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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'CEO compensation'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 July 2025

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1

Chaigneau, Pierre. "Essays on CEO compensation." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2009. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2050/.

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This thesis analyzes CEO compensation contracts in a principal-agent framework with moral hazard. It focuses on two issues: the form and the timing of performance-based pay. On the one hand, if CEOs are assumed to be mean-variance maximizers, I show that it is suboptimal to provide incentives with contracts which are convex in performance. This is because these contracts make the variance of pay an increasing function of the CEO's effort, which is inefficient. Sticks are more efficient than carrots, although the latter may be used in case the agent is protected by limited liability. On the oth

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2

Fong, Eric Alan. "Chief executive officer (ceo) responses to ceo compensation equity." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2004. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0004160.

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3

Zhang, Qiongyao. "CEO Compensation around Corporate Spinoffs." Thesis, State University of New York at Binghamton, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10620290.

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<p> Our study examines whether CEO compensation decreases in response to the reduction in firm size after a corporate spinoff. We find overall that CEO pay decreases subsequent to the spinoff, consistent with efficiency theory. However, the decrease is driven by the pay adjustment ac- companying CEO turnover around the spinoff. New CEOs hired around the spinoff have little bargaining power in regards to their compensation and thus we observe a decline in CEO compensation around these spinoff events. The compensation of those CEOs which span the spinoff event does not decrease, consistent with

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4

MA, Yiu Chung. "CEO compensation and loan contracting." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2011. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/econ_etd/3.

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The agency theory literature implies the pay-performance based managerial compensation can relieve the agency problem between shareholders and managers. As the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned, managers have incentive to invest in best projects and hence to improve firms’ performance. While the use of equity compensation to managers may reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders, its impact on agency cost of debts is ambiguous. On the one hand, a large portion of equity compensation discourages risk-averse managers to invest in risky investment and hence reduce

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5

Christensen, Johanna, and Paulina Lindgren. "CEO Compensation : the Role and Effect of Compensation Committees." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-354785.

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Compensation to executives is a complex and continuous topic that attracts media, academia, legislators, and not least the public. Due to the surprisingly under-examined research topic in Sweden and inconclusive results in prior research, this paper seeks to establish how compensation committees affect CEO compensation in light of the principal-agent theory and through uni-, bi-, and multivariate analyses. Our sample consists of approximately 200 companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm between 2013 and 2015. We find that CEO compensation is higher in companies with compensation committees co

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Peng, Yan. "Accounting system quality and CEO compensation /." view abstract or download file of text, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3181120.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2005.<br>Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-71). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

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7

Chen, Zhimin. "CEO Cash Compensation and Earnings Quality." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/146591.

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I examine the uses of accounting performance measures by testing the association between CEO cash pay sensitivity and earnings quality. I assume that the valuation and evaluation uses of accounting information are linked through the information risk. I expect to find that the sensitivities of CEO cash compensation to accruals and cash flows are associated with accrual quality and cash flow persistence. I find that there is a significant positive relation between accrual quality and CEO cash pay sensitivity to earnings. I find no association between the asymmetric pay-sensitivity to stock retur

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8

Khayati, Amine. "Bank Certification Effect on CEO Compensation." OpenSIUC, 2010. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/174.

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Contrary to other forms of outside financing, the announcement of a bank loan agreement prompts a positive and significant market return. Throughout the literature, bank loans are deemed special and unique due to multiple benefits accruing to bank borrowers. The short-term positive market reaction is however inconsistent with the long-term underperformance of borrowing firms (Billet et al., 2006). We find that unlike shareholders, CEOs gain from the bank loan relation over the long-term. Specifically, we find that bank loan agreement elicits a significant increase in total compensation through

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9

Ju, Ming. "ESSAYS ON CEO AND EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2018. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/504685.

