Journal articles on the topic 'Chapter 1. Political Ideology'

In this book, Marion Boulby traces the rise and evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan. In chapter 1, she gives a brief historical survey of Jordan's state-building and the economic and social developments in the country between 1921 and 1989. In chapter 2, she describes the formative phase of the Brotherhood and the conditions surrounding its establishment between 1945 and 1957. Here, Boulby contends that the concern over the future of Palestine rather than competition with leftist groups was the primary motive behind the formation of the Brotherhood. She also highlights the conservative nature of the founders of the movement and their adoption of a reformist ideology and pragmatic political stands. In her opinion, the norms of political conservatism, reform, and pragmatism, which have characterized the movement throughout its history, were behind the forging of a close alliance between the Brothers and the monarchy.

Karl Marx’s comments on silk manufacture in “The Working Day” chapter of Capital, volume 1, demonstrate how “quality”—usually associated with “use value”—has been mobilized by capital to naturalize industrialized labor. Putting his insight into conversation with a recent multimedia poetic project, Jen Bervin’s Silk Poems (2016–17), this essay examines the homology between, on the one hand, poetry’s avowed task of fitting form to content and, on the other, the ideology of labor that fits specific bodies to certain materials and tasks.

Summary The present article compares Augustus’ portrayal of the beginning of his political career, in Res Gestae 1-2, with what is otherwise known of the events mentioned or suppressed by the princeps in these chapters. He rewrote the story of his remarkable political acrobatics in 44-43 BCE so as to fit in with the ideology of the principate: a leadership embedded in constitutional legality and based on a consensus rooted in recognition of his extraordinary merits as alleged saviour of the res publica. In turning history into ideology, he profited in no small measure from the support he had received from Cicero during the earliest stage of his career.

Article 23 (1) of the Personal Information Protection Act stipulates that “A personal information controller shall not process any information prescribed by Presidential Decree (hereinafter referred to as ‘sensitive data’), including ideology, belief, admission to or withdrawal from a trade union or political party, political opinions, health, sex life, and other personal information that is likely to markedly threaten the privacy of any data subject.” Article 18 of the Enforcement Decree of the Personal Information Protection Act stipulates that ‘Information prescribed by Presidential Decree’ in the main clause , with the exception of the subparagraph, of Article 23 (1) of the Act means the following data or information. In subparagraph 3, “Personal information resulting from specific technical processing of data relating to the physical, physiological or behavioral characteristics of an individual for the purpose of uniquely identifying that individual” is defined as one of the sensitive data. The range of sensitive data is wider than that of biometrics. ‘Data that constitutes a criminal history record’ defined in subparagraph 5 of Article 2 of the Act on the Lapse of Criminal Sentences, etc. as stipulated in Article 18 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Personal Information Protection Act and Article 18 (4) of the Enforcement Decree of the Personal Information Protection Act ‘Personal information revealing racial or ethnic origin’ is sensitive data completely different from biometric information. Therefore, it is necessary to enact a separate law to protect and manage biometrics or biometric information that requires more protection than sensitive data. As safety measures for biometrics security, there are first, security measures for forged/falsified biometric information, second, protection of the transmission section when collecting and inputting biometric information, third, use within the scope of the agreed purpose, fourth, biometric information collection and input processing at the terminal, fifth, encryption when storing biometric information, sixth, destruction of biometric information, seventh, separate storage when storing original biometric information, eighth, in case of leakage of biometric information, protective measures are taken. The Act on Protection and Management of Biometrics (draft) includes Chapter 1 General Provisions, Chapter 2 Establishment of Biometrics Protection Policy, Chapter 3 Collection and Use of Biometrics and Restrictions on It, Chapter 4 Safe Management of Biometrics, and Chapter 5, Guarantee of Rights of Data Subjects.

I begin with a warm welcome for Evangelos Alexiou's Greek Rhetoric of the 4th Century bc, a ‘revised and slightly abbreviated’ version of the modern Greek edition published in 2016 (ix). Though the volume's title points to a primary focus on the fourth century, sufficient attention is given to the late fifth and early third centuries to provide context. As ‘rhetoric’ in the title indicates, the book's scope is not limited to oratory: Chapter 1 outlines the development of a rhetorical culture; Chapter 2 introduces theoretical debates about rhetoric (Plato, Isocrates, Alcidamas); and Chapter 3 deals with rhetorical handbooks (Anaximenes, Aristotle, and the theoretical precepts embedded in Isocrates). Oratory comes to the fore in Chapter 4, which introduces the ‘canon’ of ten Attic orators: in keeping with the fourth-century focus, Antiphon, Andocides, and Lysias receive no more than sporadic attention; conversely, extra-canonical fourth-century orators (Apollodorus, the author of Against Neaera, Hegesippus, and Demades) receive limited coverage. The remaining chapters deal with the seven major canonical orators: Isocrates, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Isaeus, Lycurgus, Hyperides, and Dinarchus. Each chapter follows the same basic pattern: life, work, speeches, style, transmission of text and reception. Isocrates and Demosthenes have additional sections on research trends and on, respectively, Isocratean ideology and issues of authenticity in the Demosthenic corpus. In the case of Isaeus, there is a brief discussion of contract oratory; Lycurgus is introduced as ‘the relentless prosecutor’. Generous extracts from primary sources are provided, in Greek and in English translation; small-type sections signal a level of detail that some readers may wish to pass over. The footnotes provide extensive references to older as well as more recent scholarship. The thirty-page bibliography is organized by chapter (a helpful arrangement in a book of this kind, despite the resulting repetition); the footnotes supply some additional references. Bibliographical supplements to the original edition have been supplied ‘only in isolated cases’ (ix). In short, this volume is a thorough, well-conceived, and organized synthesis that will be recognized, without doubt, as a landmark contribution. There are, inevitably, potential points of contention. The volume's subtitle, ‘the elixir of democracy and individuality’, ties rhetoric more closely to democracy and to Athens than is warranted: the precarious balancing act which acknowledges that rhetoric ‘has never been divorced from human activity’ while insisting that ‘its vital political space was the democracy of city-states’ (ix–x) seems to me untenable. Alexiou acknowledges that ‘the gift of speaking well, natural eloquence, was considered a virtue already by Homer's era’ (ix), and that ‘the natural gift of speaking well was considered a virtue’ (1). But the repeated insistence on natural eloquence is perplexing. Phoenix, in the embassy scene in Iliad 9, makes it clear that his remit included the teaching of eloquence (Il. 9.442, διδασκέμεναι): Alexiou only quotes the following line, which he mistakenly assigns to Book 10. (The only other typo that I noticed was ‘Aritsotle’ [97]. I, too, have a tendency to mistype the Stagirite's name, though my own automatic transposition is, alas, embarrassingly scatological.) Alexiou provides examples of later Greek assessments of fourth-century orators, including (for example) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Hermogenes, and the author of On Sublimity (the reluctance to commit to the ‘pseudo’ prefix is my, not Alexiou's, reservation). He observes cryptically that ‘we are aware of Didymus’ commentary’ (245); but the extensive late ancient scholia, which contain material from Menander's Demosthenic commentaries, disappointingly evoke no sign of awareness.

AbstractRecent studies have indicated the rhetorical purpose of Leviticus 1-16 as reification for the ritual authority of the Aaronide priesthood. In the present study, it is suggested that the literary shaping of these chapters was a response to external stimuli that threatened the priesthood. After weighing a variety of historical and socio-political contexts in which such a threat might have emerged, the tenure of Nehemiah as governor is considered as an example of the type of competing leadership typology that encroached upon the priesthood, and the rhetorical features of the Nehemiah Memoir are reconsidered in this light. The redaction of Leviticus 1-16 provides a sacral counter argument to administrative agents such as Nehemiah and his supporters, supporting an ideology where national survival was ensured not through interaction with Persia but through the integrity of Temple ritual entrusted solely to the Aaronide priests.

During World War II, the inhumane Nazi policy condemned millions of people to death. The National Socialist ideology having anti-Semitism as one of its pillars was consolidated during Hitler’s tenure in Germany, descending into taking the villainous crimes against humanity for granted. More than 18 thousand European Jewish emigrants arrived in Shanghai in the late 1930’s seeking refuge. No special permission to enter this multinational city was required and the local community provided all assistance to make their adaptation easy. Despite the cultural and linguistic differences between the local community and the refugees, the latter succeeded in adaptation, contributing to the city`s development. Quite quickly a model of adaptation to new political, economic and sociocultural conditions was found. Over time, however, the pressure and volatility of the policy of Japan, which occupied Shanghai in 1937, placed Jews in a difficult, unpredictable and dangerous position. The study reveals the concealed chapter of the history of the Holocaust describing the hardship of the Jewish population forced to emigrate to the other parts of the world to save their own lives from Nazi persecution. The name «Shanghai» has become a synonym of «salvation» for the participants of those events who have always gratefully remembered the hard, but life-saving years spent there. Along with the historical context, the cultural issue is considered in this study based on evaluation of the Jewish refugees’ assimilation in the Asian metropolis, analysis of the crosscultural interaction having arisen in the new communication space and the research on maintenance of the Jewish community’s fundamental values in an unfamiliar environment.

