Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Chinese Nationalist Party'

By the end of the twentieth century, there were many secessionist groups, but, the move towards Taiwanese secessionism has arguably been the most significant of these. It triggered the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which resulted in a historical military confrontation between Mainland China and the US. As will be shown, from 1988 to 2000, Lee Teng-hui, as president of Taiwan, manipulated the political Cross-Straits relationship to promote what was ultimately a secessionist policy. This caused Mainland China to react strongly and triggered sharp tension between Taiwan and Mainland China. This thesis considers what motivated Lee Teng-hui to implement a secessionist Cross-Straits policy and why he supported unification while adopting a substantive secessionist policy. It looks at how he was able to instigate Taiwanese hostility towards Mainlanders, to transform the hostility into a sense of Taiwanese national identity and ultimately into Taiwanese secessionist ideology. A historical approach was used in exploring the origins of secessionism, and descriptive and analytical methods to review systematically and comprehensively political developments in the ROC and its civil war, and to study Lee Teng-hui’s life; the national identity of Taiwan and Mainland China; the implementation of Lee Teng-hui’s political Cross-Straits policy; and the reaction of Mainland China. The study showed that the main cause of Taiwanese secessionism was ethnic conflict between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. It originated from the 228 Incident of 1947, in which Mainlander-led troops slaughtered many Taiwanese. Soon after, the Mainlander-led government fled to Taiwan from Mainland China, and many Taiwanese (including Mainlanders) were killed during the State of Emergency in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the Mainlander-led government fled to Taiwan in its original central government form, the Mainlander élite occupied key positions in the government during the 1950s and 1960s. It resulted in unfair power-sharing for Taiwanese, and caused the Taiwanese élite to believe that they had to establish their own government (nation). Lee Teng-hui had participated in the CCP and had been under political surveillance by the Mainlander-led government for over twenty years. He weathered these political difficulties, but by reasonable inference, there was a close relationship between the political oppression by the Mainlander-led government and his secessionist political Cross-Straits policy. Because Taiwanese residents were indoctrinated by Chiang Ching-kuo and his father, Chiang Kai-shek’s administration for about 40 years, Chinese ideology was dominant and Lee Teng-hui initially paid lip-service to Cross-Strait unification whilst working towards secessionism as reflected in the Chingdao-Lake Incident (1994); the private dialogue between Lee Teng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro (1994); the address at Cornell University (1995); and his two-state theory (1999). However, due to strong pressure from Mainland China, he did not reach his secessionist goal during his presidential term (1988-2000). In conclusion, this thesis shows that Taiwan Island’s geopolitical importance is at the heart of the US’ support for Taiwan’s secession from the Mainland. Therefore, Lee’s secessionist Cross-Strait policy aside, US national interests lie in containing Mainland China and it has, therefore, always played an important role in the secessionist issue and always will. From the perspective of Mainland China, either in terms of nationalism or national security, Taiwan’s secession is a life-and-death issue. If Taiwanese authorities were to declare independence, the only option for Mainland China would be to launch a unification war. For the US, Taiwan is only a pawn that it uses to contain Mainland China. Therefore, in the Cross-Strait issue, the US has more options than Mainland China, namely, to use military intervention in the future to deter Chinese unification or to decide to share common peaceful international relations with Mainland China by accepting Cross-Strait unification.
Thesis (DPhil (International Relations))--University of Pretoria, 2004.
