Academic literature on the topic 'CEOs entrenchment'

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Journal articles on the topic "CEOs entrenchment"

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Shi, Juehui, and Ngoc Cindy Pham. "The Boundary Conditions of Optimal Contracting and Managerial Entrenchment: A Simultaneous Two-Equation Vector Autoregression with Exogenous Variables Approach for Chief Executive Officer Compensation and Firm Performance." American Business Review 27, no. 1 (2024): 182–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.37625/abr.27.1.182-206.

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We apply the vector autoregression with exogenous variables (VARX) approach to integrate the optimal contracting theory, the managerial entrenchment theory, the principal-agent theory, the contextual criteria theory, and the upper echelon theory. Based on this new approach, we discover two middle ground conditions between the boundary of managerial entrenchment and optimal contracting, where CEO non-entrenchment or entrenchment cannot be explained by the managerial entrenchment theory or optimal contracting theory alone. For example, some CEOs are not entrenched when the agency problem is not
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Forst, Arno, Myung Seok Park, and Benson Wier. "Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation: Evidence from Initial Public Offering Firms." Journal of Management Accounting Research 26, no. 1 (2013): 101–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50622.

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ABSTRACT We examine how insider entrenching governance choices of firms conducting their initial public offering (IPOs) influence the CEOs compensation contracts post-IPO. Using ten legal provisions affecting insider entrenchment, we find that entrenching governance decisions have a significant effect on CEO compensation post-IPO. Specifically, we observe a positive association between entrenchment and levels of post-IPO salary, total compensation, and pay-for-performance sensitivity. We also find a negative relation between entrenchment and the proportion of CEOs' salary to total compensation
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ASLANOĞLU, Suphi, and Tri DAMAYANTİ. "TÜRKİYE'DE YERLEŞTİRME ETKİSİ VE İLİŞKİLİ TARAF İŞLEMLERİ." Muhasebe ve Vergi Uygulamaları Dergisi 15, no. 3 (2022): 463–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.29067/muvu.1080458.

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This research aimed to understand the important powers that affect Related Party Transactions (RPTs) decisions. It used the agency theory perspective to examine the effect of corporate mechanism, comprising variables of controlling ownership, the CEOs characteristics, and independent board of directors, on the decision of RPTs regarding potential conflicts of interest.
 A total of 310 financial reports of Turkish manufacturing listed companies in 2019 and 2020 were assessed. Subsequently, controlling shareholder and CEOs characteristics were discovered to play significant roles in the RPT
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Yang, Mei-Ling. "The Impact of Controlling Families and Family CEOs on Earnings Management." Family Business Review 23, no. 3 (2010): 266–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0894486510374231.

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This study explores the relationships between insider ownership and earnings management in family firms and the impact of family versus nonfamily CEOs on earnings management. The results show that the larger the level of insider ownership, the greater the extent of earnings management, supporting an entrenchment effect of family ownership. Furthermore, consistent with traditional agency analyses, nonfamily CEOs exhibit a greater tendency to manage earnings than do family CEOs.The study suggests that family firms should promote information transparency and quality of accounting reporting to avo
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Hollandts, Xavier, Nicolas Aubert, Abdelmehdi Ben Abdelhamid, and Victor Prieur. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment." Management international 22, no. 2 (2019): 112–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1058165ar.

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Employee stock ownership gives employees a voice and therefore may have a major impact on corporate governance. Thus, employee stock ownership may be a powerful mean to protect CEOs from both market for corporate control and dismissal threat. In this paper, we examine the relationship between employee stock ownership and CEO entrenchment. Following the recent French legislative changes, we use a comprehensive panel dataset of the major French listed companies over the 2009-2012 period. We document inverted U-shaped relationships between employee stock ownership and CEO entrenchment. Board empl
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Woo, Heejin. "New CEOs’ previous experience and acquisition performance." International Journal of Organizational Analysis 27, no. 3 (2019): 745–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijoa-03-2018-1389.

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Purpose This study aims to investigate how new CEOs’ previous experiences in other organizations and other industries create value in acquisitions. Drawing on the upper echelon perspective, this study theorizes that the multiorganizational experience of new CEOs is positively associated with acquisition performance and, in particular, that the multi-industry experience of new CEOs leads to better performance in diversifying acquisitions than in related acquisitions. While new CEOs without multiorganizational experience undergo a cognitive entrenchment in firm-specific experience, new CEOs with
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Keil, Thomas, Markku Maula, and Evangelos Syrigos. "CEO Entrepreneurial Orientation, Entrenchment, and Firm Value Creation." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 41, no. 4 (2017): 475–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/etp.12213.