In her seminal work, Authoritarian Fictions: Ideological Novels as a Literary Genre, Susan Rubin Suleiman emphasizes the co-optational dimension of romans à thèse, which seem addressed to readers who are already converted to the ideological perspective of these works. Political novels therefore tend to divide readers into two categories: proponents on the one hand, denigrators on the other. Based on a close reading of Runaway Horses (1969), Mishima Yukio’s most overtly ideological fictional work, this article is meant to enrich Suleiman’s model by showing that the most elaborate authoritarian fictional works use specific rhetorical tactics to soften or compensate for the excess of their message and to appeal to nonsympathizers. Focusing on chapters 9 and 10 of Runaway Horses, where the novel shifts from a classical and realist tone (chapters 1 to 8) to an ideological and authoritarian one (chapters 9 to 40), the article analyzes three of these rhetorical tactics: (1) the lightning rod, which consists of attracting criticisms about one specific and clearly delineated locus of the text, fulfilling an apotropaic function and serving as a foil for the rest; (2) prolepsis, which anticipates the reader’s likely negative comments and thus becomes in tune with his perspective; and (3) the tactic of enlarging the audience by which the narrator reincorporates a sectarian ideology into a larger and more universal ensemble. The conclusion questions the place of the reader and investigates the reading strategies that he or she may adopt in order to respond to this manipulation.

THE WORLD ACCORDING TO PHYSICS by Jim Al-Khalili. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020. 336 pages. Hardcover; $16.95. ISBN: 9780691182308. *The World According to Physics is Jim Al-Khalili's "ode to physics" (p. vii). While Al-Khalili has been publishing popular science for over twenty years, this is his first attempt to provide the layperson a cohesive overview of physics as a whole, linking together relativity, quantum mechanics, and thermodynamics into one unified (or rather, not yet unified) picture of the cosmos. "Ode" is appropriate, for the author's unrelenting adoration of his subject is apparent throughout; this is a child's dream fulfilled, and in many ways is a broader summa of the world according to the mature Al-Khalili, bringing together not only physics, but also his views on truth, society, and our future. *Khalili opens with a discussion of how the human mind craves narrative. Yet science has displaced much of the old myths and religions: "Contrary to what some people might argue, the scientific method is not just another way of looking at the world, nor is it just another cultural ideology or belief system. It is the way we learn about nature through trial and error, through experimentation and observation, through being prepared to replace ideas that turn out to be wrong or incomplete with better ones, and through seeing patterns in nature and beauty in the mathematical equations that describe these patterns. All the while we deepen our understanding and get closer to that "truth"--the way the world really is" (p. 2). *While physics is not just another "story," it does have a cosmic scale that gives it a captivating wonder of its own, providing the basis for chapter 2 ("Scale"). Physics encompasses the infinitely small (e.g., subatomic particles) as well as the infinitely large (e.g., the expansion of spacetime at the farthest reaches of existence). Further, its scope is not merely all of space but all of time as well, getting within decimal points of the first instant after the big bang, while providing prophetic approximations of how the cosmos might end. While Al-Khalili does not play his cards this early, his later chapters (pp. 242-43 in particular) will reveal that this extensive scope establishes physics as the most fundamental discipline, the reigning queen of the sciences. *The deeper project begins in chapter 3 ("Space and Time"). Al-Khalili wishes to display the underlying skeleton that comprise the unification project of physics, charting each merger until the final matchup is made (similar to a playoff line-up, where 16 teams soon become 8, then 4, then 2, then 1). Just as Newton wedded heaven and Earth through gravity, Einstein wedded space and time, explaining a diversity of phenomena with ever-simpler equations. While Al-Khalili's popular explanations of special and general relativity are merely adequate, his grasp of the broader narrative of unification in which these theories stand is incredibly useful, helping the layman see the trajectory of the book and physics as a whole, even when they cannot understand each individual step. *While chapter 3 unified space and time, chapter 4 ("Energy and Matter") unifies the energy and mass which warp said spacetime. Yet the unifications of relativity hit a snag when they come to "The Quantum World" (chapter 5) and to "Thermodynamics and the Arrow of Time" (chapter 6). While Einstein seems to rule over the kingdom of all things great, quantum mechanics rules over all things small, and no one has managed to negotiate a treaty just yet. Things do not work "down there" as they do "up here"; the laws of the macro are not the laws of the micro. Further, thermodynamics suggests that there is a directionality to time--for things move toward greater entropy--yet it is unclear how this can be made consistent with relativistic time or the conceptual reversibility of time in the quantum world. *Al-Khalili then moves in chapter 7 ("Unification") to possible reconciliations of these issues. He does an admirable job of explaining how the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces were unified into the electroweak force, as well as explaining the ongoing attempt to unify the strong force with the electroweak force in a grand unified theory. This would leave only the holy grail: the attempt to unify gravity with the other three forces. String theory attempted such a unification by appealing to ten dimensions, yet by the 1990s there were five different string theories, which themselves needed to be unified, spawning M Theory (which required an additional eleventh dimension). An opposing contender soon arrived in loop quantum gravity. While string theory posits a quantum particle (the graviton) that exists within spacetime, loop quantum gravity inverts the order, making space more fundamental than a quantized particle within space, and so quantizing spacetime itself. These quanta of space are then "looped" together, determining the shape of spacetime. *Having unveiled the best approximations at a unified theory in physics today, Al-Khalili then ventures in chapter 8 to evaluate the subsequent state of the subject. He expresses frustration that no definitive proof has adjudicated between possible theories of everything, and that such unification seems further away now than it did thirty years ago. Even major discoveries, such as the Higgs boson, have mostly confirmed what we already suspected for decades, rather than genuinely pushing the envelope. Yet while he has given plenty of reason to be sceptical, Al-Khalili then lists recent developments that show that plausible models of quantum gravity continue to come forward, for example, Witten's M-Theory or Maldacena's gauge/gravity duality. Further, physics continues to make substantial technological contributions to daily life. This leads naturally into chapter 9 ("The Usefulness of Physics"). Particular attention is paid to the future possibilities of quantum computing for physics, medicine, AI, and a whole host of other multi-disciplinary simulations and processes that quantum superpositions would allow (for superpositions enable a greater degree of complexity in contrast to binary). *Al-Khalili concludes with a final chapter ("Thinking like a Physicist") about how physics and the scientific method can and should help govern public discourse. In this chapter, the true aim of his project comes to light, suggesting he is not providing a picture of the world according to physics, but the world as it simply is: "One day we may find a new theory of quantum gravity, but it will never predict that my ball will take twice or half as long as Newton's equation of motion predicts. That is an absolute truth about the world. There is no philosophical argument, no amount of meditation, no spiritual awakening or religious experience, or gut instinct or political ideology that could ever have told me that a ball dropped from a height of five metres would take one second to hit the ground. But science can tell me" (p. 276). *While Al-Khalili claimed in the preface that he would try to avoid metaphysical questions (p. xiii), he inevitably (and at times, self-consciously) stumbles back upon them, making ontological claims about the world-in-itself. Indeed, even his quest for unification is arguably based on a philosophical presupposition that unity is more fundamental than diversity, a tradition which came to fruition in Neoplatonism and Christian monotheism. While Al-Khalili acknowledges the need for philosophy and science to communicate (p. xiv), in practice he seems to treat philosophy as a useful tool for science when it hits a roadblock (e.g., for unpacking the implications of quantum mechanics) rather than a discipline in its own right that has the ability to question the underlying epistemic and ontological assumptions of science itself. As such, while his manner is more open and humble than your average humanist/materialist (he was elected president of the British Humanist Association in 2012), his actual beliefs do not seem to have absorbed much at all of the philosophical or theological complexity required for the sorts of claims he is making: "The human condition is bountiful beyond measure. We have invented art and poetry and music; we have created religions and political systems; we have built societies, cultures, and empires so rich and complex that no mere mathematical formula could ever encapsulate them. But, if we want to know where we come from, where the atoms in our bodies were formed--the "why" and "how" of the world and universe we inhabit--then physics is the path to a true understanding of reality. And with this understanding, we can shape our world and our destiny" (p. 281). *Ultimately, if one wants a helpful primer on physics, Al-Khalili provides a passionate and serviceable introduction. While his explanations of some topics were perhaps too much for newcomers, his weaving together of subjects often treated in isolation helps get things back on track, providing a grander narrative for lost readers to latch on to. Yet, if one is looking to see how this narrative fares as an all-encompassing account of the "why" and "how" of our world, then there are superior accounts available on the market. Indeed, thousands of years of writing and prayer have already sought out and encountered the One at the heart of creation. *Reviewed by Jonathan Lyonhart, University of Cambridge, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, UK CB2 3HU

