Academic literature on the topic 'Central Monetary unions Banks and banking'

This paper seeks to explore the PSPP decision of the German Constitutional Court and its effect on the monetary policy decisions taken by central banks. It begins by exploring the decision and its effect in Germany, together with its wider implications for the European Monetary Union before moving onto consider the standard of review that should be applied by the Courts when they are required to review central banks actions. Conclusions are reached to show that any standard of review should be limited because of the unique economic and political circumstances in which central bank decision making takes place. Keywords: Central Banking; Judicial Review; Proportionality; European Law; European Monetary Union.

The article discusses the current state of the monetary – credit sphere in the former states of the Soviet Union. The authors note that, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which led to the defragmentation of the monetary system, is an important event in the formation of the financial sector in Central Asia. The single monetary and financial system, which was adapted to the conditions of the planned economy, had started rapidly falling apart. The result was a break of the traditionally existing economic ties. It is important to note that the monetary policy has a direct impact on the major macro-economic indicators such as GDP, employment and the level of prices. It is thus important to have a solid legal base. The accelerated formation of national monetary systems in Central Asian states has required the creation of genuinely independent emission center as the Central Banks of Central Asia. Since 1994, Central Asian governments have begun to carry out macroeconomic regulation, mutual settlement in the economy and emission activity. The next step was a reform of the banking system in Central Asia. At the beginning of the independence of the Central Asian states a legal framework was created and a transition was made to a two-tier banking system. According to the adopted laws in the countries of Central Asia, a two-tier banking system was formed, where the upper level was represented by the State Bank of the region (with emission rights), and the bottom were - commercial and government specialized. Creating second tier banks was a response to the needs of the Central Asian countries.

AbstractThis paper analyses how accounting frameworks can affect three important areas of responsibility of many central banks, namely monetary policy, financial stability and banking supervision. The identified effects of accounting rules and accounting information on the activities of a central bank are manifold. First, the effectiveness of monetary policy crucially hinges on the financial independence of a central bank, which can be evidenced, inter alia, by its financial strength. Using a new simulation of the financial results of the European Central Bank (ECB), this paper shows that the reported annual profit and financial buffers of a central bank can be significantly affected by accounting, profit distribution and loss coverage rules. Second, in respect of financial stability, the accounting frameworks applied by commercial banks can not only affect their behaviour, but also that of financial markets. Indeed, there is evidence that accounting frameworks amplified pro-cyclicality during the recent crisis, and thus posed risks to the stability of the financial system. This being so, the accounting frameworks of credit institutions have obvious implications for central banks’ analyses with regard to promoting financial stability. Finally, as regards banking supervision, regulatory reporting and key supervisory ratios are based on accounting data. Under the new regulatory framework for banks in the European Union (EU), bank supervisors are highly reliant on accounting data. This means that central banks, in their role as bank supervisors, need to understand the underlying accounting rules and should directly support the development and application of harmonised accounting frameworks.

The latest financial crises in Europe and the United States have reminded us of the importance of the role of central banks as Lender of Last Resort. This article examines the current legal framework in the European Union with regard to the allocation of Lender of Last Resort competence, which until now has been exercised by the national central banks in the Eurozone. The new Emergency Liquidity Assistance Agreement 2017 sustains this institutional design, leaves the Emergency Liquidity Assistance competence with the national central banks and specifies the cooperation between the European Central Bank and the national central banks with regard to the veto-option of the European Central Bank to national Emergency Liquidity Assistance operations. Against this background, the paper discusses whether the current legal competence structure of the European and Monetary Union would also allow for more authority of the European Central Bank with regard to Emergency Liquidity Assistance powers. The paper concludes there is a sufficient legal basis in the monetary policy and financial stability mandate of the European Central Bank to allow it to grant Emergency Liquidity Assistance at least with regard to ‘significant’ banks, as defined under the current European Banking Supervision regime.

