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Journal articles on the topic 'Choice correspondences'

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1

Campbell, Donald E., and Jerry S. Kelly. "Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences." International Economic Review 37, no. 4 (November 1996): 803. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2527312.

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2

Laslier, Jean-François. "Rank-based choice correspondences." Economics Letters 52, no. 3 (September 1996): 279–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00877-4.

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3

Lombardi, Michele. "Reason-based choice correspondences." Mathematical Social Sciences 57, no. 1 (January 2009): 58–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.07.001.

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4

Campbell, Donald E., and Jerry S. Kelly. "Independent social choice correspondences." Theory and Decision 41, no. 1 (July 1996): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00134113.

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5

Costa, Matheus, Paulo Henrique Ramos, and Gil Riella. "Single-crossing choice correspondences." Social Choice and Welfare 54, no. 1 (August 23, 2019): 69–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01212-7.

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6

Stefanescu, Anton. "Impossibility results for choice correspondences." Mathematical Social Sciences 33, no. 2 (April 1997): 129–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(96)00829-3.

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7

Kelly, Jerry S., and Shaofang Qi. "Balancedness of social choice correspondences." Mathematical Social Sciences 102 (November 2019): 59–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.08.003.

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8

Barberà, Salvador, Bhaskar Dutta, and Arunava Sen. "Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences." Journal of Economic Theory 101, no. 2 (December 2001): 374–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2782.

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9

Klaus, Bettina, and Ton Storcken. "Choice correspondences for public goods." Social Choice and Welfare 19, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 127–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s355-002-8329-7.

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10

Dutta, Bhaskar, and Jean-Francois Laslier. "Comparison functions and choice correspondences." Social Choice and Welfare 16, no. 4 (September 2, 1999): 513–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050158.

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11

Borm, Peter, René van den Brink, René Levı́nský, and Marco Slikker. "On two new social choice correspondences." Mathematical Social Sciences 47, no. 1 (January 2004): 51–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00070-2.

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12

Bubboloni, Daniela, and Michele Gori. "Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences." Mathematical Social Sciences 84 (November 2016): 37–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.007.

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13

Denicolò, Vincenzo. "Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial." Economics Letters 19, no. 1 (January 1985): 9–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90092-8.

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14

Stoye, Jörg. "Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences." Journal of Economic Theory 146, no. 6 (November 2011): 2226–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.004.

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15

Özyurt, Selçuk, and M. Remzi Sanver. "Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences." Social Choice and Welfare 30, no. 1 (March 20, 2007): 89–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0223-6.

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16

Sato, Shin. "On strategy-proof social choice correspondences." Social Choice and Welfare 31, no. 2 (December 8, 2007): 331–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0285-5.

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17

Sato, Shin. "On strategy-proof social choice correspondences." Social Choice and Welfare 32, no. 2 (February 28, 2008): 335–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0304-1.

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18

Peris, Josep E., and Begoña Subiza. "Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments." Social Choice and Welfare 16, no. 2 (February 3, 1999): 217–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050141.

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19

Peleg, Bezalel, Hans Peters, and Ton Storcken. "Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences." International Journal of Game Theory 33, no. 3 (September 2005): 381–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820400179.

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20

Jain, Ritesh. "Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences." Games and Economic Behavior 127 (May 2021): 47–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.004.

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21

Lahiri, Somdeb. "The No-Spoiler Condition for Choice Correspondences." Multiple Criteria Decision Making 14 (2019): 60–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.22367/mcdm.2019.14.04.

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22

Kutlu, Levent. "Intersection of Nash implementable social choice correspondences." Mathematical Social Sciences 55, no. 2 (March 2008): 255–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.09.002.

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23

Yamato, Takehiko. "On nash implementation of social choice correspondences." Games and Economic Behavior 4, no. 3 (July 1992): 484–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90051-s.

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24

Fuchs-Seliger, Susanne. "Order extensions, budget correspondences, and rational choice." Theory and Decision 72, no. 4 (September 16, 2011): 431–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9278-z.

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25

Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo. "On the manipulation of social choice correspondences." Social Choice and Welfare 29, no. 2 (December 19, 2006): 175–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0212-1.

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26

Ertemel, Sinan, Levent Kutlu, and M. Remzi Sanver. "Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences." Social Choice and Welfare 45, no. 1 (January 31, 2015): 187–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0872-9.

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27

Sánchez, M. Carmen, and Josep E. Peris. "Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences." Social Choice and Welfare 16, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 81–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050132.

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28

Laffond, Gilbert, Jean François Laslier, and Michel Le Breton. "Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison." Mathematical Social Sciences 30, no. 1 (August 1995): 23–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00778-7.

