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1
BOECKING, FELIX. "Unmaking the Chinese Nationalist State: Administrative Reform among Fiscal Collapse, 1937–1945." Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 2 (February 22, 2011): 277–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x11000011.
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AbstractThe defeat of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 is often explained as a consequence of Nationalist fiscal incompetence during the Second Sino-Japanese War, which led to the collapse of the Nationalist state. In this paper, I argue that from 1937 until 1940, GMD fiscal policy managed to preserve a degree of relative stability even though, by early 1939, the Nationalists had already lost control over ports yielding 80 per cent of Customs revenue which, during the Nanjing decade (1928–1937), had accounted for more than 40 per cent of annual central government revenue. The loss of this revenue forced the Nationalists to introduce wartime fiscal instruments, taxation in kind, and transit taxes, both previously condemned as outdated and inequitable by the Nationalists. Further territorial losses led to the introduction of deficit financing, which in turn became a cause of hyperinflation. The introduction of war-time fiscal instruments led to administrative changes in the revenue-collecting agencies of the Nationalist state, and to the demise of the Maritime Customs Service as the pre-eminent revenue-collecting and anti-smuggling organization. The administrative upheavals of the war facilitated the rise of other central government organizations nominally charged with smuggling suppression, which in fact frequently engaged in trade with the Japanese-occupied areas of China. Hence, administrative reforms at a time of fiscal collapse, far from strengthening the war-time state, created one of the preconditions for the disintegration of the Nationalist state, which facilitated the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) victory in 1949.
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Phillips, Steve. "The Politics of Mnemonics: History in the Debate over Taiwan's Status." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 9, no. 1-2 (2000): 5–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187656100793645994.
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AbstractWith the retreat of the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) from mainland China to Taiwan in the late 1940s, the island seemed destined to be part of another nation divided by the Cold War—superficially similar to Germany and Korea. The Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland, while the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) moved its government, the Republic of China (ROC), to Taiwan. It followed, then, that reconciliation between the two would unite both sides of the Taiwan Strait under one nation-state. Much has changed since those early years of the Cold War, however. The Communists have embraced capitalism, most nations have established relations with the PRC while cutting ties to the ROC, and it is difficult to discern whether the Nationalists are devoted to a Chinese or to a Taiwanese nation.1 Despite
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Kuzuoglu, Ulug. "Chinese cryptography: The Chinese Nationalist Party and intelligence management, 1927–1949." Cryptologia 42, no. 6 (April 9, 2018): 514–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01611194.2018.1449146.
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Lai, Sherman Xiaogang. "A War Within a War: The Road to the New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941." Journal of Chinese Military History 2, no. 1 (2013): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22127453-12341249.
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Abstract The New Fourth Army (N4A) Incident is the name given to the destruction by the Chinese Nationalist government of the headquarters of the N4A, one of the two legal armies under the command of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Sino-Japanese War, in southern Anhui province in January 1941, together with the killing of about nine thousand CCP soldiers. It was the largest and the last armed conflict between the Nationalists and the CCP during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). This article argues that this tragedy came from Joseph Stalin’s paranoia toward the West and Mao’s resulting limited pre-emptive offensives against the Nationalist government, as well as their misreading of Chiang Kai-shek during 1939-1940.
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Yin, Cao. "Kill Buddha Singh." Indian Historical Review 43, no. 2 (December 2016): 270–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0376983616663408.
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On the morning of 6 April 1927, the Jemadar of the Sikh branch in the Shanghai Municipal Police, Buddha Singh, had been shot dead by an Indian nationalist. This incident has not drawn much attention from scholars studying modern Chinese history. This article argues that the narrative framework of the Chinese national history fails to provide a space for subjects such as Sikh migrants and nationalists that can hardly be appropriated. By exploring how the Ghadar Party, the Comintern and the Chinese communists cooperated with each other to shatter the British hegemony in Shanghai and how the British colonial authorities forged a coordinative network to check the ever-flowing dissidents, this article reconstructs the dramatic case of Buddha Singh not only in the milieu of the Chinese nationalist revolution, but also in the context of the global anti-imperial and communist movements. In so doing, it challenges the established national narrative and champions an approach that incorporates modern Chinese history into the global history.
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Pimenta Bueno, Mariana, Philipe Alexandre Junqueira, and Gustavo Alves Santana. "Os Dragões internos na China: uma contribuição a partir dos estudos do Nacionalismo | Internal Dragons in China: A Contribution from Nationalism Studies." Mural Internacional 12 (December 31, 2021): e60469. http://dx.doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2021.60469.
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A presente pesquisa procura demonstrar de maneira breve os desafios políticos no aspecto do nacionalismo no país que vem, nos últimos anos, atraindo olhares: a China. Ao longo de três seções, nós analisamos a temática dos estudos nacionalistas, em como o Partido Comunista Chinês administra os enclaves da multietnicidade existente no território e as implicações de determinadas políticas promovidas pelo governo de Xi Jinping para controle de minorias através da tecnologia na presente Era Digital. O “Sonho Chinês” é assim exposto para ilustrar e problematizar a ilação entre políticas nacionalistas e identitárias com o controle do Partido em meio a um cenário mais desafiador para a China.Palavras-Chave: China; Nacionalismo; MultietnicidadeABSTRACT This research seeks to briefly demonstrate the political challenges considering the nationalism aspect in the country which is, in recent years, getting attention: China. Throughout three sections, we address the nationalist studies issue, how the Chinese Communist Party manages the enclaves from an existing multiethnicity on the territory and the implication of specifics policies provided by Xi Jinping’s Government. Thus the “Chinese Dream” is outline to illustrate and discuss an inference between nationalist and identities policies with the Party control through a more challenging arena for China. Keywords: China; Nationalism; Multiethinicity. Recebido em: 15 jun. 2021 | Aceito em: 20 set. 2021.
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Chaudhuri, Debasish. "A Hundred Years of Entanglement: The Chinese Party-State and Ethnic Minorities." China Report 58, no. 1 (January 28, 2022): 75–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00094455221074254.
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The consciousness of non-Han nationalities in modern China evolved around a deep antipathy to the Qing, assimilationist ideas, and pretentious multi-ethnicism. The concepts of equality among nationalities and right to self-determination entered into the discourse of nation- and state-building in China under the influence of Lenin’s revolutionary ideals and Stalin’s views on ‘the national question’. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has struggled to reconcile these concepts with its nationalist agenda since its inception in 1921. The CPC later innovated ethno-regional autonomy for minorities and developed corresponding institutions. This article argues that the Party’s three main agendas of national unification and interethnic unity, developmental goals, and majoritarian nationalism have all complicated its ties with ethnic minorities, and evaluates how the present leadership of the 100-year-old Party has been managing the relationship.
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De Giorgi, Laura. "Communication Technology and Mass Propaganda in Republican China." European Journal of East Asian Studies 13, no. 2 (2014): 305–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01302009.
