Academic literature on the topic 'Cognitivisme'
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Journal articles on the topic "Cognitivisme"
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Fenske, Wayne. "The Advantage of an Empirically Minded Conception of Non-cognitivism." Dialogue 39, no. 3 (2000): 513–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300007538.
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RésuméUn argument standard contre le non-cognitivisme va comme suit. Les non-cognitivistes, dit-on, sont théoriquement commis à endosser la doctrine de l'internalisme; or la doctrine de l'internalisme requiert que l'amoraliste soit inconcevable; comme l'amoraliste est concevable, l'internalisme doit être faux; le non-cognitivisme, par conséquent, n'est pas plausible. C'est ce que nous pouvons appeler l' «argument de l'amoraliste». J'essaie de montrer dans cet article que l'argument de léamoraliste ne constitue pas la réfutation décisive du non-cognitivisme que plusieurs réalistes en morale pensent y voir. Mon approche à ce sujet est de développer les implications sémantiques d'une conception d'inspiration empirique du non-cognitivisme.
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Marie, Pierre. "Psychanalyse versus Cognitivisme." Essaim 9, no. 1 (2002): 53. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ess.009.0053.
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Legrand, Michel. "Du behaviorisme au cognitivisme." L'année psychologique 90, no. 2 (1990): 247–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/psy.1990.29399.
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McDowell, John. "Non-cognitivisme et règles." Archives de Philosophie 64, no. 3 (2001): 457. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/aphi.643.0457.
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Richelle, M., E. Freixa I Baque, A. Pélissolo, and J. Van Rillaer. "Du comportementalisme au cognitivisme." Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive 15 (December 2005): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1155-1704(05)81271-6.
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Steiner, Pierre. "Introduction cognitivisme et sciences cognitives." Labyrinthe, no. 20 (April 20, 2005): 13–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/labyrinthe.754.
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Marmion, Jean-François. "L'inconscient, de la psychanalyse au cognitivisme." Les Grands Dossiers des Sciences Humaines N°10, no. 3 (March 1, 2008): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/gdsh.441.0008.
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Spector, Benjamin. "Linguistique générative et cognitivisme : bref aperçu." Labyrinthe, no. 20 (April 20, 2005): 41–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/labyrinthe.756.
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Cellérier, Guy. "La psychologie génétique et le cognitivisme." Le Débat 47, no. 5 (1987): 116. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/deba.047.0116.
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Chazaud, Jacques. "Organodynamisme et cognitivisme de Robert Michel Palem." L'information psychiatrique 82, no. 6 (2006): 515. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/inpsy.8206.0515.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Cognitivisme"
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Rakoniewski, Alain. "Behaviorisme et cognitivisme en economie experimentale." Nantes, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995NANT4012.
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L'economie experimentale constitue un vaste ensemble de programmes de recherche. La these etudie deux de ces programmes. Le premier est constitue des travaux falsificationniste portant sur la theorie de l'utilite esperee issue du livre de von neumann et morgenstern games theory and economic behavior, et sur les theories alternatives a celle-ci ; ce programme demontre les faiblesses descriptives de ces differentes theories. Le second programme porte sur les marches experimentaux de "double enchere orale"; il etait initialement oriente vers l'evaluation de la pareto-efficience des differents types d'institutions et a progressivement fait porter son attention sur les conditions experimentales de validite de la theorie des anticipations rationnelles. Ces deux programmes ont rencontre une difficulte commune : les insuffisances du programme behavioriste dominant en economie, alors que les recherches de h. Simon ouvraient la voie au cognitivisme en economie sans proposer de theorie de l'apprentissage economique. Cette these developpe un modele de l'apprentissage economique exploitant dans une methodologie constructiviste les hypotheses cognitivistes rencontrees en economie experimentale. Ce modele permet une evaluation de la contribution des deux programmes a une theorie de l'apprentissage economique et de la definition d'experimentations futures. Cette these montre que l'infuence du cognitivisme contribue a developper en economie experimentale une methodologie constructivisteExperimental economics constitutes a vast of research programs. The thesis investigate two of these programs. The first one is constituted with the falsificationist research program about expected utility theory, stemmed from the von neuman and morgensten's book games theory and economic behavior, and the alternative theories to the latter; this research program demonstrates the descriptive weakness of these different theories. The second program investigates oral double auction experimental markets; its was first designed to evaluate the paret-efficiency of different kinds of institutions and has progressively investigated the experimental validity of the rational expectations hypothesis. These two programs encountered a common difficulty : the insufficiencies of the behaviorist dominating program in economics while the h. Simon's researches introduced the congitivism in economics but without new economic learning theory. This thesis develops an economic learning model by the use of constructivist methodology and constructivist hypothesis of experimental economics. This model permits some evaluation of the contribution of the two programs to the development of the economic learning theory and to design next experimentations. This thesis demonstrates how cognitivism develops a constructivist methodology in experimental economics
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Panizza, Chiara. "Fictional names and fictional discourse." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/399676.