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29

Laffond, G., J. F. Laslier, and M. Le Breton. "Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison." Mathematical Social Sciences 31, no. 1 (February 1996): 59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(96)88687-2.

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30

Denicolò, Vincenzo. "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Correspondences and Social Decision Functions." Journal of Economic Theory 59, no. 2 (April 1993): 324–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1021.

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31

Tanaka, Yasuhito. "Garchy for Social Choice Correspondences and Strategy-Proofness." Theory and Decision 55, no. 3 (November 2003): 273–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:theo.0000044593.23976.07.

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32

Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo. "On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment." Social Choice and Welfare 32, no. 1 (April 2, 2008): 29–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0309-9.

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33

Fristrup, Peter, and Hans Keiding. "Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus." Social Choice and Welfare 18, no. 2 (April 19, 2001): 213–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550100100.

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34

Tamaki, Mitsushi. "Urn sampling distributions giving alternate correspondences between two optimal stopping problems." Advances in Applied Probability 48, no. 3 (September 2016): 726–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apr.2016.25.

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Abstract The best-choice problem and the duration problem, known as versions of the secretary problem, are concerned with choosing an object from those that appear sequentially. Let (B,p) denote the best-choice problem and (D,p) the duration problem when the total number N of objects is a bounded random variable with prior p=(p1, p2,...,pn) for a known upper bound n. Gnedin (2005) discovered the correspondence relation between these two quite different optimal stopping problems. That is, for any given prior p, there exists another prior q such that (D,p) is equivalent to (B,q). In this paper, motivated by his discovery, we attempt to find the alternate correspondence {p(m),m≥0}, i.e. an infinite sequence of priors such that (D,p(m-1)) is equivalent to (B,p(m)) for all m≥1, starting with p(0)=(0,...,0,1). To be more precise, the duration problem is distinguished into (D1,p) or (D2,p), referred to as model 1 or model 2, depending on whether the planning horizon is N or n. The aforementioned problem is model 1. For model 2 as well, we can find the similar alternate correspondence {p[m],m≥ 0}. We treat both the no-information model and the full-information model and examine the limiting behaviors of their optimal rules and optimal values related to the alternate correspondences as n→∞. A generalization of the no-information model is given. It is worth mentioning that the alternate correspondences for model 1 and model 2 are respectively related to the urn sampling models without replacement and with replacement.
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35

Klaus, Bettina, and Panos Protopapas. "On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals." International Journal of Game Theory 49, no. 4 (November 17, 2020): 1059–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00728-y.

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AbstractWe study correspondences that choose an interval of alternatives when agents have single-peaked preferences over locations and ordinally extend their preferences over intervals. We extend the main results of Moulin (Public Choice 35:437–455, 1980) to our setting and show that the results of Ching (Soc Choice Welf 26:473–490, 1997) cannot always be similarly extended. First, strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness characterize the class of generalized median correspondences (Theorem 1). Second, this result neither holds on the domain of symmetric and single-peaked preferences, nor can in this result min/max continuity substitute peaks-onliness (see counter-Example 3). Third, strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty characterize the class of efficient generalized median correspondences (Theorem 2).
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36

Alemante, Fasil, Donald E. Campbell, and Jerry S. Kelly. "Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences." Economic Theory 62, no. 4 (November 12, 2015): 765–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0930-7.

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37

Takayama, Shino, and Akira Yokotani. "Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship." Social Choice and Welfare 48, no. 3 (January 16, 2017): 573–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1025-0.

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38

GOSWAMI, USHA, JOHANNES C. ZIEGLER, LOUISE DALTON, and WOLFGANG SCHNEIDER. "Nonword reading across orthographies: How flexible is the choice of reading units?" Applied Psycholinguistics 24, no. 2 (June 2003): 235–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0142716403000134.

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It was predicted that children learning to read inconsistent orthographies (e.g., English) should show considerable flexibility in making use of spelling–sound correspondences at different unit sizes whereas children learning to read consistent orthographies (e.g., German) should mainly employ small-size grapheme–phoneme strategies. This hypothesis was tested in a cross-language blocking experiment using nonwords that could only be read using small-size grapheme–phoneme correspondences (small-unit nonwords) and phonologically identical nonwords that could be decoded using larger correspondences (large-unit nonwords). These small-unit and large-unit nonwords were either presented mixed together in the same lists or blocked by unit size. It was found that English children, but not German children, showed blocking effects (better performance when items were blocked by nonword type than in mixed lists). This suggests that in mixed lists, English readers have to switch back and forth between small-unit and large-unit processing, resulting in switching costs. These results are interpreted in terms of differences concerning the grain size of the phonological recoding mechanisms developed by English and German children.
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39

Yao, Haixiang, and Jianxin Yi. "A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences." Mathematical Social Sciences 55, no. 3 (May 2008): 299–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.09.003.

