Academic literature on the topic 'Chinese Nationalist Party'

AbstractThe defeat of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 is often explained as a consequence of Nationalist fiscal incompetence during the Second Sino-Japanese War, which led to the collapse of the Nationalist state. In this paper, I argue that from 1937 until 1940, GMD fiscal policy managed to preserve a degree of relative stability even though, by early 1939, the Nationalists had already lost control over ports yielding 80 per cent of Customs revenue which, during the Nanjing decade (1928–1937), had accounted for more than 40 per cent of annual central government revenue. The loss of this revenue forced the Nationalists to introduce wartime fiscal instruments, taxation in kind, and transit taxes, both previously condemned as outdated and inequitable by the Nationalists. Further territorial losses led to the introduction of deficit financing, which in turn became a cause of hyperinflation. The introduction of war-time fiscal instruments led to administrative changes in the revenue-collecting agencies of the Nationalist state, and to the demise of the Maritime Customs Service as the pre-eminent revenue-collecting and anti-smuggling organization. The administrative upheavals of the war facilitated the rise of other central government organizations nominally charged with smuggling suppression, which in fact frequently engaged in trade with the Japanese-occupied areas of China. Hence, administrative reforms at a time of fiscal collapse, far from strengthening the war-time state, created one of the preconditions for the disintegration of the Nationalist state, which facilitated the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) victory in 1949.

AbstractWith the retreat of the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) from mainland China to Taiwan in the late 1940s, the island seemed destined to be part of another nation divided by the Cold War—superficially similar to Germany and Korea. The Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland, while the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) moved its government, the Republic of China (ROC), to Taiwan. It followed, then, that reconciliation between the two would unite both sides of the Taiwan Strait under one nation-state. Much has changed since those early years of the Cold War, however. The Communists have embraced capitalism, most nations have established relations with the PRC while cutting ties to the ROC, and it is difficult to discern whether the Nationalists are devoted to a Chinese or to a Taiwanese nation.1 Despite

Abstract The New Fourth Army (N4A) Incident is the name given to the destruction by the Chinese Nationalist government of the headquarters of the N4A, one of the two legal armies under the command of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Sino-Japanese War, in southern Anhui province in January 1941, together with the killing of about nine thousand CCP soldiers. It was the largest and the last armed conflict between the Nationalists and the CCP during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). This article argues that this tragedy came from Joseph Stalin’s paranoia toward the West and Mao’s resulting limited pre-emptive offensives against the Nationalist government, as well as their misreading of Chiang Kai-shek during 1939-1940.

On the morning of 6 April 1927, the Jemadar of the Sikh branch in the Shanghai Municipal Police, Buddha Singh, had been shot dead by an Indian nationalist. This incident has not drawn much attention from scholars studying modern Chinese history. This article argues that the narrative framework of the Chinese national history fails to provide a space for subjects such as Sikh migrants and nationalists that can hardly be appropriated. By exploring how the Ghadar Party, the Comintern and the Chinese communists cooperated with each other to shatter the British hegemony in Shanghai and how the British colonial authorities forged a coordinative network to check the ever-flowing dissidents, this article reconstructs the dramatic case of Buddha Singh not only in the milieu of the Chinese nationalist revolution, but also in the context of the global anti-imperial and communist movements. In so doing, it challenges the established national narrative and champions an approach that incorporates modern Chinese history into the global history.

A presente pesquisa procura demonstrar de maneira breve os desafios políticos no aspecto do nacionalismo no país que vem, nos últimos anos, atraindo olhares: a China. Ao longo de três seções, nós analisamos a temática dos estudos nacionalistas, em como o Partido Comunista Chinês administra os enclaves da multietnicidade existente no território e as implicações de determinadas políticas promovidas pelo governo de Xi Jinping para controle de minorias através da tecnologia na presente Era Digital. O “Sonho Chinês” é assim exposto para ilustrar e problematizar a ilação entre políticas nacionalistas e identitárias com o controle do Partido em meio a um cenário mais desafiador para a China.Palavras-Chave: China; Nacionalismo; MultietnicidadeABSTRACT This research seeks to briefly demonstrate the political challenges considering the nationalism aspect in the country which is, in recent years, getting attention: China. Throughout three sections, we address the nationalist studies issue, how the Chinese Communist Party manages the enclaves from an existing multiethnicity on the territory and the implication of specifics policies provided by Xi Jinping’s Government. Thus the “Chinese Dream” is outline to illustrate and discuss an inference between nationalist and identities policies with the Party control through a more challenging arena for China. Keywords: China; Nationalism; Multiethinicity. Recebido em: 15 jun. 2021 | Aceito em: 20 set. 2021.