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This article analyses the policies and plans of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD) regarding wireless radio broadcasting, arguing that they laid the foundations for the development of a national-level modern cultural institution aimed, for the first time in China, at mass propaganda and education. During the Nanjing decade, notwithstanding its limits beyond the most developed urban areas, the Nationalists’ approach was the extensive use of radio broadcasting for the ‘partyfication’ (danghua) of Chinese state structure and the Chinese people’s social and cultural life. Nevertheless, their aspirations were greater than their ability to transform the plan into reality. Unable to impose an effective state monopoly on radio communication and broadcasting infrastructures, the Nationalists’ aims to exert stronger control and to gain a hegemonic position in the Chinese ‘ether’ could be achieved only by resorting to technical, administrative and legal measures whose efficacy was rather limited, because it was subordinated to a capacity to have them implemented. The Nationalists’ main accomplishments were the establishment of a powerful national radio broadcasting station under the control of the Party in Nanjing and of a central-level commission aimed at coordinating the work of the different state, Party and military bureaucracies involved in radio broadcasting propaganda.
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Du, Yue. "Sun Yat-sen as Guofu: Competition over Nationalist Party Orthodoxy in the Second Sino-Japanese War." Modern China 45, no. 2 (July 23, 2018): 201–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0097700418787519.
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This article explores the significance of the cult of Sun Yat-sen, often referred to as “Father of the [modern Chinese] Nation” 國父 (Guofu), for Nationalist state-building in China. Although Sun Yat-sen’s title of Guofu was formalized only in 1940 as a result of competition over Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD) orthodoxy between opposing Nationalist regimes in Chongqing and Nanjing during the Second Sino-Japanese War, the term reflected the ongoing importance of Sun’s legacy in securing political legitimacy in the Chinese Republic. Overall, the GMD promulgated state-sponsored veneration of the Guofu to justify its political tutelage in the name of parental guardianship over the Chinese people. Yet Sun’s legacy allowed for multiple interpretations, which complicates any effort to lock this legacy to one political purpose. The development of different elements of the Guofu’s legacy by competing wartime regimes shows how it failed to provide a truly unifying tool for political legitimation.
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Foley, Kevin, Jeremy L. Wallace, and Jessica Chen Weiss. "The Political and Economic Consequences of Nationalist Protest in China: The 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations." China Quarterly 236 (October 31, 2018): 1131–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574101800125x.
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AbstractWhat are the consequences of nationalist unrest? This paper utilizes two original datasets, which cover 377 city-level anti-Japanese protests during the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu Island crisis and the careers of municipal leaders, to analyse the downstream effects of nationalist unrest at the subnational level. We find both political and economic consequences of China's 2012 protest demonstrations against Japan. Specifically, top Party leaders in cities that saw relatively spontaneous, early protests were less likely to be promoted to higher office, a finding that is consistent with the widely held but rarely tested expectation that social instability is punished in the Chinese Communist Party's cadre evaluation system. We also see a negative effect of nationalist protest on foreign direct investment (FDI) growth at the city level. However, the lower promotion rates associated with relatively spontaneous protests appear to arise through political rather than economic channels. By taking into account data on social unrest in addition to economic performance, these results add to existing evidence that systematic evaluation of leaders’ performance plays a major role in the Chinese political system. These findings also illuminate the dilemma that local leaders face in managing popular nationalism amid shifting national priorities.
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CLINTON, MAGGIE. "Ends of the Universal: The League of Nations and Chinese Fascism on the Eve of World War II." Modern Asian Studies 48, no. 6 (October 11, 2013): 1740–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x12000923.
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AbstractFascist Italy's 1935 invasion of Ethiopia and the League of Nations’ handling of the crisis resonated strongly in Nationalist China, where it recalled the League's failure to thwart Japan's claims to Manchuria in 1931. As these two crises unfolded, the League became a nexus around which Nationalist Party debates about the position of colonized and semi-colonized countries within the extant world order crystallized. Party adherents reflected on China's and Ethiopia's positions as independent nation states with limited territorial integrity or juridical autonomy, and assessed this situation in light of their respective League memberships. While party liberals continued to view the League as a flawed but worthwhile experiment in global governance, newly-emerged fascist activists within the party denounced it as an instrument for curtailing the sovereignty of weak nations. From these conflicting views of the League, it can be discerned how Nationalist disunity was partially grounded in disagreements over the nature and ideal structure of the global order, and how Chinese fascists agitated to escape from modern structures of imperialist domination while reiterating the latter's racial and civilizational exclusions.
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FUNG, EDMUND S. K. "Nationalism and Modernity: The Politics of Cultural Conservatism in Republican China." Modern Asian Studies 43, no. 3 (May 2009): 777–813. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x07003472.
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AbstractThis article explores the political dynamics of modern Chinese cultural conservatism. It proceeds from the premise that modern Chinese conservatism, as distinct from traditionalism, was a response to modernity and, as such, a part of modernity. The article identifies the conservative with the nationalist, but not vice versa, and understands politico-cultural conservatism as politico-cultural nationalism. It will first trace the rise of modern Chinese conservative thought, revisit the ideas of two noted cultural conservatives Liang Shuming and Zhang Junmai, examine the politics of China-based cultural reconstruction, and then explore the conservative thought of the war period (1937–1945) to illustrate the interplay of war, culture and nationalism. It argues, basically, that although the conservatives did not defend the prevailing socio-political order as a whole, their understanding of politics from a cultural perspective was nuanced and that they stood in an ambiguous relationship with the existing regime and the party-state.
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McCord, Edward A. "Militia Command and Control in the Chinese National Revolution, Hunan 1926-1927." Journal of Chinese Military History 7, no. 2 (October 16, 2018): 203–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22127453-12341332.
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Abstract This article uses a case study of Hunan province to examine the role of militia in the struggle for the control of local society during the 1926-1927 National Revolution. Although the Nationalist and Communist Parties both agreed on the need eliminate militia leadership by “local bullies and evil gentry,” differences quickly arose over how to reconstruct militia following this action. Nationalist Party activists tended to favor a “statist” approach that would replace abusive militia leaders with “upright” local elites but place them under stricter and more direct official control. Communist Party activists in contrast sought a “popular” mass militia free of elite influence and controlled by new peasant and worker unions. As such, this struggle over militia command and control became a key component in the broader political competition between the two parties and their alternative revolutionary visions.
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Zhou, Min, and Hanning Wang. "Anti-Japanese Sentiment among Chinese University Students: The Influence of Contemporary Nationalist Propaganda." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 46, no. 1 (April 2017): 167–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261704600107.