Political Sciences
unrestricted

Cette thèse étudie la propagande nationaliste du régime de Pékin depuis le lancement de la politique de réforme en 1979, et plus particulièrement depuis la répression du mouvement étudiant de 1989. A travers l'étude d'un symbole particulier - la figure de l'Empereur jaune - cette thèse montre comment le PCC tente de se légitimer à l'heure où son pouvoir est érodé par l'ouverture du pays, la mondialisation de l'économie et les bouleversements sociaux. Construisant un contre-modèle de modernité à opposer aux tenants des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie, le PCC élabore un discours de légitimation cohérent quoique flou destiné à rallier la nouvelle base sociale du pouvoir chinois: la bourgeoisie urbaine émergente. Mais au-delà d'une réinvention nationaliste de la tradition somme toute assez classique, cette thèse permet également d'avoir accès à certaines représentations fondamentales du politique en Chine. En remontant aux origines du symbole, cette thèse montre que la figure de l'Empereur jaune n'a pas été choisie par hasard par les idéologues du régime, mais bien au contraire avec la volonté de capitaliser sur une symbolique ancienne qu'il importe de connaître pour comprendre la nature du politique dans la Chine contemporaine.

La tesi si concentra sul Partito Nazionalista Cinese negli anni Venti come punto privilegiato di osservazione del cambiamento politico della Cina dopo la Prima guerra mondiale. Questo decennio rappresentò un momento di definizione identitaria sia per i comunisti sia per i nazionalisti. La storiografia ne ha sottolineato numerosi aspetti, ma si è finora occupata del periodo 1919-1928 come una preistoria degli anni Trenta piuttosto che come un autonomo segmento di storia cinese. Studi recenti hanno superato implicitamente questo approccio criticando due date periodizzanti fondamentali per il Novecento cinese: la nascita della Repubblica nazionalista (1911) e la nascita della Repubblica Popolare (1949). A metà tra queste due date, gli anni Venti sono emersi come snodo decisivo nel passaggio da impero a Stato nazionale, durante cui si definì un nuovo spazio di discussione politica. Questo processo, pur interno, subì l’influsso delle strategie internazionali di sovietici e statunitensi dando vita a una nuova visione non soltanto della rivoluzione ma anche dello Stato post-rivoluzionario. Le classi dirigenti nazionalista e comunista, durante la collaborazione, si rivelarono dinamiche e tale “competizione” si trasferì anche all’interno di ciascun movimento diventando un fattore determinante per il successo o il fallimento del partito inteso come moderna formazione politica.
The thesis focuses on the Chinese Nationalist Party in the 1920s as a special standpoint to analyze the political changes in China after the World War I. That decade was crucial for shaping the identity of nationalists and communists. Many works have already examined some aspects, but they mostly considered the years 1919-1928 as a pre-history of the Thirties rather than an autonomous part of Chinese history. Recent studies have overcome this approach by criticizing two of the main periodization in the Chinese twentieth century: the birth of the nationalist Republic (1911) and the birth of the People’s Republic (1949). Halfway, the 1920s stood out as a critical juncture in the transition from empire to nation-state. A new space of political discussion was defined. The process, albeit internal, was under the influence of the USSR and US international strategies and gave birth not only to a new vision of the revolution, but also to a vision of the post-revolutionary state. Also, the nationalist and communist leaderships turned out to be dynamic. That "competition" may be seen also within the two political movements and became a shaping factor for the success or failure of the party as a modern political formation.

La tesi si concentra sul Partito Nazionalista Cinese negli anni Venti come punto privilegiato di osservazione del cambiamento politico della Cina dopo la Prima guerra mondiale. Questo decennio rappresentò un momento di definizione identitaria sia per i comunisti sia per i nazionalisti. La storiografia ne ha sottolineato numerosi aspetti, ma si è finora occupata del periodo 1919-1928 come una preistoria degli anni Trenta piuttosto che come un autonomo segmento di storia cinese. Studi recenti hanno superato implicitamente questo approccio criticando due date periodizzanti fondamentali per il Novecento cinese: la nascita della Repubblica nazionalista (1911) e la nascita della Repubblica Popolare (1949). A metà tra queste due date, gli anni Venti sono emersi come snodo decisivo nel passaggio da impero a Stato nazionale, durante cui si definì un nuovo spazio di discussione politica. Questo processo, pur interno, subì l’influsso delle strategie internazionali di sovietici e statunitensi dando vita a una nuova visione non soltanto della rivoluzione ma anche dello Stato post-rivoluzionario. Le classi dirigenti nazionalista e comunista, durante la collaborazione, si rivelarono dinamiche e tale “competizione” si trasferì anche all’interno di ciascun movimento diventando un fattore determinante per il successo o il fallimento del partito inteso come moderna formazione politica.