THE WORLD ACCORDING TO PHYSICS by Jim Al-Khalili. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020. 336 pages. Hardcover; $16.95. ISBN: 9780691182308. *The World According to Physics is Jim Al-Khalili's "ode to physics" (p. vii). While Al-Khalili has been publishing popular science for over twenty years, this is his first attempt to provide the layperson a cohesive overview of physics as a whole, linking together relativity, quantum mechanics, and thermodynamics into one unified (or rather, not yet unified) picture of the cosmos. "Ode" is appropriate, for the author's unrelenting adoration of his subject is apparent throughout; this is a child's dream fulfilled, and in many ways is a broader summa of the world according to the mature Al-Khalili, bringing together not only physics, but also his views on truth, society, and our future. *Khalili opens with a discussion of how the human mind craves narrative. Yet science has displaced much of the old myths and religions: "Contrary to what some people might argue, the scientific method is not just another way of looking at the world, nor is it just another cultural ideology or belief system. It is the way we learn about nature through trial and error, through experimentation and observation, through being prepared to replace ideas that turn out to be wrong or incomplete with better ones, and through seeing patterns in nature and beauty in the mathematical equations that describe these patterns. All the while we deepen our understanding and get closer to that "truth"--the way the world really is" (p. 2). *While physics is not just another "story," it does have a cosmic scale that gives it a captivating wonder of its own, providing the basis for chapter 2 ("Scale"). Physics encompasses the infinitely small (e.g., subatomic particles) as well as the infinitely large (e.g., the expansion of spacetime at the farthest reaches of existence). Further, its scope is not merely all of space but all of time as well, getting within decimal points of the first instant after the big bang, while providing prophetic approximations of how the cosmos might end. While Al-Khalili does not play his cards this early, his later chapters (pp. 242-43 in particular) will reveal that this extensive scope establishes physics as the most fundamental discipline, the reigning queen of the sciences. *The deeper project begins in chapter 3 ("Space and Time"). Al-Khalili wishes to display the underlying skeleton that comprise the unification project of physics, charting each merger until the final matchup is made (similar to a playoff line-up, where 16 teams soon become 8, then 4, then 2, then 1). Just as Newton wedded heaven and Earth through gravity, Einstein wedded space and time, explaining a diversity of phenomena with ever-simpler equations. While Al-Khalili's popular explanations of special and general relativity are merely adequate, his grasp of the broader narrative of unification in which these theories stand is incredibly useful, helping the layman see the trajectory of the book and physics as a whole, even when they cannot understand each individual step. *While chapter 3 unified space and time, chapter 4 ("Energy and Matter") unifies the energy and mass which warp said spacetime. Yet the unifications of relativity hit a snag when they come to "The Quantum World" (chapter 5) and to "Thermodynamics and the Arrow of Time" (chapter 6). While Einstein seems to rule over the kingdom of all things great, quantum mechanics rules over all things small, and no one has managed to negotiate a treaty just yet. Things do not work "down there" as they do "up here"; the laws of the macro are not the laws of the micro. Further, thermodynamics suggests that there is a directionality to time--for things move toward greater entropy--yet it is unclear how this can be made consistent with relativistic time or the conceptual reversibility of time in the quantum world. *Al-Khalili then moves in chapter 7 ("Unification") to possible reconciliations of these issues. He does an admirable job of explaining how the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces were unified into the electroweak force, as well as explaining the ongoing attempt to unify the strong force with the electroweak force in a grand unified theory. This would leave only the holy grail: the attempt to unify gravity with the other three forces. String theory attempted such a unification by appealing to ten dimensions, yet by the 1990s there were five different string theories, which themselves needed to be unified, spawning M Theory (which required an additional eleventh dimension). An opposing contender soon arrived in loop quantum gravity. While string theory posits a quantum particle (the graviton) that exists within spacetime, loop quantum gravity inverts the order, making space more fundamental than a quantized particle within space, and so quantizing spacetime itself. These quanta of space are then "looped" together, determining the shape of spacetime. *Having unveiled the best approximations at a unified theory in physics today, Al-Khalili then ventures in chapter 8 to evaluate the subsequent state of the subject. He expresses frustration that no definitive proof has adjudicated between possible theories of everything, and that such unification seems further away now than it did thirty years ago. Even major discoveries, such as the Higgs boson, have mostly confirmed what we already suspected for decades, rather than genuinely pushing the envelope. Yet while he has given plenty of reason to be sceptical, Al-Khalili then lists recent developments that show that plausible models of quantum gravity continue to come forward, for example, Witten's M-Theory or Maldacena's gauge/gravity duality. Further, physics continues to make substantial technological contributions to daily life. This leads naturally into chapter 9 ("The Usefulness of Physics"). Particular attention is paid to the future possibilities of quantum computing for physics, medicine, AI, and a whole host of other multi-disciplinary simulations and processes that quantum superpositions would allow (for superpositions enable a greater degree of complexity in contrast to binary). *Al-Khalili concludes with a final chapter ("Thinking like a Physicist") about how physics and the scientific method can and should help govern public discourse. In this chapter, the true aim of his project comes to light, suggesting he is not providing a picture of the world according to physics, but the world as it simply is: "One day we may find a new theory of quantum gravity, but it will never predict that my ball will take twice or half as long as Newton's equation of motion predicts. That is an absolute truth about the world. There is no philosophical argument, no amount of meditation, no spiritual awakening or religious experience, or gut instinct or political ideology that could ever have told me that a ball dropped from a height of five metres would take one second to hit the ground. But science can tell me" (p. 276). *While Al-Khalili claimed in the preface that he would try to avoid metaphysical questions (p. xiii), he inevitably (and at times, self-consciously) stumbles back upon them, making ontological claims about the world-in-itself. Indeed, even his quest for unification is arguably based on a philosophical presupposition that unity is more fundamental than diversity, a tradition which came to fruition in Neoplatonism and Christian monotheism. While Al-Khalili acknowledges the need for philosophy and science to communicate (p. xiv), in practice he seems to treat philosophy as a useful tool for science when it hits a roadblock (e.g., for unpacking the implications of quantum mechanics) rather than a discipline in its own right that has the ability to question the underlying epistemic and ontological assumptions of science itself. As such, while his manner is more open and humble than your average humanist/materialist (he was elected president of the British Humanist Association in 2012), his actual beliefs do not seem to have absorbed much at all of the philosophical or theological complexity required for the sorts of claims he is making: "The human condition is bountiful beyond measure. We have invented art and poetry and music; we have created religions and political systems; we have built societies, cultures, and empires so rich and complex that no mere mathematical formula could ever encapsulate them. But, if we want to know where we come from, where the atoms in our bodies were formed--the "why" and "how" of the world and universe we inhabit--then physics is the path to a true understanding of reality. And with this understanding, we can shape our world and our destiny" (p. 281). *Ultimately, if one wants a helpful primer on physics, Al-Khalili provides a passionate and serviceable introduction. While his explanations of some topics were perhaps too much for newcomers, his weaving together of subjects often treated in isolation helps get things back on track, providing a grander narrative for lost readers to latch on to. Yet, if one is looking to see how this narrative fares as an all-encompassing account of the "why" and "how" of our world, then there are superior accounts available on the market. Indeed, thousands of years of writing and prayer have already sought out and encountered the One at the heart of creation. *Reviewed by Jonathan Lyonhart, University of Cambridge, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, UK CB2 3HU

