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1

LUNDHOLM, MICHAEL. "Decentralizing Public Goods Production." Journal of Public Economic Theory 10, no. 2 (2008): 259–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00361.x.

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2

Michael, Michael S., and Panos Hatzipanayotou. "Public Goods Production, Nontraded Goods and Trade Restrictions." Southern Economic Journal 63, no. 4 (1997): 1100. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1061245.

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3

Mamardashvili, P., and D. Schmid. "Performance of Swiss dairy farms under provision of public goods." Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 59, No. 7 (2013): 300–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/148/2012-agricecon.

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Farmers provide not only agricultural products but also public goods and services. When analyzing farm performance, these different outputs should be modelled separately. In this study, we investigated Swiss dairy farms located in the plain, hill and mountainous regions for the period between 2003 and 2009. For the representation of production technology, we employed a parametric output distance function and modeled particular public goods and services as a separate output. The resulted elasticities of agricultural output coincided with the corresponding shares of this output. However, the ela
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Baldwin, Kate. "Elected MPs, Traditional Chiefs, and Local Public Goods: Evidence on the Role of Leaders in Co-Production From Rural Zambia." Comparative Political Studies 52, no. 12 (2018): 1925–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414018774372.

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What types of leaders are effective in organizing public goods that require community contributions? In many settings, both citizens and state agencies provide financing, labor, and oversight of local projects. This article analyzes the effects of elected Members of Parliament (MPs) and hereditary chiefs in facilitating co-produced public goods in Zambia. MPs have electoral motivations to provide public goods but may not be well-positioned to organize community contributions. Chiefs lack electoral incentives but typically have long time horizons and local social connections. I analyze the effe
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5

Kolmar, Martin, and Andreas Wagener. "Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods." Southern Economic Journal 79, no. 1 (2012): 161–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-79.1.161.

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6

Demsetz, Harold. "The private production of public goods, once again." Critical Review 7, no. 4 (1993): 559–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08913819308443318.

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7

Mader, Philip. "Attempting the Production of Public Goods through Microfinance." Journal of Infrastructure Development 3, no. 2 (2011): 153–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097493061100300204.

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This article critically evaluates attempts to create public goods via microfinance loans in reference to the specific example of water and sanitation. The microfinancing of water and sanitation is a private business model which requires households to privately recognise, internalise and capitalise the bene-fits from improved water and sanitation. But household water and sanitation, being closely linked to underlying common pool resources, and being merit goods, have strong public goods characteristics and therefore depend on collective solutions. Two cases, from Vietnam and India, are presente
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8

Woo, Yoonseuk, and Chris Webster. "Co-evolution of gated communities and local public goods." Urban Studies 51, no. 12 (2013): 2539–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0042098013510565.

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9

Kinateder, Markus, and Luca Paolo Merlino. "Public Goods in Endogenous Networks." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9, no. 3 (2017): 187–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140276.

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We study a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous players. The source of heterogeneity affects the gains from a connection and hence equilibrium networks. When players differ in the cost of producing the public good, active players form pyramidal complete multipartite graphs; yet, better types need not have more neighbors. When players differ in the valuation of the public good, nested split graphs emerge in which production need not be monotonic in type. In large societies, few players produce a lot; furthermore, networks dampen inequality under cost heterogeneity
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10

HABYARIMANA, JAMES, MACARTAN HUMPHREYS, DANIEL N. POSNER, and JEREMY M. WEINSTEIN. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" American Political Science Review 101, no. 4 (2007): 709–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055407070499.

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A large and growing literature links high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision. Yet although the empirical connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the underprovision of public goods is widely accepted, there is little consensus on the specific mechanisms through which this relationship operates. We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—what we term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms—and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mecha
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11

Pellegrini, Tassilo. "Co-Production on the Web: Social Software as a Means of Collaborative Value Creation in Web-based Infrastructures." International Review of Information Ethics 7 (September 1, 2007): 340–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/irie37.

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The concept of co-production was originally introduced by political science to explain citizen participation in the provision of public goods. The concept was quickly adopted in business research targeting the question how users could be voluntarily integrated into industrial production settings to improve the development of goods and services on an honorary basis. With the emergence of the Social Software and web-based colla-borative infrastructures the concept of co-production gains importance as a theoretical framework for the collaborative production of web content and services. This artic
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12

Jeong, Sunny. "Collective Production of Public Goods in Online Travel Communities." Information Technology & Tourism 10, no. 4 (2008): 355–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.3727/109830508788403141.