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40

Umezawa, Masashi. "Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule." Social Choice and Welfare 33, no. 1 (December 10, 2008): 151–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0351-7.

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41

McKelvey, R. D. "Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences." Social Choice and Welfare 6, no. 2 (April 1989): 139–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00303168.

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42

Klein, Harriet B., Susan H. Lederer, and Emma E. Cortese. "Children’s Knowledge of Auditory/Articulatory Correspondences." Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research 34, no. 3 (June 1991): 559–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/jshr.3403.559.

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Forty-five normally developing children, 15 within each group of mean ages 5, 6, and 7, participated in a metaphonologic study examining the knowledge of auditory/articulatory correspondences Tasks included (a) a nonverbal identification of correspondences by selecting the appropriate side of a split video screen display, and (b) a verbal explanation of the cues used to motivate this choice. With development, there were significant increases in numbers of correct responses on the nonverbal task and corresponding changes in relative proportions of verbal explanation types. No significant relationship between level of performance on metaphonologic tasks and phoneme production skill was found.
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43

Carey, A., M. Farber, and V. Mathai. "Correspondences, von Neumann Algebras and Holomorphic L2 Torsion." Canadian Journal of Mathematics 52, no. 4 (August 1, 2000): 695–736. http://dx.doi.org/10.4153/cjm-2000-030-7.

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AbstractGiven a holomorphic Hilbertian bundle on a compact complex manifold, we introduce the notion of holomorphic L2 torsion, which lies in the determinant line of the twisted L2 Dolbeault cohomology and represents a volume element there. Here we utilise the theory of determinant lines of Hilbertian modules over finite von Neumann algebras as developed in [CFM]. This specialises to the Ray-Singer-Quillen holomorphic torsion in the finite dimensional case. We compute ametric variation formula for the holomorphic L2 torsion, which shows that it is not in general independent of the choice of Hermitian metrics on the complex manifold and on the holomorphic Hilbertian bundle, which are needed to define it. We therefore initiate the theory of correspondences of determinant lines, that enables us to define a relative holomorphic L2 torsion for a pair of flat Hilbertian bundles, which we prove is independent of the choice of Hermitian metrics on the complex manifold and on the flat Hilbertian bundles.
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44

Campbell, Donald E., and Jerry S. Kelly. "The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences." Economics Letters 132 (July 2015): 109–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.026.

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45

Espunya, Anna. "Contrastive and translational issues in rendering the English progressive form into Spanish and Catalan: an informant-based study." Meta 46, no. 3 (October 2, 2002): 535–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/002710ar.

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Abstract This is a study on the formal correspondences for the English progressive in translations from English to Spanish and Catalan, with a special focus on the choice between simple and progressive forms. Its methodological approach includes the participation of informants both as translators and as evaluators of published translations. The paper discusses both the language-internal and task-related factors that play a role in the choice of verb forms.
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46

Crisinel, Anne-Sylvie, and Charles Spence. "Crossmodal correspondences between chemosensory stimuli and musical notes." Seeing and Perceiving 25 (2012): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187847612x646938.

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We report a series of experiments investigating crossmodal correspondences between various food-related stimuli (water-based solutions, milk-based flavoured solutions, crisps, chocolate and odours) and sounds varying in pitch and played by four different types of musical instruments. Participants tasted or smelled stimuli before matching them to a musical note. Our results demonstrate that participants preferentially match certain stimuli to specific pitches and instrument types. Through participants’ ratings of the stimuli along a number of dimensions (e.g., pleasantness, complexity, familiarity or sweetness), we explore the psychological dimensions involved in these crossmodal correspondences, using principal components analysis (PCA). While pleasantness seems to play an important role in the choice of instrument associated with chemosensory stimuli, the pitch seems to also depend on the quality of the taste (bitter, salty, sour or sweet). The level at which such crossmodal correspondences might occur, as well as the potential applications of such results, will be discussed.
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47

Tchantcho, Bertrand, and Lawrence Diffo Lambo. "A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games." Economic Theory 37, no. 3 (December 14, 2007): 533–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0317-5.

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48

Thomson, William. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents." Journal of Economic Theory 46, no. 2 (December 1988): 237–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90130-5.

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49

Barbera, Salvador, Bhaskar Dutta, and Arunava Sen. "Corrigendum to “Strategy-proof social choice correspondences” [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374–394]." Journal of Economic Theory 120, no. 2 (February 2005): 275. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.005.

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50

Sato, Shin. "A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives." Social Choice and Welfare 42, no. 4 (July 27, 2013): 831–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0755-x.

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