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This study looks at the sources of anti-Japanese sentiment in today's China. Using original survey data collected in June 2014 from 1,458 students at three elite universities in Beijing, we quantitatively investigate which factors are associated with stronger anti-Japanese sentiment among elite university students. In particular, we examine the link between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s nationalist propaganda (especially patriotic education) and university students’ anti-Japanese sentiment. We find that nationalist propaganda does indeed have a significant effect on negative sentiment towards Japan. Reliance on state-sanctioned textbooks for information about Japan, visiting museums and memorials or watching television programmes and movies relating to the War of Resistance against Japan are all associated with higher levels of anti-Japanese sentiment. The findings suggest the effectiveness of nationalist propaganda in promoting anti-Japanese sentiment. We also find that alternative sources of information, especially personal contact with Japan, can mitigate anti-Japanese sentiment. Thus, visiting Japan and knowing Japanese people in person can potentially offset some of the influences of nationalist propaganda.
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Tseng, Pin-Tsang. "The Wartime Regime and the Development of Public Diet in Taiwan (1947–1950s)." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 47, no. 2 (August 2018): 113–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261804700205.
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The Nationalist Party retreated to Taiwan in 1949 after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War. Faced with a population explosion, economic recession, and a serious shortage of resources, the Nationalist government retained the “wartime regime” instituted during the civil war, while strengthening control of key foods – which significantly affected people's daily life, and notably diet. This article argues that the purpose of implementing the wartime regime was not only to stabilise livelihoods, particularly to secure basic living conditions for a large number of soldiers and government employees; it also helped the Nationalist Party consolidate its authoritarian rule and establish a firm grip on national resources, facilitating national defence and economic development. The stringent control measures of the wartime regime caused, however, a gross imbalance between staple and subsidiary foods in the diet of local people, leading to consumption of excessive amounts of starchy staple foods and widening the gap between the diets of farmers and non-farmers.
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Esteban, Mario. "The Management of Nationalism during the Jiang Era (1994–2002) and Its Implications On Government and Regime Legitimacy." European Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 2 (2006): 181–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157006106778869324.
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AbstractThis paper aims to provide a detailed explanation of how the promotion of different nationalist discourses in China entails distinct repercussions on both government and regime legitimacy, looking for the rationale of governmental appeal to both affirmative and assertive nationalism within the context of general legitimacy crisis suffered by communism in the last years.Through the analysis of case studies including the return of Hong Kong and Macao under Chinese sovereignty and the success of Beijing's bid for hosting the 2008 Olympic Games, this paper regards the rise of affirmative nationalism as beneficial for the legitimacy of both the Jiang government and the CCP regime as a whole. However, the increasing relevance of assertive nationalism, discussed with reference to the Diaoyu dispute with Japan, and the diplomatic crisis with the US after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the unauthorised landing of a US surveillance plane on Hainan, has put a challenge on Jiang's government, since it has been effectively used by the leftist wing of the party for gaining more leverage within the CCP with regard to the reformists. At the same time, assertive nationalism has reinforced regime legitimacy, providing effective ammunition to criticise the liberals.
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Borchigud, Wurlig. "Between Chinese Nationalism and Soviet Colonisation: A Chinese Orientalist's Narration of Inner and Outer Mongolia (1926–1927)." Inner Asia 4, no. 1 (2002): 27–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/146481702793647605.
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AbstractThis essay questions the nature of ‘Chinese orientalism’ vis-à-vis the Western model of ‘orientalism’. It examines the dialectics of the interconnection between Chinese civilisation/nationalism and Soviet communist colonisation/modernisation, and how these shape and limit the perceptions of a Chinese scholar politician, Ma Hetian, in his travel writing about Inner and Outer Mongolia in the mid 1920s. Unlike most travel writings which focus on cultural differences of the ‘inferior’ others as study object and aesthetic idol, Ma's was a political travel writing, which represents his Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Republican government in relation to its internal frontier Inner Mongolia and the independent ‘Outer Mongolia’ (the MPR) at the time. This political travel writing challenges Kojin Karatani's coherent though essentialised reinterpretation of orientalism from its specific sociocultural contexts and geopolitical positions. Similarly to Western orientalists, Ma had an authority to speak of his ‘inferior’ Inner Mongol objects as their civiliser as well as to represent his ‘helpless’ Outer Mongol ‘brothers’ as their national guardian. However, unlike many orientalists (Western and non-Western), Ma's politically charged Sinocentric position and often chauvinistic attitude towards Mongols align him closer to his ‘enemy/friend’ – Soviet Russia.
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WANG, CHEN-CHENG. "Intellectuals and the One-party State in Nationalist China: The Case of the Central Politics School (1927–1947)." Modern Asian Studies 48, no. 6 (January 31, 2014): 1769–807. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x12000893.
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AbstractThis paper aims to provide a new perspective on the relationship between Nationalist Party (GMD) cadres and Chinese intellectuals. By studying the Central Politics School, a major GMD political training institute for professional party cadres, I hope to reassess the nature of the GMD one-party state and remind researchers of the difficult choices it faced between backing party-liners needed for the political struggle and accommodating depoliticized intellectuals needed for public administration. This paper will argue that GMD political impotence in competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was due less to an inadequate recruitment of capable experts than to the over-specialization of its well-trained cadres on technical tasks. In fact, the cadres from the Central Politics School generally resembled those considered to be ‘intellectuals’ at educational level and in ideology. This compels us to reconsider how to define ‘intellectuals’ and whether they were as uniformly alienated from the one-party state as most of the scholarly literature suggests.
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Yeh, Wen-Hsin. "Dai Li and the Liu Geqing Affair: Heroism in the Chinese Secret Service During the War of Resistance." Journal of Asian Studies 48, no. 3 (August 1989): 545–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2058639.
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The nationalist military intelligence service has long been a controversial topic in the history of the Chinese Republic (1912–49). This organization, known as the Military Bureau of Statistics and Investigation (Junshi Weiyuanhui Tongji Diaocha Ju, or Juntong), first impinged on civilian society in the 1930s, when it carried out violent deeds against urban-based intellectuals critical of the Nationalist party's rule. Newspaper writers and editors subsequently compared Juntong to the infamous Eastern Depot and Embroidered Guards of the despotic Ming emperors, denouncing the “feudal” and “fascist” nature of Nationalist rule in political tracts and assemblies. During the Pacific War the image of Juntong's chief, General Dai Li (1897–1946), was blackened when he was compared to the Nazi Heinrich Himmler by the Western press. In the bitter and protracted civil struggles between the Chinese Communist party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD) after 1941, the Communists focused sharply on the atrocities committed by Juntong and portrayed Dai Li as a monstrous instrument of Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship.
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KING, AMY. "Reconstructing China: Japanese technicians and industrialization in the early years of the People's Republic of China." Modern Asian Studies 50, no. 1 (August 25, 2015): 141–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x15000074.
