Academic literature on the topic 'Civilian Military Task Force (Guam)'

This article uses two puzzles from the Brezhnev period to test competing models of Soviet military policy and of innovation in military “doctrine.” An organizational model of Soviet military policy offers the best explanation of both cases: why the Soviet Union's Brezhnevera military strategy contradicted the Politburo's priorities (to prevent any war from escalating to nuclear use) and why the Soviet Union agreed to the ABM treaty. The ABM case shows that civilian leaders can force change in military “doctrine” when they have a policy handle–a way of redefining the issue to remove it from the military's exclusive area of competence. When civilians lack a policy handle, as in the military strategy case, they are unable to force innovation if the military is unwilling.The Russian government now faces the task of finding effective policy handles that will institutionalize civilian control of military policy. The fate of Russia's reforms may depend on it.

In contrast to other European countries, Italy lacks a Civil Defense Organization. Air Rescue is a task for the Italian Air Force Search and Rescue (S.A.R.) organization. It may also draw, if necessary, on the cooperation of the other Armed Forces and State Corps, the Merchant Navy, civilian organizations, the Italian Red Cross (C.R.I.), and the Mountain Rescue Service of the Italian Alpine Club (C.A.I.). The S.A.R. units intervene at the request of civil, state, public and private, national and international organizations. The tasks currently performed by the S.A.R. in Italy include search and rescue of civilian and military air crews lost at sea or over land and of shipwrecked survivors; emergency transport of doctors and supplies to the seriously sick or injured patients from ships at sea; inaccessible localities, earthquakes, floods, and other disasters.

Abstract Defence organisations are unique in that they comprise integrated military and civilian personnel working in partnership with each other (e.g., in headquarters, on bases, on missions, in academic settings). Many defence civilians are supervised by military supervisors and managers, while others are themselves responsible for managing military personnel. At the same time, despite often high levels of partnership and integration, military and civilian personnel are governed by very different personnel management systems, and have distinct cultures. These factors can affect the nature and quality of the collaboration and influence personnel outcomes and organisational effectiveness. Indeed, defence organisations are increasingly recognizing the importance of optimizing integration between their military and civilian workforces, with many adopting organisational terms implying that the military and civilian workforces form a cohesive whole: the Defence Team (Canada), the Whole Force Concept (United Kingdom), One Defence Team (Sweden), and Total Defence Workforce (New Zealand). This paper presents results from the Military–Civilian Personnel Survey (MCPS), which was administered in 11 nations as part of a NATO Research Task Group on the topic of military-civilian personnel collaboration and integration (NATO STO HFM RTG-226). This survey was the first systematic examination of large samples of military and civilian respondents, and the first to examine military–civilian relations from the perspective of both military and civilian personnel. The results presented here are based on three open-ended questions included in the survey, which asked respondents to identify 1) the most important factors for establishing and maintaining positive military-civilian personnel work culture and relations, 2) the challenges of working in a military-civilian environment, and 3) the main advantages of working in a military-civilian environment. Results of 5 nations, including Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (n =1,513 military respondents and n = 2,099 defence civilians) are presented. Results indicate that mixed military-civilian work environments present both unique challenges and advantages, and identified the factors considered to be important for enhancing integration and collaboration between military and civilian personnel. Given that many cross-national patterns emerged, these findings provide useful insights for enhancing military and civilian personnel integration and collaboration across nations. *Adapted from the material first reported in Goldenberg, I. & Febbraro, A.R. (2018; in publication). Civilian and Military Personnel Integration and Collaboration in Defence Organizations. NATO Science and Technology Organization Technical Report - STO-TR-HFM-226. DOI 10.14339/STO-TR-HFM-226. ISBN: ISBN 978-92-837-2092-8.

Abstract With emergency powers, President Rodrigo Duterte mobilized and deployed military and police to enforce lockdown measures in Metro Manila and Cebu City. For several months in 2020, the deployed forces ran quarantine control points in borders and city wards, and enforced curfew and liquor bans. This article examines how said deployment affected civilian control by the President and local civil-military dynamics. The heightened visibility of uniformed personnel in these urban spaces, and subsequent arrests and detention of quarantine violators came under heavy criticism. Against the backdrop of ex-military dominated national Inter Agency Task Force for Infectious Diseases (IATF), the militarized lockdown failed to stem the virus’ spread and expanded the military’s reach into civilian domain. Its involvement in law enforcement operations alongside the police poses dangers to local civil-military balance and to democracy. President Duterte’s reliance on the state’s coercive apparatus to carry out the pandemic response enabled him to assert control over local governments and to repress dissent.

Within the context of increasingly digital work, it appeared interesting to look at how military leaders and their leadership style will have to adapt to remain “up-to-speed” with current challenges. It is qualitative research based on interviews with military and civilian experts. Four interviews have been conducted, but there would be the potential to interview many more experts and look deeper into the matter. Within the context of digitalised military leadership, the importance of communication and mutual trust has been underscored by the experts. They agreed that leaders nowadays must embrace digital developments and include them in their leadership styles. The civilian world can learn from the military when it comes to leadership approaches, which is happening at the time of publication of this article with practical examples (senior military leaders assigned to lead the pandemic task force in some countries). Overall, the outcome of the research is that a relevant and resilient military leadership style in the 21st century resembles the elements of the situational leadership style developed by Hersey-Blanchard.