The ECB could hardly afford political neutrality, even in the monetary union’s “honeymoon phase”. Being a stateless central bank entailed striking compromises between confl icting (national) monetary policy preferences. However, such compromises would often be reached at the expense of theoretical consistency and to the detriment of coherence in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. And, perhaps inevitably, they would also bear the mark of the dominant partner in the European Monetary System, that is prior to the establishment of the monetary union, now also being the biggest subscriber to the ECB’s capital. Political neutrality and, for that matter, monetary activism on the part of the ECB -as well as liquidity in the euro-area- were largely inadequate during the euro area crisis, especially in its early phase. They were subsequently increased, but at a slow pace and in a preferential fashion, that is, largely to the benefi t of the banking industry. Eventually, the ECB did try to make a virtue of necessity; yet, this could only go so far. Thus, the ECB has reluctantly become the only game in town, its reluctance being mostly associated with the overriding concerns of certain national central banks of the Eurosystem, most notably the Bundesbank; namely, ensuring monetary dominance, averting (at that time illusory) infl ationary dangers, preventing moral hazard, enforcing structural reforms and, not least, fending off any, indirectly emerging, type of transfer union. Therefore, the ECB could have no great ambitions; its lonely game was unlikely to produce a medal-winning policy maker in the world championship of central banking.

Aim: The Banking Union is an important step towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union. The strengthening of the European banking system has become a topic of debate since the 2008 crisis when it became clear that stability and security of the system security may require increased supervision over operations conducted. The Banking Union was created to avoid the situation that taxpayers are first in line to pay for bailing out ailing banks. The Banking Union consists of three pillars: 1) the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which centralizes supervision of European banks around the European Central Bank, 2) the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which the main purpose is to ensure the efficient resolution for recapitalization failing banks, and 3) the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which is still unfinished. The creation of the Banking Union is accompanied by a remarkable transfer of sovereignty to the European level. This article aims to provide an overview of the changes unfolding across the Banking Union from a law and economics perspective and to explain the role of the European Central Bank in supervision over the banking system, which is different from the policy of controlling prices through determining the level of interest rates and keeping inflation under control. Design/Research methods: The analysis of the functioning Banking Union is based on the review of literature and analysis of reports and legal acts. Findings: The Banking Union supports financial integration in the EU by implementing a common set of rules and a common supervisory and resolution mechanism. The creation of the Deposit Insurance Scheme is likely to contribute to the protection of banks and consumers in case of a potential future crisis. The author argues that the European Central Bank as a supervisor of the financial market should create a second supervisory body, which would significantly strengthen the system and allow the ECB more efficiently fulfill its task as chief supervisor.

Abstract The fact that money, banking, and financial markets interact in important ways seems self-evident. The theoretical nature of this interaction, however, has not been fully explored. To this end, we integrate the Diamond (1997, Journal of Political Economy105, 928–956) model of banking and financial markets with the Lagos and Wright (2005, Journal of Political Economy113, 463–484) dynamic model of monetary exchange—a union that bears a framework in which fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium, where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable in government money, where the terms of bank deposit contracts are affected by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets, where banks are subject to runs, and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play, both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort. Among other things, the model provides a rationale for nominal deposit contracts combined with a central bank lender-of-last-resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.

Introduction. Throughout the centuries there took place a process of central banks’ development that reflected on the area of target defining, establishing the relationship with government, interconnection with financial market participants, inner management processes. This institute’s evolution from the first bank of issue creation till the modern central bank, including the supranational central bank in the European Union, is characterized by complicated tools of the change of policy, practice, institutional structure, aims and status. Nowadays the next stage of central banks’ development occurs and is characterized by expanding the mandate, reforming the policy, developing innovative aims. This stage is outlined with the global financial and economic crisis and the post-crisis period of the world financial system’s recovery. Under these circumstances, the central banks’ role tends to increase in terms of overcoming the consequences on the global financial and economic crisis that prompts actualizing the issues of integration of unconventional measures in the monetary policy tool, coordination of work of central bank and government concerning debt management, cooperation between the central bank and international financial institutions within the framework of debt management, cooperation between the central banks and international financial institutions within the framework of banking management. Purpose. Generalization of stages and systematization of the causes of emergence, formation and development of a central bank institution through the study of their creation’s evolution and functions’ transformation. Method (methodology). In order to investigate the historical processes, logical sequence of central banks’ development both historical and logical methods of scientific researches were applied. Results. The reasons of central banks’ emergence were generalized, the evolution of central banks’ creation was studied, stages of emergence and development of central banks were further developed and systematized. The peculiarities of the modern stage of central banks’ functioning, role’s change and transformation of functions under the influence of global financial and economic crises.