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AbstractThe Chinese Communist Party was confronted with the pressing challenge of ‘reconstructing’ China's industrial economy when it came to power in 1949. Drawing on recently declassified Chinese Foreign Ministry archives, this article argues that the Party met this challenge by drawing on the expertise of Japanese technicians left behind in Northeast China at the end of the Second World War. Between 1949 and 1953, when they were eventually repatriated, thousands of Japanese technicians were used by the Chinese Communist Party to develop new technology and industrial techniques, train less skilled Chinese workers, and rebuild factories, mines, railways, and other industrial sites in the Northeast. These first four years of the People's Republic of China represent an important moment of both continuity and change in China's history. Like the Chinese Nationalist government before them, the Chinese Communist Party continued to draw on the technological and industrial legacy of the Japanese empire in Asia to rebuild China's war-torn economy. But this four-year period was also a moment of profound change. As the Cold War erupted in Asia, the Chinese Communist Party began a long-term reconceptualization of how national power was intimately connected to technology and industrial capability, and viewed Japanese technicians as a vital element in the transformation of China into a modern and powerful nation.
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FERLANTI, FEDERICA. "The New Life Movement in Jiangxi Province, 1934–1938." Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 5 (January 26, 2010): 961–1000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x0999028x.
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AbstractThis paper discusses the origins and the implementation of the New Life Movement (NLM) in the Jiangxi Province between 1934 and 1938. Based upon primary sources produced during this period, it explores how the Nationalist Party utilised the NLM for the purposes of national reconstruction and social mobilisation. The first section analyses how elements of anti-communism, Christianity and state Confucianism came into play in the NLM; the second section analyses how the Nationalists reinforced the idea of ‘hygienic modernity’ by projecting it into the realms of state building and mass mobilisation; the third section discusses the changes introduced in society by the Nationalists with the creation of semi-governmental organisations; and the fourth section examines the involvement of the NLM with preparation for the war against Japan (1937–1945). The paper argues that the NLM had a lasting impact on Chinese society, and it contributed to shape citizenship and national identity.
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Lopes, Helena F. S. "War, State-Building, and International Connections in Nationalist China." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 29, no. 1 (November 8, 2018): 169–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1356186318000469.
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In a recent survey of modern China, historian Rana Mitter noted: “The war between China and Japan may have been the single most important event to shape twentieth-century China”. This perspective hasn't been around for very long. The relevance of China's War of Resistance against Japan (KangRi zhanzheng) has been revaluated by historians in recent years, a prime example of this being Mitter's book on the subject and the work of Hans van de Ven. For years, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 was crystallised into a crucial turning point and the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party/KMT) was seen as corrupt and ineffective, as epitomised by Lloyd Eastman's studies. Eastman's verdict is not entirely contradicted by some of the new scholarship, although important revisionist works have led to a reassessment of the KMT state-building efforts, in particular during their pre-war decade in power, the so-called Nanjing decade (1927–1937). Although the ‘rediscovery’ of the war came later in the English-language than it did in Chinese, it is undeniable that recent years have seen a growing interest in the period, both in academia and in popular culture. The three monographs under review here are, in many ways, illustrative of the best new research on the conflict. They provide comprehensive insight on the impact of the war on the Nationalists' state-building efforts in fiscal policy, propaganda, and justice. All are first monographs, springing from meticulous doctoral and post-doctoral research anchored on a plethora of new primary sources. They make important contributions to our understanding of the impact of the war in China, as well as to economic history, media studies, and legal history more broadly.
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Anas, Omair. "India–West Asia Relations Under the ‘Nationalist’ Modi Government." International Studies 58, no. 1 (January 2021): 59–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020881720984324.
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India’s West Asia policy discourse has traditionally revolved around its energy dependency, security and the welfare of the 7 million Indians living in the region. In recent years, particularly since the coming of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in 2014, the issues of counterterrorism, security, defence cooperation and non-oil trade have gained in importance. This qualitative shift is partially guided and supported by both pragmatism and the ideological differences that the BJP and its predecessor, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), had been maintaining against the West Asia policy of the earlier governments led by the Congress party. Through explaining the ideological perspectives of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the BJP, this article argues that the changing global and West Asian landscape, the consolidation of Chinese influence in and around India’s land and maritime boundaries, the instability in the energy market and the insecurity of the Arab uprising–hit West Asian monarchies have provided the BJP government an opportune time to rethink and reorient India’s relations with West Asia. While ideological determinants dominate the public discourse, as the BJP’s top leadership elaborates in the public domain, the policy choices made are not always in tune with these. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often preferred the pragmatic to the ideological, and this he has done over the expectations of his party and supporters.
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Zheng, Yanqiu. "A Specter of Extraterritoriality." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 22, no. 1 (April 10, 2015): 17–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02201003.
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The Sino-u.s. agreement of May 1943 that granted the u.s. military exclusive criminal jurisdiction over its troops in China was a continuation of extraterritorial rights that the United States supposedly abolished the previous January. In light of the earlier British-u.s. negotiations on the same issue, China was an integral part of a legal regime that during World War ii shielded globally deployed u.s. troops from local laws. The Chinese Guomindang (gmd) government’s renewal of the 1943 agreement in June 1946 extended the wartime legal privileges of u.s. troops into an era of precarious peace in China and set a precedent for the Status of Forces Agreements between the United States and various allies during the Cold War. The demonstrations after the Shen Chong Incident in late 1946, a largely nationalist movement that the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) co-opted, highlighted the inadequacy of public indignation and ccp manipulation in mounting a consistent legal effort to challenge the entrenched extraterritorial privileges of u.s. troops and restore Chinese jurisdiction. The gmd government also lost the opportunity to use the jurisdictional issue to demonstrate its nationalist credentials to an agitated public.
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Goldman, Merle. "Politically-Engaged Intellectuals in the Deng-Jiang Era: A Changing Relationship with the Party-State." China Quarterly 145 (March 1996): 35–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574100004412x.
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During the regime of Mao Zedong (1949–76), a number of Western scholars described Chinas modern history as moving from one orthodoxy, the Confucianism of the Qing dynasty, to the Marxism–Leninism– Maoism of the Peoples Republic. The cultural and intellectual pluralism of the intervening years of die early decades of the 20th century, the May Fourth movement, and even the more limited pluralism during the weak Leninist state and watered–down Confucianism of the Kuomintang Republic (1928–49) looked like an interregnum between two orthodoxies.1 When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 and established a milder form of authoritarianism than that of his predecessor, a number of Western scholars revised their views of 20th–century Chinese history. As Deng carried out economically pragmatic policies and relaxed controls over the intellectual community as well as over peoples personal lives and geographic regions, they pointed out that the 1949 divide of the Chinese Communist revolution was not as sharp and as singular a break in modern Chinese history as it had been presented. Rather, it should be seen as part of the ongoing effort to build a strong Chinese state and modern economy, inspired by nationalist pride, going on since the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911.