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In this dissertation I present a critical study of fiction, focusing on the semantics of fictional names and fictional discourse. I am concerned with the issue of whether fictional names need to refer, and also with the related issue of whether fictional characters need to exist, in order to best account for our linguistic practices involving fictional names. Fictional names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’, ‘Anna Karenina’, ‘Emma Woodhouse’ and ‘Don Quixote of La Mancha’ ordinarily occur in different contexts of discourse, in which we think and talk about fictional characters in ways that show that our pre-theoretical intuitions regarding the use of fictional names often tend in opposite directions. Given the conflicting intuitions about our linguistic practices when fictional names are involved, theories of fiction have ended up giving away some intuitions in order to favor others. In the contemporary philosophical debate about fiction, there are two main streams of theories of fiction: irrealist theories that state the lack of reference of fictional names, and realist theories that state that fictional names refer to fictional characters. If we assume that fictional names do not refer to fictional characters, as irrealists do, then semantic questions arise regarding how best to make sense of the apparent phenomena of reference and truth in fictional discourse. If, on the other hand, we assume that fictional names refer to fictional characters, as realists do, then semantic questions arise concerning the contexts of discourse in which there is reference and truth about fictional characters, together with metaphysical questions about the nature of those characters. This dissertation consists of six chapters. After presenting the data and desiderata for my research in Chapter 1, in Chapter 2 I address what I consider to be two of the most influential irrealist proposals, Kendall L. Walton’s (1990) and Mark Sainsbury’s (2005 and 2009). Both proposals make sense of fictional names and fictional discourse without invoking fictional entities. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I address three main realist theories of fiction, according to which fictional names refer to fictional characters: Meinongianism, Possibilism and Creationism. Even if the three theories endorse the ontological claim that there are fictional entities, they disagree
about the metaphysical nature of such entities. After arguing for pros and contras with respect to the semantic account of fictional names and discourse put forward by any such realist view, I endorse the realist stance known as creationism. The label ‘creationism’ is used in philosophical jargon to denote a family of theories that hold the metaphysical thesis that fictional characters exist as artefacts, really created by authors in making works of fiction, and so really existing; they are not concrete individuals (they are not real people, places, animals, or whatever) as they do not have a spatio- temporal location – they are abstract. In chapter 6 I put forward arguments in favor of creationism that are not broadly metaphysical in nature, but are instead founded in our understanding of storytelling practices and fictional discourse. My research focuses on the issues of how and when we refer (mentally and linguistically) to fictional characters, assuming that they are abstract created artefacts. In the view I defend in this dissertation, fictional names – as much as ordinary non-fictional names – play two crucial roles, one semantic and the other cognitive: on the one hand, they provide a particular individual as their semantic contribution to the meaning of the sentences in which they appear; on the other hand, they are triggers of significance for our cognitive minds. Fictional names are rated as directly referring expressions, leading to singular thoughts and de re pretendings about fictional characters. This view on fictional names accounts for the object-directedness of thoughts and discourse about fictional characters.El punto de partida de esta disertación es un análisis semántico de los enunciados que contienen nombres de ficción, como ‘Sherlock Holmes es un brillante detective’, ‘Sherlock Holmes no existe’ o ‘Sherlock Holmes es un personaje de ficción’. El problema semántico fundamental que postulan dichos enunciados podría sintetizarse de la siguiente manera: ¿cómo es posible explicar la intuición de que tales enunciados dan lugar a usos lingüísticos significativos e, incluso, verdaderos, aun cuando parezca que uno no está hablando acerca de nada o nadie real? Esta disertación consta de seis capítulos. Después de presentar los datos y los objetivos de mi investigación en el Capítulo 1, en el Capítulo 2 analizo las que considero ser dos de las propuestas irrealista más influyentes, la de Kendall L. Walton (1990) y la de Mark Sainsbury (2005 y 2009), que ofrecen un análisis de los nombres de ficción, y a la vez de los enunciados en los que aparecen, sin invocar entidades ficticias. Posteriormente, analizo las tres principales teorías realistas sobre la ficción, es decir el Meinongianismo, el Posibilismo y el Creacionismo. Si bien las tres teorías comparten la asunción ontológica de que sí hay entidades ficticias, discrepan no obstante acerca de la naturaleza metafísica de tales entidades. Los capítulos 3, 4 y 5 están dedicados a un análisis detallado de los pros y los contras de cada una de estas teorías realistas, con respecto al análisis semántico de los nombres de ficción y de los enunciados en los que aparecen. Finalmente, en el Capitulo 6 asumo la teoría ontológica y metafísica conocida como creacionismo, según la cual los personajes de ficción existen en la realidad como artefactos creados por la actividad artística de los autores. En este último capitulo, presento varios argumentos a favor del creacionismo que no son de carácter metafísico, sino más bien de carácter semántico y cognitivo. Desde un punto de vista semántico, defiendo la tesis de que los nombres de ficción son términos singulares que refieren a objetos ficticios, y que los enunciados en los que aparecen expresan proposiciones singulares, constituidas en parte por tales objetos ficticios. El análisis semántico se complementa con el análisis cognitivo de los nombres de ficción, y de los mecanismos que subyacen a los usos de dichos nombres.
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Durr, Margarete. "La notion de pertinence en traduction juridique bidirectionnelle français-allemand." Thesis, Strasbourg, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017STRAC036/document.
