelling paradigms - Bayesian networks and interventions objectively construed - will be criticised. The dissertation then proceeds to the defence of the agency-approach, the first part of which is a defence against the objection of conceptual circularity, which holds that agency analyses causation in causal terms. While the circularity-objection is rebutted, I rely at that stage on a set of subjective concepts, i.e. concepts that are eligible to the description of the agent's own experience while performing actions. In order to give a further, positive corroboration of the agency-approach, an investigation into the natural origins and constraints of the concept of agency is made in the central chapter six of the dissertation. The thermodynamic account developed in that part affords a third-person perspective on actions, which has as its core element a cybernetic feedback cycle. At that point, the stage is set to analyse the relation between the first- and the third-person perspectives on actions previously assumed. A dual-aspect interpretation of the cybernetic-thermodynamic picture developed in chapter six will be directly applied to the levels of abstraction proposed earlier. The level of abstraction that underpins judgments of efficient causation, the kind of causation seemingly devoid of agency, will appear as a derived scheme produced by and dependent on the concept of agency. This account of efficient causation, the 'objectification of agency', affords the rebuttal of a second objection against the agency-approach, which claims that the approach is inappropriately anthropomorphic. The dissertation concludes with an account of single-case, or token level, causation, and with an examination of the impact of the causal concept on the validity of causal models.
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Buhamad, Zahrah. "Cytomegalovirus glycoprotein types and disease causation." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2018. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/cytomegalovirus-glycoprotein-types-and-disease-causation(c05aa79c-e162-4b5b-86e7-136730243be9).html.
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Human Cytomegalovirus (HCMV) is the most common cause of viral congenital infection in the world. Around 5-10% of HCMV infected children are symptomatic at birth, and 50-90% of these develop severe manifestations with a 30% mortality rate. Among the asymptomatic children at birth, 10-15% develop late sequelae. The major cell entry glycoproteins of HCMV form three complexes: gC-I containing gB; gC-II containing gM & gN; and gC-III containing gH, gL, and gO (or UL128-131). These entry glycoproteins are polymorphic, producing different glycoprotein genotypes. The polymorphic nature of the glycoproteins as well as their ability to elicit neutralizing antibodies made them of interest in correlating them with the severity and outcome of the disease. This study aimed to develop a robust system to identify clusters of glycoprotein genotypes and to correlate them with disease manifestation. PCR assays of high sensitivity were used to identify all six glycoproteins. The PCR products were digested using restriction enzymes (RFLP) to identify the glycoprotein genotypes. Available laboratory strains (AD169, Towne, Davis, Toledo, and Merlin) as well as 112 clinical samples were amplified and genotyped using the assay, and their glycoprotein genotype profile was determined. A reliable sensitive assay was successfully developed to identify all glycoprotein genotypes including a novel gM assay using PCR/RFLP. The clinical samples were grouped according to disease manifestation (Group 1: congenital/postnatal patients (subgroup 1A: confirmed congenital patients & subgroup 1B: patients with either congenital or postnatal infection), Group 2: immunocompetent patients, Group 3: immunocompromised patients (subgroup 3A: immunocompromised patients with primary infection, subgroup 3B: immunocompromised patients with recurrent infection & subgroup 3C: immunocompromised patients with unconfirmed primary or recurrent infection)). Genotype gB1 was found predominantly prevalent in congenital/postnatal and immunocompromised patients, while gB3 was the most common genotype in immunocompetent patients. This result along with the phylogenetic analysis performed in this study suggest a relationship between gB genotypes and the immune response of the patients, where gB3 may be positively selected by host immune pressure. The novel gM assay genotyped the highly conserved gene (UL100) into three distinct genotypes; gM3 genotype associated with the congenital/postnatal group; which may provide an insight into understanding viral attachment and spread into the host cell. In congenital/postnatal infection, gH1 (72.7%) and gL4 (65.1%) were the most prevalent genotypes (gH1= 32/44, gL4= 28/43; P=0.000). In immunocompetent patients, mixed gH and mixed gL genotypes significantly correlated with the group, and in the immunocompromised group gH2 and mixed gL genotype were the most common genotypes (51.1% and 46.9% respectively). Glycoproteins gO, gH and gL are components of gC-III complex and gO1 was found to be the most prevalent gO genotype in all infection types (Group 1= 32.1%, Group 2= 85.7%, Group 3= 18.8%; P < 0.05). Also, in congenital/postnatal infection gN and gO were found to significantly link with each other and this is expected since both glycoproteins are highly polymorphic and are located on adjacent gene loci in HCMV genome (gN1+gO1a (P=0.000), gN3a+gO4 (P= 0.000)). The specific gN-gO linkages found here could be potential indicators for congenital/postnatal infection. In congenital/postnatal infection group, gH had significant linkages to gN and gO (gH1+gN1 (P=0.023, gH1+gO1a (P=0.013)) suggesting that interlinked selection of glycoprotein genotypes in the gC-II and gC-III complexes is involved in the development of congenital infection. High viral loads were found trending with immunocompromised patients, while low viral loads were significantly associated with mixed infected patients. This study has shown significant associations between a number of glycoproteins and congenital infection. Previously ignored glycoproteins gM and gL have been shown to be potentially of significant interest in this study and a larger study to confirm this is needed. In most cases the pattern of glycoprotein genotypes in congenital infection is more similar to that of immunocompromised than immunocompetent patients and it is possible that immune pressure is selecting for or against particular glycoprotein genotypes. The relationship between mixed infection and sample type may offer opportunities for development of prognostic biomarkers for congenital disease and further work is warranted.