The spread of COVID-19 has been declared a non-natural national disaster, and it is recognized as a genuine non-military threat that necessitates collaboration among various institutions, particularly within the context of non-military defense, which falls under the purview of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI). Responding to COVID-19 falls under the government’s responsibility, which includes the establishment of the COVID-19 Response Acceleration Task Force. The collaboration between civilian institutions and the TNI as elements of the unit is expected to demonstrate a streamlined and effective command line, aiming to uphold and safeguard the nation’s security effectively. This paper aims to analyze the role and capacity of TNI in addressing the COVID-19 Pandemic as a non-military threat by measuring the impact of various determinants on the implementation of the role and capabilities of TNI. The research employed a mixed methods approach, incorporating both sequential and concurrent models. Additionally, it involved an in-depth qualitative analysis of each determinant utilized in handling the COVID-19 pandemic. Generally, the primary elements in the COVID-19 Response Acceleration Task Force are civilian institutions based on the category of disaster and its societal impact. Nevertheless, the involvement of TNI through Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) can expedite COVID-19 management through aid and humanitarian operations. Non-military defense operations strategically establish control command between ministries/agencies and local governments. The optimization of TNI’s capabilities in crisis management involves deploying personnel across Indonesia, with a central command under the TNI Commander and the establishment of command centers in crisis-affected areas. The success of TNI’s performance can be evaluated by examining its strategic leadership and patterns of civil-military cooperation in a systematic and deliberate manner.

ABSTRACT Initial DoD support of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operations for New York City (NYC) coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) relief included the deployment of military medics to the Javits New York Medical Station and USNS Comfort. When Air Force (AF) Reservists arrived in NYC, 64th Air Expeditionary Group leaders worked with FEMA, Task Force New York/New Jersey, and NYC chains of command to send Airmen to NYC hospitals, including Lincoln Medical Center (LMC). Within 72 hours of arrival, 60 AF Reservists, including 30 registered nurses and 3 medical technicians, integrated into LMC to provide support during April and May 2020. This assistance began during the peak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections. Air Force nurses provided over 6,000 hours of care to over 800 patients in the emergency department and ad hoc intensive care and medical-surgical units. As infections declined, AF nurses shifted to providing care in established units. In these units, AF nurses provided patient care and worked directly with LMC nurses to provide directed teaching experiences to improve their comfort and competency with caring for acutely ill COVID-19 patients. The deployment of AF Reservists into civilian facilities was a success and bolstered the capability of three facilities struggling to care for SARS-CoV-2 patients. This effort was recognized by military and civilian healthcare leaders and resulted in over 600 military medical personnel being sent to support 11 NYC public hospitals.

executive summary: This article compares the logistical challenges associated with the West's military resupply of Ukraine and those of resupplying Taiwan in a potential future conflict. main argumentDespite facing critical munitions shortages and growing political divisiveness over the substantial financial burden of this policy, the West's resupply of the Ukrainian military during Ukraine's current war with Russia has—so far—been a success, keeping forces battle-worthy and able to continue fighting after nearly two years of high-intensity conventional warfare. Would the resupply of Taiwan against China in wartime be similarly feasible for the U.S. and its regional partners in the Pacific? Major obstacles distinguish the Taiwan scenario. In prioritizing planning for a Taiwan contingency, the U.S. government should consider five major logistical factors: geopolitical ambiguity, the tyranny of distance, the need to resupply by air and sea, the involvement of reliable regional partners, and China's tolerance for the supply of armament to Taiwan in wartime. policy implications• Pre-positioning war materiel forward on allied soil is crucial to enable a rapid response to any military aggression against Taiwan. Besides increasing stocks of arms and ammunition in Taiwan itself, materiel should be pre-positioned with short reach to Taiwan in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and closely linked with depots in Guam, Hawaii, Australia, and the continental U.S. in a hub-and-spoke framework. • To assist Taiwan in establishing reserves of arms and munitions, the U.S. should increase technology transfer and joint production of critical war materiel with and in Taiwan. Boosting Taiwan's own defense industry base will help ensure the security of supply and an independent maintenance, repair, and overhaul capability in a conflict. Moreover, to ensure the materiel survives, hardening, decentralization, and the ability to disperse at least parts of the industrial production and maintenance, repair, and overhaul capability should be advanced. • In a war across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese ports and airports would come under attack early on, and even if they were not destroyed, the People's Liberation Army would try to block access to them, hindering resupply efforts. Strong emphasis should be placed on the development of robust amphibious and civilian roll-on/roll-off capabilities, buildup of temporary piers, and improvement of Taiwan's transportation infrastructure.

Since 2013, the northern region of Nigeria has witnessed the unprecedented mobilization of militia group Civilian Joint Task Force to aid combating the Islamic fundamentalist Boko Haram. The participation of the militia was reportedly successful in routing the insurgent. Before the CJTF, Boko Haram defied most of the counterinsurgency measures of the government including the military and the political approaches. However, despite the successes of the CJTF, the strategy that influences the successes was not adequately known. This article, therefore, investigated the strategy of the CJTF that influences its successes. The study was conducted using a qualitative method designed in a case study. Data were collected from thirteen informants through in-depth interviews supported by non-participant observation. The finding shows that CJTF is a kind of informal self-defense group that emerged in response to the inadequate protections by the State. The combating successes of the group were influenced by the information-centric approach of its campaign. Careful intelligence gathering and procession along with the sociocultural linkage of the participants and in-depth knowledge over the physical terrain emerged influential to the groups’ combating. The article recommended that the Nigerian government should re-strategize its existing conventional counterinsurgency approach to adapt to the population-centric paradigm. The government should also adopt palliative measures of promoting sustainable counter-insurgency that should focus on inclusive governance, accountability, and addressing socio-economic issues of poverty and unemployment with all levels of seriousness rather than sticking to the security-only campaign.