The granting of a £7,000m bilateral loan by the British government to the Republic of Ireland in October 2010 highlights the banking co-dependence of modern Anglo-Irish relations. This article provides a Bank-of-England-centred perspective on the development of Irish monetary institutions from the granting of Irish monetary independence in December 1921 to the establishment of the Central Bank of Ireland in 1943. Irrespective of unresolved Anglo-Irish political issues, the Bank of England's Irish policy during this period was based on a strict adherence to Montagu Norman's key central banking principles of co-operation, exclusiveness and political autonomy. This article identifies that the application of these principles survived both the coming to power of Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Destiny) in Southern Ireland in 1932 and the outbreak of war in 1939. This article also argues that Norman's adherence to a wider internationalist view of monetary relations played an important role in forcing the overwhelmingly Protestant and pro-union Irish commercial banks, headed by the Bank of Ireland, to come to terms with the reality of Irish monetary independence. In this context, Norman's approach to Southern Ireland parallels the transition from Empire to Commonwealth, which began to emerge in the interwar period.

Abstract This paper reviews the measures adopted by central banks from the most important economies during the crisis and assess their effectiveness. It is important for policy makers to identify which measures were effective in limiting the financial system distress in order to adopt the appropiate measure during future crisis. In case of US, TARP was the most important program for banking system and it was effective in reducing banks’ contribution to systemic risk and banks’ default probabilities. But TARP also conducted to a reduction in loans growth and create incentives for higher risk-taking behavior. The unconventional monetary policies adopted by ECB during the period 2008- 2016 reduced the impact of the crisis on the European economy and achieved their objectives: to support banks’ funding and to increase lending to real economy (LTROs), to calm tensions from bond markets (CBPP, SMP, OMT), to support economic activity and to stabilize inflation rate (SMP, OMT, LTROs, APP).

Mestrado em Economia Monetária e Financeira
Esta dissertação analisa a supervisão bancária na União Europeia e o possível conflito de interesses entre política monetária e supervisão, que pode acontecer como consequência da integração das funções de supervisão e regulação bancária no Banco Central Europeu. A secção empírica considera o tema pelo lado da supervisão, tendo como referência o cumprimento dos princípios fundamentais de Basileia para uma supervisão bancária eficaz e procurando avaliar se a estrutura de supervisão tem impacto no cumprimento dos mesmos. Foi considerada uma amostra de 22 países e realizada uma cross-sectional anlysis. Os resultados sugerem que a estrutura de supervisão não tem significância no cumprimento dos princípios em questão. Pelo contrário, a liberdade financeira é uma variável com significância.
This dissertation analyses the banking supervision in the European Union and the possible conflict of interests between monetary policy and supervision due to the integration of banking supervision and regulation duties within the European Central Bank (ECB). The empirical section considers the topic on the supervision side, looking at the compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCP) for effective supervision as a benchmark, trying to assess whether the banking supervision framework has significant impact on the best supervision practises. A sample of 22 countries and a cross-sectional analysis was considered. The results suggest that the supervisory structure has no significance on the compliance with the BCP. On the contrary, financial freedom is a significant variable.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Dept. of Economics and Social Sciences Consortium. University of Missouri--Kansas City, 2006.
"A dissertation in economics and social sciences." Advisor: L. Randall Wray. Typescript. Vita. Title from "catalog record" of the print edition Description based on contents viewed Dec. 19, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 422-452). Online version of the print edition.