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White, Benjamin G. "Mind-Body Dualism and Mental Causation." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/390365.
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Philosophy<br>Ph.D.<br>The Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that since every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and cases of causal overdetermination (wherein a single effect has more than one sufficient cause) are rare, it follows that if minds cause physical effects as frequently as they seem to, then minds must themselves be physical in nature. I contend that the Exclusion Argument fails to justify the rejection of interactionist dualism (the view that the mind is non-physical but causes physical effects). In support of this contention, I argue that the multiple realizability of mental properties and the phenomenal and intentional features of mental events give us reason to believe that mental properties and their instances are non-physical. I also maintain (a) that depending on how overdetermination is defined, the thesis that causal overdetermination is rare is either dubious or else consistent with interactionist dualism and the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and (b) that the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause is not clearly supported by current science. The premises of the Exclusion Argument are therefore too weak to justify the view that minds must be physical in order to cause physical effects as frequently as they seem to.<br>Temple University--Theses
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Fujita, Nanako. "Gunnar Myrdal's Theory of Cumulative Causation Revisited." 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/11958.
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Langenskiöld, Sophie. "Peer influence on smoking : causation or correlation?" Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-509.
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In this thesis, we explore two different approaches to causal inferences. The traditional approach models the theoretical relationship between the outcome variables and their explanatory variables, i.e., the science, at the same time as the systematic differences between treated and control subjects are modeled, i.e., the assignment mechanism. The alternative approach, based on Rubin's Causal Model (RCM), makes it possible to model the science and the assignment mechanism separately in a two-step procedure. In the first step, no outcome variables are used when the assignment mechanism is modeled, the treated students are matched with similar control students using this mechanism, and the models for the science are determined. Outcome variables are only used in the second step when these pre-specified models for the science are fitted. In the first paper, we use the traditional approach to evaluate whether a husband is more prone to quit smoking when his wife quits smoking than he would have been had his wife not quit. We find evidence that this is the case, but that our analysis must rely on restrictive assumptions. In the subsequent two papers, we use the alternative RCM approach to evaluate if a Harvard freshman who does not smoke (observed potential outcome) is more prone to start smoking when he shares a suite with at least one smoker, than he would have been had he shared a suite with only smokers (missing potential outcomes). We do not find evidence that this is the case, and the small and insignificant treatment effect is robust against various assumptions that we make regarding covariate adjustments and missing potential outcomes. In contrast, we do find such evidence when we use the traditional approach previously used in the literature to evaluate peer effects relating to smoking, but the treatment effect is not robust against the assumptions that we make regarding covariate adjustments. These contrasting results in the two latter papers allow us to conclude that there are a number of advantages with the alternative RCM approach over the traditional approaches previously used to evaluate peer effects relating to smoking. Because the RCM does not use the outcome variables when the assignment mechanism is modeled, it can be re-fit repeatedly without biasing the models for the science. The assignment mechanism can then often be modeled to fit the data better and, because the models for the science can consequently better control for the assignment mechanism, they can be fit with less restrictive assumptions. Moreover, because the RCM models two distinct processes separately, the implications of the assumptions that are made on these processes become more transparent. Finally, the RCM can derive the two potential outcomes needed for drawing causal inferences explicitly, which enhances the transparency of the assumptions made with regard to the missing potential outcomes.<br>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006 S. 1-13: sammanfattning, s. [15]-161: 4 uppsatser
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Langenskiöld, Sophie. "Peer influence on smoking: causation or correlation? /." Stockholm : Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm School of Economics, 2005. http://www2.hhs.se/efi/summary/692.htm.
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Hide, Sophie. "Exploring accident causation in the construction industry." Thesis, Loughborough University, 2003. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/7590.