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Jenco, Leigh K. "Can the Chinese Nation Be One? Gu Jiegang, Chinese Muslims, and the Reworking of Culturalism." Modern China 45, no. 6 (February 10, 2019): 595–628. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0097700419828017.
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This article examines how the classicist and folklorist Gu Jiegang, in conversation with his Hui (Chinese Muslim) colleagues at the Yugong study society and journal (published 1934–1937), theorized the “Chinese nation” ( Zhonghua minzu) as an internally plural and open-ended political project, to resist homogenizing claims by both Japanese imperialists and the ruling Chinese Nationalist party under Chiang Kai-shek in the 1930s. Echoing the struggles of his Hui colleagues to articulate their place in the nation as both Muslim and Chinese, Gu reworked traditional “culturalist” assumptions about the non-racial character of identity formation to pose minority experience as constitutive of a constantly expanding and transforming political community. When Gu asserted in his notorious 1939 essay that the “ Zhonghua minzu Is One,” he posed a unity built not on cultural assimilation or ethnic identity, but on a shared political commitment to an expansive and culturally hybrid concept of the “Chinese nation.”
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Fitzgerald, John. "The Misconceived Revolution: State and Society in China's Nationalist Revolution, 1923–26." Journal of Asian Studies 49, no. 2 (May 1990): 323–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2057300.
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The process of state-building in the Chinese revolution was confounded, and remains obscured, by a contest between rival claimants to state power in the Nationalist and Communist parties. There is a natural temptation to trace conflict in the state-building process to ideological differences between the two parties, as they did themselves, and to overlook their similarities and downplay the potential for political conflict and social resistance inherent in state-building generally. This is the case with histories of the Nationalist Revolution of the 1920s, when the two parties came together briefly to fight for national unification and independence. Each party is assigned an irreconcilable difference of purpose, the Nationalists aiming for cohesive national revolution and the Communists for divisive social revolution, and their combined efforts are represented as the historical working through of this conflict of purpose (Rankin, Fairbank, and Feuerwerker 1986:10; Wilbur 1984). The clash of aims seems to be not far removed from a clash of ideologies, and the collapse of this First United Front is portrayed as the historical resolution to a philosophical contradiction. In the definitive words of C. Martin Wilbur, “The main weakness was disagreement among the leaders concerning the social goals of the national revolution,” traceable to “competing ideologies among intellectuals throughout China” (Wilbur 1968:223). Conflict between the parties and within society boils down, in the end, to an ideological dispute.
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Holbig, Heike. "Inside “Chinese Democracy”: The Official Career of a Contested Concept under Xi Jinping." Journal of Politics and Law 15, no. 2 (March 4, 2022): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v15n2p21.
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When the People’s Republic of China was excluded from US president Biden’s guest list for the virtual Summit for Democracy in December 2021, it reacted with a detailed self-depiction of the Chinese political system as a “Democracy That Works” to rebut US claims to be the world’s leading democracy. While the international media saw this as a surprise narrative, China’s “democratic” self-image has a long trajectory going back to the days of Mao Zedong and now elaborated more systematically under Xi Jinping. Based on a close reading of Chinese party-state documents, white papers, state media coverage, etc., this article analyzes the official career of the concept of “democracy” in Chinese Communist Party jargon and dissects the messages targeted at domestic and international audiences. It finds that the official self-depiction of “Chinese democracy” does not contradict, but rather complements the legitimation of Communist Party rule at home, buffering nationalist sentiments there. Despite its lack of persuasiveness vis-à-vis Western audiences, its underlying criticism of US democracy, and its subtle claims regarding China’s global leadership, the official vision might gain traction among other emerging powers and developing countries.
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Wang, Qisheng. "Chinese Nationalist Party on a wartime campus: A study focused on the National Southwest Associated University." Frontiers of History in China 2, no. 4 (October 2007): 590–631. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11462-007-0029-1.
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Wei, Shuge. "CIRCUITS OF POWER: CHINA'S QUEST FOR CABLE TELEGRAPH RIGHTS 1912–1945." Journal of Chinese History 3, no. 1 (November 8, 2018): 113–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jch.2018.26.
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ABSTRACTThis article examines China’s efforts to restore cable telegraph rights from the establishment of the Republic of China to the end of World War II. Challenging the conventional dichotomy of “Chinese” and “Western” actors in rights recovery issues, this article explores the intricate power relations between foreign cable companies, international interests groups and various political factions in China. It analyses China’s reclaim of cable sovereignty in three phases, each characterised by a particular controversy—the intra-clique struggle of the Communications Clique during the early Republic and the warlord era; the rivalry between the Nationalist Party, military and the state during the Nanjing decade; and the direct Sino-Japanese conflict during wartime. The article presents the argument that for the various interest groups, ideologies such as imperialism and nationalism served as rhetoric in their respective pursuits. It was the daily political tensions that played a crucial role in shaping how cable policies were devised.
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Edgerton-Tarpley, Kathryn. "A River Runs through It: The Yellow River and The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1947." Social Science History 41, no. 2 (2017): 141–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2017.2.
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In June 1938 China's Nationalist government breached a major Yellow River dike in a drastic attempt to use flooding to slow the Japanese invasion. The strategic breach caused the Yellow River to abandon the northern course it had followed since 1855, and its new southeastern course led to eight years of catastrophic flooding. After World War II, the Nationalists, with extensive aid from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), aimed to close the breach and divert the river back to its pre-1938 course. However, the Chinese Communists had taken control of much of that course, and local interests there opposed the plan to bring back the river. The Yellow River diversion project thus became intensely politicized. This article examines how the diversion plan became embroiled in the Chinese Civil War of 1946–49, how the river's return to its northern course in 1947 impacted communities in its path, and how the Communists and Nationalists imagined the river and made different tactical and rhetorical uses of it during the war. I find that the campaign to reroute the river was complicated not only by the civil war but also by tension between local and national interests within the Communist Party, and that UNRRA's attempts to mediate between the Nationalists and Communists at times put the organization at odds with both parties. Moreover, in 1946 and 1947 the intense struggle to tame, make strategic use of, or cross the Yellow River became an important metaphor for the battle to control China.
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Witek, Michał. "Historia, naród i nacjonalizm. Ewolucja misji chińskich muzeów w kontekście współczesnej „gorączki” muzealnej w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej." Prace Kulturoznawcze 23, no. 2 (November 7, 2019): 183–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/0860-6668.23.2-3.11.