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Business Administration/Finance<br>Ph.D.<br>With the continued increase in executive compensation and the resulting increase in pay disparity between executives and rank-and-file employees, CEO compensation relative to the average worker pay underscores the popular apprehension related to equity vs. efficiency. This dissertation empirically examines the determinants and consequences of the CEO-worker pay ratio, and the association between acquisitions and CEO compensation. In the first chapter, I show that country-level factors such as national culture, matter in determining the CEO-worker pay

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10

Wang, Hongxia. "Essays On CEO Turnover, Succession, And Compensation." Available to subscribers only, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1879673281&sid=20&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2009.<br>"College of Business Administration." Keywords: CEO compensation, CEO succession, CEO turnover, Managerial discretion, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Successor age. Includes bibliographical references (p. 112-124). Also available online.

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11

Boström, Sofia, and Emelie Lund. "Compensation and Rewards : - A Family firm CEO's perspective." Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Jönköping University, IHH, Företagsekonomi, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-48582.

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Background/Problem: The financial crisis in 2008 affected the whole economy and the CEO's compensation was one of the factors causing this crisis. Although, it is now years after the onset of the financial crisis, the CEO’s compensation is still an ongoing topic of debate and, for this reason, vital to study. According to literature, non-family CEOs are more likely to emphasize financial performance rather than socioemotional objectives and returns. On the contrary, family CEOs are more motivated by socioemotional wealth and non-financial goals. Taking these viewpoints into consideration, this

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12

Címerová, Helena. "Three essays on the market for CEOs." Doctoral thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11838.

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Elsaid, Eahab M. K. "CEO compensation and succession : an empirical analysis /." Available to subscribers only, 2006. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1147183131&sid=10&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

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14

Koskelo, E. (Eerik). "CEO compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity." Master's thesis, University of Oulu, 2014. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-201403131171.

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This thesis determines the state of recent developments in CEO compensation in the spirit of corresponding literature. Besides the literature review, empirical study provides further evidence on CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities in the US listed companies during 2007–2011 and containing Compustat Execucomp data of more than 33,000 CEOs from more than 3,000 companies. I build the regression similar to methods in a groundbreaking paper from Jensen and Murphy (1990a) and expecting positive and significant relationship between the change in CEO total compensation and shareholder wealth. My est

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15

Noguera, Magdy Carolina. "CEO incentive-based compensation and REIT performance." Diss., Mississippi State : Mississippi State University, 2007. http://sun.library.msstate.edu/ETD-db/ETD-browse/browse.

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16

Zhang, Zhifang. "Essays on CEO compensation and corporate governance." Thesis, Lancaster University, 2017. http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/86938/.

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This thesis examines the determinants of CEO compensation. It consists of two main studies. The first investigates the effect of compensation consultants on CEO pay levels and incentives, using a sample of large UK firms from the FTSE 350 index from 2003 to 2011. Its key focus is whether the effect of compensation consultants persists after controlling for endogeneity. Using OLS regressions and controlling for firm, CEO and corporate governance characteristics reveals that the presence of compensation consultants is positively associated with both CEOs’ pay level and the percentage of equity-b

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Bartlett, Jessica. "A Compensation Comparison: Determinants of Compensation for Chief Executive Officers and University Presidents." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/525.

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The compensation of chief executive officers has long been an alluring and controversial topic, especially in light of the rapid rise in CEO earnings over the past several decades, which has provoked discussion on the manner in which CEOs are monetarily rewarded. Recently, university presidents have joined company CEOs in the public spotlight, as increasing levels of compensation for college presidents have also sparked scrutiny and debate. This paper examines the determinants behind CEO compensation and investigates the extent to which insights on these factors compare to the compensation det

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Rescigno, Elizabeth. "Relationship Between Chief Executive Officer Compensation, Duality, and Return on Equity." ScholarWorks, 2018. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/6097.