The thesis focuses on the Chinese Nationalist Party in the 1920s as a special standpoint to analyze the political changes in China after the World War I. That decade was crucial for shaping the identity of nationalists and communists. Many works have already examined some aspects, but they mostly considered the years 1919-1928 as a pre-history of the Thirties rather than an autonomous part of Chinese history. Recent studies have overcome this approach by criticizing two of the main periodization in the Chinese twentieth century: the birth of the nationalist Republic (1911) and the birth of the People’s Republic (1949). Halfway, the 1920s stood out as a critical juncture in the transition from empire to nation-state. A new space of political discussion was defined. The process, albeit internal, was under the influence of the USSR and US international strategies and gave birth not only to a new vision of the revolution, but also to a vision of the post-revolutionary state. Also, the nationalist and communist leaderships turned out to be dynamic. That "competition" may be seen also within the two political movements and became a shaping factor for the success or failure of the party as a modern political formation.

Que la politique chinoise des nationalités soit influencée par la politique soviétique des nationalités n'est pas une découverte et en effet, différents faits historiques de la première moitié du vingtième siècle révèlent la nature de cet influence, directe, indirecte, voulue et développée ou subie. Cependant, avec le discours de la " spécificité chinoise " apparu au milieu des années 1980 et qui implique non seulement la politique générale mais aussi la politique des nationalités du PCC, comment le Parti Communiste Chinois peut-il gérer une telle influence? Peu après la désintégration de l'Union Soviétique, les recherches sur les nationalités en RPC se tournent vers une nouvelle question : comment la Chine, en tant qu' " Etat socialiste multiethnique ", peut-elle éviter le destin de l'Union Soviétique ? Les réflexions intellectuelles post-soviétiques en RPC concernant les nationalités nous donnent les éléments fondamentaux pour comprendre les tendances et les concepts développés depuis la chute de l'Union Soviétique jusqu'au début des années 2000 dans la politique des nationalités de RPC
The fact that the PRC nationality policy has been influenced by the Soviet policy is well known and indeed various historic facts reveal different aspects of the influence, a direct, indirect, deliberate and developed or undergone influence. However, the speech of the "Chinese particularism" that appeared in the middle of 1980s implies not only the general policy of the CCP but also the nationality policy. Therefore we can wonder how the CCP in its discourse manage with this influence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a lot of scholars in the PRC have been researching on nationalities attempting answer to the question of how China, as a "multiethnic socialist State", can avoid the same future as the Soviet Union ? The post-Soviet intellectual reflections in the PRC give us several elements to understand tendencies and concepts developed in PRC nationality policy since the faIl of the USSR and this, till the beginning of 2000s

Une vision manicheenne a domine tres largement durant toute la guerre du viet nam : d'un cote, un sud amolli, corrompu, illegitime parce que separatiste et lie a l'etranger, d'abord francais puis americain; de l'autre cote, un nord pur, dur, heroique, unitaire, national, ect. Simplistes et souvent caricaturales, ces images ne correspondaient pas au regime installe a saigon, infiniment plus complexe et contraste. Idylliques, elles ignoraient volontairement que le nord viet nam avait un regime totalitaire, que son communisme se reclamait d'une pratique et d'une inspiration stalinienne ; que les fronts nationaux crees sous son egide ne devaient etre que camouflage et moyen de domination pour le parti, "force unique qui dirige l'etat et la societe". Dans l'examen de ces questions, ce travail s'est efforce d'apporter : - une reflexion sur les composantes du nationalisme vietnamien ( la geopolitique dominee par la chine, la force du sentiment unitaire, la vigueur des regionalismes et les frequentes cassures de l'etat, les rapports entre communisme et nationalisme dans un contexte domine tour a tour par la france, le japon et les etats unis ) ; - un dossier sur la republique du viet nam de 1972 a 1975, des accords de paris a la chute de saigon ( le regime de nguyen van thieu et l' evolution de la situation politique, economique et militaire ) ; - une analyse du parti communiste vietnamien ( le langage, l'ideologie, les pratiques interieures, la politique exterieure. . . ) tel qu'il appa- rait au travers de la politique suivie par la republique socialiste du viet nam d'avril 1975 (prise de saigon) a mars 1982 ( ve congres et iii e plan quinquennal ); - quelques jalons sur le probleme d'une information qui s'est tenue aussi eloignee des realites. Comment, et avec quelles repercussions cette dissymetrie constante en faveur de hanoi et au detriment de saigon s'est-elle developpee ?