Christianity was the religion of spirit (and freedom), and critiqued Islam as a religion of flesh (and slavery); later, Christianity was the religion of reason, and critiqued Islam as the religion of fideism; later still, Christianity was the religion of the critique of religion, and critiqued Islam as the most atavistic of religions. Even now, when the West has critiqued its own Chris- tianity enough to be properly secular (because free, rational, and critical), it continues to critique Islam for being not secular enough. In contrast to Christianity or post-Christian secularism, then, and despite their best ef- forts, Islam does not know (has not learned from) critique. This sentiment is articulated at multiple registers, academic and popular and governmen- tal: Muslims are fanatical about their repressive law; they interpret things too literally; Muslims do not read their own revelation critically, let alone literature or cartoons; their sartorial practices are unreasonable; the gates of ijtihād closed in 900CE; Ghazali killed free inquiry in Islam… Such claims are ubiquitous enough to be unremarkable, and have political traction among liberals and conservatives alike. “The equation of Islam with the ab- sence of critique has a longer genealogy in Western thought,” Irfan Ahmad writes in this book, “which runs almost concurrently with Europe’s colonial expansion” (8). Luther and Renan figure in that history, as more recently do Huntington and Gellner and Rushdie and Manji.Meanwhile in the last decade an interdisciplinary conversation about the stakes, limits, complicities, and possibilities of critique has developed in the anglophone academy, a conversation of which touchstones include the polemical exchange between Saba Mahmood and Stathis Gourgouris (2008); the co-authored volume Is Critique Secular? (2009), by Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Mahmood; journal special issues dedi- cated to the question (e.g. boundary 2 40, no. 1 [2013]); and Gourgouris’s Lessons in Secular Criticism (2013), among others. At the same time, the discipline of religious studies remains trapped in an argument over the lim- its of normative analysis and the possibility of critical knowledge.Religion as Critique: Islamic Critical Thinking from Mecca to the Mar- ketplace seeks to turn these debates on their head. Is critique secular? Decidedly not—but understanding why that is, for Ahmad, requires revising our understanding of critique itself. Instead of the object of critique, reli- gion here emerges as an agent of critique. By this account, God himself is the source of critique, and the prophets and their heirs are “critics par ex- cellence” (xiv). The book is divided into two parts bookended by a prologue and epilogue. “Formulation” comprises three chapters levying the shape of the argument. “Illustration” comprises three chapters taking up the case study of the South Asian reformer Abul-A‘la Maududi and his critics (es- pecially regarding his views on the state and on women) as well as a fourth chapter that seeks to locate critique in the space of the everyday. There are four theses to Ahmad’s argument, none of them radically original on their own but newly assembled. As spelled out in the first chap- ter (“Introduction”), the first thesis holds that the Enlightenment reconfig- uration of Christianity was in fact an ethnic project by which “Europe/the West constituted its identity in the name of reason and universalism against a series of others,” among them Islam (14). The second thesis is that no crit- ic judges by reason alone. Rather, critique is always situated, directed, and formed: it requires presuppositions and a given mode to be effective (17). The third thesis is that the Islamic tradition of critique stipulates the com- plementarity of intellect (‘aql, dimāgh) and heart (qalb, dil); this is a holistic anthropology, not a dualistic one. The fourth thesis is that critique should not be understood as the exclusive purview of intellectuals (especially when arguing about literature) or as simply a theoretical exercise. Instead, cri- tique should be approached as part of life, practiced by the literate and the illiterate alike (18).The second chapter, “Critique: Western and/or Islamic,” focuses on the first of these theses. The Enlightenment immunized the West from critique while subjecting the Rest to critique. An “anthropology of philosophy” approach can treat Kant’s transcendental idealism as a social practice and in doing so discover that philosophy is “not entirely independent” from ethnicity (37). The certainty offered by the Enlightenment project can thus be read as “a project of security with boundaries.” Ahmad briefly consid- ers the place of Islam across certain of Kant’s writings and the work of the French philosophes; he reads their efforts to “secure knowledge of humani- ty” to foreclose the possibility of “knowledge from humanity” (42), namely Europe’s others. Meanwhile, ethnographic approaches to Muslim debates shy away from according them the status of critique, but in so doing they only maintain the opposition between Western reason and Islamic unrea- son. In contrast to this view (from Kant through Foucault), Ahmad would rather locate the point of critical rupture with the past in the axial age (800-200BCE), which would include the line of prophets who reformed (critiqued) their societies for having fallen into corruption and paganism. This alternative account demonstrates that “critical inquiry presupposes a tradition,” that is, that effective critique is always immanent (58). The third chapter, “The Modes: Another Genealogy of Critique,” con- tests the reigning historiography of “critique” (tanqīd/naqd) in South Asia that restricts it to secular literary criticism. Critique (like philosophy and democracy) was not simply founded in Grecian antiquity and inherited by Europe: Ahmad “liberates” critique from its Western pedigree and so allows for his alternative genealogy, as constructed for instance through readings of Ghalib. The remainder of the chapter draws on the work of Maududi and his critics to present the mission of the prophets as critiquing to reform (iṣlāḥ) their societies. This mandate remains effective today, and Maududi and his critics articulate a typology of acceptable (tanqīd) and unacceptable (ta‘īb, tanqīṣ, tazhīk, takfīr, etc.) critiques in which the style of critique must be considered alongside its object and telos. Religion as Critique oscillates between sweeping literature reviews and close readings. Readers may find the former dizzying, especially when they lose in depth what they gain in breadth (for example, ten pages at hand from chapter 2 cite 44 different authors, some of whom are summarizing or contesting the work of a dozen other figures named but not cited di- rectly). Likewise there are moments when Ahmad’s own dogged critiques may read as tendentious. The political purchase of this book should not be understated, though the fact that Muslims criticize themselves and others should come as no surprise. Yet it is chapters 4–6 (on Maududi and his critics) which substantiate the analytic ambition of the book. They are the most developed chapters of the book and detail a set of emerging debates with a fine-grained approach sometimes found wanting elsewhere (espe- cially in the final chapter). They show how Islam as a discursive tradition is constituted through critique, and perhaps always has been: for against the disciplinary proclivities of anthropologists (who tend to emphasize discon- tinuity and rupture, allowing them to discover the modern invention of traditions), Ahmad insists on an epistemic connection among precolonial and postcolonial Islam. This connection is evident in how the theme of rupture/continuity is itself a historical topos of “Islamic critical thinking.” Chapter 4 (“The Message: A Critical Enterprise”) approaches Maududi (d. 1979) as a substantial political thinker, not simply the fundamentalist ideologue he is often considered to be. Reading across Maududi’s oeuvre, Ahmad gleans a political-economic critique of colonial-capitalist exploita- tion (95), a keen awareness of the limits of majoritarian democracy, and a warning about the dispossessive effects of minoritization. Maududi’s Isla- mism (“theodemocracy”), then, has to be understood within his broader project of the revival of religion to which tanqīd (“critique”), tajdīd (“re- newal”), and ijtihād (“understanding Islam’s universal principles to de- termine change”) were central (103). He found partial historical models for such renewal in ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmad Sirhindi, and Shah Wali Ullah. A key element of this critique is that it does not aim to usher in a different future. Instead it inhabits a more complicated temporality: it clarifies what is already the case, as rooted in the primordial nature of humans (fiṭra), and in so doing aligns the human with the order of creation. This project entails the critique and rejection of false gods, in- cluding communism, fascism, national socialism, and capitalism (117). Chapter 5 (“The State: (In)dispensible, Desirable, Revisable?”) weaves together ethnographic and textual accounts of Maududi’s critics and de- fenders on the question of the state (the famous argument for “divine sov- ereignty”). In doing so the chapter demonstrates how the work of critique is undertaken in this Islamic tradition, where, Ahmad writes, “critique is connected to a form of life the full meaning of which is inseparable from death” (122). (This also means that at stake in critique is also the style and principles of critique.) The critics surveyed in this chapter include Manzur Nomani, Vahiduddin Khan, Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, Amir Usmani, Sadrud- din Islahi, Akram Zurti, Rahmat Bedar, Naqi Rahman, Ijaz Akbar, and others, figures of varying renown but all of whom closely engaged, defend- ed, and contested Maududi’s work and legacy in the state politics of his Jamaat-e Islami. Chapter 6 (“The Difference: Women and In/equality”) shows how Maududi’s followers critique the “neopatriarchate” he proposes. Through such critique, Ahmad also seeks to affirm the legitimacy of a “nonpatri- archal reading of Islam” (156). If Maududi himself regarded the ḥarem as “the mightiest fortress of Islamic culture” (159)—a position which Ahmad notes is “enmeshed in the logic of colonial hegemony”—he also desired that women “form their own associations and unbiasedly critique the govern- ment” (163). Maududi’s work and legacy is thus both “disabling” and “en- abling” for women at the same time, as is borne out by tracing the critiques it subsequently faced (including by those sympathetic to his broader proj- ect). The (male) critics surveyed here include Akram Zurti, Sultan Ahmad Islahi, Abdurrahman Alkaf, and Mohammad Akram Nadwi, who seriously engaged the Quran and hadith to question Maududi’s “neopatriarchate.” They critiqued his views (e.g. that women were naturally inferior to men, or that they were unfit for political office) through alternative readings of Islamic history and theology. Chapter 7 (“The Mundane: Critique as Social-Cultural Practice”) seeks to locate critique at “the center of life for everyone, including ordinary sub- jects with no educational degrees” (179). Ahmad writes at length about Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (d. 1988), the anticolonial activist who led a massive movement against colonial domination, and whose following faced British brutality with nonviolence. The Khudai Khidmatgār movement he built was “a movement of critique” (195), Ahmad writes, composed of or- dinary men and women, peasants and the unlettered. The brief remainder of the chapter suggests that the proverbs which punctuate everyday life (for example, in the trope of the greedy mullah) also act as critiques. By the end of Religion as Critique it is difficult not to see critique na- scent in every declaration or action. This deflates the analytic power of the term—but perhaps that is one unstated aim of the project, to reveal critique as simply a part of life. Certainly the book displaces the exceptional West- ern claim to critique. Yet this trope of exposure—anthropology as cultural critique, the ethnographer’s gaze turned inward—also raises questions of its own. In this case, the paradigmatic account of critique (Western, sec- ular) has been exposed as actually being provincial. But the means of this exposure have not come from the alternative tradition of critique Ahmad elaborates. That is, Ahmad is not himself articulating an Islamic critique of Western critique. (Maududi serves as an “illustration” of Ahmad’s ar- gument; Maududi does not provide the argument itself.) In the first chap- ters (“Formulation”) he cites a wide literature that practices historicism, genealogy, archeology, and deconstruction in order to temper the universal claims of Western supremacists. The status of these latter critical practices however is not explored, as to whether they are in themselves sufficient to provincialize or at least de-weaponize Western critique. Put more directly: is there is a third language (of political anthropology, for example) by which Ahmad analytically mediates the encounter between rival traditions of cri- tique? And if there is such a language, and if it is historically, structurally, and institutionally related to one of the critical traditions it is mediating, then what is the status of the non-Western “illustration”? The aim of this revision of critique, Ahmad writes, is “genuinely dem- ocratic dialogue with different traditions” (xii). As much is signalled in its citational practices, which (for example) reference Talal Asad and Viveiros de Castro together in calling for “robust comparison” (14) between West- ern and Islamic notions of critique, and reference Maududi and Koselleck together in interpreting critique to be about judgment (203). No matter that Asad and de Castro or Maududi and Koselleck mean different things when using the same words; these citations express Ahmad’s commitment to a dialogic (rather than dialectical) mode in engaging differences. Yet because Ahmad does not himself explore what is variously entailed by “comparison” or “judgment” in these moments, such citations remain as- sertions gesturing to a dialogue to come. In this sense Religion as Critique is a thoroughly optimistic book. Whether such optimism is warranted might call for a third part to follow “Formulation” and “Illustration”: “Reckoning.” Basit Kareem IqbalPhD candidate, Department of Anthropologyand Program in Critical TheoryUniversity of California, Berkeley

Conventional wisdom states that where ideas and values have mattered in American political life they have usually been the product of a single, overarching political culture. The United States, it is argued, has had political conflict but not ideological conflict. Perhaps nowhere is this premise more noticeable than in the study of political parties. According to Du-verger, “[T]he two parties are rival teams, one occupying office, the other seeking to dislodge it. It is a struggle between the ins and the outs, which never becomes fanatical, and creates no deep cleavage in the country.” Everett Carll Ladd writes, “[T]he need to seek support within an overarching ideological consensus, has historically imposed certain characteristics on the major American parties – social group inclusiveness, accommodationism, a ‘non-ideological’ stance vis-a-vis their principal opponents (which, after all, accept the same ideology).”

Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in the influence of ideology on the formation and maintenance of political attitudes. Much of this work has examined ideology as an individual difference that influences evaluations of political issues; these studies instead examined how one's ideology explicitly serves to polarize political opinions. Using the self-validation perspective as a theoretical backdrop, two studies examine the role of political ideology in validating thoughts about a political issue. In Study 1, considering one's political ideology after writing about one's attitude toward abortion increased thought confidence and attitude extremity related to abortion. Study 2 utilized a more subtle manipulation of ideology salience and found that political ideology validated thoughts about abortion, but not the issue of changing the legal drinking age (an issue less related to political ideology). These studies suggest that political ideology plays a role in attitude extremity and certainty toward ideology-relevant issues.