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13

Vicary, Simon. "Joint production and the private provision of public goods." Journal of Public Economics 63, no. 3 (1997): 429–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(96)01602-7.

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14

Thutupalli, Shashi, Sravanti Uppaluri, George W. A. Constable, et al. "Farming and public goods production in Caenorhabditis elegans populations." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, no. 9 (2017): 2289–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1608961114.

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The ecological and evolutionary dynamics of populations are shaped by the strategies they use to produce and use resources. However, our understanding of the interplay between the genetic, behavioral, and environmental factors driving these strategies is limited. Here, we report on a Caenorhabditis elegans–Escherichia coli (worm–bacteria) experimental system in which the worm-foraging behavior leads to a redistribution of the bacterial food source, resulting in a growth advantage for both organisms, similar to that achieved via farming. We show experimentally and theoretically that the increas
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15

Laussel, Didier, and Michel Le Breton. "Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency." Games and Economic Behavior 25, no. 2 (1998): 194–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0637.

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16

Jakubowski, Rafał M., and Paweł Kuśmierczyk. "PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND THE FREE-RIDING PROBLEM." Ekonomia i Prawo 3, no. 1 (2007): 163. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/eip.2007.009.

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17

Laitinen, Ilpo, Tony Kinder, and Jari Stenvall. "Co-design and action learning in local public services." Journal of Adult and Continuing Education 24, no. 1 (2017): 58–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477971417725344.

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The paper argues that from a new public governance and service management perspective, local public services are best conceptualised as service systems in which users co-produce and co-design; this differentiates public from private services, which have lower of trust and shared values resulting in a goods-dominant logic and are an alternative to the new public management viewpoint. Referencing new case studies from Finland and Scotland, we further argue that for local public servicesʼn co-production as an action- learning environment supports and encourages co-design: this makes local public s
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18

UTSUMI, YUKIHISA, and MIKIO NAKAYAMA. "STRATEGIC CORES IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY." International Game Theory Review 06, no. 04 (2004): 509–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198904000332.

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In a public goods economy with linear production technologies, we consider a strategic game with coalitions in which each player is required as a strategy to reallocate his or her own initial endowments for exchange and production. Allowing negative strategies, i.e., reallocations with negative amount, we show that the core of this economy can be characterized as the set of allocations corresponding to strategy profiles for which no coalition has a self-supporting deviation, i.e., a deviation that is not free-riding on the allocations made by the complementary coalition. Moreover, restricting
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19

Hong, Sounman, and Jungmin Ryu. "Crowdfunding public projects: Collaborative governance for achieving citizen co-funding of public goods." Government Information Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2019): 145–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2018.11.009.

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20

Chao, Lin, and Santiago F. Elena. "Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from Prisoner's Dilemma to Snowdrift." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 284, no. 1854 (2017): 20170228. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.0228.

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The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary problem. Cooperation is not favoured because the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analysed this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if the trade-off between replication and production of gene products is linear, PD is observed. However, if the trade-off is nonlinear, the viruses evolve into separa
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21

O'Brien, Siobhán, Adela M. Luján, Steve Paterson, Michael A. Cant, and Angus Buckling. "Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 284, no. 1859 (2017): 20171089. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1089.

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Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolution
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22

Grega, L. "Multifunctionality of agriculture and joint production." Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 50, No. 9 (2012): 381–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/5222-agricecon.

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There is growing the importance of the concept of multifunctionality of agriculture both in the Czech Republic and in the whole European Union. Multifunctionality reflects the fact, that agriculture produces many food and non-food commodities, while some of them have the character of externalities and public goods. The methodological framework for analysis of extra-production benefits of agriculture must include both production relationships between commodity and non-commodity products and the view on multifunctional agriculture from the demand side, e.g. it must consider the solution of exter
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23

McClennen, Edward F. "Moral Rules As Public Goods." Business Ethics Quarterly 9, no. 1 (1999): 103–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857638.