A widespread manichean vision prevailed during the viet nam war : on the one hand, an emollient, corrupted, illegitimate south because it was secessionist and tied up to foreign countries, first france, then the united states ; on the other hand, a pure, hard, heroic, unitarian, national, ect. . . North. Simplistic and often caricatural, those pictures did not correspond to the infinitely more complex and contrasted saigon political system. Idyllic, they voluntarity ignored that north viet nam had a totalitarian regime, that its communism refered to stalinian inspiration and practice ; that the national fronts created under its leadership could only be camouflaging and a means of domination for theparty, " the unique power that runs the state and the society ". Considering those questions, we endeavoured to bring : - a reflexion on the components of vietnamese nationalism ( its geopolitics ruled by china, the strength of the unitarian feeling, the vigor of the various regionalisms and frequent breaks of the state, the relationships between communism and nationalism in an environment alternately dominated by france, japan, during a short but decisive time, and the u. S. A. ) ; - a record on the viet nam republic from 1972 to 1975, from the paris accords to the fall of saigon ( the nguyen van thieu regime and the evolution of the politi- cal, economic and military situation ) ; - an analysis of the vietnamese communist party ( the language, the ideology, the internal practices, the foreign policy. . . ) as it apperars through the policy followed by the socialist repubic of viet nam ) from april 1975 ( the taking of saigon ) to march 1982 ( vth congress and third quinquennal plan ) ; - some steps on the problem of an information which was standing so far from the realities. How, and with which repercussions did that constant dissymetry in favour of hanoi and to the detriment of saigon spread out ?

Cette thèse porte sur la formation socio-historique d’un régime de parti-État socialiste dans un pays anciennement colonisé : le Vietnam. Pour saisir les spécificités du communisme vietnamien, nous étudions les vecteurs de diffusion de l’idéologie communiste, le poids de l’anticolonialisme et de la guerre, les formes d’influence exercées par les dirigeants soviétiques et chinois entre 1919 et 1991, ainsi que les processus d’appropriation et de résistance auxquels cette nouvelle forme de domination donna lieu. Notre enquête s’appuie sur des documents d’archives russes, chinois, américains et français et sur des sources imprimées en vietnamien. Il en ressort que les communistes vietnamiens s’inspirèrent continûment des modèles soviétiques et chinois, quel que fût l’état de leurs relations avec Moscou et Pékin. Les transferts observés résultent, pour l’essentiel, non de la contrainte – parfois déterminante –, mais d’un désir permanent d’imitation. Par son organisation et ses modes de gouvernement, le parti-Etat vietnamien se distingue peu des modèles soviétique et chinois. Sa ressemblance s’explique avant tout par la fidélité des communistes vietnamiens au modèle léniniste, ainsi que par la rigidité doctrinale et le caractère pratique de l’idéologie communiste. Les communistes vietnamiens affirmèrent une spécificité dans le domaine de la construction nationale. Si leurs politiques d’homogénéisation ethnique et de gestion du territoire rappellent les pratiques soviétiques et chinoises, la volonté de créer un État supranational et la refonte du discours historique marquent aussi la persistance de schèmes de domination et de formes de racisme hérités de la période coloniale
This thesis deals with the socio-historical formation of a socialist single-party state in a formerly colonized country: Vietnam. In order to grasp the specificity of Vietnamese communism, we study the agents of the communist ideology diffusion, the impact of anti-colonialism and war, the various forms of influence exercised by the Soviet and the Chinese communists between 1919 and 1991, as well as the processes of appropriation and resistance caused by this new form of domination. Our inquiry relies on various Russian, Chinese, American and French archival documents, and on a large array of printed sources in Vietnamese. It shows that, no matter the state of their relations with Moscow and Beijing, the Vietnamese communists continuously drew their inspiration from the Soviet and Chinese models. Though the observed transfers were born out of constraint at two founding moments, they resulted mostly from a permanent inclination to mimic. The Vietnamese party-state differs little from the Soviet and the Chinese models in its organization and its modes of governance. Its resemblance is mainly due to the Vietnamese communists’ fidelity to the Leninist model, as well as to the doctrinal rigidity and practical nature of the communist ideology. However, there is one domain in which the Vietnamese communists asserted specificity: the nation-building process. If their policies of ethnic homogenization and territorial administration are reminiscent of the Soviet and Chinese practices, their willingness to create a supra-national state and to recast the historical discourse also signals the persistence of some domination schemes and forms of racism, inherited from the colonial period