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The construction industry has a longstanding reputation for offering dangerous work and has above average rates of occupational injuries and fatalities. Although fatalities have more than halved in the last 20 years, there continues to be more than one construction worker death on average per week. Earlier construction research has generated a wealth of data portraying a clear profile of accident types, but has failed to reveal what happened - the causal factors. In response to this lack of information the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) sponsored this research, the main component of which has been to undertake detailed examination of construction industry accidents. Lacking any precedent of earlier or related work, an important precursor to data collection was a review of the resources that might inform development of the methodology. The path of progress in accident research was explored through evaluation of accident causation models. The need to identify active and latent factors using a systems approach was identified. Desirable features of the systems approach were isolated and, against these criteria, construction accident models were evaluated. Construction accident models were found to be too technically orientated and focused upon human failings to fulfil the criteria for the systems approach. Nevertheless some gave good representation of failure potential through the project lifecycle, and these features were isolated for later inclusion during development of the data collection methods. To complement the theoretical development, perceptions of accident causation were gathered from groups of construction industry practitioners', by the use of focus groups. Appraisal of the accident investigation processes used in industry identified numerous problems with reporting and interpretation, and it was concluded that they are not efficient ways to explore latent conditions. Recommendations for improvements include the development of `performance assessments'; a supplementary system (to synchronise with the risk assessment process) for assessment of factors that affect performance and which are contributory in accident causations, the latent conditions. Benchmarking with industries that have moved away from the traditional organisational and safety management approaches is also advised. It will be an additional challenge to devise changes that are compatible with the unique construction management and contracting methods - any interventions will need careful management, leadership, participatory processes and cross-disciplinary development.
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HOLLANDA, GABRIEL JUCA DE. "MENTAL CAUSATION AND FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY: PHYSICALIST ARGUMENTS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2011. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=18346@1.
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CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO<br>O fisicalismo contemporâneo força a filosofia a lidar com o problema da
causação mental: Como a mente é causalmente relevante em um mundo físico?
Uma das saídas propostas, o epifenomenalismo, é visto por filósofos importantes
como uma posição que preserva características essenciais à subjetividade sem
contrariar os fatos científicos. No entanto, pode-se argumentar que a
epistemologia dos mesmos e o caráter das leis naturais se chocam com as supostas
vantagens do epifenomenalismo.<br>Contemporary physicalism compels philosophy to deal with the problem of
mental causation: How is the mind causally relevant in a physical world? A
proposed solution, epiphenomenalism, is seen by major philosophers as a position
that preserves features that are crucial to subjectivity without clashing with
scientific facts. Still, the epistemology of the latter and the character of natural
laws arguably contradict the alleged advantages of epiphenomenalism.
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Pusztai, David Miklós. "Causation in the law of State responsibility." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2017. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/267922.
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Causation has, at the very minimum, two functions in legal responsibility regimes. First, there is no responsibility without a conduct with causal consequences, making causation a condition of responsibility. Second, causation determines and delimits the extent of liability. The first claim of this study is that the decision of the International Law Commission to construct a responsibility regime unconditional on damage did not result in the exclusion of causation from the conditions of responsibility. There are at least two signs demonstrating that the attempt to exclude responsibility-grounding causation from State responsibility did not hold ground in practice. First, there is abundant case law pre- and postdating the codification of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), confirming that responsibility-grounding causation exists in international law. Second, notwithstanding the denial of ARSIWA and its commentaries, reading between the lines reveals that several concepts of State responsibility are of a causal nature and their application inevitably implies a causal inquiry. There are two interrelated explanations for this. First, at the heart of the system of State responsibility lies the concept of the ‘internationally wrongful act’. I argue that the law of State responsibility lacks a coherent action theory. In particular, a causal theory of action would explain several anomalies visible in the case law. The second explanation rests on approaching causation in the law of international responsibility as a general principle of law. The prevailing view in the case law and the academic contributions is that causation and, more specifically, certain standards of causation are general principles of law. In making the second claim of this thesis, I will argue that this is only partially true. Causation is a general principle in as much as the existence of a causal link is a condition of responsibility and one possible condition of delimiting liability. ARSIWA therefore runs contrary to this general principle. However, the authorities arguing for a specific test of causation, be it directness, proximity, foreseeability or other tests, do not have a substantial basis to do so. What remains, as an empirical and inductive method in line with Article 38 (1) d) of the ICJ Statute, is to distil the actual practice of international courts and tribunals. My third claim is that there is merit in this exercise and it is possible to identify recurring solutions to recurring problems of causation. This study is the second one to conduct this survey and analysis of the case law, following the footsteps of Brigitte Stern, updating and complementing her otherwise exhaustive and authoritative text on the subject. The thesis concludes with a list of the distilled principles and postulates on respective problems of causation, in particular on the applicability and the limits of the ‘but for’ test, the applicable standard of remoteness, multiple causation and contributory negligence.
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Infantino, Marta. "Comparative Law of causation in Tort Law." IUS ET VERITAS, 2014. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/123595.