The consciousness of non-Han nationalities in modern China evolved around a deep antipathy to the Qing, assimilationist ideas, and pretentious multi-ethnicism. The concepts of equality among nationalities and right to self-determination entered into the discourse of nation- and state-building in China under the influence of Lenin’s revolutionary ideals and Stalin’s views on ‘the national question’. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has struggled to reconcile these concepts with its nationalist agenda since its inception in 1921. The CPC later innovated ethno-regional autonomy for minorities and developed corresponding institutions. This article argues that the Party’s three main agendas of national unification and interethnic unity, developmental goals, and majoritarian nationalism have all complicated its ties with ethnic minorities, and evaluates how the present leadership of the 100-year-old Party has been managing the relationship.

This article analyses the policies and plans of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD) regarding wireless radio broadcasting, arguing that they laid the foundations for the development of a national-level modern cultural institution aimed, for the first time in China, at mass propaganda and education. During the Nanjing decade, notwithstanding its limits beyond the most developed urban areas, the Nationalists’ approach was the extensive use of radio broadcasting for the ‘partyfication’ (danghua) of Chinese state structure and the Chinese people’s social and cultural life. Nevertheless, their aspirations were greater than their ability to transform the plan into reality. Unable to impose an effective state monopoly on radio communication and broadcasting infrastructures, the Nationalists’ aims to exert stronger control and to gain a hegemonic position in the Chinese ‘ether’ could be achieved only by resorting to technical, administrative and legal measures whose efficacy was rather limited, because it was subordinated to a capacity to have them implemented. The Nationalists’ main accomplishments were the establishment of a powerful national radio broadcasting station under the control of the Party in Nanjing and of a central-level commission aimed at coordinating the work of the different state, Party and military bureaucracies involved in radio broadcasting propaganda.

This article explores the significance of the cult of Sun Yat-sen, often referred to as “Father of the [modern Chinese] Nation” 國父 (Guofu), for Nationalist state-building in China. Although Sun Yat-sen’s title of Guofu was formalized only in 1940 as a result of competition over Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD) orthodoxy between opposing Nationalist regimes in Chongqing and Nanjing during the Second Sino-Japanese War, the term reflected the ongoing importance of Sun’s legacy in securing political legitimacy in the Chinese Republic. Overall, the GMD promulgated state-sponsored veneration of the Guofu to justify its political tutelage in the name of parental guardianship over the Chinese people. Yet Sun’s legacy allowed for multiple interpretations, which complicates any effort to lock this legacy to one political purpose. The development of different elements of the Guofu’s legacy by competing wartime regimes shows how it failed to provide a truly unifying tool for political legitimation.

AbstractWhat are the consequences of nationalist unrest? This paper utilizes two original datasets, which cover 377 city-level anti-Japanese protests during the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu Island crisis and the careers of municipal leaders, to analyse the downstream effects of nationalist unrest at the subnational level. We find both political and economic consequences of China's 2012 protest demonstrations against Japan. Specifically, top Party leaders in cities that saw relatively spontaneous, early protests were less likely to be promoted to higher office, a finding that is consistent with the widely held but rarely tested expectation that social instability is punished in the Chinese Communist Party's cadre evaluation system. We also see a negative effect of nationalist protest on foreign direct investment (FDI) growth at the city level. However, the lower promotion rates associated with relatively spontaneous protests appear to arise through political rather than economic channels. By taking into account data on social unrest in addition to economic performance, these results add to existing evidence that systematic evaluation of leaders’ performance plays a major role in the Chinese political system. These findings also illuminate the dilemma that local leaders face in managing popular nationalism amid shifting national priorities.