Chapter 1 builds a two-bank bargaining model of the overnight interbank market in which, due to the commitment of the central bank to its interest rate target, bargaining between banks impacts loan sizes rather than interest rates (the converse of existing models). As a result, policy changes have a different impact to what is posited by existing models. The model is applied to a market where the commitment of the central bank is well documented (Australia). With reasonable parameter values, the model replicates five stylised facts of the Australian market. Moreover, the stylised facts are replicated without recourse to any asymmetries. Chapter 2 extends the two-bank model to incorporate a large number of heterogeneous banks. This model is able to replicate the asymmetric shape of banks' end-of-day central bank deposit distributions (despite symmetric initial distributions); a novel contribution to the literature. Moreover, after inputting recent changes in Australian central bank policy, this model produces percentage changes in interbank trading volumes that closely align with the data. Central banks typically supply more overnight deposits than banks desire to hold (in aggregate), but this aggregate is typically small relative to interbank lending. With commitment, this is not required for the central bank to achieve its interest rate target (the typical explanation in the literature). So, to explain this phenomenon, Chapter 3 builds a DSGE model that incorporates commitment and the results from the previous chapters. Due to asymmetric information, there may be stigma associated with borrowing from the central bank's overnight lending facility, which is costly. But while the central bank can reduce use of its lending facility, by increasing aggregate deposits, the resulting fall in interbank lending is also costly; because the interbank market helps banks monitor their counterparties. Therefore, low but positive aggregate deposits can be explained as the welfare-optimising point in the trade-off between stigma and monitoring costs (a novel contribution to the literature).

This thesis is a technical inquiry into remedies for high inflation. In its center there is the usual tradeoff between inflation aversion on the one hand and some benefit from inflation via Phillips curve effects on the other hand. Most remarkable and pioneering work for us is the famous Barro-Gordon model - see (Barro & Gordon 1983a) respectively (Barro & Gordon 1983b). Parts of this model form the basis of our work here. Though being well known the discretionary equilibrium is suboptimal the question arises how to overcome this. We will introduce four different models, each of them giving a different perspective and way of thinking. Each model shows a (sometimes slightly) different way a central banker might deliver lower inflation than the one shot Barro-Gordon game at a first glance would suggest. To cut a long story short we provide a number of reasons for believing that the purely discretionary equilibrium may be rarely observed in real life. Further the thesis provides new insights for derivative pricing theories. In particular, the potential role of financial markets and instruments will be a major focus. We investigate how such instruments can be used for monetary policy. On the contrary these financial securities have strong influence on the behavior of the central bank. Taking this into account in chapters 3 and 4 we come up with a new method of pricing inflation linked derivatives. The latter to the best of our knowledge has never been done before - (Persson, Persson & Svenson 2006), as one of very view economic works taking into account financial markets, is purely focused on the social planer's problem. A purely game theoretic approach is done in chapter 2 to change the original Barro-Gordon. Here we deviate from a purely rational and purely one period wise thinking. Finally in chapter 5 we model an asymmetric information situation where the central banker faces a trade off between his current objective on the one hand and benefit arising from not perfectly informed agents on the other hand. In that sense the central bank is also concerned about its reputation.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2004.
Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xi, 96 p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-96). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

AbstractIn this chapter we turn to representing flows of funds in alternative international monetary frameworks, and what global liquidity these different frameworks provide. We first recall some arguments in favour of and against fixed exchange rate systems. We then introduce two international monetary arrangements of the past which imply fixed exchange rates, namely the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system, and recall why both eventually failed. We then turn to three international monetary frameworks in the context of the current paper standard, i.e. fixed exchange rate systems, flexible exchange rate systems, and the European monetary union. We explain the role of an international lender of last resort and related solutions, and how these allow for more leeway in running fixed exchange rate systems. We also show how banks and central bank balance sheets are affected by international flows of funds and the balance of payments. Finally, we briefly review recent developments of foreign currency reserves, being the key central bank balance sheet position in this context.