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Abstract:The kind of commitment to moral rules that characterizes effective interaction between persons in among others places, manufacturing and commercial settings is characteristically treated by economists and game theorists as a public good, the securing of which requires the expenditure of scarce resources on surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. Alternatively put, the view is that, characteristically, rational persons cannot voluntarily guide their choices by rules, but can only be goaded into acting in accordance with such rules by the fear of social and formal sanctions. On this wa
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24

Tosun, Jale, Sebastian Koos, and Jennifer Shore. "Co-governing common goods: Interaction patterns of private and public actors." Policy and Society 35, no. 1 (2016): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2016.01.002.

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25

Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre. "Local Powers and the Co-delivery of Public Goods in Niger." IDS Bulletin 42, no. 2 (2011): 32–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2011.00209.x.

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26

Zhang, Hong-Bin, and Hong Wang. "Group preferential selection promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game." International Journal of Modern Physics C 25, no. 11 (2014): 1450062. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183114500624.

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We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the co-player learning mechanism based on the preferential selection that are brought about by wealthy information of groups where participants collect and search for potential imitators from those groups. We find that co-player learning mechanism based on the choice of weighted group can lead to the promotion of public cooperation by means of the information of wealthy groups that is obtained by participants, and after that the partial choice of public goods groups is enhanced with the tunable prefe
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27

HARWOOD, R. R., F. PLACE, A. H. KASSAM, and H. M. GREGERSEN. "INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS THROUGH INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT RESEARCH IN CGIAR PARTNERSHIPS." Experimental Agriculture 42, no. 4 (2006): 375–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0014479706003802.

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The CGIAR System conducts research to produce international public goods (IPG) that are of wide applicability, creating a scientific base which speeds and broadens local adaptive development. Integrated natural resources management (INRM) research is sometimes seen to be very location specific and consequently does not lend itself readily to the production of IPGs. In this paper we analyse ways in which strategic approaches to INRM research can have broad international applicability and serve as useful foundations for the development of locally adapted technologies. The paper describes the evo
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28

Nemec, Juraj, Mária Murray Svidroňová, and Éva Kovács. "Welfare Co-Production: Hungarian and Slovak Reality." NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 12, no. 2 (2019): 195–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2019-0019.

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AbstractFor more than 30 years the delivery of local public services has been undergoing change, from a style of delivery dominated by the public sector to a more efficient, more effective mixed system, characterised by variations in ownership and sources of financing. Concepts such as public-private-civil sector mix, partnerships, co-operation, and co-creation have emerged as ways of organising public-services production and delivery. Our case deals with co-production via the involvement of the third sector in welfare services. The goal of this paper is to map the real relations between publi
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29

Cho, Myeonghwan. "Externality and information asymmetry in the production of local public goods." International Journal of Economic Theory 9, no. 2 (2013): 177–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12013.x.

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30

Jin Kim and Seungjin Shim. "Incentive mechanisms for international public goods under uncertainty of production costs." Economics Letters 92, no. 3 (2006): 311–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.014.

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31

Malykh, O. E. "PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN PUBLIC GOODS PRODUCTION." Vestnik of Samara State University of Economics 11, no. 193 (2020): 46–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.46554/1993-0453-2020-11-193-46-52.

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32

Berg, Julie, and Clifford Shearing. "Governing-through-Harm and Public Goods Policing." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 679, no. 1 (2018): 72–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716218778540.

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Among scholars of law and crime and practitioners of public safety, there is a pervasive view that only the public police can or should protect the public interest. Further, the prevailing perception is that the public police predominantly governs through crime—that is, acts on harms as detrimental to the public good. We argue that governing harm through crime is not always the most effective way of producing public safety and security and that the production of public safety is not limited to public police forces. An approach of governing-through-harm that uses a variety of noncrime strategie
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Rauch, Joseph, Jane Kondev, and Alvaro Sanchez. "Cooperators trade off ecological resilience and evolutionary stability in public goods games." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 14, no. 127 (2017): 20160967. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2016.0967.