By the end of the twentieth century, there were many secessionist groups, but, the move towards Taiwanese secessionism has arguably been the most significant of these. It triggered the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which resulted in a historical military confrontation between Mainland China and the US. As will be shown, from 1988 to 2000, Lee Teng-hui, as president of Taiwan, manipulated the political Cross-Straits relationship to promote what was ultimately a secessionist policy. This caused Mainland China to react strongly and triggered sharp tension between Taiwan and Mainland China. This thesis considers what motivated Lee Teng-hui to implement a secessionist Cross-Straits policy and why he supported unification while adopting a substantive secessionist policy. It looks at how he was able to instigate Taiwanese hostility towards Mainlanders, to transform the hostility into a sense of Taiwanese national identity and ultimately into Taiwanese secessionist ideology. A historical approach was used in exploring the origins of secessionism, and descriptive and analytical methods to review systematically and comprehensively political developments in the ROC and its civil war, and to study Lee Teng-hui’s life; the national identity of Taiwan and Mainland China; the implementation of Lee Teng-hui’s political Cross-Straits policy; and the reaction of Mainland China. The study showed that the main cause of Taiwanese secessionism was ethnic conflict between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. It originated from the 228 Incident of 1947, in which Mainlander-led troops slaughtered many Taiwanese. Soon after, the Mainlander-led government fled to Taiwan from Mainland China, and many Taiwanese (including Mainlanders) were killed during the State of Emergency in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the Mainlander-led government fled to Taiwan in its original central government form, the Mainlander élite occupied key positions in the government during the 1950s and 1960s. It resulted in unfair power-sharing for Taiwanese, and caused the Taiwanese élite to believe that they had to establish their own government (nation). Lee Teng-hui had participated in the CCP and had been under political surveillance by the Mainlander-led government for over twenty years. He weathered these political difficulties, but by reasonable inference, there was a close relationship between the political oppression by the Mainlander-led government and his secessionist political Cross-Straits policy. Because Taiwanese residents were indoctrinated by Chiang Ching-kuo and his father, Chiang Kai-shek’s administration for about 40 years, Chinese ideology was dominant and Lee Teng-hui initially paid lip-service to Cross-Strait unification whilst working towards secessionism as reflected in the Chingdao-Lake Incident (1994); the private dialogue between Lee Teng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro (1994); the address at Cornell University (1995); and his two-state theory (1999). However, due to strong pressure from Mainland China, he did not reach his secessionist goal during his presidential term (1988-2000). In conclusion, this thesis shows that Taiwan Island’s geopolitical importance is at the heart of the US’ support for Taiwan’s secession from the Mainland. Therefore, Lee’s secessionist Cross-Strait policy aside, US national interests lie in containing Mainland China and it has, therefore, always played an important role in the secessionist issue and always will. From the perspective of Mainland China, either in terms of nationalism or national security, Taiwan’s secession is a life-and-death issue. If Taiwanese authorities were to declare independence, the only option for Mainland China would be to launch a unification war. For the US, Taiwan is only a pawn that it uses to contain Mainland China. Therefore, in the Cross-Strait issue, the US has more options than Mainland China, namely, to use military intervention in the future to deter Chinese unification or to decide to share common peaceful international relations with Mainland China by accepting Cross-Strait unification.
Thesis (DPhil (International Relations))--University of Pretoria, 2004.
Political Sciences
unrestricted

Cette thèse étudie la propagande nationaliste du régime de Pékin depuis le lancement de la politique de réforme en 1979, et plus particulièrement depuis la répression du mouvement étudiant de 1989. A travers l'étude d'un symbole particulier - la figure de l'Empereur jaune - cette thèse montre comment le PCC tente de se légitimer à l'heure où son pouvoir est érodé par l'ouverture du pays, la mondialisation de l'économie et les bouleversements sociaux. Construisant un contre-modèle de modernité à opposer aux tenants des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie, le PCC élabore un discours de légitimation cohérent quoique flou destiné à rallier la nouvelle base sociale du pouvoir chinois: la bourgeoisie urbaine émergente. Mais au-delà d'une réinvention nationaliste de la tradition somme toute assez classique, cette thèse permet également d'avoir accès à certaines représentations fondamentales du politique en Chine. En remontant aux origines du symbole, cette thèse montre que la figure de l'Empereur jaune n'a pas été choisie par hasard par les idéologues du régime, mais bien au contraire avec la volonté de capitaliser sur une symbolique ancienne qu'il importe de connaître pour comprendre la nature du politique dans la Chine contemporaine.