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We investigate how CEO entrepreneurial orientation affects firm value creation and how this relationship is moderated by three sources of CEO entrenchment. We conducted a longitudinal analysis of S&P 500 firms between 1999 and 2007, and, in line with our predictions, we found that CEO entrepreneurial orientation enhances firm value creation and that this positive effect is reduced when CEOs are entrenched (1) due to corporate governance provisions that protect them from the majority will of shareholders, (2) due to substantial ownership that provides them too much decision–making power, an
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Mateus, Cesario, Thomas Hall, and Irina B. Mateus. "Are listed firms better governed? Empirical evidence on board structure and financial performance." Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no. 1 (2015): 736–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i1c7p2.

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We examine the relationship among board characteristics (network centrality, leadership structure, outsider participation, portion of male directors, director age, and presence of financial experts) and firm-level financial performance (cash holdings, leverage, ROA, risk, and risk-adjusted return). Our data encompass firms from eight countries during 2003-2012. Unlisted firms are smaller and have less leverage. Despite the fact that unlisted firms have prima facie better average governance (they are less likely to have an executive chair (or CEO as chair of the board) and a higher average port
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Fagbemi, Temitope Olamide, Olubunmi Florence Osemene, and Oyinlade Agbaje. "Management Entrenchment, Firm Characteristics and Earnings Management Of Conglomerate Companies In Nigeria." Jurnal Administrasi Bisnis 9, no. 1 (2020): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/jab.v9i1.28576.

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Sometimes the rivalry between shareholders and management is an indication of the level of entrenchment within the corporate environment. Managers are believed to routinely manipulate earnings in order to mislead shareholders about their company's actual economic outlook or performance. As a result, the study investigated the impact of managerial entrenchment, firm characteristics and earnings management of conglomerate companies in Nigeria. Employing the ex-post facto research design, the data was gathered from secondary source of the 6 listed conglomerate companies for the 11-year period run
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Kang, Hyung Cheol, and Jaemin Kim. "Why do family firms switch between family CEOs and non-family professional CEO?" Review of Accounting and Finance 15, no. 1 (2016): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-03-2015-0032.

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Purpose – This study aims to examine whether a switching decision between a family CEO and a non-family professional CEO has a different effect on firm performance and what determines such a decision by family firms. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses multiple regressions, Probit and univariate analyses, based the sample of family-controlled Chaebol firms in Korea for the 11-year period from 2001 to 2011. Findings – Evidence found was consistent with the family entrenchment hypothesis: firms experiencing declining Q value are more likely to replace family CEOs with non-family CEOs,
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "CEOs entrenchment"

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Forst, Arno. "Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation." VCU Scholars Compass, 2009. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/1714.

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This study investigates the effects of insider entrenchment on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in firms conducting an initial public offering (IPO). The sample comprises 220 US firms that went public between 1996 and 2002. Corporate governance choices regarding entrenchment are captured by six provisions in the corporate charter and bylaws, as well as five anti-takeover statutes, which may or may not be in effect in the state of incorporation. Firm-level items are supermajority requirements for charter amendments, bylaws amendments, and merger approvals, along with the presence or a
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Ben, Abdelhamid Abdelmehdi. "Corporate governance and employee ownership : evidence from France." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université Clermont Auvergne (2021-...), 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2021UCFAD016.

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Ce travail doctoral s’interroge sur la manière de l’actionnariat salarié à influencer la gouvernance et les choix stratégiques d’une entreprise. Le premier chapitre de la thèse présente un état de lieux de la littérature sur l’actionnariat salarié et la gouvernance des entreprises. Cette recension permet de développer les fondements conceptuels sur les questions de recherche abordées dans la thèse. Le chapitre 2 évalue l’impact de l’actionnariat salarié sur l’enracinement des PDG à leur poste. Les mesures de l'enracinement managérial dans notre recherche sont l'âge, l'ancienneté et le taux de
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Markham, James. "CEO entrenchment versus boards of directors performance is not all that matters to turnover /." Access to citation, abstract and download form provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company; downloadable PDF file, 172 p, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1654492691&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=8331&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

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Dah, Mustafa A. "Essays on the Effect of Excess Compensation and Governance Changes on Firm Value." Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2012. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/5179.

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This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and corporate governance changes on the firm's performance. The first paper utilizes a cost minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performa
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Ampofo, Akwasi Amankwaah. "Two Essays on Capital Structure Decisions of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Managerial Entrenchment and Ethical Corporate Citizenship." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/103152.