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Microbial populations often rely on the cooperative production of extracellular ‘public goods’ molecules. The cooperative nature of public good production may lead to minimum viable population sizes, below which populations collapse. In addition, ‘cooperator’ public goods producing individuals face evolutionary competition from non-producing mutants, or ‘freeloaders’. Thus, public goods cooperators should be resilient not only to the invasion of freeloaders, but also to ecological perturbations that may push their populations below a sustainable threshold. Through a mathematical analysis of th
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34

Rayamajhee, Veeshan, and Pablo Paniagua. "The Ostroms and the contestable nature of goods: beyond taxonomies and toward institutional polycentricity." Journal of Institutional Economics 17, no. 1 (2020): 71–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137420000338.

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AbstractThis paper builds on the Ostroms' oeuvre to suggest that the binary Samuelsonian taxonomy of goods – or the ‘sterile dichotomy’, as Elinor Ostrom calls it – cannot serve as a reliable guide for public policy. Using the Ostroms' insights on co-production, institutional matching, and polycentricity, we argue that the ‘inherent’ nature of goods and their specific taxonomy are not static and definitive concepts but are instead contestable and dynamic features that are institutionally contingent. We explore four crucial mechanisms and/or contexts, not altogether unrelated, whereby the natur
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35

Sun, Xingping, Yibing Li, Hongwei Kang, et al. "Co-Evolution of Complex Network Public Goods Game under the Edges Rules." Entropy 22, no. 2 (2020): 199. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e22020199.

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The reconnection of broken edges is an effective way to avoid drawback for the commons in past studies. Inspired by this, we proposed a public goods game model under the edges rules, where we evaluate the weight of edges by their nodes’ payoff. The results proved that the game obtains a larger range of cooperation with a small gain factor by this proposed model by consulting Monte Carlo simulations (MCS) and real experiments. Furthermore, as the following the course of game and discussing the reason of cooperation, in the research, we found that the distribution entropy of the excess average d
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36

Mejía-Vergnaud, Andrés. "Book Review: Global Public Goods: International Co-operation in the 21st Century." Global Social Policy: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Public Policy and Social Development 1, no. 1 (2001): 109–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/146801810100100106.

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37

Bardy, Roland. "Public goods, sustainable development and business accountability." World Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development 13, no. 1 (2017): 34–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/wjemsd-01-2016-0004.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present a linkage between performance measurement at the business level and the concept of public goods usage, and a linkage between the micro- and macro-economic aspects of sustainability. Design/methodology/approach Exhibiting the essentials of a public goods cost perspective in order to initiate discussion between statisticians, standard setters for business reporting and practitioners. Findings Showing what has been achieved in measuring the outcomes of sustainable development efforts and what still needs to be done in order to arrive at aggregate va
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Bureau, Jean Christophe, and Luois Pascal Mahé. "Cap Payments after 2013 and Rural Public Goods." QA Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, no. 4 (December 2009): 29–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/qu2009-004002.

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- The aim of this paper is to reconsider the objectives of European farm policy taking a long-term view to assessing the instruments currently in place and advancing some suggestions for the design of the future Cap due in 2013. The pro- posed guidelines for reforms include defining targeting instruments on clear objectives, guaranteeing social return for public money and replacing assistance with incentives. Measures are suggested to make EU agriculture more competitive by adapting instruments and regulations to that purpose. It is proposed to amend the current complex payment schemes, which
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Bruce, John B., Stuart A. West, and Ashleigh S. Griffin. "Functional amyloids promote retention of public goods in bacteria." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 286, no. 1903 (2019): 20190709. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0709.

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The growth and virulence of bacteria depends upon a number of factors that are secreted into the environment. These factors can diffuse away from the producing cells, to be either lost or used by cells that do not produce them (cheats). Mechanisms that act to reduce the loss of secreted factors through diffusion are expected to be favoured. One such mechanism may be the production of Fap fibrils, needle-like fibres on the cell surface observed in P. aeruginosa , which can transiently bind several secreted metabolites produced by cells. We test whether Fap fibrils help retain a secreted factor,
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40

Lowry, Robert C. "The Private Production of Public Goods: Organizational Maintenance, Managers' Objectives, and Collective Goals." American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997): 308–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2952358.