La tesi si concentra sul Partito Nazionalista Cinese negli anni Venti come punto privilegiato di osservazione del cambiamento politico della Cina dopo la Prima guerra mondiale. Questo decennio rappresentò un momento di definizione identitaria sia per i comunisti sia per i nazionalisti. La storiografia ne ha sottolineato numerosi aspetti, ma si è finora occupata del periodo 1919-1928 come una preistoria degli anni Trenta piuttosto che come un autonomo segmento di storia cinese. Studi recenti hanno superato implicitamente questo approccio criticando due date periodizzanti fondamentali per il Novecento cinese: la nascita della Repubblica nazionalista (1911) e la nascita della Repubblica Popolare (1949). A metà tra queste due date, gli anni Venti sono emersi come snodo decisivo nel passaggio da impero a Stato nazionale, durante cui si definì un nuovo spazio di discussione politica. Questo processo, pur interno, subì l’influsso delle strategie internazionali di sovietici e statunitensi dando vita a una nuova visione non soltanto della rivoluzione ma anche dello Stato post-rivoluzionario. Le classi dirigenti nazionalista e comunista, durante la collaborazione, si rivelarono dinamiche e tale “competizione” si trasferì anche all’interno di ciascun movimento diventando un fattore determinante per il successo o il fallimento del partito inteso come moderna formazione politica.
The thesis focuses on the Chinese Nationalist Party in the 1920s as a special standpoint to analyze the political changes in China after the World War I. That decade was crucial for shaping the identity of nationalists and communists. Many works have already examined some aspects, but they mostly considered the years 1919-1928 as a pre-history of the Thirties rather than an autonomous part of Chinese history. Recent studies have overcome this approach by criticizing two of the main periodization in the Chinese twentieth century: the birth of the nationalist Republic (1911) and the birth of the People’s Republic (1949). Halfway, the 1920s stood out as a critical juncture in the transition from empire to nation-state. A new space of political discussion was defined. The process, albeit internal, was under the influence of the USSR and US international strategies and gave birth not only to a new vision of the revolution, but also to a vision of the post-revolutionary state. Also, the nationalist and communist leaderships turned out to be dynamic. That "competition" may be seen also within the two political movements and became a shaping factor for the success or failure of the party as a modern political formation.

La tesi si concentra sul Partito Nazionalista Cinese negli anni Venti come punto privilegiato di osservazione del cambiamento politico della Cina dopo la Prima guerra mondiale. Questo decennio rappresentò un momento di definizione identitaria sia per i comunisti sia per i nazionalisti. La storiografia ne ha sottolineato numerosi aspetti, ma si è finora occupata del periodo 1919-1928 come una preistoria degli anni Trenta piuttosto che come un autonomo segmento di storia cinese. Studi recenti hanno superato implicitamente questo approccio criticando due date periodizzanti fondamentali per il Novecento cinese: la nascita della Repubblica nazionalista (1911) e la nascita della Repubblica Popolare (1949). A metà tra queste due date, gli anni Venti sono emersi come snodo decisivo nel passaggio da impero a Stato nazionale, durante cui si definì un nuovo spazio di discussione politica. Questo processo, pur interno, subì l’influsso delle strategie internazionali di sovietici e statunitensi dando vita a una nuova visione non soltanto della rivoluzione ma anche dello Stato post-rivoluzionario. Le classi dirigenti nazionalista e comunista, durante la collaborazione, si rivelarono dinamiche e tale “competizione” si trasferì anche all’interno di ciascun movimento diventando un fattore determinante per il successo o il fallimento del partito inteso come moderna formazione politica.
The thesis focuses on the Chinese Nationalist Party in the 1920s as a special standpoint to analyze the political changes in China after the World War I. That decade was crucial for shaping the identity of nationalists and communists. Many works have already examined some aspects, but they mostly considered the years 1919-1928 as a pre-history of the Thirties rather than an autonomous part of Chinese history. Recent studies have overcome this approach by criticizing two of the main periodization in the Chinese twentieth century: the birth of the nationalist Republic (1911) and the birth of the People’s Republic (1949). Halfway, the 1920s stood out as a critical juncture in the transition from empire to nation-state. A new space of political discussion was defined. The process, albeit internal, was under the influence of the USSR and US international strategies and gave birth not only to a new vision of the revolution, but also to a vision of the post-revolutionary state. Also, the nationalist and communist leaderships turned out to be dynamic. That "competition" may be seen also within the two political movements and became a shaping factor for the success or failure of the party as a modern political formation.