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La présente thèse porte sur la question de l’intelligibilité de la traduction juridique pour un praticien du droit. Notre hypothèse de travail consiste à dire que l’échec de la traduction juridique s’explique par l’absence de pertinence de la traduction pour son utilisateur. Pour éclairer cet aspect, une approche interdisciplinaire est adoptée. Méthodologiquement, nous partons de la critique de la notion d’équivalence et de la conception de la traduction comme recherche d’équivalents. Notre état de l’art se déploie en trois volets. Le premier volet traite de la théorie de la pertinence de Sperber et Wilson. Le second volet expose le traitement de la notion de pertinence en sciences de l’information. Le troisième volet présente la théorie de la pertinence et la théorie des connaissances élaborées par le sociologue Alfred Schütz Notre corpus d’étude comporte 145 bitextes allemand-français servant de base à des analyses contrastives. Dans la dernière partie, nous proposons une définition de la notion de pertinence et de ses conditions en traduction. Enfin, une méthode pratique de traduction fondée sur les notions de pertinence et d’usage est esquisséeThis thesis deals with the question of the intelligibility of legal translation for a legal practitioner. Our working hypothesis is that the failure of the legal translation is explained by the lack of relevance of the translation for its user. To shed light on this aspect, an interdisciplinary approach is adopted. Methodologically, we start from the criticism of the notion of equivalence and the conception of translation as a search for equivalents. Our state of the art is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the relevance theory of Sperber and Wilson. The second part describes the treatment of relevance in information science. The third part presents the theory of relevance and the theory of knowledge developed by sociologist Alfred Schütz. Our corpus includes 145 French-German texts used as a basis for contrasts analyses. In the personal contribution, we propose a definition of relevance and its conditions in translation. Finally, a practical method of translation based on the notions of relevance and usage is outlined
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Miskiewicz, Wioletta. "Le projet de la phénoménologie de la raison et le paradigme représentationnel de la philosophie de la conscience (la philosophie de Husserl dans le contexte du cognitivisme." Paris 10, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA100186.
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Schio, Lurdes de Vargas Silveira. "Cognitivismo ético." Florianópolis, SC, 2011. http://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/95863.
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Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaMade available in DSpace on 2012-10-26T06:37:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 300491.pdf: 1190763 bytes, checksum: 119e1f9d3e151ca66bff1ef28648ad67 (MD5)
Esta tese aborda o problema dos fundamentos dos conceitos morais na obra de John Locke. Aparentemente, Locke teria dois projetos irreconciliáveis para fundamentar a moral, um não-cognitivista e o outro cognitivista. Após caracterizarmos os dois projetos, defendemos que há um engano de interpretação, porque Locke tem um único projeto dividido em duas partes que se complementam para fundamentar a moral. O conceito de lei natural está sempre presente. O projeto centra-se na ideia da existência de Deus e da lei natural, aliada à razão humana. O cognitivismo ético de Locke emerge como uma consequência da sua defesa de que o entendimento pode construir as ideias a partir do acesso ao conhecimento da essência real e da essência nominal dos modos mistos. Por isso, os conceitos morais são reais e objetivos. Por conseguinte, o subjetivismo e o ceticismo éticos foram dissolvidos. Defendemos também que as ações humanas são consideradas morais, somente em comparação com as ideias de lei e não em comparação com as ideias das sensações de prazer e de dor. Com isso, as interpretações hedonistas que atribuem ao pensamento lockeano foram revisitadas e harmonizadas
This thesis approaches the problem about the fundamentals of the moral concepts in John Locke#s writings. Seemingly, Locke would have two irreconcilable projects to fundament morality, one noncognitive and the other cognitive. After having characterized the two projects, one defends that there is a misinterpretation since Locke has a unique project split in two parts, which complement each other in order to fundament morality. The concept of natural law is always present. The project concerns about the idea of God existence and the natural law associated with the human reason. Locke#s ethical cognitivism emerges as a consequence of his defense of the idea that the understanding can construct ideas from the knowledge access of the real essence and the nominal essence of the mixed modes. Thereupon, the moral concepts are real and objective. Consequently, the moral subjectivism and ceticism were dissolved. One also defends that human actions are considered moral, only in comparison with the law ideas and not in comparison with the ideas of the pain and pleasure sensation. Therefore, the hedonist interpretation attributed to the thought of Locke were revisited and harmonized
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Santos, Jorge Pelarigo dos. "O cognitivismo no cinema." Master's thesis, Universidade da Beira Interior, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.6/1322.
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Este trabalho tem como objectivo a exposição e clarificação do conceito de Cognitivismo no Cinema. A abordagem cognitivista é uma abordagem relevante na produção de investigação cinematográfica, enquadrada no âmbito dos Estudos Fílmicos contemporâneos, uma vez que tenta colmatar alguns problemas que as abordagens anteriores não conseguiram resolver completa e satisfatoriamente. Esta dissertação apresenta uma série de argumentos e posições distintas que servem de base para a exposição da nossa perspectiva analítica e crítica em relação ao tema do trabalho. No primeiro capítulo irão ser expostas as principais características da abordagem cognitivista ao Cinema, o contexto teórico dos Estudos Fílmicos em que esta forma de teorização cinematográfica surgiu e também serão apresentadas algumas das potenciais linhas de investigação que esta abordagem possibilita e propõe para o futuro. Serão transmitidas as principais razões para a necessidade de uma nova abordagem ao Cinema, e para justificar essa necessidade apresentar-se-ão as principais dificuldades da Teoria cinematográfica clássica que conduziram ao presente estado de estagnação em termos de evolução teórica. Perante tais dificuldades é apresentada a postura cognitivista como uma proposta para as ultrapassar e para promover a evolução da teorização cinematográfica.