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Poor decisions and conflicts of interest by members of company boards of directors have been a factor in the dramatic rise in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, resulting in a lower return on equity (ROE) for shareholders. The purpose of this correlational study was to examine the relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size, as measured by total assets. Agency theory was the theoretical framework for this study. The study examined whether a statistically significant relationship existed between CEO compensation,

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19

Sandahl, Carl, and Fredrik Tinglöf. "The purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations : A qualitative study of CEO compensation in sports organisations from both a board perspective and a CEO perspective." Thesis, Jönköping University, Internationella Handelshögskolan, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-52731.

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Background: CEO compensation as a phenomenon is a well explored topic in both forprofit and non-profit organisations but limited research is made on sports organisations. Due to the important social role that sports organisations entails, one can argue for the need to investigate the purpose of CEO compensation in these organisations as well. Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to explore the purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations. The purpose of executive compensation will further be studied from both a CEO perspective as well as from the board perspective. Method: This th

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Mäkinen, Mikko. "Essays on stock option schemes and CEO compensation /." Helsinki : Helsinki School of Economics, 2007. http://aleph.unisg.ch/hsgscan/hm00180229.pdf.

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Miller, Robert. "An Empirical Study on CEO Turnover and Compensation." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/424.

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This paper studies a sample of CEOs from companies listed in the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1992 to 2010, and confirms the theory that board members rely more heavily on firm performance measures for turnover and compensation decisions when less is known about the CEO’s ability. In this paper, I make two contributions to the literature. First, I confirm the empirical findings of literature with a new data set showing that the effect of firm performance on CEO turnover declines over a CEO's tenure. Second, I introduce a new tool, the relationship between CEO compensation and firm perform

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22

Minhat, Marizah. "Three essays on CEO compensation in the UK." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/2300.

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This thesis comprises three studies on CEO compensation in the UK. It specifically examines the role of CEO defined-benefit pensions, compensation consultants and CEO stock options. Firstly, research on the role of executive pensions is still at a stage of infancy due to data difficulties (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). By taking advantage of better disclosure requirements with the introduction of Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (DRRR) in 2002, this thesis examines the determinants and effects of CEO defined-benefit pensions. Consistent with rent extraction hypothesis (Bebchuk and Fri

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23

Blazer, Eric L. "CEO compensation and managerial decisions: evidence from acquisitions." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40319.

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While there is a wide body of literature examining the relation between CEO compensation and firm performance, few studies have directly tested the proposition that a strong pay-performance link: leads to improved future performance. This paper tests the hypothesis that a strong pay-performance link: leads to better managerial decisions. Following Jensen and Murphy's (1990b) methodology, pay-performance sensitivities are estimated for the CEOs of 105 NYSE and AMEX firms. The relation between the estimated pay-performance sensitivities and subsequent acquisition performance is examined f

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Le, Thi Phuong Mai. "CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking in Banking Industry." Thesis, Université de Lorraine, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015LORR0215/document.

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La crise financière de 2008 a été largement imputée à une prise de risque excessive par lesbanques US et du monde entier, qui ont été mises en grande difficulté. Une des questionsprincipales que se posent les scientifiques et les régulateurs concerne le rôle joué par lesmodes de rémunération des dirigeants des banques dans l'incitation à la prise de risque. Le butde cette recherche est d'étudier si les modes de rémunération des dirigeants des banquesinduisent la prise de risque et contribuent à la crise financière. Nous nous proposonsd'analyser séparément les effets de chaque composante de la

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Zacharias, Eric. "Activist Investor Impact on CEO Compensation of Investment Targets." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2010. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2.

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This paper examines the “activist effect” on the levels and structures of CEO compensation when a company is targeted by a sample of activist groups. Activist investors are focused funds that use their resources to influence management of target investments in an effort to increase shareholder value. Due to their efforts to impose return enhancing agendas on the management of targets, activists have developed a reputation as “raiders” and are commonly feared by management. In this paper, the nature of activist investing is discussed, including a review of previous research on activism, and an

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Stancill, Alan Jonathan. "CEO Severance Agreements and Tax Avoidance." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77862.