Que la politique chinoise des nationalités soit influencée par la politique soviétique des nationalités n'est pas une découverte et en effet, différents faits historiques de la première moitié du vingtième siècle révèlent la nature de cet influence, directe, indirecte, voulue et développée ou subie. Cependant, avec le discours de la " spécificité chinoise " apparu au milieu des années 1980 et qui implique non seulement la politique générale mais aussi la politique des nationalités du PCC, comment le Parti Communiste Chinois peut-il gérer une telle influence? Peu après la désintégration de l'Union Soviétique, les recherches sur les nationalités en RPC se tournent vers une nouvelle question : comment la Chine, en tant qu' " Etat socialiste multiethnique ", peut-elle éviter le destin de l'Union Soviétique ? Les réflexions intellectuelles post-soviétiques en RPC concernant les nationalités nous donnent les éléments fondamentaux pour comprendre les tendances et les concepts développés depuis la chute de l'Union Soviétique jusqu'au début des années 2000 dans la politique des nationalités de RPC
The fact that the PRC nationality policy has been influenced by the Soviet policy is well known and indeed various historic facts reveal different aspects of the influence, a direct, indirect, deliberate and developed or undergone influence. However, the speech of the "Chinese particularism" that appeared in the middle of 1980s implies not only the general policy of the CCP but also the nationality policy. Therefore we can wonder how the CCP in its discourse manage with this influence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a lot of scholars in the PRC have been researching on nationalities attempting answer to the question of how China, as a "multiethnic socialist State", can avoid the same future as the Soviet Union ? The post-Soviet intellectual reflections in the PRC give us several elements to understand tendencies and concepts developed in PRC nationality policy since the faIl of the USSR and this, till the beginning of 2000s

Une vision manicheenne a domine tres largement durant toute la guerre du viet nam : d'un cote, un sud amolli, corrompu, illegitime parce que separatiste et lie a l'etranger, d'abord francais puis americain; de l'autre cote, un nord pur, dur, heroique, unitaire, national, ect. Simplistes et souvent caricaturales, ces images ne correspondaient pas au regime installe a saigon, infiniment plus complexe et contraste. Idylliques, elles ignoraient volontairement que le nord viet nam avait un regime totalitaire, que son communisme se reclamait d'une pratique et d'une inspiration stalinienne ; que les fronts nationaux crees sous son egide ne devaient etre que camouflage et moyen de domination pour le parti, "force unique qui dirige l'etat et la societe". Dans l'examen de ces questions, ce travail s'est efforce d'apporter : - une reflexion sur les composantes du nationalisme vietnamien ( la geopolitique dominee par la chine, la force du sentiment unitaire, la vigueur des regionalismes et les frequentes cassures de l'etat, les rapports entre communisme et nationalisme dans un contexte domine tour a tour par la france, le japon et les etats unis ) ; - un dossier sur la republique du viet nam de 1972 a 1975, des accords de paris a la chute de saigon ( le regime de nguyen van thieu et l' evolution de la situation politique, economique et militaire ) ; - une analyse du parti communiste vietnamien ( le langage, l'ideologie, les pratiques interieures, la politique exterieure. . . ) tel qu'il appa- rait au travers de la politique suivie par la republique socialiste du viet nam d'avril 1975 (prise de saigon) a mars 1982 ( ve congres et iii e plan quinquennal ); - quelques jalons sur le probleme d'une information qui s'est tenue aussi eloignee des realites. Comment, et avec quelles repercussions cette dissymetrie constante en faveur de hanoi et au detriment de saigon s'est-elle developpee ?
A widespread manichean vision prevailed during the viet nam war : on the one hand, an emollient, corrupted, illegitimate south because it was secessionist and tied up to foreign countries, first france, then the united states ; on the other hand, a pure, hard, heroic, unitarian, national, ect. . . North. Simplistic and often caricatural, those pictures did not correspond to the infinitely more complex and contrasted saigon political system. Idyllic, they voluntarity ignored that north viet nam had a totalitarian regime, that its communism refered to stalinian inspiration and practice ; that the national fronts created under its leadership could only be camouflaging and a means of domination for theparty, " the unique power that runs the state and the society ". Considering those questions, we endeavoured to bring : - a reflexion on the components of vietnamese nationalism ( its geopolitics ruled by china, the strength of the unitarian feeling, the vigor of the various regionalisms and frequent breaks of the state, the relationships between communism and nationalism in an environment alternately dominated by france, japan, during a short but decisive time, and the u. S. A. ) ; - a record on the viet nam republic from 1972 to 1975, from the paris accords to the fall of saigon ( the nguyen van thieu regime and the evolution of the politi- cal, economic and military situation ) ; - an analysis of the vietnamese communist party ( the language, the ideology, the internal practices, the foreign policy. . . ) as it apperars through the policy followed by the socialist repubic of viet nam ) from april 1975 ( the taking of saigon ) to march 1982 ( vth congress and third quinquennal plan ) ; - some steps on the problem of an information which was standing so far from the realities. How, and with which repercussions did that constant dissymetry in favour of hanoi and to the detriment of saigon spread out ?