Having overcome the prejudice that equated emotion with irrationality, collective action theories are beginning to incorporate emotional variables. Nonetheless, these are restricted to negative ones, fundamentally anger. This is due to the fact that collective action is associated exclusively with protest, when this does not necessarily have to be the case. The aims of the present work are twofold: a) to analyse the structure of emotions with regard to the Spanish Government's decision to negotiate with ETA; and b) to verify the impact of these emotions and of ideology on the intention to participate in demonstrations supporting or protesting against said decision. The results show that emotions can be organised into three factors: anger, enthusiasm and anxiety. Anger and enthusiasm account for a high percentage of variance in the attention to demonstrate. Ideology, although to a lesser extent, also has a significant influence

Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more likely to pursue selfish outcomes, and liberals more likely to pursue egalitarian outcomes. In study 1, we examine how political ideology and political party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) predict cooperation with a partner who self-identifies as Republican or Democrat in two samples before ( n = 362) and after ( n = 366) the 2012 US presidential election. Liberals show slightly more concern for their partners’ outcomes compared to conservatives (study 1), and in study 2 this relation is supported by a meta-analysis ( r = .15). However, in study 1, political ideology did not relate to cooperation in general. Both Republicans and Democrats extend more cooperation to their in-group relative to the out-group, and this is explained by expectations of cooperation from in-group versus out-group members. We discuss the relation between political ideology and cooperation within and between groups.

An introduction to Svalbard is as necessary for a geoscientist as for any other student of the archipelago. The section on geographical nomenclature is illustrated by maps which are designed to locate many of the commonly used names. These and others are listed at the end of the volume where additional names used later are referred to. The regional context of Svalbard is shown in Fig. 1.1.The present-day physical environment is mentioned, but treated more fully in Chapters 21 and 22.The section on the present-day Svalbard biota is not by a specialist for specialists, but is intended to list those organisms commonly encountered in the field and of interest to most workers.The political and treaty considerations are interwoven and have sometimes left the Norwegian administration in an ambivalent position. Happily however the resources forthcoming from the petroleum industry to the nation has enabled the administration to fulfil its responsibility admirably and latterly without the pressures from the Cold War.Svalbard for its size has a small population, less than 4000 concentrated in relatively few settlements, but numbers are augmented by summer arrivals of construction/maintenance staff, tourists, students and scientists, while the residents often take their summer holidays on the mainland. The environmental threat from this expanding seasonal population presents one of the most serious challenges, while at the same time tourism is replacing coal mining as the principal economic resource. Provision of shipping facilities supplemented by air travel is transforming the economy, which however still requires substantial

This is the slyest, and therefore smartest, assessment of Islamic fundamentalism currently available. The author, a prolific Lebanese political theorist, has offered in this, his fourth monograph on the subject, a well-argued, highly original thesis. Moussalli asks one basic question: does Islamic fundamentalism have a philosophical basis? “Yes, it does,” he replies, “but it is not the same basis for all Islamic fundamentalists.” He then proceeds to demonstrate how particular Islamic fundamentalist theorists have addressed issues such as ideology and knowledge, society and politics, from their own philosophical perspective. The argument is markedly tilted toward politics, as each of the six chapters examines either a facet of political philosophy or the discourse of a particular theorist on the Islamic state. The first three chapters are framed as general overviews, first of the fundamentalism–modernism dyad, then of the epistemological divide between divine revelation and human reason, and finally of the discursive dichotomy between the Islamic state and democratic pluralism. The next three chapters shift to dominant theorists, the three “heroes” of Islamist ideology. Chapter 4 examines Hasan al-Banna on the Islamic state; Chapter 5, Sayyid Qutb. Chapter 6 takes up the most prominent current Islamist: Hasan al-Turabi. Not since Hamid Enayat's Modern Islamic Political Thought (Texas, 1982) has any scholar made such a comprehensive effort to trace the patterns of similarity—and the evidence of conflict and disagreement—among the major ideologues of Islamic fundamentalism.

The global spread of Salafism, though it began in the 1960s and 1970s, only started to attract significant attention from scholars and analysts outside of Islamic studies as well as journalists, politicians, and the general public following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda Central. After the attacks, Salafism—or, as it was pejoratively labeled by its critics inside and outside of the Islamic tradition, “Wahhabism”—was accused of being the ideological basis of all expressions of Sunni militancy from North America and Europe to West and East Africa, the Arab world, and into Asia. According to this narrative, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Za- wahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other Sunni jihadis were merely putting into action the commands of medieval ‘ulama such as Ibn Taymiyya, the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and modern revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. To eradicate terrorism, you must eliminate or neuter Salafism, say its critics. The reality, of course, is far more complex than this simplistic nar- rative purports. Salafism, though its adherents share the same core set of creedal beliefs and methodological approaches toward the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith and Sunni legal canon, comes in many forms, from the scholastic and hierarchical Salafism of the ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries to the decentralized, self-described Salafi groups in Europe and North America who cluster around a single char- ismatic preacher who often has limited formal religious education. What unifies these different expressions of Salafism is a core canon of religious and legal texts and set of scholars who are widely respected and referenced in Salafi circles. Thurston grounds his fieldwork and text-based analysis of Salafism in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and home to one of the world’s largest single Muslim national populations, through the lens of this canon, which he defines as a “communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation” (1). He argues fur- ther that in the history of Nigerian Salafism, one can trace the major stages that the global Salafi movement has navigated as it spread from the Arab Middle East to what are erroneously often seen as “peripheral” areas of the Islamic world, Africa and parts of Asia. The book is based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria including interviews with key Nigerian Salafi scholars and other leading figures as well as a wide range of textual primary sourc- es including British and Nigerian archival documents, international and national news media reports, leaked US embassy cables, and a significant number of religious lectures and sermons and writings by Nigerian Salafis in Arabic and Hausa. In Chapter One, Thurston argues that the Salafi canon gives individ- ual and groups of Salafis a sense of identity and membership in a unique and, to them, superior religious community that is linked closely to their understanding and reading of sacred history and the revered figures of the Prophet Muhammad and the Ṣaḥāba. Salafism as an intellectual current, theology, and methodological approach is transmitted through this can- on which serves not only as a vehicle for proselytization but also a rule- book through which the boundaries of what is and is not “Salafism” are determined by its adherents and leading authorities. The book’s analytical framework and approach toward understanding Salafism, which rests on seeing it as a textual tradition, runs counter to the popular but problematic tendency in much of the existing discussion and even scholarly literature on Salafism that defines it as a literalist, one-dimensional, and puritani- cal creed with a singular focus on the Qur’an and hadith canon. Salafis, Thurston argues, do not simply derive religious and legal rulings in linear fashion from the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna but rather engage in a co- herent and uniform process of aligning today’s Salafi community with a set of normative practices and beliefs laid out by key Salafi scholars from the recent past. Thurston divides the emergence of a distinct “Salafi” current within Sunnis into two phases. The first stretches from 1880 to 1950, as Sun- ni scholars from around the Muslim-majority world whose approaches shared a common hadith-centered methodology came into closer contact. The second is from the 1960s through the present, as key Salafi institutions (such as the Islamic University of Medina and other Saudi Salafi bodies) were founded and began attracting and (perhaps most importantly) fund- ing and sponsoring Sunni students from countries such as Nigeria to come study in Saudi Arabia, where they were deeply embedded in the Salafi tra- dition before returning to their home countries where, in turn, they spread Salafism among local Muslims. Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north, as with other regions such as Yemen’s northern Sa‘ada governorate, proved to be a fertile ground for Salafism in large part because it enabled local Muslims from more humble social backgrounds to challenge the longtime domi- nance of hereditary ruling families and the established religious class. In northern Nigeria the latter was and continues to be dominated by Sufi or- ders and their shaykhs whose long-running claim to communal leadership faced new and substantive theological and resource challenges following the return of Nigerian seminary students from Saudi Arabia’s Salafi scho- lastic institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In Chapters Two and Three, Thurston traces the history of Nigerian and other African students in Saudi Arabia, which significantly expanded following the 1961 founding of the Islamic University of Medina (which remains the preeminent Salafi seminary and university in the world) and after active outreach across the Sunni Muslim world by the Saudi govern- ment and Salafi religious elite to attract students through lucrative funding and scholarship packages. The process of developing an African Salafism was not one-dimensional or imposed from the top-down by Saudi Salafi elites, but instead saw Nigerian and other African Salafi students partici- pate actively in shaping and theorizing Salafi da‘wa that took into account the specifics of each African country and Islamic religious and social envi- ronment. In Nigeria and other parts of West and East Africa, this included considering the historically dominant position of Sufi orders and popular practices such as devotion to saints and grave and shrine visitation. African and Saudi Salafis also forged relationships with local African partners, in- cluding powerful political figures such as Ahmadu Bello and his religious adviser Abubakar Gumi, by attracting them with the benefits of establishing ties with wealthy international Islamic organizations founded and backed by the Saudi state, including the Muslim World League. Nigerian Salafis returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia actively promoted their Salafi canon among local Muslims, waging an aggressive proselytization campaign that sought to chip away at the dominance of traditional political and religious elites, the Sufi shaykhs. This process is covered in Chapter Four. Drawing on key sets of legal and exegetical writ- ings by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and other Salafi scholars, Nigerian Salafis sought to introduce a framework—represented by the canon—through which their students and adherents approach re- ligious interpretation and practice. By mastering one’s understanding and ability to correctly interpret scripture and the hadith, Salafis believe, one will also live a more ethical life based on a core set of “Salafi” principles that govern not only religious but also political, social, and economic life. Salaf- ism, Thurston argues, drawing on the work of Terje Østebø on Ethiopian Salafism, becomes localized within a specific environment.As part of their da‘wa campaigns, Nigerian Salafis have utilized media and new technology to debate their rivals and critics as well as to broad- en their own influence over Nigerian Muslims and national society more broadly, actions analyzed in Chapter Five. Using the Internet, video and audio recorded sermons and religious lectures, books and pamphlets, and oral proselytization and preaching, Nigerian Salafis, like other Muslim ac- tivists and groups, see in media and technology an extension of the phys- ical infrastructure provided by institutions such as mosques and religious schools. This media/cyber infrastructure is as, if not increasingly more, valuable as the control of physical space because it allows for the rapid spread of ideas beyond what would have historically been possible for local religious preachers and missionaries. Instead of preaching political revo- lution, Nigerian Salafi activists sought to win greater access to the media including radio airtime because they believed this would ultimately lead to the triumph of their religious message despite the power of skeptical to downright hostile local audiences among the Sufi orders and non-Salafis dedicated to the Maliki juridical canon.In the realm of politics, the subject of Chapter Six, Nigeria’s Salafis base their political ideology on the core tenets of the Salafi creed and canon, tenets which cast Salafism as being not only the purest but the only true version of Islam, and require of Salafis to establish moral reform of a way- ward Muslim society. Salafi scholars seek to bring about social, political, and religious reform, which collectively represent a “return” to the Prophet Muhammad’s Islam, by speaking truth to power and advising and repri- manding, as necessary, Muslim political rulers. In navigating the multi-po- lar and complex realm of national and regional politics, Thurston argues, Nigerian Salafi scholars educated in Saudi Arabia unwittingly opened the door to cruder and more extreme, militant voices of figures lacking the same level of study of the Salafi canon or Sunni Islam generally. The most infamous of the latter is “Boko Haram,” the jihadi-insurgent group today based around Lake Chad in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which calls itself Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad and is led by the bombastic Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram, under the leadership first of the revivalist preacher Mu- hammad Yusuf and then Shekau, is covered at length in the book’s third and final part, which is composed of two chapters. Yusuf, unlike mainstream Nigerian Salafis, sought to weaponize the Salafi canon against the state in- stead of using it as a tool to bring about desired reforms. Drawing on the writings of influential Arab jihadi ideologues including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the apocalyptic revolutionary Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the lat- ter of whom participated in the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Yusuf cited key Salafi concepts such as al-walā’ min al-mu’minīn wa-l-bara’ ‘an al-kāfirīn (loyalty to the Believers and disavowal of the Disbelievers) and beliefs about absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) as the basis of his revival- ist preaching. Based on these principle, he claimed, Muslims must not only fulfill their ritual duties such as prayer and fasting during Ramadan but also actively fight “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda) and bring about God’s rule on earth, following the correct path of the community of the Prophet Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm) referenced in multiple Qur’anic verses and outlined as a theological project for action by al-Maqdisi in a lengthy book of that name that has had a profound influence on the formation of modern Sunni jihadism. Instead of seeing Boko Haram, particularly under Shekau’s leadership, as a “Salafi” or “jihadi-Salafi” group, Thurston argues it is a case study of how a group that at one point in its history adhered to Salafism can move away from and beyond it. In the case of Shekau and his “post-Salafism,” he writes, the group, like Islamic State, has shifted away from the Salafi canon and toward a jihadism that uses only stripped-down elements from the canon and does so solely to propagate a militaristic form of jihad. Even when referencing historical religious authorities such as Ibn Taymiyya, Thurston points out, Boko Haram and Islamic State leaders and members often do so through the lens of modern Sunni jihadi ideologues like Juhay- man al-‘Utaybi, al-Maqdisi, and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, figures who have come to form a Sunni jihadi canon of texts, intellectuals, and ideologues. Shekau, in short, has given up canonical Salafism and moved toward a more bombastic and scholastically more heterodox and less-Salafi-than- jihadi creed of political violence. Thurston also pushes back against the often crude stereotyping of Af- rican Islamic traditions and movements that sees African Muslims as being defined by their “syncretic” mix of traditional African religious traditions and “orthodox” Islam, the latter usually a stand-in for “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” Islam. Islam and Islamic movements in Africa have developed in social and political environments that are not mirrors to the dominant models of the Arab world (in particular, Egypt). He convincingly points out that analysis of all forms of African Islamic social and political mobi- lization through a Middle East and Egypt-heavy lens obscures much more than it elucidates. The book includes useful glossaries of key individuals and Arabic terms referenced in the text as well as a translation of a sermon by the late, revered Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani that is part of the mainstream Salafi canon. Extensive in its coverage of the his- tory, evolution, and sociopolitical and religious development of Salafism in Nigeria as well as the key role played by Saudi Salafi universities and religious institutions and quasi-state NGOs, the book expands the schol- arly literature on Salafism, Islam in Africa, and political Islam and Islamic social movements. It also contributing to ongoing debates and discussions on approaches to the study of the role of texts and textual traditions in the formation of individual and communal religious identity. Christopher AnzaloneResearch Fellow, International Security ProgramBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University& PhD candidate, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