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This study investigates the association between CEO severance agreements and corporate tax avoidance. Severance agreements, by providing executives with additional compensation when there is a change in employment status, should serve to encourage additional risk-taking, as reflected by increased tax avoidance activities. Using a large sample of aggregate compensation data, I find some evidence of a relation between the presence of a CEO severance agreement and tax avoidance. Using a smaller sample of hand-collected data, I find a significant negative relation between the magnitude of cash sev

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Neyland, Jordan Bradley. "Wealth Shocks and Executive Compensation: Evidence from CEO Divorce." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/145400.

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To empirically test the impact of CEOs' outside wealth on their compensation, I use spousal divorce as a proxy for an exogenous, negative shock to a CEO's outside wealth. I hypothesize that this shock decreases a CEO's risk tolerance. I also expect that the board of directors responds to this decrease by raising the CEO's cash compensation and by increasing the sensitivity of the CEO's compensation to changes in firm value. I find that cash bonuses, restricted stock grants, and option grants increase following a CEO's divorce, consistent with boards reacting to changes in CEOs' outside wealt

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Li, Zhao. "Three essays in banking, financial fragility and CEO compensation." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/378040.

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This dissertation investigates two issues: (1) banks' funding liquidity risk and its implications, and (2) the optimal design of CEO compensation contracts. The first chapter analyzes the interaction between banks' funding liquidity risk and asset market illiquidity. We emphasize how the lack of information distorts asset prices. In the model,asset fire sales, bank runs, and financial contagion, are all self-fulfilling, and emerge in a rational expectations equilibrium. The model also delivers new policy insights on bank capital holding and asset purchase programs. The second chapter also rela

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Khalatyan, Ashot, and Luay Jouri. "Influence of institutional shareholders on CEO compensation in Sweden." Thesis, Gotland University, Institutionen för humaniora och samhällsvetenskap, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hgo:diva-583.

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<p>Chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation and its optimal level is an interesting and important topic. How successful and skilled are shareholders monitoring and making changes in its level and its mix? Ownership dispersion is an important determinant of it. In this study we try to answer this question from the perspective of institutional shareholders as they hold a substantial part of equity in firms. The paper sheds light on institutional ownership dispersion effect on CEO total and cash compensation in Sweden.</p><p>Analysing data from the 26 largest companies listed on Stockholm Sto

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Quartin, Rosana Inês Hipólito. "The impact of SFAS 123R on CEO equity compensation." Master's thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/9644.

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics<br>In December of 2004, FASB released SFAS 123R, mandating the expensing of executive stock options. This paper studies the changes that occurred in CEO equity compensation in the period of 2000 to 2006. Complementary, I analyze the relevance of performance conditions in this form of compensation. There are two main findings: (i) in the post-SFAS 123R period executive stock options determinants become different (ii) the use of performance equi

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Grambo, Douglas. "The Effect of CEO Compensation on Real Earnings Management." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-172473.

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Real earnings management has been a subject of increasing debate ever since the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley act in the united states. As research has pointed towards real earnings management increasing this has sparked discussions on whether real earnings management is damaging to companies, or if it is benefiting them, or if it lies somewhere in between. Forthis paper we wanted to examine how the financial incentives of a CEO would affect the usage of real earnings management. Are CEO’s being poorly motivated, and as a result harming their companies? To guide the paper,we decide to formulat

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Bonestroo, Jelle. "CEO incentive-based compensation, investment opportunities and institutional heterogeneity." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-317867.

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Using international data (15,786 obs.) from industrial companies from 28 countries over an 11-year period (2003–2014), this research contributes to the area of institutional heterogeneity, CEO compensation and investment opportunities. More precisely, we use three perspectives in order to investigate whether investment opportunities explain CEO compensation structures. We compare (i) U.S. and non-U.S. firms, (ii) Common law and Civil law firms, and (iii) firms operating with similar cultural characteristics. Overall, after controlling for firm governance and board characteristics, we find that

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Xu, Xiumin. "The association between CEO compensation structure and firm decision." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2003. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/475.