Cette thèse porte sur la formation socio-historique d’un régime de parti-État socialiste dans un pays anciennement colonisé : le Vietnam. Pour saisir les spécificités du communisme vietnamien, nous étudions les vecteurs de diffusion de l’idéologie communiste, le poids de l’anticolonialisme et de la guerre, les formes d’influence exercées par les dirigeants soviétiques et chinois entre 1919 et 1991, ainsi que les processus d’appropriation et de résistance auxquels cette nouvelle forme de domination donna lieu. Notre enquête s’appuie sur des documents d’archives russes, chinois, américains et français et sur des sources imprimées en vietnamien. Il en ressort que les communistes vietnamiens s’inspirèrent continûment des modèles soviétiques et chinois, quel que fût l’état de leurs relations avec Moscou et Pékin. Les transferts observés résultent, pour l’essentiel, non de la contrainte – parfois déterminante –, mais d’un désir permanent d’imitation. Par son organisation et ses modes de gouvernement, le parti-Etat vietnamien se distingue peu des modèles soviétique et chinois. Sa ressemblance s’explique avant tout par la fidélité des communistes vietnamiens au modèle léniniste, ainsi que par la rigidité doctrinale et le caractère pratique de l’idéologie communiste. Les communistes vietnamiens affirmèrent une spécificité dans le domaine de la construction nationale. Si leurs politiques d’homogénéisation ethnique et de gestion du territoire rappellent les pratiques soviétiques et chinoises, la volonté de créer un État supranational et la refonte du discours historique marquent aussi la persistance de schèmes de domination et de formes de racisme hérités de la période coloniale
This thesis deals with the socio-historical formation of a socialist single-party state in a formerly colonized country: Vietnam. In order to grasp the specificity of Vietnamese communism, we study the agents of the communist ideology diffusion, the impact of anti-colonialism and war, the various forms of influence exercised by the Soviet and the Chinese communists between 1919 and 1991, as well as the processes of appropriation and resistance caused by this new form of domination. Our inquiry relies on various Russian, Chinese, American and French archival documents, and on a large array of printed sources in Vietnamese. It shows that, no matter the state of their relations with Moscow and Beijing, the Vietnamese communists continuously drew their inspiration from the Soviet and Chinese models. Though the observed transfers were born out of constraint at two founding moments, they resulted mostly from a permanent inclination to mimic. The Vietnamese party-state differs little from the Soviet and the Chinese models in its organization and its modes of governance. Its resemblance is mainly due to the Vietnamese communists’ fidelity to the Leninist model, as well as to the doctrinal rigidity and practical nature of the communist ideology. However, there is one domain in which the Vietnamese communists asserted specificity: the nation-building process. If their policies of ethnic homogenization and territorial administration are reminiscent of the Soviet and Chinese practices, their willingness to create a supra-national state and to recast the historical discourse also signals the persistence of some domination schemes and forms of racism, inherited from the colonial period

Between 1965 and 1988, the history problem emerged after Japan normalized its diplomatic relations with South Korea and China. After normalization, Japanese A-bomb victims and affiliated NGOs began to commemorate foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. The South Korean and Chinese governments also pressed the Japanese government over history textbooks and prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In response, the LDP government incorporated cosmopolitanism in Japan’s official commemoration, though the LDP continued to defend nationalism. At the same time, in South Korea, ethnic nationalism was energized by the country’s economic success and the democratization movement, and in China, the communist party began to promote patriotic education to manage social instabilities created by economic reforms. Hence, nationalist commemorations in the three countries were set on a collision course.

This chapter establishes the relevance of nationalism in the digital age, and it discusses the importance of contemporary China in this regard, not merely as a simple case, but as a vast laboratory for social, cultural, and political change. The chapter introduces the ambiguities and contradictions that characterize digital politics in China today, and it outlines the themes that shape scholarly debates about digital China. This prominently includes discussions about the potential of digital technologies like the internet to empower Chinese citizens against the state and the ruling Chinese Communist Party. The introduction questions such interpretations of digital technologies as inherently democratizing. Instead, it makes the case that digital politics should not be viewed as simple struggles between state and society, but rather as complex negotiations, collaborations, and persuasions that benefit various stake-holders. Nationalist discourses in digital China, and particularly Chinese online representations of Japan, are a case in point.