No segundo capítulo abordaremos o primeiro estudo do Cinema em termos cognitivos, de que temos conhecimento, e faremos uma exposição sintetizada das ideias fundamentais que constam no livro de Hugo Münsterberg, "The Photoplay - A Psychological Study", editado em 1916. A primeira parte deste capítulo seguirá a estrutura do livro examinado e cingir-se-á à exposição das ideias de Münsterberg relativamente ao Cinema em termos psicológicos e estéticos. No final deste capítulo faremos uma análise e crítica a algumas dessas ideias, tendo como referência os argumentos de Nöel Carroll sobre as analogias de Münsterberg entre a mente e o cinema, argumentos que também irão ser examinados com o intuito de tentar estabelecer a pertinência do que foi exposto. O terceiro capítulo diz respeito à abordagem cognitivista em termos práticos de produção teórica e consistirá na exposição de um artigo científico que assume uma perspectiva cognitivista relativamente ao estudo das emoções na recepção fílmica e que reflecte muitas das premissas que este novo tipo de abordagem teórica pressupõe. Esta exposição será conduzida de forma a exemplificar esta nova postura de teorização cinematográfica contemporânea e servirá para nos aproximarmos do objectivo final deste trabalho, o de tentar estabelecer o alcance do Cognitivismo enquanto abordagem ao Cinema que se propõe fazer avançar a área de Estudos Fílmicos do seu estado de inércia. Perante tal estado de desenvolvimento da área dos Estudos Fílmicos, este trabalho é relevante na medida em que expõe e analisa uma abordagem alternativa à forma de teorização cinematográfica clássica, com o seu carácter tendencialmente psicanalítico, que tem sido pontuada por uma crescente permissividade, falta de método e tendências interpretativas que são nocivas à evolução da área de estudos em questão. Este trabalho tentará fornecer uma orientação metodológica para a criação de teoria no Cinema, expondo as principais dificuldades teoréticas convencionais e alguns dos principais erros de raciocínio lógico que deram origem à existência desses obstáculos. Para isto recorreremos às ideias e argumentos de dois dos principais defensores do Cognitivismo no Cinema, David Bordwell e Noël Carroll. Ao invés de criarmos uma dissertação que cita muitos autores de uma forma pouco aprofundada, entendemos que o objectivo deste trabalho seria melhor atingido se aprofundássemos bastante estes dois autores de referência que se assumem como extremamente relevantes para o tratamento da questão do Cognitivismo no Cinema.This dissertation’s main goal is to clarify and expose the concept of Cognitivism in Cinema. The cognitivist approach is a relevant approach in the production of film research in contemporary Film Studies, as it tries to address some problems that the prior approaches have failed to solve. This work presents a series of arguments and distinct positions that form the basis of our analytic and critic perspective about this theme. In the first chapter we will present the main features of the cognitivist approach in Cinema, the theoretical context in which this new way of film theory emerged amidst the discipline of Film Studies, and we will also present some of the potential research programs that this approach suggests for the future. We will also show the main reasons for the need of a new approach to Film Studies, and in order to justify that need we will present the main difficulties that the classic Film Theory encountered, which led to the present state of inertia in the course of evolution of Film Theory. The cognitivist approach is presented as a proposal to overcome such difficulties and to promote the development of Film Theory. In the second chapter we will address the first cognitivist study that we know of, and we will make a condensed exposition of the fundamental ideas that exist in the book written by Hugo Munsterberg, "The Photoplay - A Psychological Study", edited in 1916. The first part of this chapter will follow the structure of the book and will consist in the exposition of Munsterberg’s ideas about Film, psychologically and aesthetically. In the end of this chapter we will analyze and criticize some of these ideas, following Noël Carroll’s arguments about Munsterberg’s analogies between the human mind and film. These arguments will also be addressed in order to try to establish the relevance of what has been exposed. The third chapter addresses the cognitivist approach in practical terms of theoretical production and will consist of an exposition of a scientific article that assumes a cognitivist perspective while addressing the study of emotions in spectators and in filmic reception. This article reflects many of the premises that this new way of theorizing contains and this exposition will be led in a way that exemplifies this new stance of filmic theorizing and that will help us to come nearer to our main goal, trying to establish the range of Cognitivism as an approach to Cinema that wants to develop the present state of inertia in Film Studies. In face of this state of development in the area of Film Studies, this work is relevant as it exposes and analyses an alternative approach to the classical film theory, with its fallacious tendency for psychoanalytical approaches, which have been marked by a growing lack of method and interpretative tendencies that are bad for the evolution of Film Studies. This work will try to deliver a methodological orientation for the creation of film theory, exposing the main classical difficulties and some of the more relevant logical mistakes that led to the existence of such obstacles. In order to do that, we will use some ideas of two of the most notable defenders of Cognitivism in Cinema, David Bordwell and Noël Carroll. Instead of creating a dissertation that quotes many authors in a superficial way, we thought it would be better to quote only a couple of authors to a deeper extent, nevertheless the authors that are quoted are very relevant to the question at hand and will be adequate for what is intended with this dissertation.
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Le, Mabic Didier. "Approche psychothérapeutique métacognitive : Vers une intégration psychothérapeutique." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013AIXM3132.