AbstractThis chapter introduces conventional monetary policy, i.e. monetary policy during periods of economic and financial stability and when short-term interest rates are not constrained by the zero lower bound. We introduce the concept of an operational target of monetary policy and explain why central banks normally give this role to the short-term interbank rate. We briefly touch macroeconomics by outlining how central banks should set interest rates across time to achieve their ultimate target, e.g. price stability, and we acknowledge the complications in doing so. We then zoom further into monetary policy operations and central bank balance sheets by developing the concepts of autonomous factor, monetary policy instruments, and liquidity-absorbing and liquidity providing balance sheet items. Subsequently we explain how these quantities relate to short-term interest rates, and how the central bank can rely on this relation to steer its operational target, and thereby the starting point of monetary policy transmission. Finally, we explain the importance of the collateral framework and related risk control measures (e.g. haircuts) for the liquidity of banks and for the conduct of central bank credit operations.

AbstractThis chapter introduces the system of accounts of the main sectors of the economy (households; non-financial corporations, the government; banks, and the central bank), describing how these sectors are interrelated through financial claims and liabilities. A financial system, consisting of commercial banks and the central bank, manages flows of funds originating from households, without these flows causing a need for the real sectors to liquidate illiquid real assets. The basic types of assets and liabilities are: real goods, gold, banknotes, deposits, bonds, loans, and equity. We explain how the shortcomings of both IOU and commodity-money based financial systems can be solved via establishing a central bank. A central bank is defined here by its balance sheet and central bank money is the central bank’s basic liability. Both monetary policy implementation and lender of last resort issues relate to liquidity flows within balance sheets. Understanding the logic of basic financial flows is therefore the basis for understanding central banking.

This chapter highlights progress with the East Africa Monetary Union (EAMU) and the implications for the future of central banking in the Eastern African region. In 2013, East African countries committed to move to a monetary union by 2024. However, monetary unions offer benefits as well as challenges, given the experience in European Monetary Union. The chapter highlights four main important issues: the imperative of extensive economic integration in order to reap benefits from EAMU; the need for strong, enforceable, but feasible rules to ensure the fiscal sustainability of each partner state, given that once EAMU is established, they will no longer have the option of financing their public debt from their own central banks; the mechanism for alignment of the exchange rates in the period prior to the introduction of the common currency; and how to mitigate the adverse impact of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks within the EAC.

This chapter provides some observations regarding the evolution of central banking. It is noted that the practice of monetary policy and the scope of central banks have changed over time. The chapter reflects on the path to East African Economic and Monetary Union (EA-EMU). First, how does East Africa stand in terms of economic and financial convergence? Second, what are the milestones of central banking that all central banks of the EA-EMU should master? Third, which monetary lessons could the euro area offer? Fourth, what worked, and has not, in the euro area, what is being fixed? It is noted that East African countries have differences in income per capita, exchange rate volatility, domestic prices, and fiscal discipline. To support sustainable convergence, they should align their monetary policy frameworks and have solid fiscal arrangement.

Robert Triffin played a key role in the debates on European monetary integration, especially as the monetary expert of Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe. He developed proposals for European monetary cooperation, especially a European Reserve Fund and a European currency unit, inspired by his experience of the European Payments Union. In his view, a European Reserve Fund could be constituted by pooling 10% to 20% of the international reserves of the member states’ central banks. A key moment was the 1969 Hague summit when Triffin, via Jean Monnet, provided the German chancellor Willy Brandt with a plan for European monetary integration. Moreover, through his activities and connections in the world of commercial banking and finance, Triffin also actively promoted the European currency unit as a parallel currency in financial transactions and markets.