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Qu, Xin. "Design of CEO Equity-based Compensation and Investment Efficiency." Thesis, Griffith University, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/375770.

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The role of executive compensation contracts in providing managerial incentives is topical in academic research. Since the last decade, there have been intense debates over whether executive compensation is set optimally to align the interests of managers and those of shareholders. The significance of the global financial crisis (GFC) also sheds light on reviewing equity-based compensation granted to senior managers. The traditional perspective of equity awards holds that these equity mechanisms can attract and retain employees as well as encourage managerial effort exertion (Guay et al., 2002

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Gaertner, Fabio B. "CEO After-tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/145277.

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I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensati

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LEE, JANG WOOK. "THREE STUDIES ON THE USE OF CEO EQUITY COMPENSATION." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2019. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/577721.

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Business Administration/Accounting<br>Ph.D.<br>This dissertation contains three studies relating to executive equity compensation. In the first study (Chapter 2), I investigate whether firms adjust CEO’s equity incentives in response to the firms’ prior earnings management. I find that the risk-taking incentives from new equity grants are lower for firms with higher prior real earnings management (REM), but not for firms with higher accruals-based earnings management (AEM). My finding suggests that boards perceive the consequences of REM are more value-reducing than AEM and that they take stro

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Tepe, Mete. "Two Essays on Executive Compensation." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78706.

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This dissertation consists of two essays, both co-authored with Ugur Lel. The first essay (Chapter 1) examines whether high CEO pay inequality (CPI), the share of total managerial pay captured by the CEO, is an outcome of poor corporate governance, and its implications for shareholder wealth. We exploit the 2002 NYSE and NASDAQ governance reforms that mandated firms to have majority independent boards as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in the internal governance environment of firms. Results show that CPI decreases following the passage of these exchange listing regulations, but only in

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Shan, Wei-Yang, and 沈維洋. "CEO Duality, CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70313957562413056749.

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碩士<br>東海大學<br>會計學系<br>97<br>This study examines the relationships among CEO duality, CEO compensation, and firm performance. Panel data was collected from listed companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) during 1999-2005, and construct simultaneous equations model with three-stage least squares estimation. Empirical results show that (1) CEO duality is significantly negative associated with CEO compensation; (2) the CEO duality is also significantly positive associated with ROA and EP; (3) CEO compensation is significantly positive associated with current performance and they are jointl

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Lin, Hung-Ju, and 林宏儒. "CEO Compensation and Takeover." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93832503444016056883.

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碩士<br>國立交通大學<br>財務金融研究所<br>102<br>This paper investigates the relationship between the incentive compensation and takeover activities including friendly takeover events and hostile takeover events. Due to the fact that hostile takeover is perceived as a high risk task, therefore to test whether the higher incentive compensations granted to CEOs in advance are strong enough to compensate them for choosing to challenge the hostile takeover tasks which are associated with higher risk, rather than choosing the safer friendly takeover jobs is our main purpose. On the other hand, we will also examin

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Zhou, Yibin. "Earnings distortion and CEO compensation." 2006. http://link.library.utoronto.ca/eir/EIRdetail.cfm?Resources__ID=449771&T=F.

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Lin, Tung-Kuan, and 林東寬. "CEO Compensation and Firm Performance." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56406428884152873933.

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碩士<br>實踐大學<br>財務金融與保險研究所<br>97<br>This study adopts the non-dynamic panel threshold model introduced by Hansen (1999) to analyze the effect of structural asymmetry of CEO excessive (unexpected) compensation on firm performance in Taiwan’s listed companies from 2001 to 2007. With all specifications applied, the tests lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a linear relationship between CEO unexpected compensation and firm performance. The asymmetry implies the existence of one switching regime. It follows that there is a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and fi

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Chu, Hung-Chi, and 朱宏佶. "CEO Compensation and Corporate Innovation." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/07559600041485937808.