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Malgré l’histoire très récente de la psychologie et des psychothérapies (environ un siècle), le 21ème siècle aura connu une explosion du nombre de psychothérapies. Nous pouvons en dénombrer près de 450 à ce jour (S. Ionescu, 2000). Pour éviter le syndrôme de la tour de Babel où, devant la multiplicité des approches et des langages, la communication était devenue impossible, la nécessité d’intégrer ces différentes approches devient évidente. Quelle serait cette approche intégrative et à partir de quelles influences théoriques cette intégration serait possible ? Un courant intégratif a fait irruption dans le monde des psychothérapies à la fin du 20ème siècle, les thérapies cognitives dites de la troisième voie. L’objectif est ainsi d’intégrer les thérapies dites de la troisième voie dans une approche théorique articulée à partir des éléments comparés. La méthodologie de ces différents modèles psychothérapeutiques est essentiellement comparative. Ce travail a pour vocation de présenter une approche pratique (thèse professionnelle et théorique) permettant d’articuler les différents points communs des thérapies de la troisième voie, intégrant les approches humanistes, constructivistes, phénoménologiques et cognitives. Pour terminer ce travail, en conclusion, une mise en perspective sera réalisée à partir de la théorie du chaos et des systèmes dynamiques complexes non-linéaires. L’hypothèse est qu’un évitement émotionnel peut inscrire l’individu dans une trajectoire chaotique, à partir du postulat que les individus fonctionnent dans une dynamique (existentielle) complexe non-linéaireDespite the very recent psychology and psychotherapy (about a century) history, the 21st century has seen an explosion in the number of psychotherapies. We can count nearly 450 to date (S. Ionescu, 2000). To avoid the syndrome of the tower of Babel, where before the multiplicity of approaches and languages, communication was impossible, the need to integrate these different approaches becomes evident. What would this integrative approach from theoretical influences what this integration possible? An integrative stream broke into the world of psychotherapy in the late 20th century, cognitive therapies called the Third Way. The objective is to integrate the so-called Third Way in an articulated from the elements compared theoretical approach therapies. The methodology of these different psychotherapeutic models is essentially comparative. This work aims to present a practical approach (professional and academic thesis) for articulating the different common therapies of the third way, integrating humanistic approaches, constructivist, phenomenological and cognitive. To complete this work, in conclusion, a perspective will be made from chaos theory and complex nonlinear dynamic systems. The hypothesis is that emotional avoidance may register the individual in a chaotic trajectory, starting from the premise that individuals operate in a dynamic (existential) complex non-linear
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Ferreira, Neto Arthur Maria. "O cognitivismo e não cognitivismo moral e sua influência na formação do pensamento jurídico." Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3465.
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Previous issue date: 2013Every philosophical tradition that looks at the problem concerning the criteria that defines the correct/appropriate or the incorrect/inappropriate human action assumes a notion of moral reality (even if this is represented in a fragmented way or even if it is represented as something elusive or incapable of being known by human agents), which aims to reach or represent what is captured by judgments of right and wrong. Considering the basic dimension of this type of speculation about human action, this represents the first major disagreement that arises when one intends to establish and understand the starting point that is adopted by one or other of the most relevant philosophical traditions. This being so, it is relevant to study and classify the various proposals in meta-ethics. This study therefore has the claim to first conceptualize and classify those that, today, are defined as the major theoretical proposals developed in moral philosophy, so that it may be possible the relevant influences that these different traditions engaged in the formation of some of the most prominent schools of legal thought. Two basic divisions are commonly held when analyzing the most important meta-ethical lines of thought. First we have the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism, which dispute the possibility of speaking about a moral reality, i. e., an instance of reality in which judgments of right and wrong about human action can be produced and communicated with some intelligibility and objectivity. A second relevant division – which represents a specification of the first – allows a more specific classification of ethical traditions, so that it is common to enumerate them, from a single comparative parameter, as nihilist, emotivist, subjectivist, relativist, constructivist and realist. These meta-ethical proposals allow us to identify the elements of influence that are present in some of the most important schools of legal thought. That's because whenever one intends to answer questions that are prior to the correct understanding of legal phenomenon, one is, invariably, applying a meta-ethical scheme of thought. In this work, therefore, we shall analyse four different legal traditions, i. e., legal empiricism (usually called "legal realism"), legal positivism, the notion of law as integrity and the tradition of natural law (Natural Law Theory). Each tradition will here be represented by one author, not with the intention to explore the details and the idiosyncrasies of the particular ideas of each author, but only in order to illustrate the theoretical matrix that each adopts. Thus, the philosophers of law that will be here presented are Oliver Wendell HOLMES Jr., Hans KELSEN, Ronald DWORKIN, John FINNIS.