The global spread of Salafism, though it began in the 1960s and 1970s, only started to attract significant attention from scholars and analysts outside of Islamic studies as well as journalists, politicians, and the general public following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda Central. After the attacks, Salafism—or, as it was pejoratively labeled by its critics inside and outside of the Islamic tradition, “Wahhabism”—was accused of being the ideological basis of all expressions of Sunni militancy from North America and Europe to West and East Africa, the Arab world, and into Asia. According to this narrative, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Za- wahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other Sunni jihadis were merely putting into action the commands of medieval ‘ulama such as Ibn Taymiyya, the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and modern revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. To eradicate terrorism, you must eliminate or neuter Salafism, say its critics. The reality, of course, is far more complex than this simplistic nar- rative purports. Salafism, though its adherents share the same core set of creedal beliefs and methodological approaches toward the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith and Sunni legal canon, comes in many forms, from the scholastic and hierarchical Salafism of the ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries to the decentralized, self-described Salafi groups in Europe and North America who cluster around a single char- ismatic preacher who often has limited formal religious education. What unifies these different expressions of Salafism is a core canon of religious and legal texts and set of scholars who are widely respected and referenced in Salafi circles. Thurston grounds his fieldwork and text-based analysis of Salafism in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and home to one of the world’s largest single Muslim national populations, through the lens of this canon, which he defines as a “communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation” (1). He argues fur- ther that in the history of Nigerian Salafism, one can trace the major stages that the global Salafi movement has navigated as it spread from the Arab Middle East to what are erroneously often seen as “peripheral” areas of the Islamic world, Africa and parts of Asia. The book is based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria including interviews with key Nigerian Salafi scholars and other leading figures as well as a wide range of textual primary sourc- es including British and Nigerian archival documents, international and national news media reports, leaked US embassy cables, and a significant number of religious lectures and sermons and writings by Nigerian Salafis in Arabic and Hausa. In Chapter One, Thurston argues that the Salafi canon gives individ- ual and groups of Salafis a sense of identity and membership in a unique and, to them, superior religious community that is linked closely to their understanding and reading of sacred history and the revered figures of the Prophet Muhammad and the Ṣaḥāba. Salafism as an intellectual current, theology, and methodological approach is transmitted through this can- on which serves not only as a vehicle for proselytization but also a rule- book through which the boundaries of what is and is not “Salafism” are determined by its adherents and leading authorities. The book’s analytical framework and approach toward understanding Salafism, which rests on seeing it as a textual tradition, runs counter to the popular but problematic tendency in much of the existing discussion and even scholarly literature on Salafism that defines it as a literalist, one-dimensional, and puritani- cal creed with a singular focus on the Qur’an and hadith canon. Salafis, Thurston argues, do not simply derive religious and legal rulings in linear fashion from the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna but rather engage in a co- herent and uniform process of aligning today’s Salafi community with a set of normative practices and beliefs laid out by key Salafi scholars from the recent past. Thurston divides the emergence of a distinct “Salafi” current within Sunnis into two phases. The first stretches from 1880 to 1950, as Sun- ni scholars from around the Muslim-majority world whose approaches shared a common hadith-centered methodology came into closer contact. The second is from the 1960s through the present, as key Salafi institutions (such as the Islamic University of Medina and other Saudi Salafi bodies) were founded and began attracting and (perhaps most importantly) fund- ing and sponsoring Sunni students from countries such as Nigeria to come study in Saudi Arabia, where they were deeply embedded in the Salafi tra- dition before returning to their home countries where, in turn, they spread Salafism among local Muslims. Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north, as with other regions such as Yemen’s northern Sa‘ada governorate, proved to be a fertile ground for Salafism in large part because it enabled local Muslims from more humble social backgrounds to challenge the longtime domi- nance of hereditary ruling families and the established religious class. In northern Nigeria the latter was and continues to be dominated by Sufi or- ders and their shaykhs whose long-running claim to communal leadership faced new and substantive theological and resource challenges following the return of Nigerian seminary students from Saudi Arabia’s Salafi scho- lastic institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In Chapters Two and Three, Thurston traces the history of Nigerian and other African students in Saudi Arabia, which significantly expanded following the 1961 founding of the Islamic University of Medina (which remains the preeminent Salafi seminary and university in the world) and after active outreach across the Sunni Muslim world by the Saudi govern- ment and Salafi religious elite to attract students through lucrative funding and scholarship packages. The process of developing an African Salafism was not one-dimensional or imposed from the top-down by Saudi Salafi elites, but instead saw Nigerian and other African Salafi students partici- pate actively in shaping and theorizing Salafi da‘wa that took into account the specifics of each African country and Islamic religious and social envi- ronment. In Nigeria and other parts of West and East Africa, this included considering the historically dominant position of Sufi orders and popular practices such as devotion to saints and grave and shrine visitation. African and Saudi Salafis also forged relationships with local African partners, in- cluding powerful political figures such as Ahmadu Bello and his religious adviser Abubakar Gumi, by attracting them with the benefits of establishing ties with wealthy international Islamic organizations founded and backed by the Saudi state, including the Muslim World League. Nigerian Salafis returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia actively promoted their Salafi canon among local Muslims, waging an aggressive proselytization campaign that sought to chip away at the dominance of traditional political and religious elites, the Sufi shaykhs. This process is covered in Chapter Four. Drawing on key sets of legal and exegetical writ- ings by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and other Salafi scholars, Nigerian Salafis sought to introduce a framework—represented by the canon—through which their students and adherents approach re- ligious interpretation and practice. By mastering one’s understanding and ability to correctly interpret scripture and the hadith, Salafis believe, one will also live a more ethical life based on a core set of “Salafi” principles that govern not only religious but also political, social, and economic life. Salaf- ism, Thurston argues, drawing on the work of Terje Østebø on Ethiopian Salafism, becomes localized within a specific environment.As part of their da‘wa campaigns, Nigerian Salafis have utilized media and new technology to debate their rivals and critics as well as to broad- en their own influence over Nigerian Muslims and national society more broadly, actions analyzed in Chapter Five. Using the Internet, video and audio recorded sermons and religious lectures, books and pamphlets, and oral proselytization and preaching, Nigerian Salafis, like other Muslim ac- tivists and groups, see in media and technology an extension of the phys- ical infrastructure provided by institutions such as mosques and religious schools. This media/cyber infrastructure is as, if not increasingly more, valuable as the control of physical space because it allows for the rapid spread of ideas beyond what would have historically been possible for local religious preachers and missionaries. Instead of preaching political revo- lution, Nigerian Salafi activists sought to win greater access to the media including radio airtime because they believed this would ultimately lead to the triumph of their religious message despite the power of skeptical to downright hostile local audiences among the Sufi orders and non-Salafis dedicated to the Maliki juridical canon.In the realm of politics, the subject of Chapter Six, Nigeria’s Salafis base their political ideology on the core tenets of the Salafi creed and canon, tenets which cast Salafism as being not only the purest but the only true version of Islam, and require of Salafis to establish moral reform of a way- ward Muslim society. Salafi scholars seek to bring about social, political, and religious reform, which collectively represent a “return” to the Prophet Muhammad’s Islam, by speaking truth to power and advising and repri- manding, as necessary, Muslim political rulers. In navigating the multi-po- lar and complex realm of national and regional politics, Thurston argues, Nigerian Salafi scholars educated in Saudi Arabia unwittingly opened the door to cruder and more extreme, militant voices of figures lacking the same level of study of the Salafi canon or Sunni Islam generally. The most infamous of the latter is “Boko Haram,” the jihadi-insurgent group today based around Lake Chad in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which calls itself Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad and is led by the bombastic Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram, under the leadership first of the revivalist preacher Mu- hammad Yusuf and then Shekau, is covered at length in the book’s third and final part, which is composed of two chapters. Yusuf, unlike mainstream Nigerian Salafis, sought to weaponize the Salafi canon against the state in- stead of using it as a tool to bring about desired reforms. Drawing on the writings of influential Arab jihadi ideologues including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the apocalyptic revolutionary Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the lat- ter of whom participated in the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Yusuf cited key Salafi concepts such as al-walā’ min al-mu’minīn wa-l-bara’ ‘an al-kāfirīn (loyalty to the Believers and disavowal of the Disbelievers) and beliefs about absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) as the basis of his revival- ist preaching. Based on these principle, he claimed, Muslims must not only fulfill their ritual duties such as prayer and fasting during Ramadan but also actively fight “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda) and bring about God’s rule on earth, following the correct path of the community of the Prophet Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm) referenced in multiple Qur’anic verses and outlined as a theological project for action by al-Maqdisi in a lengthy book of that name that has had a profound influence on the formation of modern Sunni jihadism. Instead of seeing Boko Haram, particularly under Shekau’s leadership, as a “Salafi” or “jihadi-Salafi” group, Thurston argues it is a case study of how a group that at one point in its history adhered to Salafism can move away from and beyond it. In the case of Shekau and his “post-Salafism,” he writes, the group, like Islamic State, has shifted away from the Salafi canon and toward a jihadism that uses only stripped-down elements from the canon and does so solely to propagate a militaristic form of jihad. Even when referencing historical religious authorities such as Ibn Taymiyya, Thurston points out, Boko Haram and Islamic State leaders and members often do so through the lens of modern Sunni jihadi ideologues like Juhay- man al-‘Utaybi, al-Maqdisi, and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, figures who have come to form a Sunni jihadi canon of texts, intellectuals, and ideologues. Shekau, in short, has given up canonical Salafism and moved toward a more bombastic and scholastically more heterodox and less-Salafi-than- jihadi creed of political violence. Thurston also pushes back against the often crude stereotyping of Af- rican Islamic traditions and movements that sees African Muslims as being defined by their “syncretic” mix of traditional African religious traditions and “orthodox” Islam, the latter usually a stand-in for “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” Islam. Islam and Islamic movements in Africa have developed in social and political environments that are not mirrors to the dominant models of the Arab world (in particular, Egypt). He convincingly points out that analysis of all forms of African Islamic social and political mobi- lization through a Middle East and Egypt-heavy lens obscures much more than it elucidates. The book includes useful glossaries of key individuals and Arabic terms referenced in the text as well as a translation of a sermon by the late, revered Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani that is part of the mainstream Salafi canon. Extensive in its coverage of the his- tory, evolution, and sociopolitical and religious development of Salafism in Nigeria as well as the key role played by Saudi Salafi universities and religious institutions and quasi-state NGOs, the book expands the schol- arly literature on Salafism, Islam in Africa, and political Islam and Islamic social movements. It also contributing to ongoing debates and discussions on approaches to the study of the role of texts and textual traditions in the formation of individual and communal religious identity. Christopher AnzaloneResearch Fellow, International Security ProgramBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University& PhD candidate, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an explicitly normative analysis of how texts and discourses work in ideological interests with powerful political consequences. This chapter provides an historical overview of CDA, placing it in the long lineage of attempts to develop a normative political linguistics beginning with Voloshinov. Recent approaches and procedures are discussed. These attempt to bring together text analysis with contemporary social, political, and cultural theory. The case is made that new conditions of economic and cultural globalization have created theoretical and empirical challenges for CDA and, more generally, for a critical applied linguistics. It is argued that these will require that CDA augment its strong focus on ideology critique with the study of texts that model the productive uses of power and discourse in new conditions.