The European Central Bank (ECB) is the only central bank governed by supranational constitutional law. As such, it is not only the most important institution of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but it also marks a new stage in the history of central banking in general. Historically, the tasks and functions of the ECB have reflected the different stages of development of the EMU. The basic principles governing its function were set out in Maastricht, reflecting the interests and ideas about Europe’s economic constitution prevailing at that time. The sovereign debt crisis that hit Europe in 2010 was the second defining moment for the ECB after Maastricht. It posited the ECB–like the rest of the EMU–to challenges that some of the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty had not fully anticipated. These new challenges led to the adoption of novel instruments and the further clarification of fundamental rules and principles. Most important of these developments was the entrustment of the ECB with a new task, banking supervision, and the adoption of unconventional measures, which proved necessary to fulfil its monetary-policy mandate. Ultimately, not only did the ECB withstand the crisis but it emerged as a protagonist in securing the unity and integrity of the EMU.

Monetary union is one of the advanced stages of international economic integration and involves shared monetary and exchange rate policies that are executed collectively across union members. This common policy warrants price stability and requires a common supranational monetary authority. Existence of an established banking sector is crucial for effective execution of policy decisions taken by said monetary authorities. Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is officially established on January 1st of 2015 and is an example for a regional economic integration. Aim of the Union, which is comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Republic of Armenia; is to increase collaboration among economies, to improve the living standards of the participating nations and to promote stable development. This study is based on assessment banking industries of member countries, working towards common monetary authority during the transition to EAEU economic integration between years 1995 and 2014. Data acquired from World Bank and member countries' central banks is used to determine the capabilities and limitations of partaking economies based on generally accepted financial strength indicators. In conclusion; Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan are observed to be the principal EAEU members due to their advanced and strong banking industries. Increasing fragilities over the years, amplified also by developments in global markets, are evident in member countries; especially in Belarus and Armenia. Significance of achieving price stability in founding country Russian Federation is emphasized for successfully establishing a common monetary authority.

Recent financial crises hit many countries. The impact on Visegrad countries in credit area was not damaging. The main reason was stability and soundness of financial (banking) sectors in these countries and an adequate response of central banks as well as flexible management of commercial banks. Commercial banks, usually daughter companies of western banks, used above all domestic deposits for financing credits. This played a key role in credit area and helped to keep the financial system stable. It is important to underpin that responses to the crisis have been rather heterogeneous in central European countries and there are quite big disparities among Visegrad countries, too. In the paper developments and responses of the commercial banks to the crisis and their stability have been discussed on the basis of deposits, loans of monetary financial institutions to the non-financial sector, households, governments, lending for house purchase and credit for consumption in several EU countries. Net position of banks vis-á-vis foreign banks is taken into account, too.

Irrespective of whether advanced economies (AEs) or emerging market economies (EMEs), the number one problem of the global economy is not being able to generate a satisfactory growth. Income levels is in some countries are barely above the per-crisis level. Despite ample liquidity due to quantitative monetary policies, consumption and investment demands are weak. Because high level of indebtedness deter economic agents from using credit. Credit markets still do not function well either. Quantitative easing policies have been successful in containing further deterioration. Despite ample liquidity inflation has not risen, but it did delivered the expected growth. Because banking system in AEs is weak and monetary transmission mechanisms are not functioning well. As for EMEs, commodity prices and World trade appears to be weak; economic growth are slowing down, capex is visibly falling in heavy industrial sectors due to already existing excess capacity. The academia as well as the business community are worried about the appropriateness of the present policies in case another recession comes, central banks will have little ammunition to deal with it. The option being talked of now is what is dubbed as “helicopter Money”. Turkey being an open economy, has been and will be effected by the developments in the global economy through trade, capital flows and expectation channels. By international standards, Turkey have a reasonable growth rate of 3 to 4 %, implying a new growth era where high growth cycle ended due to changing global financial conditions and its structural problems. Future growth performance will depend on the level of investments and savings to finance it. As her own saving is low, foreign capital flows is crucial. High inflation and interest rate are the two negatives, but it has a strong fiscal position, debt / GDP is 32.3%, the budget is almost balanced, producing primary surplus which proved it is resilience in the face of recent failed coup and the negative attitudes displayed by the rating agencies.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.