Toda tradição filosófica que se debruça sobre o problema referente ao critério que define a correta/adequada ou incorreta/inadequada ação humana assume e pressupõe uma noção de realidade moral (mesmo que seja essa representada de modo fragmentado ou, inclusive, como algo ilusório ou incapaz de ser conhecido pelos agentes humanos) que as pessoas almejam atingir ou representar quando promovem juízos de certo e errado com pretensão de inteligibilidade. Considerando a dimensão básica desse tipo de especulação acerca da ação humana, essa é a primeira grande divergência que surge quando se pretende estabelecer e compreender o ponto de partida que é adotado por uma ou outra tradição filosófica. Nesse contexto, o estudo e a classificação das diversas propostas metaéticas surgem como relevantes. Esta tese, portanto, possui a pretensão de, primeiramente, conceituar e classificar aquelas que, hoje, são definidas como as principais correntes metaéticas desenvolvidas na filosofia moral (pretendendo realizar, assim, uma espécie de cartografia das tradições éticas disponíveis), para, em um segundo momento, apontar possíveis influências que essas variadas tradições exercem na formação de alguma das mais destacadas e relevantes linhas de pensamento jurídico. Duas etapas divisórias são, comumente, realizadas para se esquematizar – agrupar e dividir – as mais variadas tradições metaéticas.A primeira divisão – mais ampla e genérica – diferencia as correntes cognitivistas das não cognitivistas, tendo em vista as respostas que são fornecidas por cada postura a perguntas éticas de primeira ordem, ou seja, fundantes da própria experiência moral, nas quais interessa saber, por exemplo, se é, de fato, possível falar-se em uma realidade moral, i. e., uma instância –criada ou real – em que juízos de certo e errado sobre a ação humana podem ser produzidos e comunicados com alguma inteligibilidade e objetividade. Uma segunda divisão relevante – que representa um desdobramento e uma especificação da primeira – apresenta tradições éticas mais específicas nos seus fundamentos, de modo que é comum contrastarem-se, a partir de um único parâmetro comparativo, as posturas niilistas, emotivistas, subjetivistas, relativistas, construtivistas e realistas. É com base nessa classificação de propostas metaéticas que se pretende identificar os elementos de influência que estão presentes em algumas das mais relevantes escolas de pensamento jurídico. Isso porque, sempre que se pretende esclarecer e justificar o fundamento último de determinada prática jurídica ou quando se pretende responder aquelas perguntas que são prévias à correta compreensão do fenômeno jurídico, está-se, invariavelmente, aplicando um ou outro esquema metaético à tese sendo desenvolvida na ciência do direito. Neste trabalho, portanto, serão submetidas à mencionada classificação de posturas metaéticas o empirismo jurídico (costumeiramente denominado de “realismo” jurídico), o positivismo jurídico, a visão contemporânea do direito como integridade e a tradição da lei natural (Natural Law Theory), sendo que será utilizado um autor representativo de cada escola de pensamento, não com a intenção de explorar os detalhes e as idiossincrasias das ideias particulares de cada jurista, mas com o propósito de ilustrar a matriz teórica que esse adota, o que facilitará a demonstração do tipo de influência metaética que cada um acaba recebendo e incorporando na explicação e justificação do fenômeno jurídico. Assim sendo, os filósofos do direito que serão aqui invocados como meros instrumentos de demonstração da tese mais ampla que aqui será defendida são Oliver Wendell HOLMES JR., Hans KELSEN, Ronald DWORKIN e John FINNIS.
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Conti, Alberto. "Il Cognitivismo e l'apprendimento linguistico." Bachelor's thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2018.
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Il presente elaborato, dal nome Aspetti cognitivi dell’apprendimento linguistico, si concentra sul panorama del Cognitivismo e della Psicolinguistica, dando uno sguardo a quelle che sono le teorie fondanti di queste branche dello studio del linguaggio e della sua acquisizione. Basandosi sul lavoro del padre della Grammatica Generativa Noam Chomsky, e delle più recenti ricerche di Steven Pinker nel campo dell’apprendimento linguistico nei bambini, vengono analizzate le componenti cognitive applicate alla linguistica, alla ricerca della natura innata dei processi cerebrali che ci permettono di muoverci in un sistema da un lato sconfinatamente libero, dall’altro alquanto denso di regole. Questa ricerca di tipo compilativo è stata realizzata partendo da alcuni presupposti degli universali del linguaggio di Greenberg, che sono poi sfociati nella teoria dei Principi e Parametri di Chomsky. Da qui è stato possibile entrare in un ambito scientifico analitico, per avere una panoramica sulle cause di certe consuetudini linguistiche. Sono presenti vari esempi pratici discussi di volta in volta. Le domande a cui si vuole rispondere sono relative a come facciano i bambini ad imparare la propria lingua madre, secondo quali modalità e attraverso quali fasi. Vengono prese in esame le capacità computative della mente umana in relazione alla sintassi e alla semantica in contrasto con quelle di un’intelligenza artificiale; il tutto è volto a dimostrare che possediamo un vero e proprio istinto del linguaggio, che si mette in funzione già nei nostri primi mesi di vita.
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Vogelmann, Rafael Graebin. "Cognitivismo avaliativo descritivista : uma objeção." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/157030.