In this paper, we reflect on the ideology of political language delivered in political speech. We believe that language in political speech is a tool to spread hidden ideology. The impact of ideology can be positive, or it can also be negative for a nation. Our reflection deals with the revelation of ideology in the political speech text of the Indonesian politician, as well as Indonesian first president, Soekarno. Be based on grounded theory, we examined an important text of political speech that was delivered by Soekarno. The examination applied three main procedures to reveal ideology in text of political speech. The procedures are 1) by analyzing the main rhetorical devices that are used by the politician, 2) by analyzing the construction of the whole text, and 3) by reviewing the context of the situation and the background of the politician. As the results of applying the procedures, it was found that the ideologies of Soekarno’s political speech were ‘unity as the most important value for Indonesia’, revolution as the soul of Indonesia’ and, ‘imperialism as the main enemy of Indonesia’.

AbstractMachiavelli often seems to advocate a conception of religion as an instrument of political rule. But in the concluding chapter ofThe PrinceMachiavelli adopts a messianic rhetoric in which politics becomes an instrument of divine providence. Since the political project at stake inThe Prince, especially in this last chapter runs against both the interests and the ideology of the Catholic Church in Italy, some commentators have argued that Machiavelli appeals to providence merely in order to fool the Church and the Medici. This article argues that it is not necessary to appeal to such exoteric readings of the 26thchapter ofThe Princeif one envisages the possibility that Machiavelli may have drawn upon an alternative, non-Christian conception of divine providence coming from medieval Arabic and Jewish sources that is more compatible with his desire to return to Roman republican principles than is the Christian conception of divine providence.

Islamic Education and Character Education as a compulsory subject in high schools, has an important role in providing education and understanding related to Pancasila and religion, to prevent the influence of anti-Pancasila in Indonesia. The purpose of this study is to describe the integration of Pancasila values contained in the textbooks of Islamic Education and Character Education for senior high school students. This research is a library research. The results showed that some materials could be integrated with Pancasila values. (1) Class X, found in chapter I, chapter IV, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. Class XI, found in chapter I, III, IX, and XI. Class XII, found in chapter I, IV, V, VI, IX and X. (2) The integration of Pancasila values with these materials is expected to increase the spirit of nationalism and overcome the spread of anti-Pancasila ideology in Indonesia, especially among adolescents

AbstractThe goal of this chapter is to conduct the analysis of the national symbols systems in the public space of Skopje (Macedonia), Astana (Kazakhstan) and Aşgabat (Turkmenistan) that are being represented in national political discourses along with a wide interpretation and contextualization in the framework of the postsocialist process of reconstruction of national symbolism in order to indicate identity and restoration structures and development of the actual national discourse in Macedonia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In the actual process of reconstruction of national symbols system in analyzed cultural traditions it is important to underline the influence of nationalist ideology, which both in the Balkans and Central Asia has appeared in the form of ethno-nationalisms, where such factors as: language, history, culture and religion have been of crucial importance for construction of the idea of community that defined particular ethnos. One of the most influential tools of national ideology is taking the advantage of historical arguments aiming to expose the previous control over certain territory through the power structure, introduced by the present day nation.