This chapter examines the institutionalization of Sino-American collaboration through the China Institute in America. Meng Zhi (1901–1990) directed this organization for thirty-seven years and helped the Chinese government gain greater influence over the selection and training of Chinese students in the United States. In so doing, he became a valued participant in the development of America's international education establishment as spearheaded by the Institute for International Education (IIE) under the leadership of Stephen Duggan. Meng effectively advocated on behalf of Nationalist Chinese agendas and Chinese students to claim growing levels of support and accommodation from entities such as the IIE and later the Department of State. This shifting balance resulted partly from rising tides of Chinese nationalism, as well as rising hostilities with Japan.

Ode to Yimeng (Yingmeng Song), a major ballet production created in May 1974, was based on the short story “Red Sister-in-Law” (Hongsao). It is one of the “red classics” that deals with a revolutionary “base area,” and in essence, is about how the Communist Party won the support of the subaltern, the backbone of Chinese society at a tipping point in modern Chinese history, when CCP triumphed over the Nationalist army. The story of heroine, Sister-in-Law Ying, who saved a seriously wounded Communist soldier with her breast milk and nurtured him back to life, was once metaphoric and metonymic of the symbiotic relationships between army and the people. This chapter argues that the post-Mao remake in the format of a television drama has significantly re-defined the essence of the “fish-and-water” relationship in the spirit of traditional Chinese values and, in particular, Confucian values.

The history problem fully developed between 1989 and 1996. Japanese and South Korean NGOs expanded the transnational network to help former “comfort women” demand apologies and compensation from the Japanese government, while Japanese NGOs helped Chinese victims file compensation lawsuits against the Japanese government and corporations. At this historical juncture, the LDP was ousted from power. This allowed non-LDP prime ministers to offer apologies for Japan’s past wrongdoings more decisively than did their LDP predecessors. Nevertheless, the LDP remained the largest political party, forcing non-LDP prime ministers to compromise cosmopolitanism with nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration. This compromise intensified the history problem by galvanizing Japanese nationalists as well as the governments and citizens in South Korea and China. The former criticized the Japanese government for failing to honor Japanese war dead enough, whereas the latter criticized it for failing to commemorate South Korean and Chinese victims enough.

In a work that will force scholars to re-evaluate how they approach Sinophone studies, Wai-Siam Hee demonstrates that many of the major issues raised by contemporary Sinophone studies were already hotly debated in the popular culture surrounding Chinese-language films made in Singapore and Malaya during the Cold War. Despite the high political stakes, the feature films, propaganda films, newsreels, documentaries, newspaper articles, memoirs, and other published materials of the time dealt in sophisticated ways with issues some mistakenly believe are only modern concerns. In the process, the book offers an alternative history to the often taken-for-granted versions of film and national history that sanction anything relating to the Malayan Communist Party during the early period of independence in the region as anti-nationalist. Drawing exhaustively on material from Asian, European, and North American archives, the author unfolds the complexities produced by British colonialism and anti-communism, identity struggles of the Chinese Malayans, American anti-communism, and transnational Sinophone cultural interactions. Hee shows how Sinophone multilingualism and the role of the local, in addition to other theoretical problems, were both illustrated and practised in Cold War Sinophone cinema. Remapping the Sinophone: The Cultural Production of Chinese-Language Cinema in Singapore and Malaya before and during the Cold War deftly shows how contemporary Sinophone studies can only move forward by looking backwards.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.

U.S. consular reports on Mexican anti-Chinese activities document the uncoordinated, synchronous anti-Chinese activities that took place as a part of the revolutionary battlefield. This chapter traces the social relations that gave rise to cooperative violence, or grotesque assemblies, in the context of the revolution. Events like the massacre at Torreón in 1911 illustrate the emergence of new social ties based upon Porfian discontent and doing harm to Chinese. Individual cases of tactical assassinations and ritual violence against the Chinese bodies further illuminate the absence of mestizo nationalism as motivation. The chapter details reports of ritualized violence that present a battlefield where Chinese immigrants are under constant attack. These modes of popular violence against Chinese shifted the political identity of assailants, no matter their allegiance or affiliation, to patriotic revolutionaries. Peasants and Indians did not threaten the bourgeois military leaders of the revolution when they expressed antichinismo.