博士
臺灣大學
政治學研究所
96
Most of the studies on the post-WWII political development of Taiwan have referred to the Chinese Nationalist Party, or the Kuomintang, as either a Leninist or a quasi-Leninist party, and considered its party organization a pillar of the regime before it lost power in 2000. However, this view is only based on some clauses of the party constitution as well as superficial aspects of the regime. In fact, the Kuomintang did not satisfy the prerequisites for a Leninist party in terms of ideology and organization, and its party organization did not have the mobilization capability, which is characteristic of a Leninist party, both among its members and in society. If we differentiate a Leninist party from its regime, and consider the former only a means, i.e., the “organizational weapon,” to an end, we can then specify three essential elements of such a party. First and foremost, all the party members must have a strong consensus in its ideology, i.e., its political goals and party lines. Secondly, its organization must be based on the principle of democratic centralism. And thirdly, the whole party is composed of cells as its basic units, which are capable of taking actions collectively. It is not necessary for a Leninist party to embrace Communist society as its final aim, to pursue a revolutionary path towards power, to believe in the “law” of class struggle, or to adopt a party-state system once in power. The ideology of a Leninist party is to guide the platforms of the party and its members’ collective actions. It consists of analyses of the current situation, the choice of goals, and the elaboration of the party lines. How effective the ideology is depends on the precision of its analyses of current situations, the moral appeal of its goals, and the feasibility of the party lines. A Leninist party must constantly work on the construction of its ideology, that is, review unremittingly the current situation, goals and party lines, so that the ideal can be materialized in the answer to “what is to be done?” The official ideology of the Kuomintang is “Three Principles of the people,” which was invented by Dr. Sun Yat-sen over a century ago. If we take it as a system of theory, it is too incoherent to serve as a base of a belief. But it can also be seen as a framework of three important political issues, and then we can keep the framework intact while we change its contents. As long as its fundamental values, say national independence, democratic constitutionalism, and equitable affluence, remain unchanged, the Three Principles can be reformulated into new party platforms according to the needs of the time. Therefore, it is surely possible for the Kuomintang to construct an effective ideology based on the Three Principles. Nevertheless, since the purge of Communist elements in 1927, the Kuomintang had never paid enough attention to ideological construction. In the thought of Chiang Kai-shek, the doctrines and current policies were disconnected. In other words, the urgent tasks of the present were not related to the future ideal. Hence the latter lost its appeal. To make things worse, Chiang substituted moral preaching of Confucianism and Führer worship of Fascism for ideological leadership, and, consequently, he ignored ideological construction even further. Although in the first decade or so after the Kuomintang moved to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang tried to build an ideological basis for the consensus among the Kuomintang members, he did not succeed. The major reasons for his failure include mistakes in the judgment on current situation, insufficient moral appeal of its political goals, and low feasibility of the party lines. The Kuomintang eventually gave up any further effort in ideological construction in the 1970s. Without an ideological basis for its members’ consensus, the party organization of the Kuomintang could only be a tool of factional politics. Moreover, the primary organizational principle of the Kuomintang had always been the Fascist Führer principle since 1938. The democratic centralism in its constitution could hardly function under a dictatorial leader like Chiang Kai-shek. Besides, its basic units had neither power nor capability of collective actions, and, as a result, the morale of its members was generally low. Following a historical approach, this dissertation examines the history of the Kuomintang after Sun Yat-sen reorganized it in 1924, and finds out that it is definitely not a Leninist party. Instead of party organization, what makes the Kuomintang regime capable of penetrating Taiwan’s society is its secret service and the administrative system left behind by the Japanese colonial government. The party organization of the Kuomintang was too weak to take root in the local society, nor could it overcome the conflict between Mainlanders and native Taiwanese, which is the fundamental political-societal cleavage within Taiwan society. Once the Kuomintang regime is forced to change, the main course of change could only be towards Taiwanization. In addition, because of the dependence of the Kuomintang regime upon the U.S., the timing of regime change was determined by changes in the U.S.’ foreign policy, which brought about successive legitimacy crises to which the Kuomintang regime had to respond.