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History, nation and nationalism: The evolution of the mission of Chinese museums in the context of the contemporary museum “fever” in the People’s Republic of ChinaThe peculiar “museum boom” in the People’s Republic of China PRC attracts much attention from Western researchers. This phenomenon is undoubtedly linked to the cultural shift towards national and cultural heritage promoted by the authorities, which in turn is an important element of the nationalist political ideology. This policy is becoming more and more important in the last three decades of the reform and opening-up period. Museums, like the concept of a “nation” and the nationalist ideology, came to China from the West at about the same time and in a similar political and intellectual context, which meant that the museums quickly became entangled in politics and propaganda. This situation, strengthened even further in the communist period, led to the creation of a very specific form of state-controlled museology. Nowadays, museums and associated thematic parks play a key role in the strategy of developing the culture of the Chinese government, the project of “management and social order.” In this context, these institutions form part of an important mission entrusted to them by the party — the mission of building a new cultural and historical narrative serving the needs of the “new China.” The mission of various types of museums in contemporary China is shaped by overlapping political, economic, ideological and even moral dimensions. It is an important element of the soft power of modern China, which is also an important global symbol of China, attracting millions of foreign tourists a year. In this dimension, the museum’s mission is significantly expanded, it becomes a tool for building an international position and prestige. The aim of the article was to look at the history of Chinese museums in the 20th century in the context of continuity and changeability of the missionary dimension of their functioning, and to conduct a critical analysis of this missionary dimension in the unique conditions of “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” in the contemporary PRC.
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Fromm, Martin Thomas. "Mining Manchuria's Colonial Past." Journal of Asian Studies 82, no. 1 (December 5, 2022): 66–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00219118-10119671.
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Abstract The rise of nationalism in China in recent decades has grown in part out of a state-sponsored patriotic education project centered on the production of narratives involving the century-long history of China's subjection to foreign imperialism. In the northeast, the regional history of Russian and Japanese colonialism during the first half of the twentieth century has provided abundant materials for this collective commemoration of China's anti-imperialist struggles. A network of commemorative projects undertaken at local, regional, and national levels of the PRC state since the 1980s, including oral histories, monuments, museums, gazetteers, and party histories, has reframed the history of the northeast borderland in terms that legitimize post-Mao nationalist and market reform ideology. This study brings attention to another dimension of these commemorative projects, the translation and republication of Chinese and Japanese historical accounts originally produced in northern Manchuria during the 1920s and 1930s. I argue that the diverse representations of the borderland's history that are included in these accounts, while originally embedded in the colonial institutional contexts of Manchuria, acquired new significance in post-Mao reimaginings of the region's place in defining nationalism and negotiating Sino-Russian relations.
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Dixon, Jonathan. "East China Sea or South China Sea, they are all China's Seas: comparing nationalism among China's maritime irredentist claims†." Nationalities Papers 42, no. 6 (November 2014): 1053–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2014.969693.
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Much has been made over the past few years of China'vs ambitions of regaining control of its irredentist claims in the East and South China Seas. While some of this speculation focuses on the massive amounts of money the People's Republic of China (PRC) has funneled into its naval modernization program, other analysts are more interested in the drivers behind the increasingly popular sentiment that the country must “reclaim” its lost territories. The Chinese Communist Party can ill afford to ignore the voice of an already disenchanted population if it hopes to stay in power, particularly in regard to matters of national pride. As a result, in dealing with China's irredentist claims, nationalism in particular can be a powerful ideological factor in shaping the nation's foreign policies. This is especially apparent in the case of irredentism, where nationalism can often override diplomatic and strategic imperatives. This paper addresses the question of how does the nationalist discourse vary between two territorial disputes, the East and South China Seas. It uses discourse analysis to examine developing trends among online social media and news sites. This in turn allows for the construction of a framework of how nationalism develops among both elite and grassroots audiences.
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Wong, Yiu Chung. "Independence or Reunification? The Evolving PRC–Taiwan Relations." Baltic Journal of European Studies 9, no. 2 (September 1, 2019): 98–122. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bjes-2019-0016.
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AbstractThe article attempts to examine the relationship between Taiwan, a de facto political entity, and the People’s Republic of China (Mainland China) since 1949, the landmark year when the then ruling party KMT (The Nationalist Party) was defeated by the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) in the Mainland. Essentially, the narrative is focused on the government policies by the two respective political entities. The PRC pledged to unify Taiwan again and subsequently its unification policies are delineated. A two-stage schema is proposed for the analysis, albeit the second stage can be further divided into three phases. As for Taiwan, a five-stage categorization is proposed. Moreover, three sets of factors influencing the cross-Strait relations would be discussed, namely the power dynamics within the PRC, internal development inside Taiwan and the role of the USA. Finally, the implications of the coming of Trump era are outlined.
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Lai, Delin. "Searching for a Modern Chinese Monument: The Design of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing." Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 64, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 22–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25068123.
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In this article, I address the design of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing (1925-31), the most important monument of republican China. By putting it in the context of Sun's ideal for a modern China, the historiography of Chinese architecture since the nineteenth century, various historical associations of competition proposals, the new commemoration rite the Chinese Nationalist Party developed for Sun, and the iconic needs in a cultural politics for awakening masses, I argue that Chinese-style architecture, rather than a readymade system, was an open-ended discourse, in which tradition was examined in relation to the new interest in international architecture. This is epitomized in the design of the mausoleum, in which various ideals for a modern Chinese monument-stylistic, functional, and symbolic-were conceived as part of an effort to fashion the new nation. Modern architecture, in this instance, must be understood as a material embodiment of the struggle to define a modern state.
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Stolojan-filipesco, Vladimir. "The second life of a political cult: Official and popular reappropriation of Chiang Kai-shek statues in post-martial law Taiwan." East Asian Journal of Popular Culture 8, no. 1 (April 1, 2022): 131–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/eapc_00066_1.
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From 1945 to the beginning of the democratization, the Chinese nationalist party ruled Taiwan through a single-party regime. After being forced out of China in 1949, it implemented several policies promoting a national imagination in which Taiwan was turned into an ideal representation of China. One of the main symbolic pillars of the regime was the personality cult dedicated to its leader, Chiang Kai-shek. If the democratization put an end to the political ritual of the authoritarian era, the physical remnants of the cult have been subject to different reappropriations by public and private actors who publicly express a positive remembering of the deceased leader. This article explores the modalities of these reappropriations and their significance for the mnemonic divide characteristic from the symbolic Taiwanese landscape.
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Cheng, Li, and Lynn White. "Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy." China Quarterly 121 (March 1990): 1–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000013497.
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Four decades have passed since the 1949 Communist Revolution divided China into two political entities. These culturally similar polities adopted different ownership systems and divergent development strategies in their early decades, but they have witnessed nearly identical elite transformations and convergent social transitions in recent years.At their recent respective 13th party congresses, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) both promoted a great number of new leaders who can be identified as “technocrats” to top Party positions. In the Mainland, this new group of leaders has only recently come to power, while in Taiwan it emerged at the beginning of the 1970s and has continuously increased in number since then. This is a new generation of leadership, whose socialization, educational background, political experience and value orientation differ significantly from those of the old elite.Parallel to this leadership transformation, a profound social transition has also occurred in both Mainland China and Taiwan. The Chinese people in both places have made great economic achievements and have moved rapidly from isolationism towards mercantilism. This is particularly obvious in Taiwan, but it can be seen to a lesser degree in the Mainland. Less noted, but equally significant, has been the change in their political systems. In Mainland China, although the June Fourth Incident (1989) has impeded the momentum of political reform, the relationship between state and society has been significantly altered. It seems that political reform, which includes institutionalization, decentralization and liberalization, will continue its zigzag but progressive journey.