Abstract. Little is known about epistemic motivations affecting political ideology when people make environmental decisions. In two studies, we examined the key role that political ideology played in the relationship between need for cognitive closure (NCC) and self-reported eco-friendly behavior. Study 1: 279 participants completed the NCC, pro-environmental, and political ideology measures. Mediation analyses showed that NCC was related to less pro-environmental behavior through more right-wing political ideology. Study 2: We replicated these results with a nonstudent sample (n = 240) and both social and economic conservatism as mediators. The results of Study 2 showed that social conservatism mediated the relationship between NCC and pro-environmental behavior. Finally, NCC was associated with pro-environmental attitude through both social and economic conservatism.

Language reflects one’s thoughts, feelings, and worldview. Technology has led to a proliferation of brief communications. Is this brief text meaningful? We examine whether text from brief political and nonpolitical communications reflect political ideology. Student responses to their ideological foundations (Study 1), brief snippets of unanimous Supreme Court verdicts (Study 2), and celebrity tweets (Study 3) were textually analyzed to examine whether they contained perceived threat and resistance to change content and whether this predicted the authors’ political affiliation. Across three studies, words related to resistance to change, but not perceived threat, were related to political ideology such that conservatives were more likely to include resistance-to-change-related words in their responses compared with liberals. These results suggest that brief text, even when not overtly political, reflects one’s political ideology. The increase in brief text production via new technology and its ability to predict political ideology make these findings particularly meaningful.

Introduction: The political preference of voters has been shown to be associated with their health status. We investigated the relationship between political preferences and mortality in Poland around the time of the last three general elections.Methods: We used the electoral data from the general elections held in 2001, 2005 and 2007. Indicators of political ideological preference were constructed based on the percentage of votes gathered by each party. Data on mortality, education and income level were obtained from 2002-2007 from the Polish Central Statistical Office. Pearson correlation was computed between standardised mortality ratios (SMR) and political preference. Finally, the influence of political preference on SMR was examined in a multivariate analysis controlling for socio-economic factors.Results: SMR was positively correlated with liberal political views (0.26; p<0.05) and negatively correlated with both secondary education (-0.49; p<0.05) and monthly income (-0.239; p<0.05). The correlation between SMR and conservative political views was negative, although the result did not reach statistical significance. Education and income explained more of the variation in SMR than political views. In a multivariate regression, the liberal views factor and secondary education were significantly associated with the SMR (p<0.001 for both).Conclusion: Our findings are consistent with earlier studies conducted in western countries showing a positive correlation between liberal political ideology and SMR, but differ in that an inverse relationship was found between conservative political orientation with education and income. The importance of socioeconomic and geographical factors in relation to political affiliation and health inequalities in Poland should be further explored.

Language and Ideology is an area of critical discourse analysis that has increasingly gained importance in the linguistic sciences. The vast influence of the media has provided a need for the explicit analysis of common linguistic mechanisms, particularly those in political discourse. Codeswitching, general pattern in a speech community of switching between two or more available languages or dialects with respect to certain extralinguistic factors (Blom & Gumperz 1972) is strategically employed by politicians to gain support for elections (Jarraya 2013; Craig 2013). Senator Tim Kaine was one of the first White politicians to engage in code-switching during the 2016 presidential election, however his use of Spanish when engaging in political discourse was met with great resistance and skepticism by the media and voters, many of whom felt that he was pandering to Spanish-speaking citizens. Using a language ideologies framework, the present paper seeks to determine how code-switching was used as a political discourse device by Senator Kaine, and how its use varied based on the context of each speech. To answer these questions, four speeches given by Senator Tim Kaine during the 2016 presidential campaign were transcribed and translated. Following descriptive coding procedures by Saldaña (2015), two raters coded instances of codeswitching in each speech for key features of political discourse: a) dissemination of personal information or background; b) repetition; c) hyperbole; d) metaphor; e) metonymy; f) comparisons; 1. promises for the future; h) solidarity; i) legitimization of self as authority; and j) florid verbiage. Results show that Senator Kaine relied most heavily on code-switching during his speech in Miami, Florida, and used it as a tactic to gain support and build solidarity between himself and members of the audience. Additionally, Senator Kaine engaged in much repetition through code-switching to emphasize key points of his speech and political goals. The present study illustrates how codeswitching can be used to cultivate political favor, forge alliances, and demonstrate cultural similarities between White politicians and biand multilingual voters.

Political polarization has increased significantly in society over the past decade, and whether intended or not, employees at all levels bring their political ideologies into organizations. We posit that political ideology is unique and warrants the attention of organizational scholars. We begin by integrating literature from political science and political psychology to review the various conceptualizations of political ideology as representing values, identity, and political affiliation. Next, we review the literature of political ideology in organizational sciences which has examined political ideology through a values-based lens,understanding it to be a source of motivated reasoning that influences strategic decisions. We then review a smaller subset of literature that has examined political ideology through an identity-based lens, exploring its influence on social dynamics including stereotyping, diversity in teams, and person-organization fit. Finally, we chart a course for future research on political ideology, focusing on (1) conceptual expansions, (2) contextual determinants, (3) diversity, (4) cross-level alignment, and (5) the acknowledgment of possible researcher bias.

Previous research on personality traits and political attitudes has largely focused on the direct relationships between traits and ideological self-placement. There are theoretical reasons, however, to suspect that the relationships between personality traits and political attitudes (1) vary across issue domains and (2) depend on contextual factors that affect the meaning of political stimuli. In this study, we provide an explicit theoretical framework for formulating hypotheses about these differential effects. We then leverage the power of an unusually large national survey of registered voters to examine how the relationships between Big Five personality traits and political attitudes differ across issue domains and social contexts (as defined by racial groups). We confirm some important previous findings regarding personality and political ideology, find clear evidence that Big Five traits affect economic and social attitudes differently, show that the effect of Big Five traits is often as large as that of education or income in predicting ideology, and demonstrate that the relationships between Big Five traits and ideology vary substantially between white and black respondents.

Although political ideology has been examined extensively as a predictor of individual differences, it has been absent in the interpersonal relationships literature. Political ideology may have strong effects on friendship patterns because of its polarizing nature. Findings among actual friendship groups (Study 1) indicated a degree of similarity in peers’ political ideology alignments, but also suggested that liberals and conservatives were comfortable with some level of bipartisanship among their friends. In an experimental condition with hypothetical peers (Study 2), individuals’ political ideology predicted their reported friendship potential (perceived similarity and desire for friendship) with gay-affirming and gay-disapproving peers whose ideologies were not explicitly indicated. This effect of political ideology on friendship potential was significant over and above the effect predicted by individuals’ similarity or dissimilarity on sexual minority attitudes with these peers. Findings highlight the overarching relevance of political ideology as a factor that contributes to friendship patterns.

During World War II and the Holocaust, the Nazi regime engaged in an intensive effort to appeal to Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa. It did so by presenting the Nazi regime as a champion of secular anti-imperialism, especially against Britain, as well as by a selective appropriation and reception of the traditions of Islam in ways that suggested their compatibility with the ideology of National Socialism. This article and the larger project from which it comes draw on recent archival findings that make it possible to expand on the knowledge of Nazi Germany's efforts in this region that has already been presented in a substantial scholarship. This essay pushes the history of Nazism beyond its Eurocentric limits while pointing to the European dimensions of Arabic and Islamic radicalism of the mid-twentieth century. On shortwave radio and in printed items distributed in the millions, Nazi Germany's Arabic language propaganda leapt across the seemingly insurmountable barriers created by its own ideology of Aryan racial superiority. From fall 1939 to March 1945, the Nazi regime broadcast shortwave Arabic programs to the Middle East and North Africa seven days and nights a week. Though the broadcasts were well known at the time, the preponderance of its print and radio propaganda has not previously been documented and examined nor has it entered into the intellectual, cultural, and political history of the Nazi regime during World War II and the Holocaust. In light of new archival findings, we are now able to present a full picture of the wartime propaganda barrage in the course of which officials of the Nazi regime worked with pro-Nazi Arab exiles in Berlin to adapt general propaganda themes aimed at its German and European audiences to the religious traditions of Islam and the regional and local political realities of the Middle East and North Africa. This adaptation was the product of a political and ideological collaboration between officials of the Nazi regime, especially in its Foreign Ministry but also of its intelligence services, the Propaganda Ministry, and the SS on the one hand, and pro-Nazi Arab exiles in wartime Berlin on the other. It drew on a confluence of perceived shared political interests and ideological passions, as well as on a cultural fusion, borrowing and interacting between Nazi ideology and certain strains of Arab nationalism and Islamic religious traditions. It was an important chapter in the political, intellectual, and cultural history of Nazism during World War II and comprises a chapter in the history of radical Islamist ideology and politics.

This research is conducted on political discourse of a high profile Pakistani politician and a former famous cricketer Imran Khan in the context of Pakistani politics. It aims to understand the ideological process and project of creating a New Pakistan (Naya Pakistan), and that how this project influences the way Imran Khan shapes the political reality during his speeches. The analysis reveals that Imran Khan indexes more often his personal identity as a strong leader of the Tahreek-e-Insaaf party rather than the common or national identity. The results assert this point because the transformation of the country may seem to be only possible under his identity as a leader of Tahreek-e-Insaaf. From the spatial deixes analysis, it manifests that Imran Khan wants to reach to the ideological space or destination of New Pakistan where everyone will have equal rights. This projection of New Pakistan is presented like a utopian world where all things would be right and there would be justice, cooperation and peace. The deixes such as ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘today’ represent Old Pakistan (Purana Pakistan) which is its present state. But the future along the temporal axes is full of hope that reflects the vision of the founding father of Pakistan ‘Quaid-e-Azam’ in the form of New Pakistan. A comparative study of various other politicians may bring forth further elicitation of political discourse in Pakistani context in future.