碩士
國立暨南國際大學
管理學院經營管理碩士學位學程碩士在職專班
103
When business environment is changed, enterprises may conduct organizational reform and downsizing through organization adjusting, target conversion and the change of organizational structure, etc., and so the political party may do. This study aims to explore the history of organizational reform and downsizing in Taichung City Beitun District Division under KMT’s guidance by taking four previous and in-service party cadres as research objects through contents analysis for deep interview and secondary data collection, so as to deeply understand the development and context in the process of organizational downsizing. Research results show that Beitun District Division experienced in personnel downsizing twice; however, the first downsizing had quite limited influence on the division, and even two retired senior party cadres in the second downsizing didn’t cause so huge influence on the entire human resource. The main reason causing Beitun District Division to have difficulty in further business handling and sharp decrease in human resource from 14 to 2 cadres is not party headquarters’ two large-scale personnel downsizing but personnel policy of “hiring freeze” following the downsizing project. Although organizational downsizing mitigated KMT’s personnel budget, its business items remained unchanged with downsizing process and external environmental transition, causing that local division must face shorthanded dilemma in addition to dealing with plentiful, complicated and inefficient new and old businesses. Therefore, this study proposed that the target of organizational reform inside the party may build on the following three bases in the future: 1. Adjust party affairs to delete inappropriate ones and reform organizational position; 2. Select elites and new cadres to refresh party personnel; 3. Listen to opinions from local cadres at young level and promote organizational reform project in compliance with different local conditions, even to more localized.

The Kuomintang (KMT, the Nationalist Party) has been a major agent of Taiwan's transition to democracy. It is rare that a ruling party initiates the transition to democracy from within an authoritarian regime, therefore it is interesting to explore how and why the KMT has played a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy. A historical approach is employed to analyze the role of the KMT in Taiwan's transition to democracy and to explain the reasons that led the KMT to play such a role. The thesis demonstrates that socioeconomic, external and other "ecological" factors have had only an indirect impact on Taiwan's transition to democracy. It finds that the KMT made several crucial decisions that started Taiwan down the path to democracy. The KMT's ability to play a positive role is explained by the party's own nature and characteristics. Firstly, the KMT's ideology guided it to play a positive role in Taiwan's gradual transition to democracy, because Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People are fundamentally democratic, although tutelary and pragmatic in terms of the means to achieve the democratic end. Secondly, the KMT was able to play a positive role in Taiwan's transition to democracy because the top leaders of the party generally agreed on the need for change, although they had different opinions about the timing and pace of change. Chiang Ching-kuo and a group of reformers contributed most to the establishment of democratic values and procedures in the KMT party-state. The co-existence of conservative and reformist factions in the party balanced the needs for stability and change, and resulted in a gradual process of transition. Thirdly, the KMT's recruitment and organization helped the party to play a positive role in the transition to democracy. Through Taiwanization and technocratization, the KMT made itself more representative and capable. The KMT has a huge and well-coordinated organization which was used mainly as a tool of social control in the earlier authoritarian period and then as a tool of electoral mobilization in the later period on Taiwan. The adaptability and strength of the KMT contributed to the party's confidence in initiating and leading the transition to democracy on Taiwan.