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Xu, Dianqing. "The KMT Party's Enterprises in Taiwan." Modern Asian Studies 31, no. 2 (May 1997): 399–413. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x00014359.
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AbstractThis article explores the origins and development of the Kuomintang (KMT, the Chinese Nationalist Party) party's enterprises in Taiwan. Because the KMT party's enterprises are categorized in the private sector in all the statistical data, we should be very careful when we discuss the contributions of private enterprise to economic growth in Taiwan.This article aims to inspect the scale of the party's enterprises, the reasons why KMT runs its own enterprises, and what influence they exert on the economic growth and political democratization of Taiwan. Obviously, these questions are significant for further economic and political reforms in Mainland China.
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Ma, Tehyun. "‘The common aim of the Allied Powers’: social policy and international legitimacy in wartime China, 1940–47." Journal of Global History 9, no. 2 (May 23, 2014): 254–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1740022814000060.
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AbstractThis article examines why Western programmes of social security became a topic of interest for Chinese Nationalist (Guomindang) policy-makers during the early 1940s. It traces a generation of sociologists and civil servants, often trained abroad, who used wartime exigencies to make the case for New Deal-style reforms. While offering a route to professional advancement, social insurance was primarily intended to serve the needs of the government. Embedded in, and dependent on, the Anglo-American alliance, Nationalist party planners embraced the internationalist social agenda of the Atlantic Charter – advanced by institutions such as the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration – to solidify their nation's status as an aspiring great power, and to legitimize to foreign sponsors their hold on the state. In this regard, fascination with the likes of the Beveridge Report and the Social Security Act was a performance, intended to show how China was in keeping with the spirit of the age.
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Yin, Cao. "An Indian Town’s Entry into the Second World War: Holding Together the Congress Party and Training Chinese Soldiers in Wartime Raj." China Report 57, no. 1 (February 2021): 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0009445520984765.
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During the Second World War, Ramgarh, a small town in northeast India, was the site of the 53rd Session of the Indian National Congress and the training centre for the Chinese Expeditionary Force. By uncovering the links between the two events and knitting them into the broader context of the Indian nationalist movement and China’s War of Resistance, this article tries to break down the hegemony of the Eurocentric national narratives of the history of the Second World War in India and China. In doing so, it provides an alternative way of writing an entangled history of India and China during the Second World War.
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Zhang, Tao. "Governance and Dissidence in Online Culture in China: The Case of Anti-CNN and Online Gaming." Theory, Culture & Society 30, no. 5 (May 23, 2013): 70–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276413486839.
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The article explores two different articulations of the attitudes of young Chinese netizens towards the state: the neo-nationalist web community, ‘Anti-CNN.com’/‘April Youth’, and the online ‘machinema’ film, ‘Online Gaming Addicts’ War’. Both of these online practices are associated with the post-’80 s generation, which I argue is a key constituency in contemporary Chinese internet discourse. Through these case studies, the article explores the viability of recent attempts to apply Foucauldian theories of governmentality to the case of China. It identifies a determining factor here in the recurring tendency of the Party-state, whilst generally attempting to embrace more sophisticated forms of governance, to default towards crude techniques and technologies of prohibition in its regulatory stance towards the internet. Whilst this stance is likely to be unsustainable in view of the dynamics of global media culture, the article argues that this does not undermine claims over the existence of a distinctive Chinese form of governmentality. Rather, the Chinese case should strengthen doubts over the view of some that governmentality is incompatible with the state’s deployment of violence.
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BARRETT, GORDON. "Between Sovereignty and Legitimacy: China and UNESCO, 1946–1953." Modern Asian Studies 53, no. 05 (June 3, 2019): 1516–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x17001159.
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AbstractUNESCO's founding in 1946 coincided with the resumption of hostilities between China's ruling Nationalist Party (KMT) and their Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rivals for power. The new international organization's officials in Paris and its representatives on the ground in China were thus forced to navigate a fractious and fluid set of national circumstances that would result in an ambiguous outcome in 1949, with regimes on the Chinese mainland and Taiwan both claiming to represent ‘China’. Although the KMT-led Republic of China continued to claim membership in UNESCO until the 1970s, the international organization nevertheless continued to operate within the People's Republic of China (PRC) for a number of years. Exploring the relationship between the issue of Chinese representation in UNESCO and the organization's on-the-ground presence from the mid-1940s through to the early 1950s, this article argues that domestic and international factors were inescapably intertwined in shaping the trajectory of Chinese relations with international organizations during this period. While CCP officials demonstrated a mixture of ideology and pragmatism, similar to their handling of foreign entities and groups present in the PRC after its founding, engagement with UNESCO was significantly shaped by the complexity and depth of the KMT's engagement with the international organization from its inception onwards. The CCP's relations with UNESCO underscore the extent to which the emerging Cold War—and China's place within it—was ultimately characterized by complexity and contingency.
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AHMAD, MOHD ABDUL AZIZ, and MOKHTARRUDIN AHMAD. "PERCUBAAN FAHAMAN KOMUNIS MENGUASAI PARTI KEBANGSAAN MELAYU MALAYA (PKMM)." International Journal of Creative Future and Heritage (TENIAT) 5, no. 1 (March 31, 2017): 25–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.47252/teniat.v5i1.208.