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碩士<br>大葉大學<br>企業管理學系碩士班<br>103<br>This paper uses sample firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange from 2005 to 2013 and investigates whether CEO compensation provides CEOs incentives to invest in corporate innovative activities as taking firms’ corporate governance into consideration. The empirical results indicate that the level of CEO cash compensation and the associated stock option have positive impacts on CEOs’ incentives to spend on R&D. The stock dividend has no impacts on CEOs’ incentive to engage in R&D; however, higher ratios of independent directors moderate the rel

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Fodor, Andrew. "Two essays on CEO compensation." 2008. http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/available/etd-05022008-170748.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2008.<br>Advisor: James Ang, Florida State University, College of Business, Dept. of Finance. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Oct. 13, 2008). Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 77 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

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Ting-LingKu and 古庭綾. "CEO Compensation and Post-Merge Divestitures." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38264843077624338845.

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碩士<br>國立成功大學<br>財務金融研究所<br>98<br>The self-interested managers are more likely to undertake the value-reducing diversifying acquisitions. The performance of firms after the M＆A is worse than before. After M＆A, the firms’ performance become poorer and their leverage become higher for firms. One way to alleviate the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders is providing the equity-based compensation. Awarding the equity-based compensation for managers can prevent them from engaging in acquisitions and also reduce the likelihood of divestitures. Because M＆A would lead to the poor p

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Ho, Kuan-Hsien, and 何冠嫻. "Diversification, CEO Turnover and Executive Compensation." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57828587390735046387.

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碩士<br>國立成功大學<br>財務金融研究所<br>97<br>This study examines whether diversified firms have principal-agent problem. In this paper, we illustrate a different approach to test these issues for U.S. sample during the period of 2002-2007. We select two measures to examine agency implication of diversification: CEO turnover and CEO compensation. We find that: CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm performance for diversified firms, and pay-performance sensitivity is weaker for diversified firms. Additionally, our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate performance. Taken together, our resu

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Lin, Ying-Fen, and 林穎芬. "CEO Compensation and Turnover in Taiwan." Thesis, 1999. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/91523505473065475486.

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博士<br>國立中山大學<br>企業管理學系<br>87<br>Agent theory starts with the assumption that people act in their own self-interest, and holds that under normal conditions, the goals, interests, and risks of two actors (main actor and agent) are not identical. This means that the agent will not necessarily act according to the interests of the main actor. Thus, a series of mechanisms are required to ensure that the agent will behave according to the main actor''s interests. CEO compensation and CEO replacement are types of control mechanisms that companies employ to reduce the agent problem. Is it p

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Neto, Paulo Alexandre Fernandes. "CEO Compensation and Family Firms Heterogeneity." Master's thesis, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/10216/124502.

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Neto, Paulo Alexandre Fernandes. "CEO Compensation and Family Firms Heterogeneity." Dissertação, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/10216/124502.

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Yeh, Hsiao-Ching, and 葉筱靖. "Common Membership and CEO Incentive Compensation." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30686026069250574104.

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碩士<br>國立中央大學<br>會計研究所<br>104<br>This paper is to investigate whether the compensation committee members who also serve on the audit committee affect the efficiency and effectiveness of CEO incentive compensation or not. This study uses a sample of 5,828 firm-year observation for the period 2003 to 2010 in the US firms. Including CEO related data, firm’s financial data and director data. We find a significantly negative relationship between common membership and CEO incentive pay and a significantly negative relation between common membership and reported and real performance on the full sample

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CHU, PEI-CHIN, and 朱珮津. "CEO Compensation and M&As." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/00937664171864556748.

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碩士<br>國立雲林科技大學<br>財務金融系<br>104<br>Mergers and acquisitions is an important issue in capital markets. Mergers and acquisitions can not only create firm value but also bring business growth. This paper investigates changes of CEO compensation structure in M&A activities. The literature on executive compensation proposes two competing theories: incentive alignment argument and managerial power argument, for clarifying the agency costs between managers and shareholders. The incentive alignment argument suggests that CEOs are rewarded for skill and effort in M&A business, while the managerial power

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