Taiwan’s February 28 Incident happened in 1947 as a set of popular protests against the postwar policies of the Nationalist Party, and it then sparked militant actions and political struggles of Taiwanese but ended with military suppression and political persecution by the Nanjing government. The Nationalist Party first defined the Incident as a rebellion by pro-Japanese forces and communist saboteurs. As the enemy of the Nationalist Party in China’s Civil War (1946-1949), the Chinese Communist Party initially interpreted the Incident as a Taiwanese fight for political autonomy in the party’s wartime propaganda, and then reinterpreted the event as an anti-Nationalist uprising under its own leadership. After the rapprochement of Mao’s China with the United States in the 1970s, both parties successively started economic or political reform and revised their respective policies toward the February 28 Incident. Moreover, the Democratic Progressive Party rose as a pro-independence force in Taiwan in the mid-1980s, and its stress on the Taiwanese pursuit of autonomy in the Incident coincided with the initial interpretation of the Chinese Communist Party. These partisan views and their related policy changes deeply influenced historical research on the Incident. This study re-examines both the history and the historical accuracy of these partisan discourses and the relevant scholarship on the Incident, and further proposes to understand this historic event in the long-term context of Taiwanese resistance and political struggles.
Graduate

碩士
南華大學
非營利事業管理研究所
95
For most of enterprises, the benefit of relationship marketing (RM) is to gain the whole life value from customers; on the other hand, from customers’ aspect, it will help to reduce the uncertainty and transaction costs. In order to increase the benefit for both enterprises and customers, enterprises must maintain and improve the relationship with customers. This research will base on to build, maintain and strength the relationship between political party and supporters through effective RM and the practical know-how. The use of RM has been more understood through interview with the political party and supporters. Through this research it is found how the political party should play the critical role in the relationship building, maintain and strengthen, the results which match the academic theory, and finally provide a proper suggestion for the use of RM in the political environment in Taiwan. 　 　　The political civilization development, KMT played a critical role in Taiwan. Researchers usually take KMT as the example to analyze the political environment in Taiwan, especially when the issues are regarding to the local politics and elections. This research will focus on customer oriented RM to see the following three aspects. Firstly, to overview the current use of RM in a particular county/city branch for KMT. Secondly, the comparative study for investigating the effectiveness and differences of RM in different background supporters. Finally, the relative effectiveness of using RM to a particular county/city branch for KMT will be discussed. 　 　　In the conclusion, it is proved that an organizing system is passive and still, which is only live when the relationship is active and operative, the use of RM is an effective method for a political party. The results of this research are important to the politics and social study in Taiwan, especially for KMT in RM. Which is including the observation of KMT operation and the development and management of basic-level staff in the local network.

The Chinese Dream was first introduced by Xi Jinping in 2012. Since then, the concept is being used as a common goal of the nation, serving as a way of increasing nationalism inside China, as well as drawing legitimacy to the CCP. So, the Chinese Dream is usually perceived as more of a national then international concept. However, the concept is often used internationally as well, when addressing other countries: terms such as the "African Dream" and the "World Dream" started to appear in speeches delivered by Chinese Leaders, standing as a soft power tool. Often, the dream is portrayed as a peaceful concept and is used to relate to other nations. The concept requires, as many times emphasized by many Chinese leaders, a peaceful world and good external relations, especially regionally. But the contradiction between this need and the increasing pressure of the population to defend Chinese interests abroad and the dependence of CCP's legitimacy on the realization of the dream may cause a conflict of interests within the concept. So, in order to understand the divergent and converging points of the international and national dimension of the Chinese Dream, and further answer the question "how does the Chinese Dream impact Chinese Foreign Policy", the research analysis both national and international discourses delivered by the CCP leaders and related to the concept. The aim is to understand the contradiction and obstacles of the concept and relate them to the implications they have for Chinese foreign policy.