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Penyebaran fahaman komunis di Tanah Melayu dilakukan oleh Parti Komunis Malaya (PKM), fahaman komunis pada peringkat awalnya disebarkan di kalangan masyarakat Cina sahaja, kemudiannya mereka menyebarkan fahaman mereka kepada masyarakat Melayu. Fahaman komunis disebarkan kepada masyarakat Melayu melalui dua kaedah. Pertama, penyebaran secara langsung kepada orang Melayu (propaganda atau penyebaran ideologi komunis dilakukan secara terus melalui Parti Komunis Malaya); dan kedua, melalui penguasaan parti politik Melayu (menguasai parti politik Melayu dan menyebarkan ideologi komunis dalam parti politik Melayu tersebut). Kajian mengenai kaedah pertama sudah banyak dihasilkan oleh penyelidik sebelum ini. Oleh itu, artikel ini bermatlamat meneliti kaedah kedua komunis iaitu melalui penguasaan parti politik Melayu iaitu Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM). Perkara yang menjadi persoalan kajian ialah sejauh manakah fahaman komunis berjaya menguasai PKMM? Bagi menjawab persoalan kajian, kaedah kualitatif digunakan berdasarkan kepada analisis teks bertemakan sejarah politik. Hasil analisis ini pengkaji telah mendapati fahaman komunis tidak dapat menguasai kepimpinan dan dasar parti kerana dalam PKMM mempunya tiga aliran iaitu aliran nasionalis, aliran agama dan aliran komunis. Aliran yang menguasai kepimpinan adalah aliran nasionalis dan agama. Kegagalan fahaman komunis menguasai PKMM juga disebabkan oleh kerjasama yang terjalin antara mereka adalah atas sebab kepentingan masing-masing. The spread of communism in Malaya was undertaken by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). The movements of communism were initially diffused only among the Chinese community, then later on to the other communities. Communism was disseminated to the communities through two methods. Firstly, the ideology was spread directly to the Malays (the propaganda of communist ideology was made directly through the Malayan Communist Party); and secondly, it was carried out through the control of Malay political parties (by dominating the Malay political parties and spread the communist ideology in the Malay political parties). The study of the first method has been widely produced by the researchers before. Therefore, this article aims to examine the second method utilized by the communists to control the Malay political party, Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM). A question arises as to what extent the communists successfully gained control of PKMM? To answer the research question, a qualitative method is used based on the analysis of political history themed texts. The result of the analysis, researcher found that communists did not dominate the leadership and policy of the party for PKMM consists of three streams which are the nationalist, religious and communist streams. The streams that took control of the leadership are the streams of nationalism and religion. The failure of communists to dominate PKMM was due to the cooperation linked between them and also because each of the streams cared for their own interests.
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Lascher, Bill. "Radio Free China." Boom 4, no. 1 (2014): 11–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/boom.2014.4.1.11.
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Often lost in recollections of World War II is the eight-year conflict fought between Japan and China. The war claimed 14 million Chinese lives and, for a time, China was nearly cut off from contact with the outside world. But Charles E. Stuart, a dentist in the sleepy California beach town of Ventura who was passionate about amateur radio and a staunch defender of the nationalist Kuomintang party that controlled China was able to broadcast its message to the outside world. Working from a bunker carved deep into the rocks beneath the wartime Chinese capital of Chongqing, a cadre of young freelance journalists and Chinese information ministry employees operated a shortwave station known as XGOY to broadcast free China’s news and information. Despite the fact that the station was constantly bombarded and Japanese forces jammed its signal, Doc Stuart’s mastery of shortwave radio was able to capture and record XGOY’s transmissions, while Stuart’s wife, Alacia Held, tirelessly transcribed their contents for delivery to Chinese officials and news organizations in the United States. Without Doc Stuart, free China may have been completely cut off from the outside world.
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SHIRK, SUSAN L. "Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China." Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (March 14, 2007): 43–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109907002472.
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China has undergone a media revolution that has transformed the domestic context for making foreign policy as well as domestic policy. The commercialization of the mass media has changed the way leaders and publics interact in the process of making foreign policy. As they compete with one another, the new media naturally try to appeal to the tastes of their potential audiences. Editors make choices about which stories to cover based on their judgments about which ones will resonate best with audiences. In China today, that means a lot of stories about Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, the topics that are the objects of Chinese popular nationalism. The publicity given these topics makes them domestic political issues because they are potential focal points for elite dis-agreement and mass collective action, and thereby constrains the way China' leaders and diplomats deal with them. Even relatively minor events involving China' relations with Japan, Taiwan, or the United States become big news, and therefore relations with these three governments must be carefully handled by the politicians in the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee. Because of the Internet, it is impossible for Party censors to screen out news from Japan, Taiwan or the United States that might upset the public. Common knowledge of such news forces officials to react to every slight, no matter how small. Foreign policy makers feel especially constrained by nationalist public opinion when it comes to its diplomacy with Japan. Media marketization and the Internet have helped make Japan China' most emotionally charged international relationship.
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Dong, Guangbi. "The political background of a pattern transformation in the Chinese system of science and technology during the 20th century." Cultures of Science 5, no. 1 (March 2022): 16–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/20966083221094150.
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The development of modern science and technology in China involved three transformations: from a traditional mindset to a modern one through the enlightenment of scientific thought, from the Anglo-Saxon pattern to the Soviet pattern in the process of instituting the Chinese system of science and technology, and from national defence to economics due to an awakening of technical economics after the ‘Cultural Revolution’. This paper surveys the political background of the second transformation. The idea of ‘doing science for science’s sake’ never had a footing in China because the Chinese began to learn about modern science and technology only under the threat of colonists’ gunboats. Developing science and technology has always been one of the means for China to cast off national humiliation and regain its status as a major country in the world. Compared with science and technology in other countries, Chinese science and technology were more susceptible to the international political environment and domestic political situation. It took about two decades, between the establishment of the Academia Sinica in 1928 and the inauguration of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1949, for China to form its system of science and technology. The system had three successive configurations because of the international competition among Japan, the US and the Soviet Union over China, and the domestic political contest between the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1912) and the Communist Party of China. China’s science and technology system started by modelling itself on its counterparts in Europe and America. After undergoing a series of unconventional developments during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1931–1945) and the War of Liberation (1946–1949), the system transformed to the Soviet pattern after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.
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Cha, Tae-geun. "A Miscarried Chinese World Order: Focusing on the Postwar Vision of the KuoMinTang(The Nationalist Party) in the Early 1940s." Korea Journal of Chinese Language and Literature 89 (September 30, 2022): 189–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.46612/kjcll.2022.09.89.189.
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Esherick, Joseph W. "Radicalism and Its Demise: The Chinese Nationalist Party, Factionalism, and Local Elites in Jiangsu Province, 1924-1931. Bradley K. Geisert." China Journal 50 (July 2003): 230–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3182299.
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Cuthbert, Ross. "Beijing Rides the Bandwagon." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23, no. 3 (July 1, 2018): 71–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v23i3.444.
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This paper offers a critical assessment of the Chinese Communist Party’s post-9/11 efforts to build international support for its security activities in its Xinjiang province. Xinjiang has traditionally presented the party with a particular challenge. It is remote and relatively underdeveloped, has borders with seven countries, and, most importantly, is inhabited by a large, concentrated, and restive Islamic minority known as the Uygurs. The party is very concerned about the presence of separatist elements among the Uygur population. Beijing’s activities to control such elements have traditionally been quite secretive. However, after 9/11, a Beijing-released report claimed that Xinjiang’s separatist activity is Islamist in nature and that groups operating within the region have ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. I argue that inconsistencies surrounding this report tend to undermine the party’s position. Furthermore, given the nature of Islamic practice in Xinjiang and the historical development of Uygur-Han relations in the region, it is more likely that the primary motivations for separatism are rooted in ethno-nationalist, rather than religious, considerations.