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I reformulate Mancur Olson's by-product theory of collective action as a theory of resource allocation by interest group managers. I then test alternative hypotheses about managers' objectives drawn from exchange theory and commitment theory. Financial data for 16 environmental citizen groups show that the production of public goods is subsidized by other activities, and revenues from member dues are not affected by spending on public goods. Spending on selective incentives and information generates revenues but also may contribute to the pursuit of collective goals. Estimated marginal revenue
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Moseiko, Viktoriya. "Specifics of the Production of Pensionary Good in Russia." Moscow University Economics Bulletin 2020, no. 3 (2020): 200–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.38050/013001052020310.

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The author considers the concept of «pensionary good» and the specifics of its production at the state and non-state levels. The purpose of the study is to analyze the actions aimed at creating a «pensionary good» under the influence of incentives and coercion. Drawing on the theory of goods, the author comes to conclusion that the elements of pensionary good can be produced in the form of public goods, merit goods, club goods and private goods. The author identifies the specifics of pensionary good structure at the analyzed levels and shows that national pension in the Russian Federation is b
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Semenov, Andrey, Vsevolod Bederson, Irina Shevcova, and Stanislav Shkel. "POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC GOODS PRODUCTION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK." Вестник Пермского университета. Политология 12, no. 4 (2018): 21–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2018-4-21-34.

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43

Abe, Kenzo, Hisayuki Okamoto, and Makoto Tawada. "A Note on the Production Possibility Frontier with Pure Public Intermediate Goods." Canadian Journal of Economics 19, no. 2 (1986): 351. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/135290.

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44

Kichurchak, Marianna. "The peculiarities of program and target method’s using in public goods production." Ukrainian society 2013, no. 2 (2013): 140–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/socium2013.02.140.

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The author has defined the basic factors and peculiarities of program and target method introduction in budget process, has studied foreign experience and has suggested some proposals of activation of using this technology in public goods production.
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Marotta, Giuseppe, and Concetta Nazzaro. "Public goods production and value creation in wineries: a structural equation modelling." British Food Journal 122, no. 5 (2020): 1705–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/bfj-08-2019-0656.

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PurposeThe aim of the study is to analyse the value creation processes in multifunctional wineries. Specifically, the paper poses the following research questions: can the creation of public goods (i.e. multifunctionality) open up new paths of value creation for wineries? And if so, can multifunctionality be only compensated through policy instruments? Or, is there a form of market compensation?Design/methodology/approachAn empirical analysis was carried out on selected wineries that sell directly. The study implemented the “value portfolio” model that identifies specific variables, both inter
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Roscoe, Philip, and Barbara Townley. "Unsettling issues: valuing public goods and the production of matters of concern." Journal of Cultural Economy 9, no. 2 (2015): 121–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2015.1107852.

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47

Einy, Ezra, and Benyamin Shitovitz. "The optimistic stability of the core mapping in public goods production economies?" Economic Theory 6, no. 3 (1995): 523–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050036.

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48

Einy, Ezra, and Benyamin Shitovitz. "The optimistic stability of the core mapping in public goods production economies." Economic Theory 6, no. 3 (1995): 523–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01211792.

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49

Dowding, Keith, and Patrick Dunleavy. "Production, Disbursement and Consumption: The Modes and Modalities of Goods and Services." Sociological Review 44, no. 1_suppl (1997): 36–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954x.1996.tb03435.x.

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Two completely separate literatures have analysed government involvement in consumption; the collective consumption stream in urban studies and neo-classical economics' account of public goods. Both traditions have significantly converged in recent years, especially in recognizing a differentiated spectrum of provision in place of previous dichotomous categories. Collective consumption theories have poorly explained consumption process trends, but captured many of the key social and political causes of change. Public goods theories have underpinned public policy shifts, and thus been congruent
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Kar, Saibal, and Srijan Banerjee. "Tax Evasion and Provision of Public Goods: Implications for Wage and Employment." Studies in Microeconomics 6, no. 1-2 (2018): 84–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321022218791010.

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This exploratory paper analyses, theoretically with some numerical examples, the relationship between tax evasion and provision of public goods. In this model, we incorporate tax evasion leading to a fall in the supply of public goods. We investigate the relation between provision of public goods and wages of workers engaged in the production of public goods and an intermediate private goods. We show that under plausible conditions, and parameter values, fall in the number of taxpayers leads not only to fall in the provision of public goods, but also lowers wages. We find a threshold level of
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