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this article analyzes the causal element of torts from the perspective of comparative law, focusing on the field of tort liability. Thus, it specifies both the particular aspects of the investigation as well as each legal system studied. then, the article discusses the differences and similarities of each system. Later, it stops on the dominant approaches examining its success on facing the tort phenomenon in order to highlight the essential characteristics that determine the various approaches tort liability can assume.<br>El presente artículo analiza el elemento causal de la responsabilidad civil desde una perspectiva de derecho comparado, haciendo énfasis sobre el campo de la responsabilidad aquiliana. Así, precisando tanto los aspectos particulares de la propia investigación como de cada Ordenamiento Jurídico estudiado, el artículo aborda las diferencias y similitudes de cada Ordenamiento. De esta forma, se detiene sobre los enfoques dominantes examinando la capacidad de los mismos. Ello con la finalidad de evidenciar las características esenciales que determinan los diversos alcances que puede asumir la responsabilidad aquiliana.
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Fletcher, Laura B. "Depression in chronic pain syndromes determining causation /." Online version, 1999. http://www.uwstout.edu/lib/thesis/1999/1999fletcherl.pdf.
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Friend, Toby. "A Humean account of laws and causation." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2018. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10041589/.
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The thesis proposes a new account of laws of nature and token causation within the Humean tradition. After a brief introduction in §1, I specify and defend in §2 a Humean approach to the question of laws and causation. In §3 I defend the view that laws are conditional generalisations which concern 'systems' and detail further issues concerning the scope, content and universality of laws. On the basis of the discussion concerning laws' logical form, I argue in §4 against a view of laws as mirroring the structure of causal relations. Moreover, I show how this conception is implicit in the best system account of laws, thereby giving us reason to reject that account too. §5 presents an alternative `causal-junctions conception' of laws in terms of four causal features often associated with laws: component-level and law-level dispositionality, and variable-level and law-level causal asymmetry. These causal features combine to demarcate a central class of laws called `robust causal junction laws' from which other laws can be accounted for. §6 provides a Humean analysis of the causal features used to characterise robust causal junction laws. This is done first by providing an analysis of dispositions in terms of systems and laws, and second, by providing an analysis of causal asymmetry in terms of relations of probabilistic independence. In §7, I then provide a nomological analysis of token causation by showing how the causal junctions described by robust causal junction laws can be chained together in a particular context.
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White, Andrea Suzanne. "Mental causation and the metaphysics of action." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2018. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/20501/.
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The subject of this dissertation is the problem of mental causation: the problem of how the mental is able to causally interact with the physical. I show that the problem of mental causation, as it is presented in contemporary philosophy of mind, is a pseudo-problem. My claim is that contemporary philosophy of mind has misidentified what it is about mental causation that we need, but struggle, to understand. This is because contemporary philosophy of mind labours under a misapprehension of what mental causation is supposed to be. In most discussions of the problem of mental causation, mental causation is presented as a cause-effect relation between mental and physical entities. I call this understanding of mental causation the relational understanding of mental causation: Relational understanding of mental causation: mental causation is a matter of mental items (events, processes or states) standing in causal relations to physical events, e.g. bodily movements. The relational understanding of mental causation is widely endorsed largely because it is thought essential to our conception of ourselves as agents who act intentionally and who bear moral responsibility. I argue that while intentional action does entail the existence of causation which involves mentality – something which is worthy of the name ‘mental causation’ – the mental causation intentional action presupposes ought not to be understood in relational terms. When we say that someone acted intentionally because of what she believed, desired or intended, the concepts belief, desire and intention do not refer to items which stand in causal relations to bodily movements. I will defend this thesis by examining metaphysics of action and the nature of agency.
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Liu, Dayang. "A review of causal inference." Worcester, Mass. : Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 2009. http://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/ETD/Available/etd-010909-121301/.
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Donovan, Paul. "Context and causation in the evaluation of training." Thesis, University of Leicester, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.490754.
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De, Anna Gabriele. "Formal causation and mental representation : a Thomistic proposal." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12915.
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In the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's theory of cognition for contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that mind and world are formally identical and that this relationship overcomes various problems associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is grounded on the idea that the world can act on the mind through a relation of formal causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and which may meet the requirements prompted by current discussions. The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, according to which the world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are hylomorphically constituted (viz., metaphysically composed of form and matter) is defended. Aquinas's claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. the forms of human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be in principle carried on without the need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four species of causes (material, formal, final and efficient). Aquinas's attempt to explain causal relations conditionally is developed along the lines suggested by John Mackie's INUS conditional analysis. Jaegwon Kim's implementation of Mackie's proposal through an object-based metaphysics of events is then adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these grounds, a theory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas's theory of mental representation. The ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in the broad sense that it is built on Aquinas's metaphysics and is consistent with his claims on causation.