AbstractThis chapter analyzes how the city museums of Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Galle Fort deal with the memory and legacy of colonialism in the framework of the expanding economic and political power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Asia. In the PRC, the historical memory of the country’s colonial past has been shaped by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In contrast to the transnational nature of the communist ideology, the CCP’s interpretation of history is strongly nationalist. China’s political expansion in the ex-British colony of Hong Kong and its economic ties to other Asian countries such as Sri Lanka open space for a discussion about its power to influence these countries’ understanding of their own history. How is the expansion of China, defined by many as a neo-colonial power, changing the way other countries in Asia understand the colonial past? Is China able to exports its own vision of colonialism and post-colonial order outside its own borders? This chapter answers these questions through an analysis of the permanent exhibitions of three city museums: The Shanghai History Museum; the Hong Kong Museum of History, and the Galle Fort Museum in Sri Lanka, part of the “One Belt, One Road” project.

AbstractThe U.S.-China strategic competition has grown increasingly intense in recent years. A large share of the explanation lies in the changing structure of the international system, as a rising China poses a challenge to the U.S. position as the established superpower. Domestic political factors in both countries also play important roles, however. The clash between the two countries’ political systems, pitting a liberal democracy against a one-party authoritarian state, intensifies the conflict. Moreover, recent political developments in both countries create pressure for increasingly intense competition. As the 2020 U.S. presidential election made clear, a strong bipartisan consensus has formed in the United States in favor of a more confrontational approach toward China than the engagement strategy pursued for the past few decades. In China, the combination of domestic political problems made worse by the coronavirus pandemic, the imperative to satisfy Chinese nationalism, and Xi Jinping’s consolidation of one-man rule could push China toward an increasingly assertive foreign policy. All of these domestic factors could further intensify the U.S.-China strategic competition.

This chapter discusses the connections between the Chinese communities in Indonesia and the Chinese Nationalist government as well as the evolving structure of international relations in the Asia-Pacific after World War II. It argues that the Chinese Nationalist government's lack of sympathy for Indonesia's struggle for independence and its insistence on exercising jurisdiction over the Chinese in Indonesia aggravated ethnic conflicts. Claimed as citizens by both the ROC and the Republic of Indonesia but protected by neither, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia exercised their own agency by organizing self-defense forces in collaboration with the Dutch or turning to support the Indonesian nationalists. While the Chinese Nationalists could rely on formal institutions in Indonesia, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established its support base through an informal web of personal connections centered on left-leaning writers, teachers, and journalists who migrated from Mainland China. These left-wing intellectuals inspired a generation of ethnic Chinese youth and motivated them to engage in politics.

This chapter details how, with the People's Republic of China winning Mainland China and the diplomatic recognition of Indonesia, the positions of the Nationalists and Communists reversed. Having switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, Jakarta nevertheless allowed the Chinese Nationalist Party apparatus to continue its activities until 1958. Jakarta's ambiguous attitude induced a battle for influence between the two rival Chinese governments. As a regime in exile, the Chinese Nationalist government adjusted its past policies to fit the new circumstances resulting from its retreat to Taiwan. Having lost formal diplomatic representation, the Nationalists forged clandestine alliances with the Indonesian right-wing forces through the personal networks of the remaining Chinese Nationalist loyalists. In contrast with Taipei, Beijing prioritized state-to-state diplomacy over its connections to the overseas Chinese. By suspending the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) among the overseas Chinese and signing the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty, Beijing attempted to ease Jakarta's concern that the ethnic Chinese could be used as a Communist fifth column.

Chapter 2 explores the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) role in China’s grand strategy. First, it focuses on the CCP as a nationalist party, one that emerged from the patriotic ferment of the late Qing period and has sought to restore the country to its rightful place. Second, it focuses on the CCP as a Leninist party, one that has built centralized institutions—blended with a ruthless amorality—to govern the country and achieve its nationalist mission. Together, it argues, the Party’s nationalist orientation helps set the ends of Chinese grand strategy, while Leninism provides an instrument for realizing them. Finally, the book focuses on the CCP as a producer of paper and a subject of research, noting how a careful study of the Party’s own voluminous publications can provide insight into its grand strategic concepts. It then outlines much of the textual research strategy employed in the rest of this book.

China is composed of 56 ethnic groups, and there are 55 ethnic minorities besides the Han nationality. Minority culture is an important part of Chinese culture. The language of ethnic minorities has a long history of development and is an important part of culture. Daur nationality is one of the traditional nationalities in the north, which has its own special development history. Culture is unique, so the protection and development of Daur language has become a hot topic for cultural protection workers. Under the background of big data, this paper puts forward the digital protection and inheritance scheme of Daur language, which can provide some reference for the protection and inheritance of Daur language.