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Cognitivismo Avaliativo Descritivista é a tese segundo a qual atribuições de valor pretendem descrever aspectos da realidade. Segundo essa tese, ser valioso não é senão instanciar certa propriedade ou participar de certa relação. O esforço de reflexão e discussão avaliativa é concebido como um esforço para ajustar nossas convicções avaliativas à realidade, e quando este esforço é bem-sucedido obtermos conhecimento avaliativo. Atribuições de valor se distinguem de outras proposições descritivas apenas em razão do caráter peculiar dos aspectos da realidade dos quais se ocupa. O objetivo da presente dissertação é objetar a este tese. Cabe ao defensor do Cognitivismo Descritivista delimitar a região da realidade da qual tratam atribuições de valor. É por referência a ela que o cognitivista deve explicar os traços distintivos do juízo de valor. Há duas alternativas disponíveis: ou juízos de valor dizem respeito a um reino de fatos que transcendem a realidade natural ou dizem respeito a fatos naturais. No primeiro capítulo argumento que o Cognitivismo em sua forma Não-Naturalista não pode dar conta da covariação do valor. A covariação consiste no fato de diferenças em valor sempre são acompanhadas de diferenças não-avaliativas. Esta é uma restrição à qual nossas atribuições de valor se conformam, mas não podemos dar sentido a ela se assumimos a verdade do Cognitivismo Não-Naturalista. O Cognitivismo Descritivista deve, portanto, assumir uma forma Naturalista. No segundo capítulo argumento a única razão para preferir o Cognitivismo Naturalista a caracterizações alternativas do juízo de valor consiste no fato de que essa tese promete dar conta da objetividade de atribuições de valor segundo certa concepção de objetividade Segundo esta concepção só são objetivos aqueles aspectos da realidade acessíveis em abstração de qualquer perspectiva particular, incluída aí a perspectiva caracterizada pela propensão a certas respostas comportamentais e afetivas que adquirimos ao longo de nossa educação moral. Argumento que esta concepção de objetividade não se sustenta e que, portanto, não temos nenhuma razão para adotar o Cognitivismo Naturalista. No terceiro capítulo argumento que, mesmo que tivéssemos alguma razão para supor que atribuições de valor consistem na descrição de aspectos naturais da realidade, esta caracterização do juízo de valor também falha em dar conta de um traço distintivo de tais juízos, qual seja, a restrição à terceirização de juízos de valor. A restrição à terceirização consiste no fato de que o parecer de pretensos especialistas em valor não pode fornecer razão para aceitar certo juízo de valor. Usualmente o parecer de especialistas pode fornecer razão para adotar juízos descritivos, e se assumimos que atribuições de valor descrevem aspectos naturais da realidade não podemos dar conta dessa restrição. Concluo que devemos recusar o Cognitivismo Descritivista.Descriptive Evaluative Cognitivism is the thesis according to which ascriptions of value aim at describing features of reality. According to this thesis, to be valuable is just to instantiate some property or to take part in some relation. The effort of evaluative reflection and discussion is conceived as an effort to adjust our evaluative convictions to reality, and if we succeed in this effort we obtain evaluative knowledge. Ascriptions of value distinguish themselves from other descriptive propositions in virtue of the peculiar character of the features of reality they aim to describe. The goal of this dissertation is to present an objection to this thesis. The defender of Descriptive Cognitivism must specify the domain of reality ascriptions of value are about. It is by reference to it that the cognitivist must explain the distinctive traits of value judgments. There are two available options: either value judgments are about a domain of facts that transcends natural reality, or they are about natural facts. In the first chapter I argue that Cognitivism in its Non-naturalistic form cannot account for the covariation of value. Covariation consists in the fact that differences in value are always accompanied by non-evaluative differences. Our ascriptions of value comply with this constraint, but we cannot make sense of it if we assume that Non-naturalist Cognitivism is correct. Descriptive Cognitivism must, therefore, adopt a Naturalistic form. In the second chapter I argue that the only reason to prefer Naturalist Cognitivism to alternative characterizations of value judgments is the fact that it can account for the objectivity of value ascriptions according to a certain conception of objectivity According to this conception, only those features of reality accessible in abstraction from any particular perspective, including the perspective characterized by the propensity to certain behavioral and affective responses that we acquire during our moral education, are objective. I argue that this conception of objectivity does not hold and that, therefore, we have no reason to accept Naturalist Cognitivism. In the third chapter I argue that even if we had some reason to suppose that ascriptions of value consist in the description of natural aspects of reality, this characterization of value judgments also fails to account for a distinctive feature of such judgments - the restriction on the outsourcing of value judgments. The restriction on outsourcing consists in the fact that the opinion of would-be value experts cannot provide a reason to accept a certain value judgment. Usually the expert opinion can provide a reason to accept descriptive judgments, and if we assume that ascriptions of value describe natural features of reality, then we cannot account for this restriction. I conclude that we must reject Descriptive Cognitivism.
Books on the topic "Cognitivisme"
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Auteur, Escribe Christian, ed. Histoire de la psychologie générale: Du behaviorisme au cognitivisme. 2nd ed. Paris: In Press, 2010.
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Viale, Riccardo. Methodological Cognitivism. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40216-6.
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Leidlmair, Karl. After Cognitivism. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9992-2.
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Viale, Riccardo. Methodological Cognitivism. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24743-9.
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L'organisation: Une perspective cognitiviste. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2004.
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Cognitivismo, consciência e comportamento político. São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Edições Vértice, 1986.
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Dualism: The original sin of cognitivism. Mahwah, N.J: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2004.
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Sacchi, Elisabetta. Pensieri e rappresentazioni: Frege e il cognitivismo contemporaneo. Roma: Carocci, 2005.
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Cimatti, Felice. Il senso della mente: Per una critica del cognitivismo. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2004.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Cognitivisme"
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Matthew S., Bedke. "Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism." In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, 292–307. New York: Routledge, 2017. | Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315213217-19.
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Saidel, Eric. "Cognitivism." In Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior, 1–12. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47829-6_1215-1.
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Saidel, Eric. "Cognitivism." In Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior, 1509–20. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55065-7_1215.