O sonho chinês foi apresentado pela primeira vez por Xi Jinping em 2012. Desde então, o conceito tem sido utilizado como um objectivo comum da nação, servindo como uma forma de aumentar o nacionalismo dentro da China, bem como de conferir legitimidade ao PCC. Por isso, o Sonho Chinês é geralmente visto como um conceito mais nacional do que internacional. Contudo, o conceito é frequentemente utilizado também internacionalmente, quando se dirige a outros países: termos como o "Sonho Africano" e o "Sonho Mundial" começaram a aparecer em discursos proferidos por Líderes chineses, usados como uma ferramenta de "soft power". Muitas vezes, o sonho é retratado como um conceito pacífico e é utilizado para estabelecer relação com outras nações. O conceito requer, como muitas vezes enfatizado por muitos líderes chineses, um mundo pacífico e boas relações externas, especialmente a nível regional. Mas a contradição entre esta necessidade e a crescente pressão da população para defender os interesses chineses no estrangeiro e a dependência da legitimidade do PCC na realização do sonho pode causar um conflito de interesses dentro do conceito. Assim, a fim de compreender os pontos divergentes e convergentes da dimensão internacional e nacional do Sonho Chinês, e responder à pergunta "como é que o Sonho Chinês afecta a Política Externa Chinesa", a análise investiga tanto discursos nacionais como internacionais emitidos pelos líderes do PCC e relacionados com o conceito. O objectivo é compreender a contradição e os obstáculos do conceito e relacioná-los com as implicações que têm para a política externa chinesa.

This thesis is the first comprehensive study of the history of China-orientated nationalism in post-World War II (WWII) colonial Hong Kong. The thesis examines events in each decade diachronically and links them together in a broader perspective. It shows the continuities and changes in the meaning and politics of China-orientated nationalism and how the focus of that nationalism became increasingly on what was happening in Hong Kong rather than China in the long period from 1949 to 1997. Three types of China-orientated nationalism emerged in Hong Kong during the 1949-1997 period: cultural nationalism, political nationalism, and popular nationalism. Some of the exiled Chinese intellectuals in the 1950s promoted cultural nationalism, while political nationalism in Hong Kong revolved around the Chinese Communist Party-Guomindang (CCP-GMD) struggle. Popular nationalism in the post-1967 period was tied primarily to Hong Kong politics. This thesis demonstrates how the various nationalist sentiments were a product of the China factor, the Hong Kong factor, and colonialism. China-orientated nationalism was open to interpretation and its rise and evolution was a haphazard process. Over time, the rhetoric of political nationalism that revolved around the CCP-GMD struggle became less significant as younger generations of Hong Kong Chinese who had little interest in Chinese politics became politically active in the 1970s. In this new phase, nationalism was tied not to the pro-CCP/pro-GMD rhetoric of the 1950s and 1960s, but to young Hong Kong peoples concern about problems in Hong Kong society and Hong Kong politics. In the 1980s and 1990s, expressions of popular nationalism were linked to Hong Kong peoples concern over the future of Hong Kong following the Tiananmen Square incident and on the eve of the 1997 handover. This study of the evolution of China-orientated nationalism in colonial Hong Kong also provides an understanding of how the colonial government responded, and how some sectors of the Hong Kong Chinese community manoeuvred vis-Ã -vis the colonial administration and other Hong Kong-based groups by using their own strategically constructed nationalism.