Academic literature on the topic 'Chaco Boreal (Paraguay and Bolivia)'

This chapter investigates two prominent red herrings: the Chaco War from 1932 to 1935 and the Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. It explains that the two red herring conflicts were widely assumed to have been oil driven. It also mentions Bolivia and Paraguay that purportedly fought over the Chaco Boreal's prospective petroleum endowments, as well as Iraqi president Saddam Hussein who supposedly invaded Iran in order to seize its oil-rich Khuzestan Province. The chapter points out that in the Chaco War, Bolivia and Paraguay knew that the contested territory did not contain oil resources, while in the Iran–Iraq War, Saddam's territorial ambitions were limited to small areas along the states' bilateral boundary. It emphasizes how the Chaco War and Iran–Iraq War were not fought to grab petroleum resources.

This chapter addresses how the Tapiete, an indigenous people of Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay have claimed space, recognition, and participation, and how in so doing they have articulated transnational connections which strengthen their identity. Faced with an intermittent presence of the State and its institutions, with an unstable economic and social context, the Tapiete have resorted to the Evangelical Church as a source of support and community cohesion. Evangelism provides a sense of continuity in a context of disruptive political practices and loss of legitimacy undergone by political leaders of the community throughout the years, and it provides a common idiom in Tapiete transnational and trinational connections. The chapter addresses the transnational dimension of Tapiete life by examining their multiterritoriality.

The Chaco is an international biome, connecting four countries: Paraguay (230,000 km2), Bolivia (90,000 km2), Argentina (520,000 km2), and Brazil (Mato Grosso do Sul state (MS), with around 9,000 km2 and in the middle of South America. Brazilian Chaco is restricted to Porto Murtinho region, MS. The daisies (Asteraceae) with near 24,000 species worldwide is characterized by herbs and shrubs that coevolved with several taxa of endophagous insects: dipterans Agromyzidae, Ceciidomyidae and Tephritidae; Coleoptera (Apionidae), Hemiptera (Miridae), Lepidoptera (Blastobasidae, Gelechiidae, Pterophoridae, Pyralidae, and Tortricidae) and the parasitoids of this endophagous insects, which found in the daisies’s flower heads ideal conditions for food, breeding site and shelter. The Neotropical florivorous flies are the Agromyzinae (Agromyzidae), and Tephritinae (Tephritidae), which in their larval stage feed on Asteraceae inflorescences. To report the species of florivore flies, their host plants and parasitoids in flower heads of Asteraceae from the Brazilian Chaco, we sampled inflorescences of 25 species (± 500 flower heads/species) that were kept in containers to the emergence of the florivorous flies or their parasitoids sampled in the three phytophysiognomies. The adult insects after 48 hours of their emergence were fixed in 80% ethanol for later identification. A total 25 species of Asteraceae were evaluated in the Brazilian Chaco, being collected 17,000 flower heads. Nine tribes of two Asteraceae subfamilies were sampled, from which 15 species of florivorous flies were recovered. We found 5 genera with 9 of Tephritinae (Tephritidae), 6 species of Melanagromyza (Agromyzinae, Agromyzidae), and 104 parasitoids (Hymenoptera) of the florivorous flies.

Abstract BY THE BEGINNING OF 1936, Roosevelt had felt almost helpless against the worldwide drift toward war. A stream of warnings from abroad filled him with “extreme disquiet” about European and Asiatic affairs. “Nearly all of the political leaders in Europe and even here,” Norman Davis wrote from London, “are now thinking of how best to prepare for the war which they think Germany is going to force upon them.” “We are back where we were before 1914,” Ambassador Bullitt reported from Moscow, “when the familiar and true remark was, ‘Peace is at the mercy of an incident.’” “The whole European panorama is fundamentally blacker than at any time in your life ... or mine,” Roosevelt said in response. These “may be the last days of ... peace before a long chaos.” 1This deterioration abroad made FDR cager to unify the Americas against any outside threat. Hull had initiated the process in June 1935 when he sounded out other American states on establishing “adequate peace machinery” to deal with future inter-American disputes. Though Roosevelt fully supported Hull’s idea, they decided to delay a proposal for a conference on the subject until mediators could settle the Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay. In January 1936, nine days after the belligerents had signed peace protocols, Roosevelt had invited the twenty Latin American states “to assemble at an early date ... to determine how the maintenance of peace among the American Republics may best be safeguarded .... With the conclusion of the Chaco War and with the reestablishment of peace throughout the Continent,” Roosevelt declared, “there would appear to be offered an opportunity for helpful counsel among our respective Governments which may not soon again be presented.” The President’s proposal at once received “cordial approval” throughout Latin America, though the formulation of an agenda took until August, when Argentina issued formal invitations for a meeting in Buenos Aires beginning December 1, 1936.

These two quotations, dating to within almost a decade of each other, refer to very different parts of South America, the first the La Guajira Peninsula at its northern tip, the second the savannahs of the Gran Chaco at its very heart. The Wayúu, dwelling in the first, had no direct connection with the Mbayá of whom Dobrizhoffer wrote here (though he is more famous for his work on their cousins, the Abipones). Nevertheless, both regions shared aspects of their respective experiences of colonial intrusion and settlement: the frequent adoption not just of horses but also of other exotic species like cattle and sheep; Spanish use of missionaries to try and pacify their Indigenous inhabitants; and the fact that the latter could play off one European power, or Spanish province, against another, thereby maintaining their own freedom of action. Aiding the Native peoples in this was their geographically, politically, and economically marginal position with respect to the main foci of colonial power in the Andes and along the Atlantic. Spain began exploiting Venezuela’s pearl fisheries as early as 1508, even settling on the mainland from 1522, but the real impetus to conquest in South America came only with Francisco Pizarro’s invasion of the Inka Empire in 1533. The highlands of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia (the latter never part of Inka domains), the lowlands between them and the Pacific Ocean, the northern half of Chile, and the northwestern corner of Argentina all passed quickly—if not always easily—under Spanish control. So too did parts of Paraguay, settled by following rivers inland from the Atlantic. Portugal, on the other hand, secured for herself the coast of Brazil, eventually expanding her reach across virtually the entire Amazon Basin. Horses were as much a part of the conquistadores’ repertoire in South America as in Mexico. They sowed panic when Pizarro first confronted Inka troops at Cajamarca in 1533, but Native American surprise and fear did not last. Inka armies quickly devised tactics to neutralize the effects of horses on the battlefield in vain efforts to expel the invader.