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Mancing, Howard, and Jennifer Marston William. "Cognitivism." In Restoring the Human Context to Literary and Performance Studies, 261–80. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89078-0_11.
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Garnham, Alan. "Cognitivism." In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, 99–110. Second edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429244629-7.
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Huemer, Michael. "Non-Cognitivism." In Ethical Intuitionism, 17–47. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230597051_2.
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Huemer, Michael. "Non-Cognitivism." In Ethical Intuitionism, 17–47. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-50317-5_2.
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Viale, Riccardo. "Introduction." In Methodological Cognitivism, 1–44. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40216-6_1.
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Viale, Riccardo. "Cognitive Realism and Science Policy." In Methodological Cognitivism, 245–66. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40216-6_10.
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Viale, Riccardo. "Behaviours and Values that Prompted Permanent Innovation." In Methodological Cognitivism, 267–302. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40216-6_11.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Cognitivisme"
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Kaptelinin, Victor, Bonnie Nardi, Susanne Bødker, John Carroll, Jim Hollan, Edwin Hutchins, and Terry Winograd. "Post-cognitivist HCI." In CHI '03 extended abstracts. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/765891.765933.
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Gerson, Joni Fischer. "Beyond Neuroscience Cognitivism: Criticism of Substance and Structural Dualisms." In Third International Conference on Social Science, Public Health and Education (SSPHE 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200205.001.
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Alghazzawi, Daniyal M. "Representing OS services for computer novices using constructivism and cognitivism." In 2012 IEEE Global Engineering Education Conference (EDUCON). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/educon.2012.6201123.
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Rüütmann, Tiia. "ENGINEERING PEDAGOGY SCIENCE AS THE CONTEMPORARY BASIS FOR EFFECTIVE TEACHING OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING." In 3rd International Baltic Symposium on Science and Technology Education (BalticSTE2019). Scientia Socialis Ltd., 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.33225/balticste/2019.187.
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This study is introducing the basic principles of Engineering Pedagogy Science for effective design, teaching and learning of science, technology and engineering. The basic didactical models are introduced for contemporary design of effective teaching and learning. A quadruple instruction model of Engineering Pedagogy Science is proposed, integrating the principles of Behaviourism, Cognitivism, Social Constructivism and Humanism on the basis of didactic model of Engineering Pedagogy Science. Keywords: didactical model, effective teaching of STE, engineering pedagogy, educational design, quadruple instruction model.
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Bakar, Hajah Norasiken Bte, and Halimah Badioze Zaman. "Virtual laboratory for chemistry based on the constructivism-cognitivism-contextual approach (VLab-Chem)." In 2008 International Symposium on Information Technology. IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itsim.2008.4631622.
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Baltieri, Manuel, and Christopher L. Buckley. "The dark room problem in predictive processing and active inference, a legacy of cognitivism?" In The 2019 Conference on Artificial Life. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isal_a_00137.
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Baltieri, Manuel, and Christopher L. Buckley. "The dark room problem in predictive processing and active inference, a legacy of cognitivism?" In The 2019 Conference on Artificial Life. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isal_a_00137.xml.
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Efgivia, M. Givi, Ulfi Ukhrowati, Maria Ulfah, and Maliatu Fitriah. "Implementation of Cognitivism Theory in the Learning Process at Riyadlul Jannah Middle School in the Pandemic Era." In 1st UMGESHIC International Seminar on Health, Social Science and Humanities (UMGESHIC-ISHSSH 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211020.030.
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Đorić, Biljana. "REPRESENTATION OF LEARNING THEORIES IN THE DESIGN OF ELECTRONIC COURSES IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHER EDUCATION." In SCIENCE AND TEACHING IN EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT. FACULTY OF EDUCATION IN UŽICE, UNIVERSITY OF KRAGUJEVAC, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/stec20.147dj.
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E-learning is based on numerous psychological and pedagogical theories of learning, which is why their implementation in the context of instructional design can greatly affect the organization and content of e-courses. Diversity in the contents of certain teaching areas requires different approaches in shaping the learning environment. Therefore, the aim of this pilot study is to examine the representation of learning theories in e-course design in the context of higher education. For the needs of the research, an instrument was created which was piloted on a sample of 20 teachers and associates of the Faculty of Technical Sciences in Čačak, University of Kragujevac. The questionnaire covers the following learning theories: behavioral theories, individual and social constructivism, cognitivism and enactivism. The results of this research indicate that teachers and associates give statistically different estimates of the representation of individual learning theories in their e-courses, although these differences do not exist between all compared categories. The principles of individual constructivism are most represented, and social constructivism and enactivism are the least represented. Based on the obtained results, the paper presents pedagogical and research implications for a more detailed examination and understanding of the subject of research.
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DAS DORES DA SILVA, MARIA, AMANDA CELERINO DA SILVA, MATHEUS ALVES BARBOSA, KAROLAYNE ANDRADE DA SILVA, and CRISLAINE MARIA DA SILVA. "MULTIMÍDIA NA EDUCAÇÃO: ANÁLISE DE UM VÍDEO SOBRE MEMBRANA CELULAR A PARTIR DA TEORIA COGNITIVISTA DA APRENDIZAGEM MULTIMÍDIA(TCAM)." In VI CONGRESSO INTERNACIONAL DAS LICENCIATURAS. Instituto Internacional Despertando Vocações, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.31692/2358-9728.vicointerpdvl.2019.0093.
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