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This dissertation consists of two essays on the impact of managerial entrenchment and ethical corporate citizenship on capital structure decisions of the firm. The first essay examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on financial flexibility and capital structure decisions of firms. Agency conflicts and asymmetric information between managers and shareholders of firms exacerbate managerial entrenchment, which is operationalized using the entrenchment index. The excess cash ratio of a firm over the median cash ratio of firms within the same 3 digits SIC code is the proxy for financial fle
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Backlund, Carl-Oscar, and Viktor Granström. "Påverkar VD:ns aktieinnehav bolags finansiella prestation? : En kvantitativ studie om sambandet mellan VD:ns nivå av aktieinnehav inom bolaget och dess finansiella prestation." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-186680.

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Titel: Påverkar VD:ns aktieinnehav bolags finansiella prestation?  - En kvantitativ studie om sambandet mellan VD:ns nivå av aktieinnehav inom bolaget och dess finansiella prestation.    Författare: Carl-Oscar Backlund & Viktor Granström   Handledare: Jörgen Hellström   Problembakgrund och problemdiskussion Synen på VD:ns roll och dennes betydelse för ett bolag har ändrats mycket genom åren. I modern tid anses en VD vara ytterst ansvarig för bolagets verksamhet, med lagstadgade uppgifter, men också samtidigt vara ansiktet utåt mot media och press. Hur pass stark är korrelationen mellan bol
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Lin, Chuan-Ju, and 林娟如. "Debt Maturity Choice in CEO Entrenchment: Evidence in Taiwan." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4mt79j.

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碩士<br>國立交通大學<br>管理學院財務金融學程<br>107<br>This study examines the effect of CEO entrenchment on a firm’s debt maturity choice. We examine Taiwanese firms over the period 1998–2016 and find that entrenched managers choose long-term debt financing to avoid early liquidation. In addition, we show that the effect of CEO entrenchment on long-term debt is more pronounced for firms with a higher degree of informational opacity and poorer credit quality. Our evidence supports the agency theory argument for the manager–creditor conflict. This investigation provides novel empirical insights into CEO entrench
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Chen, Ting-Chung, and 陳鼎中. "The Relationship between Audit Fees, CEO Perquisites and Entrenchment index in the Post-SOX Era." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61625298527808119948.

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碩士<br>元智大學<br>財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)<br>105<br>This study examines the relationship between audit fee and CEO perquisites with Entrenchment Index, after the implement of SOX Act. Wysocki (2010) indicates that the CEO compensation is significantly positive linked with the audit fees. However, Kim et al. (2011) indicate this positive relation between CEO compensation and audit fees is mitigated for the firms which have better corporate governance. Furthermore, there is no study uses the CEO perquisites to examine the relation with audit fee. In that case, I use the Entrenchment Index (See Bebchuk, C
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Books on the topic "CEOs entrenchment"

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Rose, Nancy L. Firm diversification and CEO compensation: Managerial ability or executive entrenchment? National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994.

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Rose, Nancy L. Firm diversification and CEO compensation: Managerial ability or executive entrenchment? Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994.

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Book chapters on the topic "CEOs entrenchment"

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Lee, Kin Wai, and Gillian Hian Heng Yeo. "Capital Structure in Asia and CEO Entrenchment." In Handbook of Quantitative Finance and Risk Management. Springer US, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77117-5_56.

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Finet, Alain. "The Agency Theory, CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Governance Theories." In Handbook of Top Management Teams. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230305335_68.

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Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle, and Luc Renneboog. "Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies." In Corporate Governance Regimes. Oxford University PressOxford, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199247875.003.0013.

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Abstract Managerial quality is maintained by the intervention of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. Yet, when insufficient monitoring or when managerial entrenchment has insulated management, markets will tend to react favorably to the CEO departures. In this chapter, we investigate whether forced CEO dismissal triggers positive abnormal returns in listed French companies. Voluntary CEO departures or unexpected deaths of CEOs may entail a loss of human capital to the firm. We analyses whether negative abnormal returns are generated in these cases. However, these market reac
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Ferretti, Paola, and Cristina Gonnella. "Governance Practices and CEO Hubris." In Transforming Corporate Governance and Developing Models for Board Effectiveness. IGI Global, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-6669-5.ch008.

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This chapter analyzes the connection between CEO hubris and corporate governance contingencies, including a case study of an Italian bank for which the state of financial distress shall be linkable also to bad governance. The main objective is to verify whether, in presence of hubristic CEO, the internal control mechanisms, set to ensure the board vigilance and limit the overconfidence of the leader, are implemented, and if so, whether such mechanisms, even when formally respected, may be not so appropriate to guarantee a good governance. Particularly, the existence of a CEO hubris could neutr
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Conference papers on the topic "CEOs entrenchment"

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Yuan, Chun-sheng. "A study of the effect of managerial entrenchment on CEO turnover in Chinese listed companies." In 2009 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2009.5318057.

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Reports on the topic "CEOs entrenchment"

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Rose, Nancy, and Andrea Shepard. Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment? National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4723.

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